Recoil - when did it historically happen?

[Erpingham]

Though we have a limited sample, significant physical recoil seems to be rare.  The really decisive movements seem to be related to withdrawal or attempting to rally and reform further back.  Dependent on the morale state of the participants, this could lead to rout.  Do we have further detail of the circumstances e.g. of a successful re-establishment of a line further back or is being forced back in melee usually a prelude to retirement or rout?

[Duncan Head]

Though we have a limited sample, significant physical recoil seems to be rare.

I'm not sure that's true - we seem to me to have come up with plenty of examples of recoils, and fewer cases where there is no recoil.

Unless that's because we're using different definitions. I've only just noticed that Mark said:

So, plenty of justification for one side pushing the other back - othismos style.
But that's not necessarily recoil, where a clear break in contact is evidenced.

Why does "recoil" need "a clear break in contact"? As the word is used in those rules mechanisms I am familiar with, a recoil just means one side going back a short distance, unbroken and still facing the enemy; the other side may follow up and continue contact, or may not. What Mark suggests with "a clear break in contact" is a little more like the DBMM concept of "repulse" (though in DBMM that involves going back further than a "recoil"). 

Now, I'm not sure what Justin meant when he initially asked about recoiling, nor exactly what Anthony means when he suggests it's rare!

[Erpingham]

Now, I'm not sure what Justin meant when he initially asked about recoiling, nor exactly what Anthony means when he suggests it's rare!

What I feel is rare in the accounts is evidence of a significant distance of physical pushing back.  Only the Agincourt example seems to quantify this, and, as Nick said, within the scope of most rules, its a bit neither here nor there.  In the first few seconds, pushed back 12 feet then for remainder of melee remain static?  Some of the others may involve a physical push back but aren't clear on that.  They could also mean "forced to give ground" in some morale or rally back sense.  To pick up Mark's comment about non-continuous combat, we could just be seeing two sides separating, with one falling back each time and the conflict renewing further back.  So, to try and be clear, I'm separating a rugby scrum push back (rare or short distance) from controlled withdrawal from combat.  I don't know if Justin is doing the same, however.

[Justin Swanton]

Yes. To take DBM, the large scale ruleset I'm most familiar with, 25mm = 50 yards (or "paces"). A base is required to recoil its depth, which varies from 15mm (30 yards) to 50mm (100 yards). This affects all troop types. To what extent do these distances conform to the historical reality? Did all troop types recoil? Seeing as there were quite a few slogging matches where neither side recoiled a significant distance, ending only when one side broke, what circumstances favoured recoil?

[Mark G]

That's the thing though Justin, did the 'quite a few' slogging matches where neither side gave ground actually mean that they were face to face and fighting for hours?

or did they mean both sides stuck to their relative lines, and made localised attacks into each other which failed to produce a material change, but which did feature lots of localised too and fro?

Consider a trench raid, it comes over, enters the trench, takes the captive / knocks out the sniper position, then pulls back.
Relative front lines unchanged, but push and pull exhibited.
The raid is too small to describe in sources, but locally it has an effect.

That is much closer to how i see fighting.  They are engaged, but not physically face to face
  sub units make flurries into face to face contact, they are brief, the may or may not push the other back, but they will not individually break the line or cause a bend in overall position, and the small attack will also pull back.
A non continuous melee model.

If you don't buy into that, and see combat as face to face and fighting until one side runs, then pushback and recoil become much harder to explain, as you require immediate follow up and you have an issue with formed men recoiling in contact (well all the pro historians i could find do anyway, as they disbelieve non continuous for those reasons)


Which is why i think questions like this need a lot more stating of terms in advance of the question.

In db rules terms though, i recon recoil is a mechanism to enable the Carthaginians to perform a convex - concave manoeuvre ala Cannae, something on a much bigger scale than the small unit flurry i described.

This is the model of the envelopment that makes a lot more sense to me than frankly unbelievable notions of African veterans marching past and turning in on the Romans line, all they need do is stay stationary, as the romans are pulled into the centre and expose their own flanks in the process.  Much easier to do that in dba than most other rules too, i note.

[Patrick Waterson]

That's the thing though Justin, did the 'quite a few' slogging matches where neither side gave ground actually mean that they were face to face and fighting for hours?

At Syracuse (Thucydides VI.66-71) the armies came together without either yielding ground for some time, and as both were hoplite armies with melee weapons only one is inclined to conclude they spent the time fighting toe-to-toe.

or did they mean both sides stuck to their relative lines, and made localised attacks into each other which failed to produce a material change, but which did feature lots of localised too and fro?

Consider a trench raid, it comes over, enters the trench, takes the captive / knocks out the sniper position, then pulls back.
Relative front lines unchanged, but push and pull exhibited.
The raid is too small to describe in sources, but locally it has an effect.

That is much closer to how i see fighting.  They are engaged, but not physically face to face
  sub units make flurries into face to face contact, they are brief, the may or may not push the other back, but they will not individually break the line or cause a bend in overall position, and the small attack will also pull back.
A non continuous melee model.

This seems to equate to what is traditionally considered 'skirmishing', not close combat between close formation infantry formations.  One might look at Caesar, Civil War I.44, in which the Pompeians use a related form of in-and-out attack, which Caesar considers not unusual for mountain peoples, whereas Caesar's own forces very definitely stand their ground and are used to continuous combat, and so find the Pompeian approach strange and offputting, at least to begin with.

If you don't buy into that, and see combat as face to face and fighting until one side runs, then pushback and recoil become much harder to explain, as you require immediate follow up and you have an issue with formed men recoiling in contact (well all the pro historians i could find do anyway, as they disbelieve non continuous for those reasons)

Why do pushback and recoil become harder to explain in the face of physical pressure?  Face to face combat would start to be decided when one side weakened, was pushed back, and unless somehow rallied and reinvigorated would be broken, cf. Sertorius at the Sucro, Plutarch, Sertorius 19.3-6.

"When the fighting was at close quarters, it happened that Sertorius was not himself engaged with Pompey at first, but with Afranius, who commanded Pompey's left, while Sertorius himself was stationed on the right. Hearing, however, that those of his men who were engaged with Pompey were yielding before his onset and being worsted, he put his right wing in command of other generals, and hastened himself to the help of the wing that was suffering defeat. [4] Those of his men who were already in retreat he rallied, those who were still keeping their ranks he encouraged, then charged anew upon Pompey, who was pursuing, and put his men to a great rout, in which Pompey also came near being killed, was actually wounded, and had a marvellous escape. For the Libyans with Sertorius, after getting Pompey's horse, which had golden decorations and was covered with costly trappings, were so busy distributing the booty and quarrelling with one another over it, that they neglected the pursuit. [5] Afranius, however, as soon as Sertorius had gone off to the other wing with aid and succour, routed his opponents and drove them headlong into their camp; and dashing in with the fugitives, it being now dark, he began to plunder, knowing nothing of Pompey's flight and having no power to keep his soldiers from their pillaging. But meanwhile Sertorius came back from his victory on the other wing, and falling upon the straggling and confused soldiers of Afranius, slew great numbers of them."

[Erpingham]

I am struck by the time Sertorius has in this situation.  Reports reach him that his men are giving way.  He delegates command, rides over, visits some units standing firm, rallies some others then organises a counter attack.  Whatever push backs/recoils that are going on are gradual.  It also seems to me that the units giving way have broken contact, as they "charge anew".  It is less clear whether the units standing firm are actually still in contact or standing ready to join the counter attack.

[aligern]

men cannot maintain the physical effort of combat for more than ten, fifteen, maybe 20 minutes. Thus there have to be pauses. Either they stop where they stand or they drop back mutually... the effect is the same, I can see it being more difficult for a pike phalanx to fall back than a Republican Roman line, but they must rest and gather breath. So punctuated flurries are highly likely. With repeated attacks and rests it is highly likely that troops who are suffering will move backwards, but not break because the opponent will not have the weight and momentum to cause a rupture, indeed falling back is likely done to avoid opponents breaking through. In the pause period the irregularities and vulnerabilities in the line will be corrected so that vulnerabilities are removed. If you are losing then it is likely that the reorganisation moves your line backwards.

Of course this whole process varies by troop type. perhaps pike phalanxes tired rather less and maybe hoplites were less elastic than Romans, but the mechanics of combat are determined by the endurance, mental and physical, of men.
Roy

[Jim Webster]

I've wondered about pike phalanxes when reading the discussion.
One cannot imagine a small group of Sarissa pikemen surging out from the block to prod and poke at the enemy before scurrying back.

Perhaps that was the strength of pikes, that they were a mechanism for keeping everybody moving forward whether they wanted to or not?

As for pushbacks, we have accounts of Roman armies 'reeling' back in front of the pike's advance, perhaps without a combat even happening.

But we have to remember that 'push back' is also a wargame rulewriter's mechanism.
All this little groups charging out and falling back is subsumed into rolling the dice and so doesn't get overtly displayed on the table

Jim

[Patrick Waterson]

men cannot maintain the physical effort of combat for more than ten, fifteen, maybe 20 minutes.

A lot depends upon exactly what one does in 'combat' - my impression is that Roman legionaries, after the initial missile discharge, slammed into the opposition and then exerted no more effort than pushing against/leaning on them while pinking them with the gladius, cf. Polybius II.33.6:

"The Romans, on the contrary, having excellent points to their swords, used them not to cut but to thrust: and by thus repeatedly hitting the breasts and faces of the enemy, they eventually killed the greater number of them."

This sort of thing would not be any more strenuous than the 'post exercise' described by Vegetius as part of a soldier's training.  Josephus (Jewish War III.70) also notes how:

"Now here one cannot but admire at the precaution of the Romans, in providing themselves of such household servants, as might not only serve at other times for the common offices of life, but might also be of advantage to them in their wars. And, indeed, if any one does but attend to the other parts of their military discipline, he will be forced to confess that their obtaining so large a dominion hath been the acquisition of their valor, and not the bare gift of fortune; for they do not begin to use their weapons first in time of war, nor do they then put their hands first into motion, while they avoided so to do in times of peace; but, as if their weapons did always cling to them, they have never any truce from warlike exercises; nor do they stay till times of war admonish them to use them; for their military exercises differ not at all from the real use of their arms, but every soldier is every day exercised, and that with great diligence, as if it were in time of war, which is the reason why they bear the fatigue of battles so easily; for neither can any disorder remove them from their usual regularity, nor can fear affright them out of it, nor can labor tire them; which firmness of conduct makes them always to overcome those that have not the same firmness; nor would he be mistaken that should call those their exercises unbloody battles, and their battles bloody exercises."

It may also be worth considering that dashing into action, exchanging blows, breaking off and dashing out again is a more exhausting form of fighting than simply standing in line and thrusting away.

With repeated attacks and rests it is highly likely that troops who are suffering will move backwards, but not break because the opponent will not have the weight and momentum to cause a rupture, indeed falling back is likely done to avoid opponents breaking through. In the pause period the irregularities and vulnerabilities in the line will be corrected so that vulnerabilities are removed. If you are losing then it is likely that the reorganisation moves your line backwards.

This rather tentative style of warfare seems to fit Mesoamericans but not many Europeans (although Irish and perhaps Britons might be happy with it).  Interestingly enough, the original proto-manipular legion investigated by our own Rodger Williams utilised piecemeal reinforcement of shaky parts of the line, though in the manipular legion this was eventually replaced by the line as a whole being relieved before it came apart.  The Roman line relief system allowed even their super-fit troops to fight in 'shifts'.

In hoplite battles there was no question of falling back to prevent opponents from breaking through: the fate of the Thespians at Delium (surrounded and wiped out when the contingents on each side of them gave way) illustrates this.  The Sciritae at First Mantinea suffered a not dissimilar fate for a not dissimilar reason.

Perhaps pike phalanxes tired rather less

When up against Achaemenids or Romans, they rarely met a foe who could withstand them, the Greek mercenaries in Persian service seemingly being better at this than Roman legionaries.  Up against each other, we either see quality prevailing (the Argyraspids at Paraitakene and Gabiene) or the phalanxes not getting into serious contact at all (Ipsus and Raphia).

Perhaps noteworthy at both Ipsus and Raphia is that the respective phalanxes stood off while the cavalry action was being decided, and in both cases one side's phalanx refused to close because of the threat of enemy cavalry.

My own impression, for what it is worth, is that phalanxes tended to go for short, sharp fights using a decisive push; the limited push-backs seen on one wing at Sellasia appear to have been because both sides were trying to seize a position but not following up once it was taken, whereas on the other wing once ascendancy was obtained it was kept up all the way down the slope and the retreating force was thoroughly broken.

"What Eucleidas ought to have done, when he saw the enemy's lines advancing, was to have rushed down at once upon them; thrown their ranks into disorder; and then retired himself, step by step, to continually higher ground into a safe position: for by thus breaking them up and depriving them, to begin with, of the advantages of their peculiar armour and disposition, he would have secured the victory by the superiority of his position. But he did the very opposite of all this, and thereby forfeited the advantages of the ground. As though victory were assured, he kept his original position on the summit of the hill, with the view of catching the enemy at as great an elevation as possible, that their flight might be all the longer over steep and precipitous ground. The result, as might have been anticipated, was exactly the reverse.

For he left himself no place of retreat, and by allowing the enemy to reach his position, unharmed and in unbroken order, he was placed at the disadvantage of having to give them battle on the very summit of the hill; and so, as soon as he was forced by the weight of their heavy armour and their close order to give any ground, it was immediately occupied by the Illyrians; while his own men were obliged to take lower ground, because they had no space for manœuvring on the top. The result was not long in arriving: they suffered a repulse, which the difficult and precipitous nature of the ground over which they had to retire turned into a disastrous flight." - Polybius II.68

The 'Illyrians' were part of a combined force, principally of phalangites:

"To face the division of the enemy on Evas Antigonus stationed his Macedonian hoplites with brazen shields, and the Illyrians, drawn up alternately [enallax], under the command of Alexander, son of Acmetus, and Demetrius of Pharos, respectively. Behind them he placed the Acarnanians and Cretans, and behind them again were two thousand Achaeans to act as a reserve." - ibid II.66

One may note in passing the deployment of archers and javelinmen behind a phalanx.  Indirect shooting?

[Duncan Head]

"The Romans, on the contrary, having excellent points to their swords, used them not to cut but to thrust: and by thus repeatedly hitting the breasts and faces of the enemy, they eventually killed the greater number of them."

This sort of thing would not be any more strenuous than the 'post exercise' described by Vegetius as part of a soldier's training.

Psychologically it certainly would be.

[Jim Webster]

Also remember we have accounts of Roman Legionaries throwing themselves onto the shields of German/Gallic enemies to bear them down through sheer body weight

Jim

[Mark G]

We found a clear description of a phalanx moving backwards out of contact, and cited it in the wmww somewhere.

I recall the amazement, but it was there.

Id also note Sabin, who says that the evidence on hoplites clearly points to their fights being very quick, whereas roman battles are reported as taking hours and can be demonstrated to gave done so by the time needed to cover the ground.

Leaving aside 'national' efforts like plates, most hoplite battles are also tiny compared to punic wars ones

[Patrick Waterson]

"The Romans, on the contrary, having excellent points to their swords, used them not to cut but to thrust: and by thus repeatedly hitting the breasts and faces of the enemy, they eventually killed the greater number of them."

This sort of thing would not be any more strenuous than the 'post exercise' described by Vegetius as part of a soldier's training.

Psychologically it certainly would be.

This is - if one pardons the observation - a two-edged sword.  On the one hand there is indeed the increased psychological pressure of combat, although this tends to exist in inverse proportion to troops' experience, but on the other there is the enlivening and refreshing sense of achievement and victory when a foe gets hit or goes down.

Also remember we have accounts of Roman Legionaries throwing themselves onto the shields of German/Gallic enemies to bear them down through sheer body weight

Jim

Quite true: the case in point being Gallic War I.51-53:

"The day following, Caesar left what seemed sufficient as a guard for both camps; [and then] drew up all the auxiliaries in sight of the enemy, before the lesser camp, because he was not very powerful in the number of legionary soldiers, considering the number of the enemy; that [thereby] he might make use of his auxiliaries for appearance. He himself, having drawn up his army in three lines, advanced to the camp of the enemy. Then at last of necessity the Germans drew their forces out of camp, and disposed them canton by canton, at equal distances, the Harudes, Marcomanni, Tribocci, Vangiones, Nemetes, Sedusii, Suevi; and surrounded their whole army with their chariots and wagons, that no hope might be left in flight. On these they placed their women, who, with disheveled hair and in tears, entreated the soldiers, as they went forward to battle, not to deliver them into slavery to the Romans.

Caesar appointed over each legion a lieutenant and a questor, that every one might have them as witnesses of his valor. He himself began the battle at the head of the right wing, because he had observed that part of the enemy to be the least strong. Accordingly our men, upon the signal being given, vigorously made an attack upon the enemy, and the enemy so suddenly and rapidly rushed forward, that there was no time for casting the javelins at them. Throwing aside [therefore] their javelins, they fought with swords hand to hand. But the Germans, according to their custom, rapidly forming a phalanx, sustained the attack of our swords. There were found very many of our soldiers who leaped upon the phalanx, and with their hands tore away the shields, and wounded the enemy from above. Although the army of the enemy was routed on the left wing and put to flight, they [still] pressed heavily on our men from the right wing, by the great number of their troops. On observing which, P. Crassus, a young man, who commanded the cavalry - as he was more disengaged than those who were employed in the fight - sent the third line as a relief to our men who were in distress.

Thereupon the engagement was renewed, and all the enemy turned their backs, nor did they cease to flee until they arrived at the river Rhine , about fifty miles from that place. "

Had the heavy pressure on the Roman right produced a recoil?  As Crassus sent up the third line it would seem that the first line had already been relieved by the second and the latter was showing some signs of distress.  'Pressed heavily' is the translator's rendering of 'premebant', which means "press, press upon, oppress, overwhelm, weigh down; to urge, drive, importune, pursue, to press close or hard, etc." (Lewis lexicon) and one might reasonably conclude that Caesar's intent was to convey that the Roman line was being forced back under pressure.

[aligern]

Said it before , will say it again, in the Caesarian period  goes in very shortly after the first as a second shock into gaps the first line leaves, or it is sent in as an almost automatic reinforcement. IIRC only the third line is described as being used as a reserve in Caesar's accounts.

Roy