Triarii as Camp Guards

[Mark G]

Pat and I have a small but interesting disagreement on whether references to early Triarii as 'Camp Guards' indicates a tactical origin or not.

Pat can detail for himself the significance which he places on this, but for me, I think it is as meaningless as noting that because the 20th armoured brigade includes the 1st Queen's dragoons guards and the Queen's Royal Hussars, then there must be some meaningful cavalry component to them.

I on the other hand, think that as the best equipped and most experienced troops in the Roman army, these guys are the key battle winning tactical reserves, deployed last and locally available at all times to ensure that if the first lines fail but victory is at hand it can be won - but equally, able to be used to stabilise a disaster and protect the integrity of the army as a whole if need be.

I asked Patrick to detail the sources he was using to come up with his statements that the Triarii were camp guards.

He reported the following

See Dionysius V.15.4; VIII.86.4 and IX.12.1.  See also Livy II.47.5 (480 BC) and IV.19.8 (437 BC).

http://soa.org.uk/sm/index.php?topic=1376.15
reply #20 p2

[Mark G]

Dionysius V.15.4
battle with Butus against the sons of king Tarquinius

" 4 For those of the Romans who were on the right wing, which was commanded by Valerius, the other consul, were victorious over the Veientes, and pursuing them to their camp, covered the plain with dead bodies; while those of the Tyrrhenians who were posted on the enemy's right wing and commanded by Titus and Sextus, the sons of King Tarquinius, put the left wing of the Romans the son of flight, and advancing close to their camp, did not fail to attempt to take it by storm; but after receiving many wounds, since those inside stood their ground, they desisted. These guards were the triarii, as they are called; they are veteran troops, experienced in many wars, and are always the last employed in the most critical fighting, when every other hope is lost. "

This is actually the quote which I thought attributed to Livy - the battle is lost, and the triarii have withdrawn back to protect the camp, exactly as a reserve would be expected to operate.


Dionysius VIII.86.4
Battle against the Volscii

" But when, after attacking the hill and surrounding the camp, they endeavoured to pull down the palisades, first the Roman horse, obliged, from the nature of the ground, to fight on foot, sallied out against them, and, behind the horse, those they call the triarii, with their ranks closed. These are the oldest soldiers, to whom they commit the guarding of the camp when they go out to give battle, and they fall back of necessity upon these as their last hope when there has been a general slaughter of the younger men and they lack other reinforcements"

Again, battle has resulted in a roman defeat and a direct attack on the survivors of the battle in the camp - looking at the immediately preceding passage (3)

" For hearing both from scouts and from those who escaped from the enemy's camp that the Romans who had saved themselves were very few, and the greater part of these wounded, they conceived great contempt for them, and immediately seizing their arms, ran to attack them"

so again, the triarii are guarding the camp, but so are the cavalry - because they entire army has withdrawn after a defeat - hardly indicative of the triarii remaining in camp as camp guards during the battle itself.


Dionysius IX.12.1
Battle with Manlius against the Tyrrhenians
appears to be the same battle as described by Livy in II.47 against the Veientes and Etruscans (480)

Dionysus:

" In the meantime the Tyrrhenians who had possessed themselves of the camp abandoned by Manlius, as soon as the signal for battle was given at headquarters, ran with great haste and alacrity to the other camp of the Romans, suspecting that it was not guarded by a sufficient force. And their belief was correct. For, apart from the triarii and a few younger troops, the rest of the crowd then in the camp consisted of merchants, servants and artificers; and with many crowded into a small space — for the struggle was for the gates of the camp — a sharp and severe engagement followed, and there were many dead on both sides"

Livy

". At the same time the battle-line of the enemy was now less strong, for, relying on their excess of numbers, they had withdrawn their reserves and dispatched them to storm the Roman camp. [5] There, having forced an entrance without encountering much opposition, they were frittering away their time, their thoughts more taken up with the booty than with the battle, when the Roman reserves, which had been unable to withstand the first onset, sent word to the consuls how things stood, and then closed up their ranks, returned to the praetorium, and of themselves resumed the battle."

Step back a chapter in Dionysus to 11 though and we see that the he has the Tyrrhenians' now given over to pursuit of the army - another Roman defeat.

This one is quite a long and confused battle - consul Manlius and his men had dismounted to fight on foot (with some success), the opposite wing has been outflanked however under Q Fabrius who is killed - the next consul M Fabrius commanding the centre takes his best centuries (note he has his best men unengaged in the middle of the battlefield) and passes beyond the line and further out past the enveloping enemy right wing, before turning in to attack the near encirclement of the left flank.

Manlius is then hit and believed killed - rendering the army without a general and with one flank consul dead and the centre stripped to hold an envelopment. 

In short, another Raman defeat is looming - and the  Tyrrhenians' are able to take one camp (unguarded) where Manlius is believed dead and turn to take the second

- for me here again, the troops which had stabilised the left flank have seen the loss and the triarii have been withdrawn to guard their camp -

so it is not surprising to see triarii performing the same function that they have performed in the previous two examples - fighting in the battle, and when it is lost, withdrawing back to defend the camp.

This is not evidence that the triarii are camp guards who stay in camp during battle, but rather evidence that they are the tactical reserve, who have a duty to protect the camp if the army is defeated and a withdrawal is called for - but equally, these are surely the self safe men who M Fabrius had available and unengaged in the centre and used to stabilise the left wing sufficiently that they COULD withdraw back to the camp when Manlius was killed and his right wing was routed and his camp was taken (unguarded).

Livy by contrast for this battle, focusses on Manius' flank and has the Etruscans committing their reserves to take the camp, while the main battle line of Manlius is rallied and continues to fight by the consul from the opposite flank.

Leaving aside hat yet again, Livy seems to have turned a Roman defeat into a victory by virtus, the key point here is that both have Manlius' camp unguarded, and both have Roman forces equipped with local reserves able to be dispatched to a combat role at short notice by the local commander. 

These are clearly going to be the Triarii - and they have not been left back in camp as a camp guard, but as I would expect, the best equipped and most experienced men are out in the field and are being used as a tactical reserve.

All of these are particularly early battles - the latest dated approximately 480 b.c. Before the Peloponnesian wars and not long after Marathon, when the Athenians deployed a single line of hoplites as their basic battle formation.

[aligern]

Impressive Mark.
Roy

[Patrick Waterson]

Impressive Mark.
Roy

Well, it would be but for one or two small details ...

Dionysius V.15.4
battle with Butus against the sons of king Tarquinius

" 4 For those of the Romans who were on the right wing, which was commanded by Valerius, the other consul, were victorious over the Veientes, and pursuing them to their camp, covered the plain with dead bodies; while those of the Tyrrhenians who were posted on the enemy's right wing and commanded by Titus and Sextus, the sons of King Tarquinius, put the left wing of the Romans the son of flight, and advancing close to their camp, did not fail to attempt to take it by storm; but after receiving many wounds, since those inside stood their ground, they desisted. These guards were the triarii, as they are called [ēsan d' autou phulakes hoi triarioi legomenoi]; they are veteran troops, experienced in many wars, and are always the last employed in the most critical fighting, when every other hope is lost. "

This is actually the quote which I thought attributed to Livy - the battle is lost, and the triarii have withdrawn back to protect the camp, exactly as a reserve would be expected to operate.

Except that the triarii have not 'withdrawn' - they are and have been guarding the camp.  Dionysius calls them phulakes.  They are guards, not refugees from the battlefield.

Dionysius VIII.86.4
Battle against the Volscii

" But when, after attacking the hill and surrounding the camp, they endeavoured to pull down the palisades, first the Roman horse, obliged, from the nature of the ground, to fight on foot, sallied out against them, and, behind the horse, those they call the triarii, with their ranks closed. These are the oldest soldiers, to whom they commit the guarding of the camp [hois ta stratopeda epitrepousi phulattein] when they go out to give battle, and they fall back of necessity upon these as their last hope when there has been a general slaughter of the younger men and they lack other reinforcements"

Again, battle has resulted in a roman defeat and a direct attack on the survivors of the battle in the camp - looking at the immediately preceding passage (3)

" For hearing both from scouts and from those who escaped from the enemy's camp that the Romans who had saved themselves were very few, and the greater part of these wounded, they conceived great contempt for them, and immediately seizing their arms, ran to attack them"

so again, the triarii are guarding the camp, but so are the cavalry - because they entire army has withdrawn after a defeat - hardly indicative of the triarii remaining in camp as camp guards during the battle itself.

Let me reiterate: These are the oldest soldiers, to whom they commit the guarding of the camp.  How much plainer can Dionysius get?

Dionysius IX.12.1
Battle with Manlius against the Tyrrhenians
appears to be the same battle as described by Livy in II.47 against the Veientes and Etruscans (480)

Dionysus:

" In the meantime the Tyrrhenians who had possessed themselves of the camp abandoned by Manlius, as soon as the signal for battle was given at headquarters, ran with great haste and alacrity to the other camp of the Romans, suspecting that it was not guarded by a sufficient force. And their belief was correct. For, apart from the triarii and a few younger troops, the rest of the crowd then in the camp consisted of merchants, servants and artificers; and with many crowded into a small space — for the struggle was for the gates of the camp — a sharp and severe engagement followed, and there were many dead on both sides"

Livy

". At the same time the battle-line of the enemy was now less strong, for, relying on their excess of numbers, they had withdrawn their reserves and dispatched them to storm the Roman camp. [5] There, having forced an entrance without encountering much opposition, they were frittering away their time, their thoughts more taken up with the booty than with the battle, when the Roman reserves, which had been unable to withstand the first onset, sent word to the consuls how things stood, and then closed up their ranks, returned to the praetorium, and of themselves resumed the battle."

Step back a chapter in Dionysus to 11 though and we see that the he has the Tyrrhenians' now given over to pursuit of the army - another Roman defeat.

This one is quite a long and confused battle - consul Manlius and his men had dismounted to fight on foot (with some success), the opposite wing has been outflanked however under Q Fabrius who is killed - the next consul M Fabrius commanding the centre takes his best centuries (note he has his best men unengaged in the middle of the battlefield) and passes beyond the line and further out past the enveloping enemy right wing, before turning in to attack the near encirclement of the left flank.

Manlius is then hit and believed killed - rendering the army without a general and with one flank consul dead and the centre stripped to hold an envelopment. 

In short, another Raman defeat is looming - and the  Tyrrhenians' are able to take one camp (unguarded) where Manlius is believed dead and turn to take the second

- for me here again, the troops which had stabilised the left flank have seen the loss and the triarii have been withdrawn to guard their camp -

Another 'phantom withdrawal', I fear.  The 'Tyrrhenians' - Dionysian for Etruscans - head for the camp which they think will be inadequately guarded: triarii are not 'withdrawn to guard their camp' because they are already there along with the merchants, servants and artificers.

so it is not surprising to see triarii performing the same function that they have performed in the previous two examples

Camp guards.  (Guards for the camp, that is.)

This is not evidence that the triarii are camp guards who stay in camp during battle, but rather evidence that they are the tactical reserve, who have a duty to protect the camp if the army is defeated and a withdrawal is called for - but equally, these are surely the self safe men who M Fabrius had available and unengaged in the centre and used to stabilise the left wing sufficiently that they COULD withdraw back to the camp when Manlius was killed and his right wing was routed and his camp was taken (unguarded).

'Could' is rather different to 'was in fact the case'.  As we have seen, our source explicitly identifies then as camp guards.  No more, no less.  No amount of imagination will change that.

[aligern]

And yet the attraction of Mark's argument remains. It really hinges upon whether the Triarii are in front of the camp as a reserve, or in it manning its walls.  And they don't just stay in camp they leave it to attack. Your argument has strength Patrick, but it is not cut and dried.
Roy

[Mark G]

Perhaps if you could give a compelling reason why anyone would choose to give their best equipment to men who were not expected to be on the battlefield, and why your most experienced troops are left behind

[Duncan Head]

Perhaps if you could give a compelling reason why anyone would choose to give their best equipment to men who were not expected to be on the battlefield

Why do you think the triarii have "the best equipment"?

[Swampster]

Perhaps if you could give a compelling reason why anyone would choose to give their best equipment to men who were not expected to be on the battlefield, and why your most experienced troops are left behind

Having the best men as the final reserve, or even guarding the baggage, isn't so unusual. Ask Napoleon.

[Mark G]

I agree having the best men in reserve is a sensible tactic.
Where pat and i disagree, is that i have them on the field, and he takes a litteral interpretation that they were back in the camp while battle rages, which i find inconceivable.

[Swampster]

I agree having the best men in reserve is a sensible tactic.
Where pat and i disagree, is that i have them on the field, and he takes a litteral interpretation that they were back in the camp while battle rages, which i find inconceivable.

I know that this is only one battalion of 600+ men rather than the large numbers of the triarii, but the 1/1 Chasseurs of the Old Guard were indeed left in the 'camp' - in their case guarding the treasury wagons. I wouldn't want to draw the analogy too far, but these were some of Napoleon's most senior troops. Out of the rest of the proper Old Guard (i.e the 1st and 2nd regts of Grenadiers and Chasseurs), half were kept back from even being involved in the last throw of the dice, being used only to cover the retreat of the army (and the Emperor).

[Patrick Waterson]

Where pat and i disagree, is that i have them on the field, and he takes a litteral interpretation that they were back in the camp while battle rages, which i find inconceivable.

"... the struggle was for the gates of the camp ..." - Dionysius IX.12.1

This would put the triarii inside the camp, considering the opposition wanted to get in rather than out.

And the job of camp guards is to be inside while the battle rages, just in case something like the Etruscan attack materialises.

[Mark G]

who had possessed themselves of the camp abandoned by Manlius, as soon as the signal for battle was given at headquarters, ran with great haste and alacrity to the other camp of the Romans

the line immediately before yours, Pat, and also from Dionysius IX.12

first camp, not defended by triarii.
second camp defended - after first camp has been lost, no less.

the point being, triarii are not IN camp, but are on battlefield, and have responsibility to return to protect it - which they do - when the battle is lost.

if there is any meaning whatsoever to your assertion that the triarii began as camp guards, then they must be in the camp to defend it.  otherwise, they act as republican triarii - on the field primarily, with additional responsibilities.

otherwise it is just pedantry to assert whenever anyone starts a discussion mentioning triarii that they began as camp guards. 
so what, the 20th armoured brigade began as hussars.

[Patrick Waterson]

who had possessed themselves of the camp abandoned by Manlius, as soon as the signal for battle was given at headquarters, ran with great haste and alacrity to the other camp of the Romans

the line immediately before yours, Pat, and also from Dionysius IX.12

first camp, not defended by triarii.
second camp defended - after first camp has been lost, no less.

the point being, triarii are not IN camp, but are on battlefield, and have responsibility to return to protect it - which they do - when the battle is lost.

*Sigh* Let us have a look at the full action, in context.  First, the 'loss' of the first camp.

" 6 1 The Tyrrhenians, being irked by the prolongation of the war, taunted the Romans with cowardice because they would not come out for battle, and believing that their foes had abandoned the field to them, they were greatly elated. They were still further inspired with scorn for the Roman army and contempt for the consuls when they thought that even the gods were fighting on their side. 2 For a thunderbolt, falling upon the headquarters of Gnaeus Manlius, one of the consuls, tore the tent in pieces, overturned the hearth, and tarnished some of the weapons of war, while scorching or completely destroying others. It killed also the finest of his horses, the one he used in battle, and some of his servants. 3 And when the augurs declared that the gods were foretelling the capture of the camp and the death of the most important persons in it, Manlius roused his forces about midnight and led them to the other camp, where he took up quarters with his colleague. 4 The Tyrrhenians, learning of the general's departure and hearing from some of the prisoners the reasons for his action, grew still more elated in mind, since it seemed that the gods were making war upon the Romans; and they entertained great hopes of conquering them. For their augurs, who are reputed to have investigated with greater accuracy than those anywhere else the signs that appear in the sky, determining where the thunderbolts come from, what quarters receive them when they depart after striking, to which of the gods each kind of bolt is assigned, and what good or evil it portends, advised them to engage the enemy, interpreting the omen which had appeared to the Romans on this wise: 5 Since the bolt had fallen upon the consul's tent, which was the army's headquarters, and had utterly destroyed it even to its hearth, the gods were foretelling to the whole army the wiping out of their camp after it should be taken by storm, and the death of the principal persons in it. 6 "If, now," they said, "the occupants of the place where the bolt fell had remained there instead of removing their standards to the other army, the divinity who was wroth with them would have satisfied his anger with the capture of a single camp and the destruction of a single army; but since they endeavoured to be wiser than the gods and changed their quarters to the other camp, leaving the place deserted, as if the god has signified that the calamities should fall, not upon the men, but upon the places, the divine wrath will come upon all of them alike, both upon those who departed and upon those who received them. 7 And since, when destiny had foretold that one camp should be taken by storm, they did not wait for their fate, but of their own accord handed their camp over to the enemy, the camp which received the deserted camp shall be taken by storm instead of the one that was abandoned."

7 1 The Tyrrhenians, hearing this from their augurs, sent a part of their army to take possession of the camp deserted by the Romans, with the intention of making it a fort to serve against the other camp. For the place was a very strong one and was conveniently situated for intercepting any who might come from Rome to the enemy's camp. After they had also made the other dispositions calculated to give them an advantage over the enemy, they led out their forces into the plain."

The camp 'abandoned by Manlius' had been abandoned before the battle in response to an augury.  This is why it was 'not defended by triarii' and also why it was full of Etruscans before the battle started.

Now the battle itself.

"11 When both armies had come into the plain and the trumpets had sounded the charge, they raised their war-cries and ran to close quarters; and engaging, horse with horse and foot with foot, they fought there, and great was the slaughter on both sides. The troops on the right wing of the Romans, commanded by Manlius, one of the consuls, repulsed the part of the enemy that stood opposite to them, and quitting their horses, fought on foot. But those on the left wing were being surrounded by the enemy's right wing, 2 since the Tyrrhenians' line at this point outflanked that of the Romans and was considerably deeper. Thus the Roman army was being broken in this sector and was receiving many blows. This wing was commanded by Quintus Fabius, who was a legate and proconsul and had been twice consul. He maintained the fight for a long time, receiving wounds of all kinds till, being struck in the breast by a spear, the point of which pierced his bowels, he fell through loss of blood. 3 When Marcus Fabius, the other consul, who commanded in the centre, was informed of this, he took with him the best of the centuries, and summoning Caeso Fabius, his other brother, he passed beyond his own line, and advancing a long way, till he had got beyond the enemy's right wing, he turned upon those who were encircling his men, and charging them, caused great slaughter among all whom he encountered, and also put to flight those who were at a distance; and finding his brother still breathing, he took him up. 4 The man lived only a short time after that; but his death filled his avengers with still more and greater anger against the foe and, heedless now of their own lives, they rushed with a few followers into the densest ranks of the enemy and made large heaps of their dead bodies. 5 In this part of their line, therefore, the Tyrrhenians were hard pressed, and those who earlier had forced their enemies to give ground were now repulsed by those they had conquered; but those on the left wing, where Manlius was, though they were already in distress and beginning to flee, put their opponents to flight. For when Manlius had been struck in the knee with a javelin by an opponent who thrust the point through to the hamstrings, and those about him took him up and were carrying him back to the camp, the enemy, believing the Roman commander to be dead, took heart and, the rest coming to their assistance, pressed hard upon the Romans who now had no commander. 6 This obliged the Fabii to quit their left wing once more and rush to the relief of the right; and the Tyrrhenians, learning that they were approaching in a strong body, gave over further pursuit, and closing their ranks, fought in good order, losing a large number of their own men, but also killing many of the Romans.

12 1 In the meantime the Tyrrhenians who had possessed themselves of the camp abandoned by Manlius, as soon as the signal for battle was given at headquarters, ran with great haste and alacrity to the other camp of the Romans, suspecting that it was not guarded by a sufficient force. And their belief was correct. For, apart from the triarii and a few younger troops, the rest of the crowd then in the camp consisted of merchants, servants and artificers; and with many crowded into a small space — for the struggle was for the gates of the camp — a sharp and severe engagement followed, and there were many dead on both sides.[/i] "

Please note that the Etruscans in Manlius' abandoned camp went for the other camp at the start of the action 'with great haste and alacrity' - and found triarii already there.  There is no question of triarii being on the battlefield or being redeployed from the battlefield.  They were in the camp.

if there is any meaning whatsoever to your assertion that the triarii began as camp guards, then they must be in the camp to defend it. 

And, as we have seen, they were. 

[aligern]

I love this, Etruscans who close their ranks, thus indicating that they had been fighting in a more open order and wound the consul Manlius with a telum, well a thrown weapon.


Good stuff Patrick, keep up the argument for Etruscans as missile armed proto pilum throwers. :-))


Roy

[Patrick Waterson]

I love this, Etruscans who close their ranks, thus indicating that they had been fighting in a more open order and wound the consul Manlius with a telum, well a thrown weapon.

The more open order seems to have been for pursuit rather than for combat.

Good stuff Patrick, keep up the argument for Etruscans as missile armed proto pilum throwers. :-))

Lars Porsena's army did have a complement of missile weapons at the time when Horatius Cocles holding the bridge (509 BC), because Dionysius records some hurling missiles at him and some, 'who had no missiles' throwing shields and swords.  The real question as of this date is whether the missiles were coming from mainstream heavy infantry and what proportion of them - and for that matter from whose infantry, as the army was a composite of nations and cultures with some 'wild cards'.

Lars Porsena's army is described thus:

"His left wing was commanded by the sons of Tarquinius, Sextus and Titus, who had with them the Roman exiles together with the choicest troops from the city of Gabii and no small force of foreigners and mercenaries; the right was led by Mamilius, the son-in‑law of Tarquinius, and here were arrayed the Latins who had revolted from the Romans; King Porsena had taken his place in the centre of the battle-line." - Dionysius V.22.4

Horatius Cocles' stand is described thus:

"For the pursuers, looking upon him as a madman who was courting death, dared no longer come to grips with him. At the same time it was not easy for them even to come near him, since he had the river as a defence on the right and left, and in front of him a heap of arms and dead bodies. But standing massed at a distance, they hurled spears, javelins, and large stones at him, and those who were not supplied with these threw the swords and bucklers of the slain. 3 But he fought on, making use of their own weapons against them, and hurling these into the crowd, he was bound, as may well be supposed, to find some mark every time. Finally, when he was overwhelmed with missiles and had a great number of wounds in many parts of his body" - ibid.24.2-3

The question arises: who of the composite force of Etruscans, Latins and Roman exiles lacked missiles to hurl?  This really belongs in the Early Italian Armies thread.

But perhaps we can return to the subject of triarii as camp guards, unless it is considered that this point has now been settled.