File recoil

[Justin Swanton]

I've had notion I'd like to bounce off the forum.

I've been  wondering about what happens to an infantryman who faces a superior or fresher opponent. In a single combat situation he would rapidly give ground after the first few blows and then turn and run if he didn't want to be killed. So what saves his neck in a battleline? With men behind him he has nowhere to run and so should be dead in moments. Why do battlelines, when faced with superior opponents, not immediately disintegrate and flee?

Taking the facts that battlelines do recoil in battle if they are getting the short end of the stick and that the basic unit of a battleline is a file, I came up with this idea.

Here is a line of hoplites facing off against some legionaries.

Supposing a central hoplite is knocking the stuffing out of his Roman counterpart. The legionary naturally gives way. His file is under orders to give way with him.

The victorious hoplite then finds he has a problem. As he advances against the recoiling file he finds himself partially surrounded by hostile troops.

If he keeps advancing, he will find himself facing three enemy soldiers on his front and two flanks, and will be quickly killed.

Hence the legionary, by recoiling, renders himself immune to follow up from the hoplite. Of course the leading legionaries of the two adjacent files now find themselves partially exposed and may feel obliged to fall back in turn. A ripple motion of recoils is initiated and the entire line starts falling back. The golden rule is: whether you are advancing or recoiling or standing still, never get into a situation where you face enemy from any direction except your front.

A line that is unable to recoil in this manner becomes vulnerable. Weaker individuals in the line cannot retire into the protective space of the line and are killed by enemy troops. If the line is surrounded or attacked from front and rear it loses this vital recoil ability, whilst enemy soldiers remain free to retire within their lines if they feel themselves overmatched. The surrounded line is soon annihilated. Hence the destruction of the Roman infantry at Cannae even though they still outnumbered the Carthaginians after their cavalry had been chased from the field.

Any comments on this hypothesis?

[Patrick Waterson]

The golden rule is: whether you are advancing or recoiling or standing still, never get into a situation where you face enemy from any direction except your front.

True - even then, canny foes might be able to do something vicious: at Argentoratum AD 357), the Primani legion in Julian's army managed to slaughter elite German warriors in a basically frontal configuration.

"Taking care to avoid being wounded and covering themselves like gladiators, they plunged their swords into the barbarians' sides, which their wild rage left exposed." - Ammianus XII.48

This suggests that the Romans were using the British Culloden-style tactic of skewering the opponent to one's right rather than the man ahead.  If anything, this reinforces the basic point that letting an enemy get at your sides individually or collectively is a recipe for a very short life on the battlefield.

And then there is the matter of a frontally superior foe.

A line that is unable to recoil in this manner becomes vulnerable. Weaker individuals in the line cannot retire into the protective space of the line and are killed by enemy troops.

Turning to Polybius II.33, we find Insubrian Gauls in exactly this situation.  The tribunes in the Roman army issued the spears of the triarii to the front rank of hastati, knowing that holding out the spears would encourage the Gauls to chop downwards to splinter the shafts.  The hastati were ordered immediately to close corps-a-corps when this happened, which would result in each of them being nose-to-chin and chest-to-swordarm with a Gallic warrior whose sword was inconveniently caught with its blade between a Gallic leg or shield and a Roman scutum.

In theory, the Gauls should have been able to back out and get a breathing-space, not to mention space in which to regain control of their weapons.  In practice, it would seem that the men behind the leaders simply got in the way, either pressing from behind or just awaiting their turn, indicating that the Gauls had no such capacity for adjustment.  Not being regulars they would presumably have lacked any form of file organisation.

I would add that a file leader might not necessarily realise when he was outmatched - or might realise too late.  One recalls Crastinus at Pharsalus, one of the best if not the best of Caesar's superannuated centurions, leading an elite century of an elite cohort of an elite legion - and getting killed by a sword-thrust through the mouth.  That said, the ability of Roman legions to fall back from a Macedonian pike phalanx at both Cynoscephalae and Pydna suggests some form of 'file fallback' in operation.

If the line is surrounded or attacked from front and rear it loses this vital recoil ability, whilst enemy soldiers remain free to retire within their lines if they feel themselves overmatched. The surrounded line is soon annihilated. Hence the destruction of the Roman infantry at Cannae even though they still outnumbered the Carthaginians after their cavalry had been chased from the field.

A surrounded or sandwiched line will quickly become compacted if individuals try to fall back or are forced back on each other, rendering most of them unable to use their weapons effectively or at all.  The Greek mercenaries at the Granicus and the Roman infantry at Adrianople both fell afoul of this feature, ending up as a compressed mass which did little more than provide their opponents with easy weapon practice.  The Romans at Cannae appear to have suffered a similar difficulty, although Paullus is recorded as passing from one part of the action to another until close to the end, so it looks as if the allied wings were the first to suffer acute constraint and compression, the Romans themselves being more gradually herded in by a combination of Hannibal's Gallic stop-line, Hasdrubal's cavalry and the victorious Carthaginian infantry wings.

[Mark G]

Leaving aside the lack of hoplites vs legionaries encounters.

The point if the red formation is that the next red guy steps forward, not that the white guy moves suicidally into the red formation.

And when the red guys stop wanting to step up to the hole, red leader calls for a pull back to reform.

[Justin Swanton]

Leaving aside the lack of hoplites vs legionaries encounters.

The point if the red formation is that the next red guy steps forward, not that the white guy moves suicidally into the red formation.

And when the red guys stop wanting to step up to the hole, red leader calls for a pull back to reform.

Which raises the subject of file members rotating through the front position of the file. Do the sources attest to this? How was it executed?

[RichT]

I'd question some assumptions.

Supposing a central hoplite is knocking the stuffing out of his Roman counterpart. The legionary naturally gives way. His file is under orders to give way with him.

I'd question the last sentence - the file would (I believe) be under orders to stand fast and stop him from giving way. That is what the rearward ranks are for. The more rearward ranks there are, the less likely they are to give way - that is why deep formations were effective, because they provided resistance against backward movement. The general consensus (I understand) for formations in combat is that they run away from the back, not from the front (not least because until the men behind have run away, there's nowhere for those in front to go).

The result might then be that the outmatched legionary would be rapidly killed or injured, but that is why the best, most experienced men were placed in the front rank. If he did go down, the second ranker would step up to take his place, so that the hole would be closed.

The victorious hoplite then finds he has a problem. As he advances against the recoiling file he finds himself partially surrounded by hostile troops

If the hoplite did find his opposite number down, dead or recoiling, I surmise he would not advance into the pocket, but would assist his fellows to left or right, while maintaining his position in the ranks. As you say - 

Of course the leading legionaries of the two adjacent files now find themselves partially exposed and may feel obliged to fall back in turn. A ripple motion of recoils is initiated and the entire line starts falling back. The golden rule is: whether you are advancing or recoiling or standing still, never get into a situation where you face enemy from any direction except your front.

Broadly speaking I'm sure that's correct - although of course as Pol xviii.30 says:

"Now, a Roman soldier in full armour also requires a space of " ... let's not go there ... "But as their method of fighting admits of individual motion for each man — because he defends his body with a shield, which he moves about to any point from which a blow is coming, and because he uses his sword both for cutting and stabbing — it is evident that each man must have a clear space, and an interval of at least " .... something or other ... "on flank and rear, if he is to do his duty with any effect.

So I think (depending on formation, armament, training etc) it wasn't always strictly one-on-one, facing the front.

Probably 1 v 2, 1 v 3 etc were possible, and survivable, because aside from Barbarians exhibiting wild fury, hand to hand fighting was more cagey than we usually picture it, with a lot more hiding behind the shield, watching and waiting and a lot less slashing and bashing.

But I also think (with the possible exception of Romans specifically trained to it) that recoiling was never a good thing - it was involuntary, dangerous and undesirable, and usually a sign of imminent defeat  - which isn't to say formations couldn't recoil without breaking - but that it wouldn't be done deliberately (Romans perhaps excepted).

Which raises the subject of file members rotating through the front position of the file. Do the sources attest to this? How was it executed?

No they don't. It wasn't.

Aside from rear rankers replacing fallen comrades in front (or pulling the wounded out of the way), I don't think there is any evidence whatever for rotation within the files.

[Justin Swanton]

The golden rule is: whether you are advancing or recoiling or standing still, never get into a situation where you face enemy from any direction except your front.

True - even then, canny foes might be able to do something vicious: at Argentoratum AD 357), the Primani legion in Julian's army managed to slaughter elite German warriors in a basically frontal configuration.

"Taking care to avoid being wounded and covering themselves like gladiators, they plunged their swords into the barbarians' sides, which their wild rage left exposed." - Ammianus XII.48

This suggests that the Romans were using the British Culloden-style tactic of skewering the opponent to one's right rather than the man ahead.  If anything, this reinforces the basic point that letting an enemy get at your sides individually or collectively is a recipe for a very short life on the battlefield.

It also suggests that some of the the Roman files deliberately fell back, admitting the imprudent Germans into their ranks where they could be slaughtered by flanking files.

[Patrick Waterson]

Which raises the subject of file members rotating through the front position of the file. Do the sources attest to this? How was it executed?

No they don't. It wasn't.

Aside from rear rankers replacing fallen comrades in front (or pulling the wounded out of the way), I don't think there is any evidence whatever for rotation within the files.

Agree with Richard here: strange how a habit can grow on one ...

As an example (Ammianus about Argentoratum again):

"Yet frequently the Roman, driven from his post [pulsus loco] by the weight of armed men, rose up again [resurgebat]; and the savage, with his legs giving way from fatigue, would drop on his bended left knee and even thus attack his foe, a proof of extreme resolution." - Rerum Gestatum XVI.12.48

I think 'pulsus loco' may signify 'knocked down in [his] place' rather than 'driven from his post'; either way, the original occupant of the location restores himself to action in situ rather than being relieved.

Probably 1 v 2, 1 v 3 etc were possible, and survivable, because aside from Barbarians exhibiting wild fury, hand to hand fighting was more cagey than we usually picture it, with a lot more hiding behind the shield, watching and waiting and a lot less slashing and bashing.

Less sure about this, as our sources tend to picture it as very up close and personal, with any advantage or perceived advantage being followed up with alacrity.  Against raw or timid opponents, yes, the above could apply (and be responsible for some remarkable disparities in casualty rates even before a rout started), but methinks not against veteran or even standard troops, let alone full-blooded barbarians high on the adrenalin curve.

[Erpingham]

I think I would agree with the general view that it was not about individual files pushing back their opposite numbers.  However, I do think there was a general attempt to break the line, to force your way into the other sides formation, at least in the Middle Ages.  To do this successfully, you were relying on your comrades to step up with you - an individual, even a good fighter, risked being torn down by the pack.  The obvious mirror to this was that you were trying to stop anyone getting into your formation, and again this had to be a team effort.  The other aspect of a disciplined, unit-based approach was that, if the line started to be penetrated in places, you could give ground in an orderly fashion to maintain unit integrity, which I think is what a wargames push back is meant to be.  Once you start tumbling backwards, unable to resist the pressure, the unit is on the point of rout. 

[Justin Swanton]

Which raises the subject of file members rotating through the front position of the file. Do the sources attest to this? How was it executed?

No they don't. It wasn't.

Aside from rear rankers replacing fallen comrades in front (or pulling the wounded out of the way), I don't think there is any evidence whatever for rotation within the files.

Agree with Richard here: strange how a habit can grow on one ...

As an example (Ammianus about Argentoratum again):

"Yet frequently the Roman, driven from his post [pulsus loco] by the weight of armed men, rose up again [resurgebat]; and the savage, with his legs giving way from fatigue, would drop on his bended left knee and even thus attack his foe, a proof of extreme resolution." - Rerum Gestatum XVI.12.48

I think 'pulsus loco' may signify 'knocked down in [his] place' rather than 'driven from his post'; either way, the original occupant of the location restores himself to action in situ rather than being relieved.

Which then raises the question of why infantry lines were so deep. If - like a rock group - the front man was the only chap who did any real work, what was the need for lines deeper than three or four men? Infantry battlelines were not meat grinders, working through 50-60% of their opponent until one side finally had enough. Yet 6 deep was the minimum, 8 deep the standard and deeper lines quite common.

My own take is that sections of a line could be obliged to recoil as described above. In this case the line had to be deep enough so the recoiling section remained in contact with its friendly flanking files. These latter could then turn against the advancing portion of the enemy line and decimate it, pushing it back.

[Justin Swanton]

I'd question some assumptions.

Supposing a central hoplite is knocking the stuffing out of his Roman counterpart. The legionary naturally gives way. His file is under orders to give way with him.

I'd question the last sentence - the file would (I believe) be under orders to stand fast and stop him from giving way. That is what the rearward ranks are for. The more rearward ranks there are, the less likely they are to give way - that is why deep formations were effective, because they provided resistance against backward movement. The general consensus (I understand) for formations in combat is that they run away from the back, not from the front (not least because until the men behind have run away, there's nowhere for those in front to go).

The result might then be that the outmatched legionary would be rapidly killed or injured, but that is why the best, most experienced men were placed in the front rank. If he did go down, the second ranker would step up to take his place, so that the hole would be closed.

Which means a compressed line unable to recoil would be no worse off than any other line, hence surrounding a line should not confer any benefit to the surrounders, and I have a problem with that...

"Now, a Roman soldier in full armour also requires a space of " ... let's not go there ... "But as their method of fighting admits of individual motion for each man — because he defends his body with a shield, which he moves about to any point from which a blow is coming, and because he uses his sword both for cutting and stabbing — it is evident that each man must have a clear space, and an interval of at least " .... something or other ... "on flank and rear, if he is to do his duty with any effect.

So I think (depending on formation, armament, training etc) it wasn't always strictly one-on-one, facing the front.

Of course the passage could refer to the mobility of a Roman soldier fighting a foe to his front, moving his shield up and down as his opponent's blows come high or low. Notice that he couldn't use his shield effectively if the blows were coming from two directions at once.

[aligern]

Noting the side swipe at the Gauls may I remind us that the Helvetii retrea d a considerable distance against Caesarvwithout it turning into a route. This suggests that as units they could fall back fighting. probably in the pauses for exhaystion and repkacement that occur when both sides have had enough for a bit. I do think there is replacement within files when the rests are taken and new fighters move forward to take the pkace of the wounded .
I agree tgat even having beaten an oppobent. a warrior is not going to set out on his own beyond the front rank. Fighting hand to hand is a team effirt and it will ge unuts that mive forward ir in retrograde .
Roy

[Erpingham]

Which means a compressed line unable to recoil would be no worse off than any other line, hence surrounding a line should not confer any benefit to the surrounders, and I have a problem with that...

But this assumes compression in any direction is equally bad.  We seem often to reach the point of having to remember than these formations were designed to work in one direction - forwards. Compression from the front could reasonably be expected to be allowed for.  Compression from the sides or rear or multiple directions is more difficult to handle.

[RichT]

Which then raises the question of why infantry lines were so deep.

Which is a much discussed question. The options are:
A - to provide replacements for casualties
B - to allow 'file relief' (ie rearward ranks of the file can move forward to take a turn at the front)
C - to give extra shoving power in a shoving match
D - to provide greater resilience against retreat, by providing a mass of men behind with forward pressure

A - can be ruled out where we have casualty figures (e.g. hoplite battles) because the victor typically only suffers about 5% casualties which is less than half of one rank
B - there is no evidence for, and it sounds difficult to achieve in a close order formation (especially if as some believe some formations only allowed 18" per man yet were still 8-16 ranks deep)
C - is true if you think close combat was a shoving match, but lots of people don't believe it was
D - is what Polybius and others say and also explains why deep formations were also useful in other periods of history, when we know (or believe we know) only the front rank or three actually fought.

I side with D - other opinions are also available.

Of course the passage could refer to the mobility of a Roman soldier fighting a foe to his front, moving his shield up and down as his opponent's blows come high or low.

Not really, since this is given as a reason why a Roman needed more space to either side, not above and below (the ground will always be a problem below, and the sky pretty much maximizes the space above).

Which means a compressed line unable to recoil would be no worse off than any other line, hence surrounding a line should not confer any benefit to the surrounders, and I have a problem with that...

Well to agree again in passing with Patrick, once a body of men is compressed past a certain point it will be unable to fight effectively. But being surrounded might not necessarily have disadvantaged individual fighters 1 v 1 (and surrounded men were sometimes able to fight their way out) - but it would have caused disorder of ranks and files, be demoralising, and prevent any chance of escape.

[Justin Swanton]

Which means a compressed line unable to recoil would be no worse off than any other line, hence surrounding a line should not confer any benefit to the surrounders, and I have a problem with that...

But this assumes compression in any direction is equally bad.  We seem often to reach the point of having to remember than these formations were designed to work in one direction - forwards. Compression from the front could reasonably be expected to be allowed for.  Compression from the sides or rear or multiple directions is more difficult to handle.

But this is the problem. If the file was supposed to prevent the front fighter from recoiling at all, then he would be in exactly the same position whether facing enemy at the front, rear or flanks of a line. I imagine the troops on the flanks could shuffle easily enough into a position where they didn't have to fight against more than about one opponent each, but that still wouldn't save them (see diagram below). The inability to recoil crucially affects the survival of a battleline.

[Erpingham]

If the file was supposed to prevent the front fighter from recoiling at all, then he would be in exactly the same position whether facing enemy at the front, rear or flanks of a line.

A fair point.  I would suggest, however, that the file (or less formal version thereof) acted more as a "damper" than a brick wall. The extra ranks can cushion a push back from the front, allowing ground to be yielded smoothly and a continuous front be maintained. (This would, I think, go with Rich's option "D" in the reasons for deep formations).  Hit from the rear or flank, there is no organised give and it just compresses, disrupting the controlled absorption of pressure.