Macedonian cavalry success against close order infantry

[Imperial Dave]

 

One problem that practically everyone encounters in staging Chaeronea is that practically every rules set in existence gives Macedonian Companions a hard time frontally against hoplites and spear types generally.  While this is really a subject for separate discussion, from repeated examples of Macedonian cavalry penetrating lines of opposing spearmen (Granicus, Issus - they also went through some at Gaugamela, but in flank) I conclude that a Macedonian cavalry wedge could go through frontally-facing hoplite infantry like a knife through steak (some steaks are of course tougher than others, and Alex seems to have got temporarily stuck in the opposing hoplites at the Granicus).

If rules sets instead allowed Companions to be superior to hoplites in frontal combat, then on Alexander's flank Chaeronea could run exactly as the sources say it ran, even with him on horseback.

As per the quote and thanks to Patrick for the prompt, any thoughts as to the whys and the wherefores of Macedonian cavalry success (especially frontally) against close order infantry? This is of particular interest to me as I am building up my Macedonian forces in 15mm to the point where I now have 400+ figures painted and based 

[Patrick Waterson]

I shall let someone run through the usual thinking first, and the reasons for it.

[Imperial Dave]

Well I will have a stab at the counter argument in that conventional thinking says that cavalry will not charge home against formed close infantry presenting spears. Does this mean that the Macedonian (and I presume Companion) cavalry had an effect, not present in other cavalry charges, that accounts for their success? Or are the accounts somewhat "poetic" in description of the charge delivery even if the outcome is the same? Or is it just a case that the Macedonian cavalry managed to instill panic in their opponents in all of the major engagements described such that their (the receiving infantry) cohesion wavered and or broke before contact?

[Duncan Head]

What Macedonian cavalry success frontally against close order infantry?

At Chaironeia, cavalry aren't mentioned.

At Graneikos, the defeat of the surrounded mercenaries a was achieved jointly by the cavalry and the infantry; but "leading the phalanx against these, and ordering the cavalry to fall upon them from all sides, he soon completely surrounded them and cut them up" - there is no indication that the cavalry broke through frontally.

At Issos, we simply don't know what Persian troops Alexander and the Companions broke through - the controversy about whether the Persian kardakes were hoplites or peltasts is well known. We have one source saying the kardakes were hoplites, another mentioning peltasts, personally I suspect there were some of each - but we don't know that Alexander broke through heavy or close-order infantry.

At Gaugamela there were a few heavy infantry near Darius, and the Companions had to go either through or round them, but we don't know which, and if they went through them then, as Patrick said, it was presumably from the flank.

So I suspect this thread may be a red herring.

[Imperial Dave]

Fair and clear points Duncan, which reinforces (for me) my stereo-typical view of cavalry against close order infantry.

Tha Kardakes armament and modus operandi is admitedly a mish-mash of (to me) confusion. However, peltast style Kardakes would presumably fit the bill of being more of an easier route through for the cavalry.

I hate red herrings and especially if its a thread I started!   

[Patrick Waterson]

Let us begin with Chaeronea.  The principal source is Plutarch, and what good old Lucius Mnestrius (yes, if you had a name like that you would probably want to be known to posterity as 'Plutarch') says is:

" He was also present at Chaeroneia and took part in the battle against the Greeks, and he is said to have been the first to break the ranks of the Sacred Band of the Thebans."

In the Greek, this is 'protos ensisei', which means the first to attack, first to drive into or first to damage, shake, jar, rush upon or attack.  To me this reads as if he is at the tip of a wedge.  Since Macedonian cavalry used wedges and their infantry did not, this implies to me that he was leading cavalry.

The Sacred Band were famous for dying at Chaeronea "with all their wounds in front", so the logic goes thus:

1) Alexander is first into the Theban lines

2) Alexander is therefore at the tip of a wedge

3) Alexander is therefore leading cavalry

4) The Theban Sacred Band is wiped out, taking all their wounds in front

5) Therefore they were overcome frontally by Alexander's cavalry.

This may not be crystal clear or firm to the reader, so in order to validate the idea that Macedonian cavalry could overcome spearmen (and specifically hoplites) frontally, we have to look at their frontal actions against such troop types in other engagements, notably the Granicus and Issus.  I leave aside Gaugamela because Alexander seems to have struck that particular contingent in flank, and while turning to face may not have been beyond their capabilities, they are not known to have done so.

The Granicus
The Greek mercenaries, who were predominantly hoplites, were surrounded at the close of the action and refused quarter as 'traitors to Greece'.  Then we have the following two accounts of what happened next.

"The enemy, however, did not resist vigorously, nor for a long time, but fled in a rout, all except the Greek mercenaries. These made a stand at a certain eminence, and asked that Alexander should promise them quarter. [7] But he, influenced by anger more than by reason, charged foremost upon them and lost his horse, which was smitten through the ribs with a sword (it was not Bucephalas, but another); and most of the Macedonians who were slain or wounded fought or fell there, since they came to close quarters with men who knew how to fight and were desperate."

Plutarch, Life of Alexander, 16.6-7

"Ordering a combined assault by infantry and cavalry [kai toutois ten de phalagga epagagōn kai tous hippeas pantē prospesein keleusas en mesō di' oligou katakoptei autous] Alexander quickly had them surrounded and butchered to a man."

(Arrian, Anabasis of Alexander, I.16.2)

I have put one particular phrase in bold, because it is for some reason omitted from most translations: en mesō di' oligou katakoptei autous.  It means: he himself cut his way almost into the middle.

Arrian and Plutarch thus agree on a Macedonian cavalry charge led by Alexander into the hoplite formation.  One can surmise that if he 'charged foremost upon them' he did so frontally, not from a flank (which might anyway have been difficult if they had adopted an all-round defence).

Issus

At Issos, we simply don't know what Persian troops Alexander and the Companions broke through - the controversy about whether the Persian kardakes were hoplites or peltasts is well known. We have one source saying the kardakes were hoplites, another mentioning peltasts, personally I suspect there were some of each - but we don't know that Alexander broke through heavy or close-order infantry.

At Issus the Companions frontally charged and broke through picked Persian infantry across a (shallow) river.  Actually the question about whether Kardakes were peltasts or hoplites can probably be answered with the word neither*, but if they were hoplites then Alexander broke clean through them; if they were peltasts they had no business holding a frontage in a role for which heavy/close order infantry would have been required.  Whatever type of infantry they were, the Companions went through them frontally like a dose of salts.

*I have a theory that they were traditional Persian close-order infantry with bow, shield and spear.

In the same battle Alexander also led the Companions into a flank attack on the main body of Greek mercenaries; we can perhaps assume that they did not manage to change facing before he was upon them.

What we observe in these battles (and at Gaugamela where once again Macedonian cavalry ride down Greek hoplites, this time from the flank) is the confidence and effectiveness with which Companions charge into infantry, and in at least some cases specifically hoplite, formations from the front.  We never hear of Companions being repulsed by any infantry, hoplite or otherwise.  For me, this is enough to suggest that Companions (and perhaps other xyston-armed, wedge-fighting cavalry) were able to defeat spear-armed infantry frontally.

If this was indeed the case, it would give yet another reason for the Macedonian infantry to use the sarissa (pike) rather than the traditional doru (spear).  It also raises the interesting possibility that 'sarissaphoroi' among the Macedonian cavalry actually used sarissas in order to outreach opponents with longer spears or even pikes, but that is just conjectural possibility.

[Erpingham]

Arrian and Plutarch thus agree on a Macedonian cavalry charge led by Alexander into the hoplite formation.  One can surmise that if he 'charged foremost upon them' he did so frontally, not from a flank (which might anyway have been difficult if they had adopted an all-round defence).

Just on the basis of the information provided, I think this is a bit of a stretch.  The initial attempt seems to have failed, then a more deliberate combined approach is used, then finally Alexander smashes the formation.  By the point he breaks into the centre, it is probably on its last legs, so less of a test of cavalry skill that a fresh, fully formed unit.  Also, if some suggest he may have led an infantry attack on the Sacred Band (which was news to me because I haven't read any recent Alexander stuff) what is to stop him having dismounted here to lead an assault?

[Jim Webster]

Let us begin with Chaeronea.  The principal source is Plutarch, and what good old Lucius Mnestrius (yes, if you had a name like that you would probably want to be known to posterity as 'Plutarch') says is:

" He was also present at Chaeroneia and took part in the battle against the Greeks, and he is said to have been the first to break the ranks of the Sacred Band of the Thebans."

In the Greek, this is 'protos ensisei', which means the first to attack, first to drive into or first to damage, shake, jar, rush upon or attack.  To me this reads as if he is at the tip of a wedge.  Since Macedonian cavalry used wedges and their infantry did not, this implies to me that he was leading cavalry.

But surely the same phrase could mean 'he was the first general who's men broke the ranks of the Theban sacred band'.

A general can 'break the enemy ranks' without having to do it in person. He gets the credit even if he merely gives the order because it is assumed that his genius made it happen.

Jim

[Duncan Head]

Let us begin with Chaeronea.  The principal source is Plutarch ... In the Greek, this is 'protos ensisei', which means the first to attack, first to drive into or first to damage, shake, jar, rush upon or attack.  To me this reads as if he is at the tip of a wedge.  Since Macedonian cavalry used wedges and their infantry did not, this implies to me that he was leading cavalry.

The same Plutarch, in the life of Pelopidas, says: "It is said, moreover, that the Band was never beaten, until the battle of Chaeroneia; and when, after the battle, Philip was surveying the dead, and stopped at the place where the three hundred were lying, all where they had faced the sarisai, with their armour, and mingled one with another, he was amazed...". So the Sacred Band were slain by the sarisai, the weapon of the Macedonian phalanx. That much is reasonably clear.

Hammond, IIRC, combined this and Alexander's charge to suggest that the Thebans were held frontally by the phalanx and Alexander's cavalry charged through a gap into their flank; this is a bit speculative. Again IIRC, the suggestion of a phalanx attack is one of the planks of Buckler's theory that we have no evidence for cavalry involvement at all. That Alexander was the first to break the Theban ranks does not prevent his being on foot: even in a line, someone can break through first. The narrative you get from lookiing at both Plutarch passages is, at best, very ambiguous indeed; but without the preconception that Alexander was leading cavalry, it looks as if he led a phalanx attack.

The Granicus...."But he, influenced by anger more than by reason, charged foremost upon them and lost his horse, which was smitten through the ribs with a sword" ...
I have put one particular phrase in bold, because it is for some reason omitted from most translations: en mesō di' oligou katakoptei autous.  It means: he himself cut his way almost into the middle".

Before or after his horse was killed?

LSJ suggests that while oligou dein or oligou on its own may mean "almost", di'oligou is more like "at a short distance" or "for a short time". So something more like "he cut his way a short distance into them"? Combining the two passages suggests that Alexander did indeed charge, whether into the Greek front or into a flank - though "influenced by anger more than by reason", which suggests that he was perceived as acting rashly rather than in pursuance of the standard Macedonian tactical doctrine - but that he only got a little way into the Greek formation before being unhorsed. 

At Issus the Companions frontally charged and broke through picked Persian infantry

I don't think anyone describes them as "picked".

across a (shallow) river.  Actually the question about whether Kardakes were peltasts or hoplites can probably be answered with the word neither*, but if they were hoplites then Alexander broke clean through them; if they were peltasts they had no business holding a frontage in a role for which heavy/close order infantry would have been required.  Whatever type of infantry they were, the Companions went through them frontally like a dose of salts.

But if they weren't hoplites, they have no real bearing on the question. Even Tissaphernes' lot at Kounaxa could ride through peltasts.

*I have a theory that they were traditional Persian close-order infantry with bow, shield and spear.

I believed something similar once - hence my reconstruction in AMPW, and an article in Slingshot probably somewhen around 1981 - but no more. I now reconcile Arrian/Ptolemy's "the kardakes are hoplites" with Kallisthenes/Polybios' "peltasts" by way of Curtius' list of units to suggest that both troop-types were present.

What we observe in these battles (and at Gaugamela where once again Macedonian cavalry ride down Greek hoplites, this time from the flank) is the confidence and effectiveness with which Companions charge into infantry, and in at least some cases specifically hoplite, formations from the front.  We never hear of Companions being repulsed by any infantry, hoplite or otherwise.  For me, this is enough to suggest that Companions (and perhaps other xyston-armed, wedge-fighting cavalry) were able to defeat spear-armed infantry frontally.

At Chaironeia, the decisive blow was clearly a phalanx attack. At Graneikos, the cavalry part of the combined assault seems to have had very limited success. At Issos, which is the best example for Patrick's case, the most we can say is that Alexander's cavalry broke through some infantry of uncertain type. Yes, the Companions were confident and prepared to charge infantry, but there is no unambiguous example of their charging heavy infantry from the front and winning.

[Justin Swanton]

The notion of Macedonian companions cracking through formed heavy infantry, especially hoplite infantry, has always intrigued me. Let me grab my popcorn and get comfortable...

[aligern]

Someone pointed out the confusion within the evidence here. The sources we have are not trying to tell us whether Alexander and his companions charged into a hoplite formation frontally despite Oatrick's elaborate chain of supposition. they are generally saying that the Macedonians attacked someone , Alexander was involved and the target was beaten. Even where we can reasonably surmise that the attackers are cavakry we are not told that a frontal charge to contact was made.
Cavalry have a repertoire of ways of. dealing with infantry.
1) They can charge them frntally, crack in and hope that theycan overwhelm the oppsing spear line. That would take a lot of courage and willingness to lose expensive trained men and riders. Goths can't do it, Sarmatians don't do it, Parthian cataphracts do not do this.

2) They can charge towards them, continuing if the infantry flinch and waver enough to indicate they will run, but turning aside if they do not and coming back to try again.
3) They can use associated missile men to create a hole in the infantry line and then break in. Once the line is broken the cavalry are through because they close so quickly.
4) They can ride up to the infantry and hack slash and poke at them until they create a gap in the line. Because the cavalry can hold back units on either flank in reserve they can prevent the infantry coming forward andcan so localise the point of melee. By rotating smsll units into the fray the cavalry can wear down the infantry at the point of contact until a charging unit can break through.
5) They can use their own missiles to concentrate on a sector of line, weaken it and then break through.

The cavalry can use these different techniques according to the situation. At Hastings it is a combination of 3and 4. With their long xyston I would think that 4 was particularly appropriate for the Companions,  reverting to 2 when the opponent looked  degraded enough.

Being very tired is generally a precursor to losing. When infantry become exhausted they are probably easy meat for a cavalry charge. At the end if a battle keeping cavalry out would difficult for highly stressed men who have already fought for a long time against say other infantry.
Roy

[Andreas Johansson]

5) They can use their own missiles to concentrate on a sector of line, weaken it and then break through.

Did the Companions have their own missiles? I was of the impression the carried only lances/spears and swords.

[Patrick Waterson]

Also, if some suggest he may have led an infantry attack on the Sacred Band (which was news to me because I haven't read any recent Alexander stuff) what is to stop him having dismounted here to lead an assault?

The fact that he had a horse killed under him?  Incidentally, I do not see in our sources any mention of a failed initial assault followed by a more deliberate combined arms one.

But surely the same phrase could mean 'he was the first general who's men broke the ranks of the Theban sacred band'.

I wondered about that, but the Greek seems to have the sense of immediate combat not abstract achievement.

The same Plutarch, in the life of Pelopidas, says: "It is said, moreover, that the Band was never beaten, until the battle of Chaeroneia; and when, after the battle, Philip was surveying the dead, and stopped at the place where the three hundred were lying, all where they had faced the sarisai, with their armour, and mingled one with another, he was amazed...". So the Sacred Band were slain by the sarisai, the weapon of the Macedonian phalanx. That much is reasonably clear.

Again, this is what I used to think until I began to wonder if Plutarch specifically means the infantry sarissa.  In Plutarch's Alexander (68.4) Alexander slays Abuletes, son of Oxyathres, with a sarisa (one would expect him to use a xyston), and in 67.2, when the army is having a 'Bacchic march' Plutarch remarks that 'not a shield (pelta) nor helmet (kranos) nor spear (sarisa) was to be seen'.  The focus of this comment seems to be upon Alexander and his Companions, although it could be a generalised comment applied to the whole army, but in such a case I would expected 'aspis' rather than 'pelta' as the generic word for shield.  He has Alexander bear a xyston at Gaugamela but this is the only mention of the weapon other than when he has Cleitus use one to strike down Rhoesaces at the Granicus (where incidentally Plutarch has Alexander carrying a 'pelta' which seems to tie in with 67.2).

All things considered, I do not think we can draw the conclusion that the Sacred Band were slain by Macedonian infantry, particularly not on the basis of the word 'sarisais', which Plutarch may be using (as apparently in Alexander 67.2) to mean cavalry lances.  For Alexander to be leading and fighting in an infantry formation at Chaeronea seems to run counter to what we know of Macedonian practice - if anyone was to fight with the infantry, it seems to have been daddy, not junior - vide Antigonus and Demetrius at Ipsus.

The Granicus...."But he, influenced by anger more than by reason, charged foremost upon them and lost his horse, which was smitten through the ribs with a sword" ...
I have put one particular phrase in bold, because it is for some reason omitted from most translations: en mesō di' oligou katakoptei autous.  It means: he himself cut his way almost into the middle".

Before or after his horse was killed?

Before.

LSJ suggests that while oligou dein or oligou on its own may mean "almost", di'oligou is more like "at a short distance" or "for a short time". So something more like "he cut his way a short distance into them"? Combining the two passages suggests that Alexander did indeed charge, whether into the Greek front or into a flank - though "influenced by anger more than by reason", which suggests that he was perceived as acting rashly rather than in pursuance of the standard Macedonian tactical doctrine - but that he only got a little way into the Greek formation before being unhorsed. 

This is quite possible, and I may have misunderstood di'oligou as oligou dein, so he does not get very far into the middle of the mercenary formation.  I doubt however that Alexander would, even if acting rashly, be able to change Macedonian tactical doctrine on the spot: his 'anger' I read as emotive commitment against the 'traitors to Greece', and Plutarch is reproving him for losing men in a fight that was basically unnecessary.  I know of no case where his actual tactical judgement was clouded by his emotions, including this one.

There may be a good reason why he would not have got far.  The mercenaries were surrounded, and presumably under attack from all sides.  This would have pressed them together without fall-back room, and while this would have increased their losses it would also have meant that Alexander's cavalry could not bounce them back, and hence progress would be stopped rather than the momentum continuing.

He does however penetrate a formation of hoplites with Companions in a frontal charge, which is the point that grabbed my interest.

At Issus the Companions frontally charged and broke through picked Persian infantry

I don't think anyone describes them as "picked".

They do seem to have been the best infantry on the Persian side, so I am happy to substitute that wording.

But if they weren't hoplites, they have no real bearing on the question. Even Tissaphernes' lot at Kounaxa could ride through peltasts.

But they were let through a gap.  To develop the point, anyone can ride through a gap.    And the choice is not necessarily either hoplites or peltasts.

*I have a theory that they were traditional Persian close-order infantry with bow, shield and spear.

I believed something similar once - hence my reconstruction in AMPW, and an article in Slingshot probably somewhen around 1981 - but no more. I now reconcile Arrian/Ptolemy's "the kardakes are hoplites" with Kallisthenes/Polybios' "peltasts" by way of Curtius' list of units to suggest that both troop-types were present.

Your earlier belief may in fact be correct.  Arrian (II.10.3) gives the impression they were archers, which fits neither hoplites nor peltasts but accords with the traditional Persian infantry armament mix.

At Chaironeia, the decisive blow was clearly a phalanx attack.

For reasons given above, I think not.

At Graneikos, the cavalry part of the combined assault seems to have had very limited success.

But it nevertheless penetrated a hoplite formation from the front, even if only a little way.

At Issos, which is the best example for Patrick's case, the most we can say is that Alexander's cavalry broke through some infantry of uncertain type. Yes, the Companions were confident and prepared to charge infantry, but there is no unambiguous example of their charging heavy infantry from the front and winning.

We have however established that they do charge heavy infantry, and do so frontally.  There is also no case of their charging heavy infantry and losing.  While one may question individual instances and the assumptions behind them (and few if any do this better than Duncan), there is a consistent pattern of Macedonian cavalry charging heavy infantry frontally and clearly not losing.   At the Granicus Alexander charges mounted against hoplites and makes his way into the formation without anyone specifically noting that this is unusual or contrary to doctrine.  At Issus, he charges Kardakes, whose nature may be debateable but whose permeability to Macedonian cavalry is not.  And at Chaeronea the sole argument against his charging the Sacred Band frontally with cavalry rests on a single word which the same writer appears to use in his Life of Alexander to signify a Macedonian cavalry lance.

[Erpingham]

The fact that he had a horse killed under him?

Which would not preclude him leading a subsequent infantry assault.

Incidentally, I do not see in our sources any mention of a failed initial assault followed by a more deliberate combined arms one.

I am going by the two you provided, as I am entirely inexpert.  The Plutarch quote in particular sounds like something that might have lasted some time.  While it doesn't stop the whole Macedonian army charging in at one go, it doesn't seem to be the only explanation.  And for avoidance of doubt, I'm not saying Alexander didn't lead cavalry assaults in both battles, just that the evidence does not look unchallengeable.

On the wider point, I agree we have good evidence that the Companions were a confident bunch confident to tangle with formed infantry.  But the thread title mentions success, and this is harder to be certain of. Did later successor companions have a track record of success against infantry, or do we think this is the "Alexander touch"?

[Duncan Head]

5) They can use their own missiles to concentrate on a sector of line, weaken it and then break through.

Did the Companions have their own missiles? I was of the impression the carried only lances/spears and swords.

They almost certainly owned javelins, or at least throwing-spears, as traditional hunting-weapons. However there are few references to them using such weapons in battle. Possibly the only one is in Arrian, Book I, the battle against the Triballians at the Lyginus:

But when Alexander had drawn them thus out of the woody glen, he ordered Philotas to take the cavalry which came from upper Macedonia, and to charge their right wing, where they had advanced furthest in their sally. He also commanded Heraclides and Sopolis to lead on the cavalry which came from Bottiaea and Amphipplis against the left wing; while he himself extended the phalanx of infantry and the rest of the horse in front of the phalanx and led them against the enemy's centre. And indeed as long as there was only skirmishing on both sides, the Triballians did not get the worst of it ; but as soon as the phalanx in dense array attacked them with vigour, and the cavalry fell upon them in various quarters, no longer merely striking them with the javelin, but pushing them with their very horses, then at length they turned and fled through the. woody glen to the river.