Macedonian cavalry success against close order infantry

[Duncan Head]

In an earlier post, I noted that Richard Gabriel in his advocacy of the Macedonian cavalry wedge as an anti-hoplite formation says Arrian states Philip II adopted the formation specifically to fight infantry.  I followed this up using the wonders of Google books and he is referencing here Arrian's Tactica 16.7 ff, if anyone wishes to look it up.  He has taken the quote in his text from Minor Markle "The Macedonian Sarissa, Spear, and Related Armor" AJA 81 (1977) (Isn't that a great name?).  Doubtless these works are known to the Hellenic specialists here.  Is Arrian really specific about Philip II adopting the wedge as an anti-infantry formation?

Briefly - no, he doesn't. Arrian says that Philip taught the Macedonians to use this formation (taxis). He also says that the wedge is the best formation to use for breaking through an enemy taxis. He doesn't say that is why Philip adopted wedge, nor does he specify that it was used for breaking through infantry formations.

[Erpingham]

Thanks Duncan.  From your earlier remarks I suspected as much.  I suspect from the text that Gabriel has taken Markle at his word, perhaps unable to check the Greek for himself (he appears to be a general military historical writer rather than a classicist).

So that leaves us, in the known facts, that Philip II is thought to have introduced the wedge to macedonian cavalry.  Because it isn't mentioned by historians, we don't know if it was used exclusively and we have no detailed record of how it operated.  We have no unambiguous evidence that formed hoplites were broken frontally by Macedonian cavalry.  We do know that on one occassion, cavalry were involved in the breaking of hoplites in a combined arms action.

The hypothesis presented is that Macedonian cavalry, through rearmament, new tactics (the wedge) and a high level of individual weapon skill, developed into a force capable of destroying even elite hoplites.  In particular, a theory based on aiming the wedge at the gap between two hoplite files meant that cavalry could with minimal difficulty ride through a hoplite formation, picking off hoplites with their spears.  This tactic was a surprise to hoplites, who had no time to create a counter.  The new tactics were only used during the life of Alexander, as hoplites were replaced by pike-armed phalangites.  The discontinuity meant that the new tactics were not readopted when infantry stopped being pikemen.

The counter argument is that there is no good evidence that Macedonian cavalry ever bested formed hoplites frontally and, if they did, that they used a wedge to do so.  The inter-file theory takes little or no account of any counter measures hoplites might use (even if surprised) or that they are armed, that the gap between files is less than a horse width so there would be some "friction" even if no hoplite moved or used a weapon, that riding through a formation at a trot picking of targets at will would be very difficult even in a field of dummies and that the lack of evidence of this tactic in the histories, or attempts to duplicate it, are very surprising if it really could break elite close order infantry in a matter of seconds.

Is that a reasonable summary of the argument so far?

[Jim Webster]

Seems to sum things up OK for me Anthony

When you think about we have the Sacred War where Philip had plenty of chances to ride down hoplites. Historians might not have mentioned it, but one suspects the contemporary hoplite commanders would have noticed it and pondered on it.
We have on incident at the Battle of Chaeronea where it is possible that Alexander was part of a cavalry unit that might possibly have defeated hoplites frontally.
We then have the war against Sparta in 331BC, followed by the Lamian war where cavalry fail to ride down hoplites frontally. Indeed in the Lamian war Macedonian cavalry struggle to cope with Thessalians
Finally we have the period up to the 270s BC when we think similar cavalry tactics were used, Pyrrhus used the same cavalry tactics against the Romans who weren't even all armed with long spears without any notable accounts of his cavalry defeating infantry frontally. Indeed some seem to thing that it was Pyrrhus returning from Italy who brought the idea of shielded heavy cavalry to the Hellenistic mainstream

Jim

[Justin Swanton]

Good summing up, Anthony.

The two objections to the mechanism of a wedge passing between infantry files are:

a) the friction would have stopped the horses,

b) the hoplites would have killed or incapacitated the Companions.

There is no evidence confirming a). What we really need is some mounted reenactors to attack in wedge a formation of (disposable) Russian peasants and see what happens. Visualising it, I suspect that the hoplites would instinctively try to get out of the way of the riders. Since each mounted file is 6 feet apart and the horses are not heading directly towards the footmen, that suggests the infantry would jump for the gaps between the horses. Bearing in mind they have no drill for what to do in this situation.

For b) ones needs to keep in mind that only the first two rows of a hoplite phalanx have their spears at the ready. Faced with advancing horse and riders whose lances had a greater reach, the hoplites' reaction would by-and-large be one of self-preservation: move out of the way of the horses, raise shields to guard against the lancepoints. To think about all that and about getting a spear into a horseman is rather asking a lot of the hoplite.

[Erpingham]

Visualising it, I suspect that the hoplites would instinctively try to get out of the way of the riders. Since each mounted file is 6 feet apart and the horses are not heading directly towards the footmen, that suggests the infantry would jump for the gaps between the horses. Bearing in mind they have no drill for what to do in this situation.

I think you underestimate these phalanxes.  Their whole essense is collective action.  So, I think they would have tried to brace against impact.  The front rankers might go down, but they'd either bring down the horse or slow it for others to attack it.  You really didn't get to stand in the front rank of the Sacred Band if you thought of your own safety rather than that of your comrades.  You also didn't have a victim mentality - even if Plutarch piles on the pathos after you are dead.  To paraphrase Patton, you don't win wars by dying for your country but by making some other dumb b*****d die for his.

[Justin Swanton]

Only way of confirming/refuting it is for reenactors to try it out (unless someone has some really sophisticated simulation software?).

Being trained professionals is only an advantage if your training takes into account what you are up against. The Spartans, for all their professionalism, had no answer to the Theban column and no time to devise any - they broke and ran.

Bracing would have helped the Sacred Band hoplites only if they were in close order - each man of a file pushing against the man in front. A hoplite with three feet between himself and chap behind is going to be pushed aside or knocked down by a horse, no matter what he does. I really can't see how a horse can have trouble pushing two men aside in this fashion. It's only two at a time, no problem for 1000 pounds of trained horseflesh.

Of course all this doesn't prove the Companions used a wedge to go frontally through hoplites, but it does make it at least plausible.

[Jim Webster]

Good summing up, Anthony.

The two objections to the mechanism of a wedge passing between infantry files are:

a) the friction would have stopped the horses,

b) the hoplites would have killed or incapacitated the Companions.

There is no evidence confirming a). What we really need is some mounted reenactors to attack in wedge a formation of (disposable) Russian peasants and see what happens. Visualising it, I suspect that the hoplites would instinctively try to get out of the way of the riders. Since each mounted file is 6 feet apart and the horses are not heading directly towards the footmen, that suggests the infantry would jump for the gaps between the horses. Bearing in mind they have no drill for what to do in this situation.

For b) ones needs to keep in mind that only the first two rows of a hoplite phalanx have their spears at the ready. Faced with advancing horse and riders whose lances had a greater reach, the hoplites' reaction would by-and-large be one of self-preservation: move out of the way of the horses, raise shields to guard against the lancepoints. To think about all that and about getting a spear into a horseman is rather asking a lot of the hoplite.

And hereby lies a problem
It's going to be a long project.
Firstly you don't just have to train the re-enactors, you have to train the horses. My guess is that you're probably talking about ten years for the horsemen, spending a large number of hours each week, every week on horseback. For the horses, you're probably going to have to start with unbroken horses to get them used to the different style of riding and bits.
By the time the ten years are up the re-enactors are probably up to training their own horses.

Then to get the re-enactment right you have to make sure that the re-enactors know that their horse could well die (but that they'll be paid compensation at the end of the financial year if the money holds out and we win) and that if the horse is injured then they'll have to survive on foot within spear range of a lot of vengeful infantry.
In training, just to drive this home, you could have a few practices where they were armed with poles and the 'infantry' had riot shields and baseball bats. This should remind them that it's a potentially dangerous occupation.

As for the infantry, why Russian peasants? I'd expect the phalanx to be made up of small businessmen, prosperous farmers, poets, playwrights, philosophers, pretty well all of whom are fit enough to plough an acre a day under the Greek sun.
But even with Russian Peasants and no common language I bet I could produce good hoplites in a lot shorter time, and for a far lower cost than it cost you to produce the companions.

As for instinctively running away. Why? That just guarantees that you die. One thing that all hoplites knew was that the side that ran, died. That's why they kept fighting for so long, because it was turning your back to run that was the dangerous thing to do. If the enemy behind you didn't kill you, the file closer on your own side probably would to deter others.
And that's why the file closers were chosen with care, tough veterans, the second most experienced man in the file, who knew that as long as the others kept facing forward, he was going to live.
That was one reason for Spartan success, they had a reputation for not pursuing, which meant it was safe to run away from them.
Run away from cavalry and you're dead. This isn't a new Macedonian invention, it's something the Greeks knew anyway, from the Persian wars and their own cavalry forces.

Friction doesn't stop horses. The one guy who's so bluidy minded he smashes a horse on the nose with his shield stops horses, or rips open it's thigh with his butt spike as it goes past. It's not an exercise riding through dummies, the smell of blood and screams are going to terrify the horse, especially the screams of other horses.

Jim

[Patrick Waterson]

In an earlier post, I noted that Richard Gabriel in his advocacy of the Macedonian cavalry wedge as an anti-hoplite formation says Arrian states Philip II adopted the formation specifically to fight infantry.  I followed this up using the wonders of Google books and he is referencing here Arrian's Tactica 16.7 ff, if anyone wishes to look it up.  He has taken the quote in his text from Minor Markle "The Macedonian Sarissa, Spear, and Related Armor" AJA 81 (1977) (Isn't that a great name?).  Doubtless these works are known to the Hellenic specialists here.  Is Arrian really specific about Philip II adopting the wedge as an anti-infantry formation?

Briefly - no, he doesn't. Arrian says that Philip taught the Macedonians to use this formation (taxis). He also says that the wedge is the best formation to use for breaking through an enemy taxis. He doesn't say that is why Philip adopted wedge, nor does he specify that it was used for breaking through infantry formations.

Having had a look, yes, Duncan has it correct - although for that matter Arrian does not specify that it was used against cavalry or not used against infantry.  I think Gabriel or Markle may have inferred that since the only serious cavalry formations Philip is likely to have faced would be Thessalian wedges, and a wedge is not going to be that great at cutting through a wedge, the intended use would have been against hoplite infantry, which a wedge could cut through if the cavalrymen had appropriate weapons.  Psiloi and Thracian peltastic types (which the Macedonian infantry seem to have resembled prior to re-equipment with the sarissa) were probably defeatable by standard javelin-armed heavy cavalry.

If one asks why Philip would have wanted his cavalry to cut through hoplites, the answer may lie in the context of the Sacred War, when Onomarchus of Elatea and his Phocian mercenary army were carrying all before them.  Onomarchus handed Philip two successive defeats and Philip enlisted the help of the Thessalians for his next campaign, in which he won the Battle of the Crocus Field against 500 Phocian cavalry and 20,000 Phocian infantry.  Diodorus ascribes the victory to the Thessalian cavalry:

"A severe battle took place and since the Thessalian cavalry were superior in numbers and valour, Philip won." - Diodorus XVI.35.5

Although the first duty of the Thessalians would have been to deal with their Phocian counterparts, just removing 500 horse from the battlefield does not win the battle (vide Bagradas): something more is required, namely the defeat of the enemy infantry.  Is Diodorus hinting at this?  In any event, it seems that Philip started thinking about wedge-configured cavalry at about this point.  His infantry, which was using 'javelins' when he first fought Onomarchus, may have been re-equipped with the sarissa at around the same time that Philip overhauled his cavalry.

Visualising it, I suspect that the hoplites would instinctively try to get out of the way of the riders. Since each mounted file is 6 feet apart and the horses are not heading directly towards the footmen, that suggests the infantry would jump for the gaps between the horses. Bearing in mind they have no drill for what to do in this situation.

I think you underestimate these phalanxes.  Their whole essence is collective action.  So, I think they would have tried to brace against impact.  The front rankers might go down, but they'd either bring down the horse or slow it for others to attack it.  You really didn't get to stand in the front rank of the Sacred Band if you thought of your own safety rather than that of your comrades.  You also didn't have a victim mentality - even if Plutarch piles on the pathos after you are dead.  To paraphrase Patton, you don't win wars by dying for your country but by making some other dumb b*****d die for his.

I rather doubt that a hoplite phalanx meeting Macedonian cavalry for the first time would have tried to brace against impact, simply because they would not have expected an impact.  This in itself would in part account for the success of the Macedonian cavalry at Chaeronea.  One point that Justin made is the speed with which the whole attack would take effect - there would have been no possibility of thinking through, let alone working out, a collective response.

Had hoplite phalanxes been given the kind of training that later (much later) generations received on the subject of how to deal with cavalry then yes, they could probably have stopped a Macedonian wedge by kneeling, bracing weapons, etc.  The essential point is that they never had such training and that is why the Macedonian cavalry wedge was so effective.

One can see the same pattern with elephants: against troops not trained in dealing with them, they were terrifyingly effective.  Against troops who were trained to deal with them, they were usually not very useful.  The same pattern repeats with tanks in the 20th century.

[Justin Swanton]

In an earlier post, I noted that Richard Gabriel in his advocacy of the Macedonian cavalry wedge as an anti-hoplite formation says Arrian states Philip II adopted the formation specifically to fight infantry.  I followed this up using the wonders of Google books and he is referencing here Arrian's Tactica 16.7 ff, if anyone wishes to look it up.  He has taken the quote in his text from Minor Markle "The Macedonian Sarissa, Spear, and Related Armor" AJA 81 (1977) (Isn't that a great name?).  Doubtless these works are known to the Hellenic specialists here.  Is Arrian really specific about Philip II adopting the wedge as an anti-infantry formation?

Briefly - no, he doesn't. Arrian says that Philip taught the Macedonians to use this formation (taxis). He also says that the wedge is the best formation to use for breaking through an enemy taxis. He doesn't say that is why Philip adopted wedge, nor does he specify that it was used for breaking through infantry formations.

This makes me wonder why a wedge couldn't be larger than a taxis (about 200-odd men). Looking at my reconstruction of how a wedge worked (last time, promise!) it is clear there would be a definite limit on the width hence the size of a wedge. The mechanism requires that the file leader of the frontmost cavalry column heads for the gap between two infantry files, and that the two adjacent file leaders orientate themselves on him, slightly adjusting their direction to head for the gaps two infantry files across, allowing the next pair of file leaders to orient themselves, and so on.

The problem is that the cavalry wedge does not start out with its files exactly double the width of the infantry files it is attacking. It's approximate, which means that although the central cavalry files will have little adjusting to do, the outermost files will have to do a good deal more swerving in order to line up with their target gaps. There comes a limit as to how much a file can swerve in mid-trot and that limit determines the width of the wedge.

Presuming that Alexander's wedge targeted the substantial part of the Sacred Band, the wedge would have a maximum possible width of about 50 yards, presuming the Band deployed 6 deep ( 300 / 6 = 50 men wide = 50 yards wide), or about 25 files, 12 on each side of the central file. But it may well have been less than this.

[Patrick Waterson]

We also tend to assume that a wedge continues to taper and expand until there is only one man at each rear corner.  It could have expanded each rank up to (say) 10 or 12 wide and then just kept this width for the balance of the formation, being in effect a short column with a sharp tip.  This would make it similar to a Thessalian rhombus with the aft end squared off.

[Duncan Head]

That is what is envisaged in 15th-century German manuals - basically a column tipped by a wedge. But it 's not what the Hellenistic manuals describe - though they do only speak of pretty small wedges, so that isn't a completely foolproof argument when we look at the sort of wedge(s) formed by a 2-300 man squadron.

[Patrick Waterson]

This is why I am somewhat hesitant about adopting the 'tipped column' suggestion: a) there seems to be no direct (and not a lot of indirect) evidence for it as part of the Hellenistic repertoire and b) the Thessalian rhombus seems not to have worried that the men at the corners were over-exposed, so should the Macedonian wedge be troubled on that point?

In theory, the men at the leading edge of the wedge can each give their opponents a sarissa in the kisser to take the hoplite out of the fight.  The men behind them deal with any opponents still on their feet.  Those at the left and right corners of the wedge do not have anyone behind them, so when their turn comes to barrel through the enemy formation they do so solo.  If each corner man had a half-file behind him he would be rather less exposed and much better supported.  It is one of those logic-from-thin-air observations and should be considered on its merits - but only if it has any. 

[Justin Swanton]

It may not be necessary for the outermost files to have more than one cavalryman each. Since horses do not physically push against each other, the frontmost horse of each file must make its way between the infantry files on its own, with the following riders getting the job of sending the infantrymen to their ancestors. Hence a lone cavalryman should be able to push though an infantry formation and possibly take out a footman whilst doing so, without needing any mounted colleagues behind him.

[RobertGargan]

Whether wedge or line I should imagine it would not be an easy task for a horseman, lance in hand, to pick out and eliminate a hoplite in a close shield formation.  Didn't Xenophon describe, in the return journey of the Ten thousand, an incident when hoplites formed up, moved as one, and unintentionally intimidated and caused panic among allied horse?  Horses being intelligent animals may be a little hesitant to impale themselves on pointed sticks or have hooves cut by sharp swords.  I suppose it all depends on the training and leadership of the opposing forces.
Robert Gargan

[Duncan Head]

Hence a lone cavalryman should be able to push though an infantry formation and possibly take out a footman whilst doing so, without needing any mounted colleagues behind him.

So they don't really need a wedge at all?