The Hoplite phalanx

[Chuck the Grey]

I've enjoyed the discussion even if work has delayed my participation.

Patrick, I agree that the hoplite enjoys an advantage in equipment for the melee that will usually result in the victory. However, I have for some time been troubled by the assumption of some game designers, and some wargamers, that the hoplite versus the sparabara was a walk over, and this belief resulted in a lower melee factor for the Persians. At Marathon, the Persian center, probably sparabara, was able to push back the Athenian center. I realize that the Athenian center had been thinned out, but the success of the Persian center started me thinking that hoplites needed a minimum depth of formation, that arms and armor were not a guarantee of success, and that the Persian sparabara formation was not as weak in melee as many had assumed.

At Plataea, Herodotus reports that the Persians threw down their bows when the Spartans attacked. Herodotus also describes a battle around the wicker shields that eventually fell over. The mention of the bows and wicker shields indicates this is a sparbara formation. My belief is when Herodotus describes the Persians as throwing their bows down, he is describing the actions of the first two or three ranks behind the shield bearers. I doubt that the rearmost ranks would've immediately thrown their bows down, and during the fierce struggle at the wicker shield barrier the archers for the back would've engaged targets of opportunity adding to the melee effectiveness of the Persians. During the struggle at the shield barrier, some Spartans would've exposed less well protected, or unprotected parts of their body to Persian archery. I grant that this would not have been decisive, but I feel it had affect in extending the melee.

We also have Herodotus' description of the Persians dashing out beyond the front lines individually or in groups of 10 in charge of writing to the Spartan ranks where they perished. This seems to indicate that there was space between the Spartan and Persian lines. Was this space a result of the Spartans at first unable to force the way through the shield barrier, does this indicate that the lines had separated temporarily to regroup, or is this a description of Persian actions immediately preceding the Spartan's contacting the shield wall. In any case, I think it demonstrates that the sparabara formation was at least initially a tougher nut to crack in melee that many of us had assumed over the years.

[Rob Miles]

"At Marathon, the Persian center, probably sparabara, was able to push back the Athenian center. I realize that the Athenian center had been thinned out, but the success of the Persian center started me thinking that hoplites needed a minimum depth of formation, that arms and armor were not a guarantee of success, and that the Persian sparabara formation was not as weak in melee as many had assumed."

Just a point of reference here- at Marathon the centre was not expected to hold and, being an army of citizens, the men there would have understood this. Hoplite formations were more about pushing the enemy over (hence the wicker shields falling at Plataea) and so the more 'depth' you had, the more ability you had to force your opponent back. Later pike phalanx formations and Roman legions did not do this- it was unique to the Hoplite era (and various mobs and so forth). Battle casualties were relatively light for Hoplite-on-Hoplite battles unless one side became snared or encircled.

The Persians did not fight like Hoplites. They chained themselves to fixed positions in defence and so they were easy meat for the more beefy tactics of the Greeks. The Persian war was an example of superior ethos in many respects- citizens over subjects, hoplite formations against fixed lines, imaginative tactics against rigid adherence to doctrine.

However, the Spartan Hoplites were a grade above the normal Greek. Spartan Hoplites were drilled in a manner approximate to Roman legions in that they could turn, retire and otherwise lead the enemy a merry dance at any point in the battle. It would not surprise me if the Spartans did retire to entice the more adventurous Persians into coming into the open, just as the Normans did at Hastings.

Persian formations would have been very good against just about any other of their neighbours, but nobody had anything better than the hoplite at that time until the advent of the long wobbly pole.

[aligern]

From Chuck 'We also have Herodotus' description of the Persians dashing out beyond the front lines individually or in groups of 10 in charge of writing to the Spartan ranks where they perished. This seems to indicate that there was space between the Spartan and Persian lines. Was this space a result of the Spartans at first unable to force the way through the shield barrier, does this indicate that the lines had separated temporarily to regroup, or is this a description of Persian actions immediately preceding the Spartan's contacting the shield wall. In any case, I think it demonstrates that the sparabara formation was at least initially a tougher nut to crack in melee that many of us had assumed over the years.'
I don't think it indicates that the sparabara firmation was tough, rather that, when the Greeks got to close quarters,  the Persians had no effective answer to the agreek spears and resirted to trying to grab them and tear them out of the Greeks' hands. The wall of shields will have been awkward rather than a. real defence as it is designed to stop archery rather than deal with aggressive spearmen.
After Marathon and Plataea the Persian infantry doesn't really face the Greeks in the field. If we believe in Mycale the wall of shields goes down there too.
As. to rear rank archers shooting at the Greeks, well it cannot be ruled out, but such shots will have been few and difficult to make unless both sides break off for a rest and then the wall if shields must be down because otherwise they would prevent direct shooting.

Roy

[Patrick Waterson]

And just to add something else into the mix:

Croesus, finding that his Greek allies were slow in coming to his aid, chose out some of the ablest and stoutest of the Lydians, and armed them in the Greek manner. Cyrus' men, who were unaccustomed to Greek weapons, were at a loss how either to attack, or to guard against them. The clang of the spears upon the shields struck them with terror; and the splendour of the bronze shields so terrified the horses, that they could not be brought to charge. Cyrus was defeated by this stratagem, and made a truce with Croesus for three months.  - Polyaenus, Stratagems 8.1

There seems to have been something about Greek weaponry that the Persians never quite came to terms with.  Their greatest (and arguably only real) success against Greeks was during their suppression of the Ionian revolt, when they won an encounter with an outnumbered and poorly-led Ionian army near Sardis (Herodotus V.102).

One may also note that when the Ionians were asking the mainland Greeks for aid, they mentioned:

"... the Persian mode of fighting: how they used neither shield nor spear*, and were very easy to vanquish." - Herodotus V.97

[*oute aspida oute doru - to be understood as not using 'proper' shields and spears, not as being entirely bereft of both.]

In the engagements of 490 and 479 BC (Marathin and Plataea), the Persians attempted to redress their inferiority in armament by dedicated valour.  Herodotus (IX.62) records them seizing Greek spear shafts at Plataea and breaking them, and also as hurling themselves (esepipton) onto the Greeks singly or in groups of up to ten.  They were attempting to break the Greek formation, but to no avail at Plataea.  However similar tactics of desperation at Marathon against a shallow central Athenian line might well have succeeded in breaking the thin formation there.

On the whole, it looks as if the sparabara were seriously inferior to hoplites, and the only equalising factor that kept the sparabara going in battle was the tremendous, desperate courage of the native Persian troops.  Other Persian contingents tended to melt away as soon as the shieldwall (or shield fence) had been breached, perhaps unsurprisingly, as:

"... what harmed them the most was the fact that they wore no armor over their clothes and fought, as it were, naked against men fully armed." - Herodotus IX.63

At Plataea, the Persian army sallied forth in a hurry, thinking they were undertaking a pursuit rather than a battle.  It is quite likely that most if not all infantry left behind their armour as an unnecessary encumbrance.  However at Marathon and Mycale armour did not save the Persians and their subject contingents from defeat, so at Plataea this seems to have been icing on the cake for the Greeks rather than a different cake.

[Justin Swanton]

In the engagements of 490 and 479 BC (Marathin and Plataea), the Persians attempted to redress their inferiority in armament by dedicated valour.  Herodotus (IX.62) records them seizing Greek spear shafts at Plataea and breaking them, and also as hurling themselves (esepipton) onto the Greeks singly or in groups of up to ten.  They were attempting to break the Greek formation, but to no avail at Plataea.  However similar tactics of desperation at Marathon against a shallow central Athenian line might well have succeeded in breaking the thin formation there.

This brings up something I've been wondering about. Besides othismus, line depth was good for one other thing: a constant supply of fresh spears. If the Greeks were deep enough at Plataea, the rear ranks would be able to feed the front ranks a sufficiently steady supply to keep up the pressure until the Persians gave way. At Marathon the thinness of the Greek line would have meant the Greeks running out of spears before the Persians broke - and hence breaking themselves.

Applying this idea, can one postulate that greater line depth would be employed to remedy situations in which the front rank troops more quickly ran out of spears? Would the greater depth of the pike phalanx correspond to the fact that five ranks of pikes were in the fight, as opposed to the two ranks of spears of a hoplite phalanx, and hence needed more rear ranks to replace broken pikeshafts (which were more easy to break since one was not up close and personal to the phalangite holding them)?

[aligern]

At Matathon the Greeks run in and are likely disordered when they reach the Persian line, but they have crossed the beaten zone with very few dasualties. It matpy well ge that the Persian troops in the centre are not sparabara as the pavise may already be on the ships, but that the troops facing the Athenians are armed with a dipylon style shield and a shirt spear or sagaris. Given the greater depth of the Persians it is likely that in a mixed melee the Persians were able to pysh through the centre of the Greek line, but as the stronger Greek wings closed inwards the Oersians in the centre were only conducting a flight to the front.
Roy

[Rob Miles]

I know this thread is about archery, but I think a little more on hoplites is needed for clarity.

The Hoplite's most functional piece of equipment was his SHIELD. Without it, he could not function as a hoplite. When Cleonymus famously dropped his once, Aristophanes lampooned him in just about every single one of his plays. After the shield comes the armour and only then do the spears and swords come to prominence.

The shield was slammed into the enemy. The hoplites behind the front rank-- all of them going back to the last in the column--- then braced against the men in front of them and pushed like a rugby scrum. Meanwhile, the spears were thrust overhand-- over the tops of the shields--- to inflict such injury as they could and to put the enemy off balance. If you fell, you were more likely to be trampled to death than stabbed (although stabbing was always an option). The importance to the Greeks was one of the unity of the polis in defeating through unified strength and this unity, common purpose and, above all, loyalty to their city gave them terrific morale. Whether democratic or oligarchy, the hoplite embodied a social ethos strengthened often by homosexual love and fear of the public shame that would befall anyone who dropped his shield.

[Duncan Head]

The shield was slammed into the enemy. The hoplites behind the front rank-- all of them going back to the last in the column--- then braced against the men in front of them and pushed like a rugby scrum.

This part, of course, is seriously controversial: many scholars are dead set against the "rugby scrum" model as a complete misinterpretation of hoplite warfare, and some see the "pushing" as figurative rather than physical.

See for example Adrian Goldsworthy's article here.

[Rob Miles]

Re :"See for example Adrian Goldsworthy's article here."

Ah-- a man from my old college! It was certainly not the prevailing thinking when I did my Classics degree there.... And, frankly, I find the long argument about the real reason for maintaining depth was to maintain cohesion very hollow-- ANY army of that period up until 1815 would have marched in column over any distance for the reasons given AND THEN have stretched out into a line commensurate with its weaponry and training to bring maximum force to bear. The Greek hoplites remained, largely 8 or more ranks deep. The significant evidence comes from vase paintings, which always show the overarm spear thrust (something you would ONLY do if your shield was locked against the enemy) and accounts such as those of Marathon where a deliberate policy of thinning the centre to four ranks led to the outcome of the centre almost collapsing whilst the wings held and pushed back (and eventually into the now-disfigured Persian 'line'.

I will not be unkind here and suggest that my experience with research historians leads me to understand the importance of establishing controversy to their survival (you should have seen the stuff their research chair in critical theory came up with!), but there is nothing in Adrian Goldsworthy's article that amounts to more than conjecture with only spurious or very singular references which are open to interpretation one way or the other. Contemporary historians always write for their own time and do not assume that we have moved on to bombs and drones and suchlike-- so vital detail is usually omitted on the grounds that it, to them, is just stating the bleeding obvious. EVERYONE would have fought in a hoplite formation. It was a condition of citizenship for the ordinary Greek.

The hoplite formation was the embodiment of the polis-- strength through unity. Every man in the hoplite was expected to do his part or face humiliation, exile or death. The idea that the rear six or more ranks of a hoplite formation just waited until their friends in front to die trembles the foundations of the whole identity of the city-state.

And, OK, so not like a rugby scrum in a literal way. Ironically, given the counter-argument, it was a metaphor.

[Duncan Head]

The significant evidence comes from vase paintings, which always show the overarm spear thrust (something you would ONLY do if your shield was locked against the enemy)

Of course, the overarm thrust is controversial, too - though not rejected by anything like the number of academics who reject the "rugby scrum"-othismos. Christopher Matthew, in A Storm of Spears: Understanding the Greek Hoplite in Action, argues, if I remember the details right, that the overarm thrust is an artistic convention going back to the overarm position used to throw spears, and that hoplites really used a high underarm grip (this is the closest I can find in a hurry) - almost like a couched lance - in the phalanx. That seems a popular grip with re-enactors of diverse periods, like these mediaeval guys.

(His arguments are rejected here.)

I don't find this one at all convincing myself, but I thought I'd just point out that almost everything about phalanx combat seems to be controversial these days.

and accounts such as those of Marathon where a deliberate policy of thinning the centre to four ranks led to the outcome of the centre almost collapsing

Hans van Wees (in the brilliant [but of course controversial] Greek Warfare: Myths and Realities) points out that this isn't exactly what any of the Greek sources say. Herodotos says that the centre was only a few taxeis, which would normally mean "a few units". If he meant to say "a few ranks", he'd probably have said something more like "a few shields deep".

Yes, the phalanx was strong because of its depth, and a shallow phalanx was weak. But there is still a great deal of disagreement about exactly how the mechanics of this strength worked. Was it primarily physical, or psychological? Did the rear ranks push physically, replace tired front-rankers, or just stop them from falling back? All have been proposed. (And this uncertainty is nothing new, but goes back at least to Fraser's "The Myth of the phalanx-scrimmage" article of 1942.)

If you want to understand the current state of thinking on hoplite warfare, I suggest reading the van Wees book and Adam Schwartz, Reinstating the Hoplite: Arms, Armour and Phalanx Fighting in Archaic and Classical Greece which is something of a response to van Wees re-stating something like the traditional views.

[Rob Miles]

Posted by: Duncan Head
« on: Today at 10:37:06 AM »

Thanks for that-- I have also been away for far too long and see that 'rot' has set in. 2,500 years of informed, intelligent analysis swept away in a wave of popular conjecture with very little evidence other than arguments about argument and interpretation. For the record, there are plenty of vase paintings showing a variety of spear grips, but ALL the ones depicting lines of hoplites converging on each other show the overarm grip. When in single combat, spearmen are depicted using underarm. So much for 'artistic convention' for which there is zero evidence-- there is less than zero evidence to suggest the hoplites threw their spears.

The hoplite were named from the hoplon- the shield without which one could not operate as a hoplite. It was designed so that the whole of the arm AND THE SHOULDER could support it. It was DESIGNED for shoving. I know researchers need to earn a living, as do TV evangelists and other such 'modern thinkers'. The difference between the thinking and the truth is the evidence, and there is NO EVIDENCE to support the idea that hoplites engaged in a manner more appropriate to dark-age spearmen than the innovative battle-winner that it was in its day.

Bloody hell- you can tell I'm in my menopause! These young people they don't know they're born etc etc etc...

[Duncan Head]

The hoplite were named from the hoplon- the shield

Not really. Hoplon is a tool or piece of equipment, hopla is arms or equipment in general, but hoplon does not specifically mean the shield. See Lazenby's article. "Hoplite" means "armed man", not "man with a hoplon shield", which is why the word can be used for heavy-armed soldiers who don't have the hoplite's Argive shield.

[Rob Miles]

ὅπλον, in common with most words in all languages, has many meanings. It became associated with the hoplite because of the ὅπλον and so, by extension, to mean an armed man. I believe the Greeks invented the word μετωνυμία.

Boy you guys are making me work hard this morning!

[Mark G]

The van wees is a damn good read too, just as an aside.

[Duncan Head]

ὅπλον, in common with most words in all languages, has many meanings. It became associated with the hoplite because of the ὅπλον and so, by extension, to mean an armed man.

Do you have any evidence for this assertion? As far as I know, no classical Greek writer uses "hoplon" to mean a shield: there is one explicit passage in Diodoros saying hoplitai are so named because of their aspis (which is of course written some centuries after the Argive shield went out of fashion - and even that doesn't say that the aspis is called hoplon), and I think some ambiguous uses, but that's all. As Lazenby says, it's one of those things that scholars just repeat from other scholars.