Macedonian cavalry success against close order infantry

[Justin Swanton]

Since the hoplite system works on straight files, the gaps between the files are natural corridors through which a thousand-pound horse can push its way unless something more substantial than a human body can stop it. Bearing in mind the leading horseman will be through in seconds - about 2 seconds for a line 6 deep and 4 seconds for a line 12 deep - the Sacred Band would have had no time at all to react.

I'm afraid this just has to be wrong
Or there is no way infantry would ever have stood against cavalry.
Given that infantry did stand against cavalry I think we can assume that it wasn't perhaps that easy

Jim

This is Macedonian cavalry, well-trained and armed with long lances, against infantry whose spears were shorter and - more importantly - who had no training to counter the wedge.

It took a while for the world to figure out how to counter massed tank assaults. Compare France 1940 to Kursk 1943. 

[Justin Swanton]

In devising the Macedonian phalanx, Philip made sure nobody tried the same trick on him. 

If I were Philip and my cavalry could destroy elite hoplites in less than 5 seconds, I wouldn't have bothered devising a phalanx

A wedge can effectively hit only a narrow frontage. You can't take out an entire army with it. Strictly-speaking, I should have given the wedge in my diagrams more rear ranks. I'm guessing too it wasn't a perfect triangle. The back two corners would have been chopped short so as not to leave a lone horseman having to punch his way without support through the enemy ranks.

[Jim Webster]

Since the hoplite system works on straight files, the gaps between the files are natural corridors through which a thousand-pound horse can push its way unless something more substantial than a human body can stop it. Bearing in mind the leading horseman will be through in seconds - about 2 seconds for a line 6 deep and 4 seconds for a line 12 deep - the Sacred Band would have had no time at all to react.

I'm afraid this just has to be wrong
Or there is no way infantry would ever have stood against cavalry.
Given that infantry did stand against cavalry I think we can assume that it wasn't perhaps that easy

Jim

This is Macedonian cavalry, well-trained and armed with long lances, against infantry whose spears were shorter and - more importantly - who had no training to counter the wedge.

It took a while for the world to figure out how to counter massed tank assaults. Compare France 1940 to Kursk 1943. 

All sorts of people had been using cavalry wedges, it was mentioned earlier in this thread. Also in your description you don't need a lance.
You said "Since the hoplite system works on straight files, the gaps between the files are natural corridors through which a thousand-pound horse can push its way unless something more substantial than a human body can stop it."
A dead horse moving at speed can travel 30 yards, (this they discovered in the Napoleonic period) so all you need do is get your horse into a gallop and even if a front rank spear kills it, it'll still travel down the gaps between the files bowling the infantry over.

This would have happened for the Assyrians, the Medes, the Persians and everybody else. It didn't therefore I would suggest your mechanism is wrong

Jim

[Jim Webster]

In devising the Macedonian phalanx, Philip made sure nobody tried the same trick on him. 

If I were Philip and my cavalry could destroy elite hoplites in less than 5 seconds, I wouldn't have bothered devising a phalanx

A wedge can effectively hit only a narrow frontage. You can't take out an entire army with it. Strictly-speaking, I should have given the wedge in my diagrams more rear ranks. I'm guessing too it wasn't a perfect triangle. The back two corners would have been chopped short so as not to leave a lone horseman having to punch his way without support through the enemy ranks.

Hoplite armies didn't have reserves, this is well known. Why the hell did Philip bother with a phalanx. All he had to do was launch his companions anywhere at the enemy line (because the Theban sacred band would be the toughest bit, anywhere else would actually have been better.)

The lead wedge would have poured through the Hoplite line, other units would have poured through the gap and spread out behind hitting the Greeks from the rear whilst the Phalangites just applauded, threw bouquets and looked menacing enough so that the Hoplites dare not turn their backs on them to deal with the Companions now rampaging about their rear echelon. (not that they could deal with them because any hoplite unit that did face off the companions would just be ridden through automatically, )

So the real question is why the hell did Philip bother rearming his infantry. He could have saved the money on them, kept them as javelin throwing irregulars and the money saved could have gone into more infantry busting cavalry units
Jim

[Justin Swanton]

All sorts of people had been using cavalry wedges, it was mentioned earlier in this thread. Also in your description you don't need a lance.
You said "Since the hoplite system works on straight files, the gaps between the files are natural corridors through which a thousand-pound horse can push its way unless something more substantial than a human body can stop it."
A dead horse moving at speed can travel 30 yards, (this they discovered in the Napoleonic period) so all you need do is get your horse into a gallop and even if a front rank spear kills it, it'll still travel down the gaps between the files bowling the infantry over.

This would have happened for the Assyrians, the Medes, the Persians and everybody else. It didn't therefore I would suggest your mechanism is wrong

You need a lance to cow the infantry into a protective defensive posture, enabling you to push through them without becoming a pincushion.

If cavalry are not trained to execute this surgical file-slicing with precision, then horses would barge frontally into footmen and be stopped by them. Stop one horse and all the remaining horses of the file stop as well. Stop enough front horses and the wedge disintegrates, the stopped horsemen themselves becoming targets for the infantry around them.

Why didn't Assyrians, Medes, Persians, et al try this? Perhaps simply because no-one thought of it. (they didn't think of hoplite infantry either). Why didn't cavalry armies after Macedonia try it? Because the Macedonian phalanx was an effective countermeasure, making the tactic obsolete, and by the time one got to Rome it had been forgotten.

My understanding of the history of tactics and formation is that good ideas often get forgotten. How long did it take Mediaeval Europe to figure out that pike was the right way to oppose heavy cavalry?

[Justin Swanton]

Hoplite armies didn't have reserves, this is well known. Why the hell did Philip bother with a phalanx. All he had to do was launch his companions anywhere at the enemy line (because the Theban sacred band would be the toughest bit, anywhere else would actually have been better.)

The lead wedge would have poured through the Hoplite line, other units would have poured through the gap and spread out behind hitting the Greeks from the rear whilst the Phalangites just applauded, threw bouquets and looked menacing enough so that the Hoplites dare not turn their backs on them to deal with the Companions now rampaging about their rear echelon. (not that they could deal with them because any hoplite unit that did face off the companions would just be ridden through automatically, )

So the real question is why the hell did Philip bother rearming his infantry. He could have saved the money on them, kept them as javelin throwing irregulars and the money saved could have gone into more infantry busting cavalry units
Jim

The principal reason is that the Companions have lost most of their lances in the first pass, and are not able either to intimidate or take out infantry a second time round. Even if the horsemen punch a hole through the centre of the line, there is still need of good infantry to follow up - not only to exploit the hole but to successfully engage the portions of the line that are still intact. Javelin-throwing irregulars just don't cut it.

Other reasons: the skill needed for this wedge tactic to work was considerable. It would require superlative horsemanship combined with an excellent handling of a long lance. It was not something everyone could do. I also suspect (thinking on the fly) that surprise was an important element of success. Once the Greek commander realised his infantry were being frontally assaulted by cavalry, he would order them to close up (18" between each man of a file), making them too compact to be pushed aside by the horses. There would then be real danger of the wedge grinding to a halt, which is what seems to have happened at the Granicus.

[Jim Webster]

But you've pointed out the weakness in your own argument

1) From your explanation it's the horse not the spear that's the important bit, from the various discussions on this thread the infantry spear might well have hit the horse before the horseman's spear hit the infantryman. Remember I think it was Duncan who commented that there is no evidence for Companions using Sarissa
2) It had been forgotten by the Roman period? And there's those Parthians with all those cataphracts armed with kontos and dripping with armour, and it never occured to them that they could just ride down the gaps between the files and scatter Roman infantry instead of sitting watching the horsearchers shoot for hours on end. It's a pity all these Parthian monarchs who called themselves 'Philhellene' didn't actually read any Greek histories because then they'd have known.

Jim

[Justin Swanton]

Not quite sure how I have?

1. Both horse and spear are important. Without the spear the hoplites will be able and willing to have a go at jabbing the horseman. With the spear aimed at them they are more likely to duck or raise their shields. With the horse one can push between hoplites and penetrate right through their formation.

2. My impression of cataphracts dripping with armour is that they had been originally conceived to deal with phalangites, i.e. they formed up in close order and frontally rammed an infantry line, ignoring pikes and jabbing the footmen with their kontos. Nothing that required subtlety or training which was not the Parthians' strong point. They were not in the league of Macedonia's professionalism, if I'm not mistaken.

If the Greek histories described exactly how a wedge worked would we be having this discussion?

[Jim Webster]

Exactly, the Greeks described the wedge but none of them ever noticed it was any use in riding down infantry, even those writing after Alexander
Strange that
Jim

[Justin Swanton]

Because - after Alexander - it wasn't? 

[Jim Webster]

Because - after Alexander - it wasn't? 

Why not, the Successors were leading the same men, there were still Hoplites or even easier meat Thureophoroi, and Pyrrhus lead his men against legionaries, they should have been a doddle to ride down, most of them didn't have long spears

Jim

[Duncan Head]

Exactly, the Greeks described the wedge but none of them ever noticed it was any use in riding down infantry, even those writing after Alexander

Clarification: The Greek historians don't mention Macedonian cavalry using wedges, not even when describing the campaigns of Philip and Alexander. Not that they describe any other formation, either.

The Greek tacticians describe the wedge, saying that the Macedonians used it, and saying that it was the best formation for breaking through an enemy formation - not distinguishing enemy infantry from cavalry:

It is said that the Scythians and Thracians invented the wedge formation, and that later the Macedonians used it, since they considered it more practical than the square formation; for the front of the wedge formation is narrow, as in the rhomboid, and only one‑half as wide, and this made it easiest for them to break through, as well as brought the leaders in front of the rest, while wheeling was thus easier than in the square formation...

Don't read too much into some very patchy evidence.

[Erpingham]

Exactly, the Greeks described the wedge but none of them ever noticed it was any use in riding down infantry, even those writing after Alexander

Clarification: The Greek historians don't mention Macedonian cavalry using wedges, not even when describing the campaigns of Philip and Alexander. Not that they describe any other formation, either.

The Greek tacticians describe the wedge, saying that the Macedonians used it, and saying that it was the best formation for breaking through an enemy formation - not distinguishing enemy infantry from cavalry:

It is said that the Scythians and Thracians invented the wedge formation, and that later the Macedonians used it, since they considered it more practical than the square formation; for the front of the wedge formation is narrow, as in the rhomboid, and only one‑half as wide, and this made it easiest for them to break through, as well as brought the leaders in front of the rest, while wheeling was thus easier than in the square formation...

Don't read too much into some very patchy evidence.

In an earlier post, I noted that Richard Gabriel in his advocacy of the Macedonian cavalry wedge as an anti-hoplite formation says Arrian states Philip II adopted the formation specifically to fight infantry.  I followed this up using the wonders of Google books and he is referencing here Arrian's Tactica 16.7 ff, if anyone wishes to look it up.  He has taken the quote in his text from Minor Markle "The Macedonian Sarissa, Spear, and Related Armor" AJA 81 (1977) (Isn't that a great name?).  Doubtless these works are known to the Hellenic specialists here.  Is Arrian really specific about Philip II adopting th wedge as an anti-infantry formation?

[Justin Swanton]

Presuming that a cavalry formation could penetrate hoplite infantry in the manner I suggested earlier, it becomes clear why the cavalry formation had to be a wedge and not a line. There are two reasons.

The first is aim. For it to work, the cavalry files had to target the space between every other infantry file, as smashing head-on into infantry would in all likelihood stop the horses. Hence it was crucial for each file leader to hit exactly the right spot. This meant one file leader had to be ahead of the others, directing them. He would hit the infantry first. This gave the leaders of the two cavalry files next to him their cue and the time to nudge their horses into the space two infantry files along, which in turn gave the next file leaders the chance to nudge their horses towards the next correct file spaces, and so on. If the cavalry had attacked in a line there would be no lead to follow; the cavalry would hit the infantry at a random point with potentially disastrous results.

The second reason is space. For the wedge tactic to work as described, the leading horsemen must be able to shunt aside infantry on either side of the space between the infantry files, widening it so a file of horse could pass through easily. If a line of horses hits the file spaces at the same time, the infantry in adjacent files are pushed toward each other, colliding and possibly obstructing the creation of the passageway for the horses. However in the case of a wedge, a file leader is always able to push infantry away on one side easily, as the next cavalry file on that side is still behind him. Corridors are cleared and the cavalry can push through without trouble.

Thus endeth the hypothesis. Now let me get my shield up...

[Patrick Waterson]

In an earlier post, I noted that Richard Gabriel in his advocacy of the Macedonian cavalry wedge as an anti-hoplite formation says Arrian states Philip II adopted the formation specifically to fight infantry.  I followed this up using the wonders of Google books and he is referencing here Arrian's Tactica 16.7 ff, if anyone wishes to look it up.  He has taken the quote in his text from Minor Markle "The Macedonian Sarissa, Spear, and Related Armor" AJA 81 (1977) (Isn't that a great name?).  Doubtless these works are known to the Hellenic specialists here.  Is Arrian really specific about Philip II adopting the wedge as an anti-infantry formation?

I shall have to give the Greek a good going through at some point.  Exact details are not obvious (with my level of Greek) from a casual scan through.  Interesting that the subject has come up before.

Exactly, the Greeks described the wedge but none of them ever noticed it was any use in riding down infantry, even those writing after Alexander
Strange that
Jim

A bit more precision would be helpful.  The generic wedge was useful for manoeuvre, but until the Macedonians added long weapons it does not seem to have been used for penetrating hoplite formations.  Greek historians had few chances to notice the effects of Macedonian cavalry on hoplites before Macedonian supremacy became a fact of life - they seem not to have given much attention to the Sacred War, and Greek (other than Phocians) did not face Macedonians in open battle until Chaeronea in 338 BC.  After Chaeronea we have the Spartan campaign in 331 BC and that is usually mentioned in passing without any details.

Hoplite armies didn't have reserves, this is well known. Why the hell did Philip bother with a phalanx. All he had to do was launch his companions anywhere at the enemy line (because the Theban sacred band would be the toughest bit, anywhere else would actually have been better.)

The lead wedge would have poured through the Hoplite line, other units would have poured through the gap and spread out behind hitting the Greeks from the rear whilst the Phalangites just applauded, threw bouquets and looked menacing enough so that the Hoplites dare not turn their backs on them to deal with the Companions now rampaging about their rear echelon. (not that they could deal with them because any hoplite unit that did face off the companions would just be ridden through automatically, )

So the real question is why the hell did Philip bother rearming his infantry. He could have saved the money on them, kept them as javelin throwing irregulars and the money saved could have gone into more infantry busting cavalry units

Macedonian infantry were unremarkable until rearmed, and more to the point not recorded as being able to stand up to hoplites.  After rearming they were well capable of dealing with hoplites.  Since they constituted a small percentage of the army - 2,000 of 32, 000 at Chaeronea or about 6% - the other 94% of the army needed to hold their own against the rather large part of the opposing army that could not be burst through at the outset.