On conducting historical research into ancient battlesites

[Imperial Dave]

Ok, as acknowledgment upfront, this is a big nod to Philip Sabin in his Lost Battles book and thus to the original author N Whatley (read to the Oxford Philological Society in 1920!) of the principles of researching ancient battles.

As I am doing a couple of articles for Slingshot I wanted to ensure that I had as many avenues of information (and structure) to aid my research. On reading Philip Sabin's excellent Lost Battles book, I came across a section within the Sources chapter which describes Whatley's original thoughts on how to conduct historical (battle) research. The principles hold true today even if the tools available nowadays are radically different. The below is a very brief overview of what Philip Sabin wrote in his book based upon Whatley's work.

1. Study the topography of the battle area, including use of maps, photography and fieldwalking where possible
2. Use of prior military experience (personal or through involved experts) to interpret the given information about the battle
3. The application of logic and common sense to critically assess the available data and information especially when presented from several sources
4. The piecing together of seemingly disparate elements of information into a working, coherent proposition using the above principles but applying a "filter" to make use of the key aspects gleaned
5. The generic assessment of how armies fight for the period in question, not necessarily trying to pinpoint this for the exact battle/timeframe being researched

Although the above is probably not rocket science, especially to those already familiar with conducting research, I found it a very useful framework when I started doing my studies. Hopefully this will be of use to others

[yesthatphil]

I recall a talk given at Kettering Museum and Gallery by John Kliene of the Naseby Project.   He identified the 3 main threads of Battlefield History as Archaeology, Documentary evidence and Fieldwork ... To be sure you've got it right, you really need some physical material recovered or located on the site (hopefully with context), you need to have eyewitness accounts or similar according with the other evidence ... and then the story that is emerging has to make sense on the ground.

A case in point might be e.g. Bosworth, where there has been a 'traditional' site (made much of) - and which, because it is in an Osprey, some lazy wargamers still want to believe in - but there is no physical evidence and no documentary evidence to support it ... and the ground does not fit the narrative.   There was no marsh near Ambion hill in 1485 (something the sources agree was key) and contemporaries don't mention Henry attacking uphill (which you'd have thought would have featured somewhere).  Unsurprisingly, when you look somewhere else  you start to find things (marshes that were there in 1485, artefacts buried in the mud, a landscape and place names that match contemporary accounts) ...

For obvious reasons, pre gunpowder battlefields are a tough subject: very little survives (nearly all detritus is cleared up and recycled - especially arrows judging by England's Medieval battlefields - and burial pits, where found, give little away)

As a History graduate it immediately occurred to me that my training only gave me third of those skills if that ... on the others I was somewhere on the amateur to self-taught scale.   This is true of many: the archaeologists are often flakey on their history (no - I'm not naming names) and the skilled field interpreters as often went into uniform rather than university ...

However, if you can locate the field with some accuracy, it is often possible to answer some mysteries by attention to the landscape (this is a relatively modern approach ... in the past, the landscape might be skewed to suit an interpretation of the documentary evidence by historians who may not even have visited the site) ...

Phil

[Imperial Dave]

Good additional points Phil. I would add that in addition to battles/battlefields there are an awful lot of people trying to make history fit their perceptions of what they think rather than the other way around!

Case in point, I am doing research into a possible (and I stress possible as there is only one reference to it written 600 years after the event!) battle in SE Wales circa 600AD (give or take a couple of decades). Whilst doing this research I have been "nabbed" by the cat of curiosity and found myself wandering the path of a wider context that I originally set out on...."Arthurian Britain" no less. I wont stray too far into that but suffice it to say that some of the theories proposed by educated authors are definitely stretching the facts (such as they are) to breaking point in trying to prove the truth of the matter! I wont name names but I suspect if you put all the polarised Arthurian theorists (as opposed to the sensible-on-balance theorists) into a room there would be a new battle of Camlann!

Even if I have a theory I do try to visit the facts as well as the location to get as wide an understanding as I can before coming to a conclusion if that is possible

To summarise:

1. I come up with a basic theory which initial examination of facts suggests to me.
2. I do more in depth research, ground work where possible (for an amateur like me), photographs and ask experts for opinion
3. I either believe my theory is basically still correct, alter some of the assumptions and thus some of the conclusions or completely dismiss my theory as disproved.

It is really difficult not to try and fit facts to your own theory as this is a human trait attested to by physchology (self justification/positive reinforcement etc) so common sense is very much required as well as the openess to accept structured criticism from others.

The bit about actually visiting a proposed battlefield is very very worthwhile even if the details are fleeting if not downright ethereal! Also do not under estimate the power of maps. There are caveats to be aware of (rivers silting up, shoreline changing etc) but getting the strategic bird's eye view can often give insights that might not make sense by tactical trench views alone

[aligern]

Land use change is a huge factor in this. As Phil says, the existence of a marsh at the time will make a huge difference, many marshes have been drained and some marshes are only ever intermittent, being there in winter, but drying up in summer.
Afforestation is a major problem. there might have been more trees years ago, but these were probably in damp valley bottoms with the tops of the hills farmed or grazed and if well settled the use of wood for burning will have taken away. a lot of trees. So battlefields that were open at the time of the battle may have trees on them now as the higher ground is poorer soil, but the rich valley bottoms, open now, may have been choked then.

You should have a look at the theories of Colonel Burne who posited Inherent Military Probability, fundamentally, that a soldiers eye will see the logic of position and choose that place to deploy, attack, encircle etc. The problem with that is that motivations and technology do vary over time. It might suit a medieaval king to put his standard on an eminence to show he is there or deploy with a river to his rear in order to emphasise that he will fight or die or just to protect against an enemy coming from the rear. S maybe military probability is not that inherent. However, it is useful to look at because it throws a light on the idea of 'common sense'  as a discriminator. It would have been common sense for Harold Godwinson to have stayed in London for a week to rest and recruit.
Roy

[Erpingham]

In fairness to AHB, his IMP approach at least credited people in the past with a rational approach to warfare.  His real aim was at historians who wrote about battles without pausing for a moment to apply their common sense to the problem.  That said, he did fail badly at assuming that military logic was as taught by the British army in the early 20th century, without any real understanding of how the military priorities might have looked different to commanders in the past.  He was also a so-and-so for deciding on a place that fitted his interpretations and reconstructing the battle around it.  This is something to watch for - as Phil said, there have been some detailed reconstructions based on the wrong battlefield.

[Duncan Head]

Another problem that affects ancient battlefield location and reconstruction is that the size of the armies, and thus the space they take up, is often unknown. I think the point cropped up  in the Chalons discussions: if you believe Attila had 300,000 men, you're loooking for a much more extensive site than if you think he had 20,000.

[Justin Swanton]

Unless very large armies deployed in depth. There seems to have been a limit on the maximum width of an army in line, caused largely by command limitations. The general needed to be able to signal his commanders and so time the execution of his orders, at least from the starting positions. I don't think it a coincidence that the battleline turned into the frontline after the invention of the telephone.

[Duncan Head]

Though depth still takes up space.

[Justin Swanton]

Though depth still takes up space.

But not that much, surely? An army of 20 000 men deployed in a depth of 10 ranks with an assumed frontage and depth of 1 yard per man would be 2000 yards wide and 10 yards deep. A 200 000 man army with the same frontage would have a depth of 100 yards, a little more if it deploys in several lines - not a significant difference.

[Jim Webster]

Though depth still takes up space.

But not that much, surely? An army of 20 000 men deployed in a depth of 10 ranks with an assumed frontage and depth of 1 yard per man would be 2000 yards wide and 10 yards deep. A 200 000 man army with the same frontage would have a depth of 100 yards, a little more if it deploys in several lines - not a significant difference.

But their camp, women, slaves and other livestock will take up ten times the area and they'll need a far better water supply etc.

Jim

[aligern]

I think you might have to allow. three yards per man  for depth when deployed. otherwise they would be hardly able to move , level weapons etc.
Roy

[Imperial Dave]

The battle I am researching is potentially a small affair although it will be pure guess-work and even looking at other battles of the same era doesnt necessarily hold that mine will be the same

If I had to guess, a few hundred a side for a border skirmish in a valley network in the early 600's AD Britain?

[Patrick Waterson]

I think you might have to allow. three yards per man  for depth when deployed. otherwise they would be hardly able to move , level weapons etc.
Roy

Vegetius emphasised two yards for Romans, largely it would seem to ensure missiles could be hurled without other ranks being inconvenienced by the thrower.  Macedonians and Romans, according to Polybius, allocated one yard of depth per man when in battle formation (i.e. for close combat).  A general lack of manuals for barbarians makes conclusions on their customary depth per man a bit more nebulous, but one suspects that one yard per man will not be too far out for infantry and double that for cavalry.

I think Justin's point is basically valid: a 300,000-strong army is not going to want to have a frontage of much more than 2,000 (or in a pinch 3,000) yards because command and control start to lag seriously with larger frontages (not the mention it being increasingly difficult for the C-in-C to see what is going on).  Depth for such an army might not be uniform across the whole frontage - cavalry may well have a different depth to infantry - but increased depth makes the army a lot handier to manage than increased frontage, and best of all allows use of a modestly-sized battlefield.

But their camp, women, slaves and other livestock will take up ten times the area and they'll need a far better water supply etc.

But not on the actual battlefield, surely?  From what I can make out the fashion was to encamp at a convenient location within five or so miles of the enemy and then march to the battlefield when the opponent did (or ideally just before).

[Jim Webster]

You work out the size of a camp for 200,000 men and their baggage etc. Then work out how long it takes men to march through it to get out :-)

Jim

[Imperial Dave]

You work out the size of a camp for 200,000 men and their baggage etc. Then work out how long it takes men to march through it to get out :-)

Jim

Agreed, that's some logistical nightmare.....

Mind you, it takes nearly a day for me to get 4 people and one dog packed and ready to go camping