Battlefield signalling

[RichT]

Actually I missed a couple of useful bits from the previous paragraph of Arrian:

Arr 3.12 "Directions had been given to the commanders of these men posted in reserve, to wheel round and receive the attack of the foreigners, if they should see their own comrades surrounded by the Persian army... Instructions had been given to Menidas and the troops under him to wheel round and attack the enemy in flank, if they should ride round their wing."

(The word used for 'directions/instructions had been given' is 'parangello').

Which then applies to these two incidents form the fighting:

Arr 3.13 "Then Darius, fearing that his chariots would become useless, if the Macedonians advanced into uneven ground, ordered the front ranks of his left wing to ride round the right wing of the Macedonians, where Alexander was commanding, to prevent him from marching his wing any further. This being done, Alexander ordered the cavalry of the Grecian mercenaries under the command of Menidas to attack them."

('ordered' is 'keleuo')

Arr 3.14 "But the commanders of the men who had been posted as a reserve to the first phalanx, learning what was taking place, quickly moved from the position which they had been ordered to take, and coming upon the Persians in the rear, killed many of them there collected round the baggage"

No advance orders equivalent to those to Menidas are recorded for Alcetas or Aristo(n) (which isn't to say they weren't given of course - we just don't know).

In the case of Menidas, Alexander seems to be ordering him to execute a pre-arranged order - which could indicate that a signal was all that was needed - however, there is no evidence here or anywhere else for unit-specific signals of this kind. But this does tie in nioely with the Anderson article I quoted earlier in this thread - Greek armies seem to have worked by giving a verbal preparatory order explaining what was to be done, then a visual or audible executive order to carry out the instructions.

In the case of the anonymous commanders of the reserve, it seems they didn't receive or need an executive order from Alexander - when the circumstances coincided with the preparatory instructions they had, they executed them.

It just shows how little we really know about how ancient warfare worked. If I had to place a bet, it would be that Alexander gave more or less detailed advance orders to all his commanders ('part to let chariots through', 'attack attempted outflankers', 'face about to deal with encirclement' etc); then in the course of the battle, when events occured within his view (which would have been limited) he could issue the executive orders (which I would guess was by messenger as the commanders in question were posted close by), and for those outside his field of vision (a few hundred yeards? Less?) the local commander (Parmenion) or unit commanders (Simmias, anon reserve officers) would carry out an equivalent function). Arrian's account of Alexander ordering in the various counterattacks would then be accurate - Alexander would have issued the executive orders in each case - but this was only in a narrow bubble around Alexander, outside of which (the reserve, Simmias' taxis, Parmenion's cavalry) Alexander would have no idea what was happening until he found out (by messenger or by going there in person) later on.

[Patrick Waterson]

Richard's contribution is excellent.

Agreed.

I rather like Richard's 'bet' about the way things would have worked.  The cavalry contingents sent off to deal with the Persian left would have been pre-briefed, and Alexander would have kept things flexible depending upon how successful Menidas' contingent was.  In the event he seems to have needed only Ariston in support, allowing Alexander to hold on to the Prodromoi (Sarissophoroi) until these could be released with devastating effect into the flank and rear of Bessus' cavalry.

Regarding order transmission for the cavalry on Alex's right, I think Richard has the right idea about a messenger - probably one of Alexander's inner circle of somatophylakes - going over to say: "Menidas, now's your time!" or some such equivalent.

The simplest explanation is often the correct one.  Grab the nearest junior officer-type, instruct him go over to Aristo and tell him to get stuck in.

I would have thought the simplest explanation is your option 2 - that the local commander (e.g. Aristo) did it himself, and that the literary sources later ascribed 'an order' to Alexander.

Junior commanders acting on their own initiative seems to have been so rare as to be noteworthy when it happened.  Philipoemen at Sellasia is a case in point.

"Philopoemen was stationed among the Macedonian cavalry with his own fellow-citizens,2 and had as a support the Illyrians, a large body of good fighters, who closed up the line of battle. [2] They had been ordered to lie quietly in reserve until, from the other wing, a signal should be made by the king with a scarlet coat stretched upon a spear. But the Illyrians, at the command of their officers, tried to force back the Lacedaemonians, while the Achaeans, as they had been ordered to do, kept quietly waiting at their post. Therefore Eucleidas, the brother of Cleomenes, who noticed the gap thus made in the enemies' line, quickly sent round the most agile of his light-armed troops, with orders to attack the Illyrians in the rear and rout them, now that they had lost touch with the cavalry.

[3] These orders were carried out, and the light-armed troops were driving the Illyrians before them in confusion, when Philopoemen perceived that it would be no great task to attack the light-armed troops, and that the occasion prompted this step. At first he pointed this out to the king's officers. Then, when they were not to be persuaded by him, but looked down upon him as a madman (since his reputation was not yet great enough to justify his being entrusted with so important a manoeuvre), he took matters into his own hands, formed his fellow-citizens into a wedge, and charged upon the enemy. [4] At first the light-armed troops were thrown into confusion, then put to rout with great slaughter." - Plutarch, Philopoemen 6.1-4

Note the 'consultation' preceding Philopoemen's initiative.  After the battle:

"After his victory, therefore, Antigonus put his Macedonians to the question, and asked them why, without his orders, they had brought the cavalry into action. [7] They defended themselves by saying that they had been forced against their will to attack the enemy, because a young man of Megalopolis had first led a charge against them. At this, Antigonus gave a laugh and said: 'Well, then, that young man behaved like a great commander.' " - idem 6.6-7

Given the sentiments expressed about acting without orders, I would consider it to have been extremely rare.

[Nick Harbud]

Of course, the pre-battle conditional orders could have been another literary mechanism for justifying what subsequently happened, and enhancing Alexander's reputation for forecasting opponents' actions into the bargain....

[Erpingham]

Junior commanders acting on their own initiative seems to have been so rare as to be noteworthy when it happened.  Philipoemen at Sellasia is a case in point.

It certainly shows how these things were structured in terms of age, experience and ally status in this case.  The senior Macedonian commanders had their orders and did not judge they should deviate from them.  A junior allied officer makes the case against his superiors, fails but decides going it alone is the best choice (high risk - not many young officers would have taken that risk).  Luckily, he is proved right.  On the other side, Eucleidas spots a gap, orders troops through it.  Almost certainly an initiative move, possibly a conditional order (if a gap opens up.....).  But this is a more senior commander, established in the hierarchy - no issue or scandal commented on.

[Patrick Waterson]

At Sellasia, the battle was divided into two parts because the Spartans manned two hills: Cleomenes (the king) commanded on one and Eucleidas, his brother, the other.  Polybius II.65 has the details.  Eucleidas thus, unlike Philopoemen, had full authority for handling the cavalry under his command.

For the record, Eucleidas lost the battle by trying to be a bit too clever (he lured his Macedonian and Illyrian opponents all the way up the hill so his men could have a fine time pushing them all the way back down, but their initial impetus pushed his troops back over the crest and did unto them what they had hoped to do to their foes).

For the purposes of this thread, the interesting bit about the battle is the prearranged signals:

"It was arranged that the Illyrians, who had bivouacked in full order during the previous night along the river Gorgylus, close to the foot of Evas, were to begin their assault on the hill when they saw a flag of linen raised from the direction of Olympus; and that the Megalopolitans and cavalry should do the same when the king raised a scarlet flag." - Polybius II.66.10-11

Anyone who moved before the relevant flag was raised would need a very good reason for doing so.  Philopoemen actually had one.  Another clue about how rare the use of individual initiative was is provided by the sequel:

"This naturally brought Philopoemen into high repute. Antigonus was eager that he should take service under him, and offered him command and pay." - Plutarch, Philopoemen 7.1

Of course, the pre-battle conditional orders could have been another literary mechanism for justifying what subsequently happened, and enhancing Alexander's reputation for forecasting opponents' actions into the bargain....

There is actually a fairly involved story behind both sides' pre-battle orders at Gaugamela: one which was missed by our still-extant sources, and which I intend to expound in a forthcoming article about Gaugamela.  Suffice to say we shall probably be assessing both Darius' and Alexander's generalship in a new light.

[Dangun]

I doubt the quality of the sources supports the precision or certainty that we would like to ascribe to them.

[Erpingham]

Thanks for the clarifications on Sellasia Patrick - not a battle I know.  The signals are interesting but the example illustrates something on the limits of independent action.  Eucleidas, a wing commander, has the initiative both to exploit a gap and attempt a ploy which fails.  Further down the chain of command, Philopoemen, who seems to be commander of a cavalry contingent, has the right to approach his superiors with a suggestion but breaks the rules by taking independent action.  We might suggest from this example that our rules might reflect an unlikelyhood of independent initiative by units but a possibility by wings and divisions.  That possibility might be encouraged or constrained.  The Macedonian cavalry were under very strict orders not to do anything until signalled.

If we take this through to the medieval period we see a similar pattern, perhaps with more flexibility given to the divisional commands (or this may be an artefact of the different style of reporting). 

So, how do we best game this?  I think it does give justification, if not to the general towering over the field, then to the active playing of the main commanders - which is good because most of us don't like putting most of the army on autopilot and only playing the general figure.  However, within those main commands, the individual units might have limited initiative.  Signals seem to be of two sorts; standard and one-off.  An army would recognise "General advance", "Withdraw to camp", "Rally to your standards".  Then there could be perhaps one or two special signals meaning "execute pre-planned action" - cloak waving, a particular call etc.

[Patrick Waterson]

So, how do we best game this?  I think it does give justification, if not to the general towering over the field, then to the active playing of the main commanders - which is good because most of us don't like putting most of the army on autopilot and only playing the general figure.  However, within those main commands, the individual units might have limited initiative.  Signals seem to be of two sorts; standard and .  An army would recognise "General advance", "Withdraw to camp", "Rally to your standards".  Then there could be perhaps one or two special signals meaning "execute pre-planned action" - cloak waving, a particular call etc.

A good summary.

One might also allow some armies which historically displayed the ability to fiddle creatively with small contingents (e.g. Alexander's army at Issus and Gaugamela) to do so with units designated as 'semi-independent' (extra points paid by either the units or the general?) which can be despatched from within a certain radius of the C-in-C.  This could cover the putative messenger aspect which emerged in discussion.

WRG 6th paid lip service to this aspect of command by limiting the number of units an army list could field, e.g. an Alexandrian Macedonian army could use up to 20 regular command 'factors' @ 10 points and 8 irregular command 'factors' @ 25 points (one command 'factor' being needed for each unit unless it served as a non-detachable bodyguard) while a Feudal French army could use only 6 and 12 respectively.  Assuming significant and equal point values (about 3x the usual 1,000-1,500 points) the Feudal French would field fewer units, mainly irregular (the regulars are almost all mercenaries) while the Macedonians could have large infantry formations and many small, flexible cavalry units.

Signalling was covered (sort of) on p.21 of the 6th Edition WRG rules, as follows:

One new order or signal per turn maximum (not both).

Orders are sent by messenger, represented by a figure from the general's bodyguard which peels off and moves at charge speed.

Signals are assumed to be visible and audible if a general is accompanied by a standard, otherwise audible only.

Audible signals are heard at 100 paces and repeated by units hearing them.  Repeats are heard by everyone within 80 paces of the officer of the repeating unit.  (Keep your units close together if your army uses only audible signals!)

Visual signals are seen at the limits of vision (usually the whole table except at night or in bad weather).

There are two types of signal everyone can use and understand:

- Change present order to Attack

- Mounted troops change present order to Attack

Regular troops add:

- Mounted troops change present order to Skirmish

- Foot change Hold order to Attack

- Foot change Attack order to Hold

We could probably suggest some improvements to this, particularly in connection with contingents given specific roles (ambush, reserve, etc.).

[Jim Webster]

If we take this through to the medieval period we see a similar pattern, perhaps with more flexibility given to the divisional commands (or this may be an artefact of the different style of reporting). 

I'm not sure we can extrapolate. We know that in the Medieval period there are examples of 'officers' refusing to take orders from their superiors who were also their social inferiors.
We also have the issue that in the medieval period the commander of a 'unit' wasn't the person you as general put in command of that unit, he was the owner of that unit who'd brought them with him. In some circumstances he might have to be treated more as an ally to be cossetted and jollied along than a subordinate

Jim

[Patrick Waterson]

I think Anthony was referring more to the broad nature of battlefield signals than the officering thereof, though the point about mediaeval social susceptibilities is well made.

[Erpingham]

Jim points are indeed good, though we may disagree how much actual difference they made - how often did the hierarchy not work for social reasons, for example.  It was certainly a factor in the "omnishambles" which was French command at Agincourt.  We should also note personal tensions over points of honour.  Commanders suggesting caution were often (at least according to our sources) often accused of cowardice.  It took a confident man to brush this off.  A headstrong man could launch himself and his men on a suicide mission because of this (see e.g. Dupplin Moor).

With these allowances for complicating factors, the general pattern of leadership and signalling capability seems fairly similar between Antiquity and the Middle Ages. 

On the subject of units being more like allies than subordinates, again a good point.  However, this was hardly a uniquely medieval problem.  Classical Greeks seem to have had similar problems and I'm sure it wasn't straightforward getting a Gallic or German army to follow a strict "command and control" model

Interestingly, I was re-reading Michael Mallet's account of Fornovo, as this has some interesting command and signalling issues.  In particular, Gonzaga tried to tightly control the actions of his army, rather than going for a more normal medieval delegated command framework.  This might have worked if he had sat back with the reserve but instead he charged with the first forces to attack and was killed.  No signals or messengers triggered the release of the reserves, and a possible victory drifted into defeat.

[Nick Harbud]

I'm not sure we can extrapolate. We know that in the Medieval period there are examples of 'officers' refusing to take orders from their superiors who were also their social inferiors.
We also have the issue that in the medieval period the commander of a 'unit' wasn't the person you as general put in command of that unit, he was the owner of that unit who'd brought them with him. In some circumstances he might have to be treated more as an ally to be cossetted and jollied along than a subordinate

Jim

Jim makes a good point, which demonstrates the superiority of messengers over signals.  A messenger represents the CinC and can argue with the recipient and/or threaten him wth the consequences of not acting, as well as providing confirmation to the CinC that the order was properly delivered and understood.

Signals are even less likely to be receieved than that really important email.

[Jim Webster]

Yes, the signal says 'forward'

The good messenger says 'The CinC has been considering the wise counsel you offered at the discussion last night and agrees totally that you should be the one to take your lads forward"


Jim

[Patrick Waterson]

One is left wondering then why everyone who was anyone in the classical period seems to have preferred signalling.

One factor to consider is reaction time: some actions were quite opportunity-sensitive, so 'emerge and charge when you see a red flag on the hill to the left' can be implemented with very little time lag involved once the commander decides to get it going.  Conversely, if he sends off a messenger there will be a time lag of at least a few minutes during which the opportunity may pass.

Signals are even less likely to be received than that really important email.

If one thing emerges from classical sources, it is the reliability of battlefield signalling, barring the odd situation like Caesar at Gergovia, where he ascribes his repulse to a misunderstanding of - or rather lack of obedience to - signals (Gallic War VII.43-51).

Where messengers were habitually and (usually) beneficially used was for agents or advance detachments or similar reporting back to the C-in-C.  Tigranes (the 'Great') of Armenia is famously reported to have killed the first messenger bringing him news of Lucullus' army's progress, and from then on Tigranes could get no news because the messengers all avoided him. (Plutarch, Lucullus 25)

[Jim Webster]

I think there is the issue of timeliness as you said.
Also a signal can be seen over a long distance and also perhaps over intervening enemy troops

Jim