Battlefield signalling

[Erpingham]

The usual guess seems to be that they served a cultic purpose, but then "probably served a cultic purpose" tends to be archaeologists' first guess for anything not obviously meant for something else.

We would probably put the carnyx in the same category if it wasn't for the Romans recording they were used in warfare.  I'm not saying that the Lur was anything but cultic, but they could be associated with secular pomp just as well and in either function have found themselves on a battlefield.  The evidence just isn't there.

[Patrick Waterson]

Unfortunately games that boil down to "line up and kill whatever is in front of you" tend to make for a boring gaming experience, especially when you consider that wargamers fight far more battles than any historical general ever did. Most successful rules therefore grant unrealistic levels of control to players to generate the decision points that make the gaming experience interesting.

What do mean boring?  This is my normal tactic with the sort of hairy armies I end up with and it is not at all boring for me, although my opponent occasionally finds it distressing that his really expensive troops types, who brushed off the first wave of riff-raff, get soundly thrashed by the second or third wave. 

Recreating an historical level of troop control is simple.  I normally find that several pints of pre-match lager does the trick!

Unfortunately most modern rules no longer support this tactic, because they insist the army should pack up and go home once a third of its number (ie, the first wave) has been destroyed. 

This could be a serious problem for Ottoman armies, which routinely did this sort of thing (in with the bashi-bazouks, then send in the provincials over their bodies and finally wrap up with the janissaries).

Ottoman armies, incidentally, seem to have been fairly inflexible in their battle plans once their empire got going, but even so they had 'attack' and 'retire' signals, the latter being evidenced during the siege of Malta, when on 7th August 1565 Mustafa Pasha launched what he expected would be the final and decisive assault against the main positions of Birgu and Senglea.  Repulsed at Birgu, the Turks managed to gain a footing on the citadel of St Michael at Senglea.  Mustafa Pasha was leading the janissaries in to exploit the breach when suddenly news arrived that a Christian relief force had landed and was sacking the Turkish camp.

"Clear above the noise of battle, the Turks heard the signal to retreat." - Ernle Bradford, The Great Siege: Malta 1565, p.170

Mustafa Pasha feared that the relief force would take his army in the rear just as he and his best troops were funnelled into an uncomfortable narrow space.  In point of fact it was not the relief force (which did not arrive for another month) but a cavalry sortie from the city of Mdina in the north of the island.  Mustafa Pasha was not pleased when he learned that he had aborted his best chance of taking the key Hospitaller stronghold in Malta, but he did at least demonstrate that the Ottomans had a signal for breaking off and retiring.

[Nick Harbud]

On a more serious note, I suspect that most battlefield communication was undertaken by couriers.  Mark Adkin in "The Charge: Real Reason Why the Light Brigade Was Lost" goes into some detail on this subject due to its importance in the events his book deals with.

The big advantage of couriers over audible or visual signals is not only the complexity of the message, but also the ability of the recipient to question the messenger, who was expected to be familiar with the sender's intent and to provide such clarification as required. 

One might also consider the relative speed of delivery.  Horses canter at 16-27 km/h, covering a kilometre (~15 base widths) in 2-4 minutes.  A gallop is about twice as fast.

[Erpingham]

On a more serious note, I suspect that most battlefield communication was undertaken by couriers.  Mark Adkin in "The Charge: Real Reason Why the Light Brigade Was Lost" goes into some detail on this subject due to its importance in the events his book deals with.

In the Crimea, the armies are operating a completely different type of leadership, where a general can sit on a hill with a telescope, sending off notes with ADC  Ancient and medieval generals always strike me as being more in the thick of it.  That's not to say messengers didn't come to and fro.  Patrick will doubtless conjur up that occassion when Alexander in one of his battles gets a sit-rep from one of his division commanders during a battle.  And Xenophon's story, which I think was covered in the Persian thread of the Greeks being sent orders which they respectfully declined at Cunaxa. But I'd suggest this method of comunication, though always present, may have been more restricted in ancient times because of reduced opportunity.

[Dangun]

"Clear above the noise of battle, the Turks heard the signal to retreat." - Ernle Bradford, The Great Siege: Malta 1565, p.170

Very weird that you should bring that up since I just downloaded this to Kindle while waiting for my flight out of Malta. 

[Patrick Waterson]

"Clear above the noise of battle, the Turks heard the signal to retreat." - Ernle Bradford, The Great Siege: Malta 1565, p.170

Very weird that you should bring that up since I just downloaded this to Kindle while waiting for my flight out of Malta. 

One of life's little coincidences.   It is quite a good account, with the author explaining what was important and why (and how) as an integral part of the narrative.  This makes the details of the siege (and peripheral activities like the preparation of the relief force) fairly easy to follow.

In the Crimea, the armies are operating a completely different type of leadership, where a general can sit on a hill with a telescope, sending off notes with ADC  Ancient and medieval generals always strike me as being more in the thick of it.  That's not to say messengers didn't come to and fro.  Patrick will doubtless conjure up that occasion when Alexander in one of his battles gets a sit-rep from one of his division commanders during a battle.

At Gaugamela, Parmenio sent messengers to Alexander at least twice and perhaps three times (depending on whose account you read) saying he was in trouble and some help would be very welcome.  Alexander sent a return message which in essence was to stop being a wet blanker and get on with it; however the final message was couched in such terms as to cause Alex to abandon his pursuit of Darius and return to the battlefield.

This is the only case I can remember of Alexander, or rather one of his subordinates, making use of a messenger during a battle.   The lack of messengers at the Hydaspes is very notceable despite this battle involving more complex and intricate manoeuvring than Gaugamela.

As Anthony says, it was a different type of battlefield and a different type of battle.  On the classical battlefield you could see the whole of your army and that of your opponent.  As a rule of thumb, 5,000 men in the classical period would deploy on the frontage of 500 men in the Napoleonic period.  If you wanted your subordinate to do something different, and it was in the book, you usually had a signal.  If not, then unless you led from the front Macedonian-style you could usually nip over yourself and have a word - a general could ride as fast as a messenger and was much better able to assess the situation and decide what was needed.

And Xenophon's story, which I think was covered in the Persian thread of the Greeks being sent orders which they respectfully declined at Cunaxa. But I'd suggest this method of communication, though always present, may have been more restricted in ancient times because of reduced opportunity.

In fact it was Cyrus himself who paid the Greeks a visit and dropped a broad hint that maybe they should reposition themselves where they could win the battle at a stroke.  This was before the fighting started: once it began Cyrus quickly became involved leading his bodyguard from the front and that was that as far as messages were concerned.

We get mention of C-in-Cs perambulating about the battlefield (e.g. Sertorius at Lauron, Caesar at the Sambre) far more often than we find any mention of battlefield messengers, who seem to be a rara avis turning up only when the situation has taken an unexpected turn.  I cannot offhand think of any mention of a classical commander issuing orders through a battlefield messenger, though doubtless the ability was there should it be desired.  It just seems not to have been used.

[RichT]

Gaugamela is a rather interesting case as there is a lot of ordering going on, though it's not made clear how the orders are transmitted (Signal? Messenger? Presumably not in person). The word used is generally κελεύω keleuo, 'ordered' without any elaboration.

Examples (using the translation by E. J. Chinnock because it's to hand (or to mouse))
Arr Anab 3.13 f.

"Alexander led his own army more towards the right"
Presumably A just leads and everyone follows

"Then Darius ... ordered the front ranks of his left wing to ride round the right wing of the Macedonians"
Darius stayed in the centre - so was this a messenger order? Pre-arranged signal?

"Alexander ordered the cavalry of the Grecian mercenaries under the command of Menidas to attack them."
Again A doesn't leave the Companions. Unless signals had been arranged for specific units to attack (seems unlikely), this seems to be a messenger.

"But the Scythian cavalry and the Bactrians, who had been drawn up with them sallied forth against them,"
As ordered by Darius? On their own (or Bessus', or some other leader's) initiative?

"Alexander then ordered Aristo at the head of the Paeonians and Grecian auxiliaries to attack the Scythians"
Another messenger?

"Notwithstanding this, the Macedonians sustained their assaults, and assailing them violently squadron by squadron"
Standing orders / doctrine

"Meantime the foreigners launched their scythe-bearing chariots against Alexander himself"
This could be done easily by signal (from Darius presumably).

"the Agrianians and the javelin-men with Balacrus, who had been posted in front of the Companion cavalry, hurled their javelins at them"
Standing orders / doctrine

"the men stood apart and opened their ranks, as they had been instructed"
Pre-arranged orders

"As soon as Darius began to set his whole phalanx in motion"
A 'general advance' signal?

"Alexander ordered Aretes to attack those who were riding completely round his right wing"
Another messenger?

"and up to that time he was himself leading his men in column"
Lead/follow

"Alexander wheeled round towards the gap, and forming a wedge as it were of the Companion cavalry and of the part of the phalanx which was posted here, he led them with a quick charge and loud battle-cry straight towards Darius himself"
The Companions can lead/follow, but what about the phalanx? Pre-arranged?

"Simmias and his brigade were not yet able to start with Alexander in pursuit, but causing the phalanx to halt there, he took part in the struggle, because the left wing of the Macedonians was reported to be hard pressed"
A report (from whom?) to Simmias, and Simmias on his own initiative stopping to help.

"some of the Indians and of the Persian cavalry burst through the gap towards the baggage of the Macedonians"
Own initiative (attacking what is (or isn't) in front of them).

"But the commanders of the men who had been posted as a reserve to the first phalanx, learning what was taking place, quickly moved from the position which they had been ordered to take"
Pre-arranged orders overridden by initiative

"At this juncture, while the Macedonians were doubtful as to the result of the battle, Parmenio sent a messenger to Alexander in haste"
First definite messenger! In this case, bearing information not orders, up the command chain.

"When this news was brought to Alexander, he immediately turned back again from the pursuit, and wheeling round with the Companion cavalry, led them with great speed against the right wing of the foreigners"
Lead/follow

[Dangun]

"Then Darius ... ordered the front ranks of his left wing to ride round the right wing of the Macedonians"

It is interesting to find so many "orders" being described by Arrian.
Although I wonder whether many of the references are literary artifacts rather than information from Arrian's sources.

This is more obvious in the instances of Darius' "orders". Arrian's source was more likely Greek than Persion and probably only saw 'Darius phalanx go left' and then either the source or Arrian inferred that 'Darius ordered the phalanx left'. The inference may be correct, but it may equally be a literary choice to focus on the actions - real or otherwise - of two individuals - Big Al and Darius.

You could make the same argument about Alexander's 'orders'. Its not as strong because the sources (including Aristobulus)  probably knew more about the Macedonians than the Persians. But its a very small literary addition to change a fact - Aristo's auxiliaries attacked the Scythians - to 'Alexander then ordered', especially when it fits Arrian's more hagiographical tendencies.

[Jim Webster]

I stopped to think about it and it struck me that there were an awful lot of Greeks who had served at pretty high levels in Persian armies. Probably at a higher level than in Macedonian armies. So it's not entirely impossible for something to have come down to say how the Persians did things

Jim

[RichT]

Although I wonder whether many of the references are literary artifacts rather than information from Arrian's sources.

I agree in principle, especially as regards the Persians (when the Bactrians rode out to attack I don't suppose anyone in Alexander's army knew what the trigger was, whether messenger from Darius, signal, pre-arranged plan, or initiative. Describing all movements of an army in terms of positive intentions of the commander is after all commonplace (Napoleon sent in his cavalry, Hitler sent in his panzers etc etc). Though there would have been opportunities for Ptolemy and Artistoboulos to find out afterwards if they were so inclined ("so tell me Mazaios, how does command and control work in your army?").

For Alexander, while I'm as wary as anyone of attributing all positive actions to him alone, the feeding of units into the right wing cavalry fight does read as if this is how it really happened. Note that nothing whatever is said of what was going on on the left where presumably Parmenion was conducting a similar exercise with his cavalry (completely outside Alexander's control - Alexander didn't have any idea what was happening on the left until Parmenion's messenger found him).

[Erpingham]

For Alexander, while I'm as wary as anyone of attributing all positive actions to him alone, the feeding of units into the right wing cavalry fight does read as if this is how it really happened. Note that nothing whatever is said of what was going on on the left where presumably Parmenion was conducting a similar exercise with his cavalry (completely outside Alexander's control - Alexander didn't have any idea what was happening on the left until Parmenion's messenger found him).

An interesting observation which might indicate what the command and control "horizon" may have been.  Alexander can successfully control the elements of the right wing but can be much less hands on with the left wing because he isn't there.

[Jim Webster]

Although I wonder whether many of the references are literary artifacts rather than information from Arrian's sources.

I agree in principle, especially as regards the Persians (when the Bactrians rode out to attack I don't suppose anyone in Alexander's army knew what the trigger was, whether messenger from Darius, signal, pre-arranged plan, or initiative. Describing all movements of an army in terms of positive intentions of the commander is after all commonplace (Napoleon sent in his cavalry, Hitler sent in his panzers etc etc). Though there would have been opportunities for Ptolemy and Artistoboulos to find out afterwards if they were so inclined ("so tell me Mazaios, how does command and control work in your army?").

Wouldn't even need to ask a defeated Persian general, they'd have enough Greeks and Iranian horsemen who'd been in Persian service who would know how it had done.
I suspect that there'd be a 'transition' period where the new contingents had to learn Greek ways, or Greek ways might change to take up on bright ideas the new chaps brought in

Jim 

[Nick Harbud]

Richard's contribution is excellent.

Fundamentally, the chronicler is detailing the key reactions of units to developments during the battle that could probably not have been foreseen and accounted for in pre-battle orders, briefings, councils of war, etc.  IMO there are only 3 possible explanations as to how Alexander 'ordered' his units:

• He gave one or more signals
• He did not give any orders and it was all down to the local commander using his initiative
• He sent messengers.

To 'signal' a particular unit to attack a particular enemy (eg,"Alexander then ordered Aristo at the head of the Paeonians and Grecian auxiliaries to attack the Scythians") would require a complex signal system, which whether or not one believes in its existence, would definitely require a significant and sophisticated effort to develop. 

Of course, Aristo might have decided to attack by himself, but would he really risk such an irrevocable act without the command or at least agreement of his notoriously unforgiving CinC, and if so, would such an unusual act not have been recorded as elsewhere in the narrative?

The simplest explanation is often the correct one.  Grab the nearest junior officer-type, instruct him go over to Aristo and tell him to get stuck in.

One might also note that the creators of sophisticated battlefield signalling systems in more modern times were the navies, not the armies.

[Jim Webster]

This would have the advantage that the junior officers nearest to Alexander would almost certainly be individuals known to the rest of the officer corps

[Dangun]

The simplest explanation is often the correct one.  Grab the nearest junior officer-type, instruct him go over to Aristo and tell him to get stuck in.

I would have thought the simplest explanation is your option 2 - that the local commander (e.g. Aristo) did it himself, and that the literary sources later ascribed 'an order' to Alexander.

I would also suggest that the simplest of all options should be added to your list - that noone ordered anything. Perhaps the two lines - under only the broadest of macro instructions - just closed to a distance at which they started swinging at each other. 'and then x attacked y' makes it sound it more controlled, and leads us to infer intentions and orders. But there are many layers of authoring at which such conjunctions may have been added to the facts.