What is so effective about cavalry charging infantry in the flank?

[Erpingham]

So, I think we may have identified our mechanismfor how the shock of a flank attack moves deeper into a formation.  I would speculate the the "shudder" is felt well beyond the ability to understand its cause.  Thus a relatively small force could cause a lot of damage, its effect magnified by uncertainty/fear.  As to whether a body struck like this will inevitably fail, I think a lot depends on how far and fast the ripple goes, and whether it successfully crosses unit boundaries - a body deeper in the block might be able to co-ordinate its resistance to the ripple effect if it peters out or slows down.  Two ways to prevent it becoming decisive might be to break through to the front or to charge reserves into the now disordered outflankers.  Both would convert that flank into a confused melee, as opposed to a source of directional pressure deeper into the formation.  Though, from what I've read, flank attacks are often fairly decisive

Anyone like to suggest the mechanisms by which this effect could work in a wargame?

[Imperial Dave]

I guess you would get a bonus score when added to morale (or similar) dice for moving forward and perhaps a larger bonus if you "win your melee to the front" ?

[Patrick Waterson]

In effect, it would seem that the developing consensus is that the flank attack has at least as great a moral effect as a physical one.  The physical effects can be summarised as unbalancing and constriction (and of course casualties) while the moral effects are disorientation and spreading anxiety (or uncertainty tinged with anxiety).

This suggests that on the wargames table one effect of a flank attack will be to affect morale: force a check or force a (possibly temporary) drop or, in like the DB-series which do not have separate morale ratings, penalise combat effectiveness.

[Imperial Dave]

To clarify my suggestion this would be in the form of....

If hit in the flank........when calculating morale.........add +1 if moving forward or following up and add +2 if breaking through/routing your opponents to the front

Another thought then occured to me.

We are looking at dense infantry formations hit in the flank. What about more open formations? The ripple effect and condensing of troops into a crowd would be lessened for more open infantry BUT would allow greater penetration by a mobile flank charge as there would be less "resistance"

[Patrick Waterson]

We are looking at dense infantry formations hit in the flank. What about more open formations? The ripple effect and condensing of troops into a crowd would be lessened for more open infantry BUT would allow greater penetration by a mobile flank charge as there would be less "resistance"

True.  The most noticeable effect would probably be more men cut down more quickly - and as soon as the remainder realised what was happening they would tend to panic individually rather than wait to panic collectively.  Overall effect - extra casualties, with a morale check into the bargain.

[Imperial Dave]

Agreed....

can we summarise thus far that dense infantry bodies hit on the flank by mounted would be pinned initially but heavily disordered to the point of structural (organisational/effectiveness) and eventually break spectacularly. Looser formation infantry bodies would suffer greater initial penetration/casulaties and probably break quicker

[aligern]

Well, what the sources say is that the victim units  suffer a dramatic loss of fighting power. There might be a morale effect, but I suggest that either occurs before the attack goes in  or later when the slaughter has reduced men to panic. It might be instructive for us to search out examples of what actually gets reported.  I have cited Cannae and Adrianople. There is a battle where Totila sends a small force of around 300  round to the rear of an Early Byzantine army and these, thinking they ay are the advance guard of a large force, collapse before the impact of the 300.  Actually such a small force would probably not have made a huge difference to the actual fighting except where they were committed, however seeing them every Byzantine unit probably thought that they would be the point of the attack.

Roy

[Chuck the Grey]

Philip Sabin in his book Lost Battles (pages 54-55) mentions that he feels the massive combat bonuses for attacking the enemy in the flank or rear may in fact be exaggerated. He mentions the battles of Ibera, Telamon, and Ruspina is battles where troops fought for a long time despite having to fight to the front and rear. Philip Sabin does feels that some troops are more vulnerable to flank or rear attacks. These troops would include hoplites, phalangites, and massed archers.

I think we have to consider if the troops being attacked have time to respond to the threat before they are attacked either front or rear. Changing direction with a body of troops isn't as easy as some gamers think. It's basically a problem of time and distance; will you have enough time to turn your unit before those other people with murderous intent reach you with sharp pointy things. It's easier to have some men do an about face to face a rear attack than moving an entire unit through an arc of 90 degrees.

I think it boils down to a question of whether the troops under a flank or rear attack attack have time and ability to prepare and counter the threat. For a gaming point of view, we would also have to consider perhaps reducing the attacked unit combat value when fighting in two directions rather than increase the attacking units combat value.

[Imperial Dave]

Good points Chuck.

In addition I would like to say that if fighting in 2 different directions, apart from the possible compression/disruption effect of this, a loss of manpower from the "front" of the unit in the form of less shoving, encouragment and filling in of gaps immediately behind those engaged could also play a part 

[Patrick Waterson]

Philip Sabin in his book Lost Battles (pages 54-55) mentions that he feels the massive combat bonuses for attacking the enemy in the flank or rear may in fact be exaggerated. He mentions the battles of Ibera, Telamon, and Ruspina is battles where troops fought for a long time despite having to fight to the front and rear. Philip Sabin does feels that some troops are more vulnerable to flank or rear attacks. These troops would include hoplites, phalangites, and massed archers.

What Prof Sabin's thinking omits is that these troops were not fighting to front and rear as a single formation, but as separate battlelines facing in different directions, so each battleline was fighting only to its front.  Cannae would have been a much better example to consider - and interestingly enough, Phil Sabin's Cannae scenario in Lost Battles - and especially the analysis of it in chapter 3 of the eponymous book - has problems.

That said, he is certainly right on the other point - that phalangites never performed well when attacked in flank (and rear) - though whether hoplites or massed archers were especially vulnerable when attacked this way when compared to, say, legionaries or tribal troops is an open question, which may be difficult to resolve because legionaries may have been faster to respond to an attack in flank, judging by Caesar's accounts (although this did them little good at Cannae).

I think it boils down to a question of whether the troops under a flank or rear attack attack have time and ability to prepare and counter the threat. For a gaming point of view, we would also have to consider perhaps reducing the attacked unit combat value when fighting in two directions rather than increase the attacking units combat value.

Very much agree here.  If unengaged troops perceive a threat to flank before that threat becomes operative, they can change front (which with classical formations is much better than changing facing) so that when the opponent closes to melee the combat will not be a flank attack.  If they can at least change facing (turn left or right 90 degrees) then it will still be a flank attack, but an opposed one.

Taking the classical era, the question is how aware particular troops would be about what is happening on their flank amid the noise and dust of a typical Mediterranean battle.  If the lines have not closed, a threat to the flank could be obvious from a long way off: at Raphia in 217 BC the right wing Ptolemaic cavalry slipped round the opposing elephants to catch their cavalry opponents in flank with surprise and quickly saw them off.  This was perceived by the Seleucid phalanx who, aware of the threat to their flank, became very reluctant to advance and in fact retired off the field.  At Bagradas in 255 BC the Roman infantry perceived the defeat of their own cavalry and presumably adopted an all-round facing because Polybius describes them as being 'shot down' as opposed to 'ridden down' by the Carthaginian cavalry.  At Cannae in 216 BC the Romans, with the Volturnus wind blowing dust in their faces, seem not to have perceived the Carthaginian enveloping manoeuvre until it was upon them.

Wargame rules could introduce a visibility rating based on the climate and the terrain.  For games of a suitable level of abstraction (e.g. DB-system) high visibility could decrease the effect of flank attacks (except on pikes) and low visibility could enhance it.  For more tactical systems which allow parts of units to change facing/direction the reaction time available for this could be increased or decreased accordingly.

[Chuck the Grey]

Good points Patrick. I agree that pike armed units seemed especially vulnerable to flank and rear attacks, and I think that may have carried over to hoplite units. The question that I have been pondering is this vulnerability due to the difficulty in handling pikes, the depth and density of the formation, or the level of training and morale of the unit. I don't have a real answer at this time since I'm still mulling it over in my mind.

As far as the Roman legions at Cannae, consideration must be given to the compression of the units preventing effective use of weapons, the loss of unit cohesion as the various units were forced together, and perhaps some shock and dismay as the reality of the situation became apparent to the Romans. So from a gaming point of view, to simulate a situation like Cannae the unit being attacked on the flank in the rear would have to have a reduction in their combat effectiveness and take a loss in morale.

The point about visibility is a good one and deserves consideration. However, we also have to consider the effect of tunnel vision. It is very common for soldiers, police, and other people in stressful situations to focus on one threat and be totally unaware of any additional threats. I believe this can apply to even massed units that are common in our historical era of interest. A secondary threat may be visible to a unit, but will they recognize the threat and then react to it. Wargame rules would have to have some mechanism, regardless of the level of abstraction, to account for this in some way.

[Imperial Dave]

The tunnel vision thing is a good point to make Chuck. I have seen a documentary whereby individuals are given something to focus on and inadvertently they zone out alot of what is around them (in the example I saw, over 50% of the subjects in the study completely failed to observe a fight between 6 men 3 metres away!)

In addition, the whole visibility thing within massed units is important. Unless you are head and shouldes above your fellow soldiers, the average infantryman would not be able to see much if not in the first few ranks (of front or flank) of the unit. On the flat and in the "middle" mass of infantry, your visibility of what's happening is virtually nil until something happens like an impact of a charge. I am surmising that the reaction of the middle mass of infantry is based more on perception and morale than anything else during combat.

[Erpingham]

The point about visibility is a good one and deserves consideration. However, we also have to consider the effect of tunnel vision. It is very common for soldiers, police, and other people in stressful situations to focus on one threat and be totally unaware of any additional threats. I believe this can apply to even massed units that are common in our historical era of interest. A secondary threat may be visible to a unit, but will they recognize the threat and then react to it. Wargame rules would have to have some mechanism, regardless of the level of abstraction, to account for this in some way.

I think you have a good point here Chuck.  Not only is the formation organised to fight forward, its threat awareness points that way too.  This would be particularly true of troops not on the very edges of the line.  Whether some formations were organised in ways that helped or hindered, I don't know.  Didn't Romans have their officers on the front and back corners of the formation for example?

The question of visibility is one our WWII colleagues spend a lot of time on, because it is critical for any kind of period feel.  Earlier periods it is less of an issue so we put less time into it. Yet, the biggest curse we have is the giant general who can take in the whole of his line and the enemies at a glance.  He can even see that flank march not yet deployed sitting on a side table.  So, while we can creation reaction factors for units menaced from the flank, we can't stop a subtle redeployment to take into account troops which the unit (and general) couldn't actually see.

[Imperial Dave]

The point about visibility is a good one and deserves consideration. However, we also have to consider the effect of tunnel vision. It is very common for soldiers, police, and other people in stressful situations to focus on one threat and be totally unaware of any additional threats. I believe this can apply to even massed units that are common in our historical era of interest. A secondary threat may be visible to a unit, but will they recognize the threat and then react to it. Wargame rules would have to have some mechanism, regardless of the level of abstraction, to account for this in some way.

I think you have a good point here Chuck.  Not only is the formation organised to fight forward, its threat awareness points that way too.  This would be particularly true of troops not on the very edges of the line.  Whether some formations were organised in ways that helped or hindered, I don't know.  Didn't Romans have their officers on the front and back corners of the formation for example?

The question of visibility is one our WWII colleagues spend a lot of time on, because it is critical for any kind of period feel.  Earlier periods it is less of an issue so we put less time into it. Yet, the biggest curse we have is the giant general who can take in the whole of his line and the enemies at a glance.  He can even see that flank march not yet deployed sitting on a side table.  So, while we can creation reaction factors for units menaced from the flank, we can't stop a subtle redeployment to take into account troops which the unit (and general) couldn't actually see.

Excellent point Anthony re the "giant general" curse as you put it. We are all guilty of getting sucked into the modern wargaming perception of battlefield visibility at some point or other. I sometimes try to visualise battles as if I was on the ground and this is actually quite instructive if you are able to visit an actual battlefield that we are reasonably confident of the relative positions of troops on the topography of the ground. It gives you a better feel for what is easy or otherwise to see.

Back to our question at hand and I maintain that the majority of troops within an infantry unit will have poor visibility of movement and positions of other troops around them and so possibly their reaction to stimuli, be it shouts from officers or co-combatants or actual physical shock waves fo the crowding effect after a combat impact will be greatly magnified in psychological terms if nothing else.

[Patrick Waterson]

Agreed: Chuck makes a good point, because in addition to (usually) wearing a helmet that restricts peripheral vision, our troops have noise all round them and are cued up to focus on and evaluate the threat in front, not least because that is what is occupying everyone else's attention at the moment.  Man does tend to be something of a herd animal (or group mind sentient) and when in a mass of other men with a shared single purpose tends to develop tunnel vision centred on the immediate goal.

Veteran troops will sometimes have an intuitive feeling that all is not well in a certain sector, and will check out their feeling by a glance round, but even if a threat is noticed by an alert veteran there remains the problem of conveying the discovery before everyone finds out the hard way.

Dave's point about the sheer limits of visibility when surrounded by other soldiers will mean that any shift of perception (realising that trouble is arriving on the flank) will of necessity be a rude and abrupt awakening and a sudden transition from 'everything OK' to 'what the **** is going on and is it about to kill me?'

Anthony mentions officers being stationed at points which would enable them to watch, or at least glance without hindrance to, the flanks and rear: this could have cued troops in reasonable time to take any countermeasures of which they were capable.  Interesting in this regard are the Roman tales from Cannae of Carthaginian 'deserters' who later 'picked up Roman shields' and 'joined the fighting' from behind the Roman army.  Hannibal had re-equipped his veteran Liby-Phoenicians Roman-style (Polybius III.87), and these were the troops who carried out the double envelopment at Cannae: one wonders if they were spotted by inexperienced Roman officers as they closed in and were assumed to be Romans (perhaps the 10,000 men sent to attack Hannibal's camp being redeployed, if they thought about it at all).  This would have meant that the potential early warning system of having officers able to look around actually worked against itself in this instance.