The Hoplite - What Made Him Special?

[Patrick Waterson]

During the 5th century BC, the Greek armoured infantryman, already a popular addition to Egyptian and occasionally Neo-Babylonian armies, came to dominate the infantry battlefield.  Greeks took on and defeated Achaemenid armies and each other, and in the process became the most sought-after troop type in the Eastern Mediterranean.  Following the spectacular escape of the Ten Thousand from the Persian Empire, even the Persians decided they must have Greeks as the cutting edge of their army.

Then, less than a century later, with the rise of the Macedonian phalangite, the Greek hoplite as we know him rapidly disappears - or seems to.

This thread is intended for examination of the hoplite as a weapons system in an attempt to pin down how this peculiar infantry type achieved such an ascendancy - and why he lost it.  It is also useful as a repository for any interesting details about hoplites irrespective of the big picture.

So what made the hoplite special?  Was he even that special?  How did he function, both individually and en masse?  There are many aspects we can examine: weaponry, protection, organisation, tactics and accounts of battles which demonstrate hoplite characteristics.

[eques]

What made them special I would say:

Heaviness of armour/weapons
Shieldwall
Long spears
Communal teamwork ethic
Citizen not subject infantry
Had a stake in what they were fighting for
Not afraid of close quarter fighting (in fact they fetishized it)
Small geographic and demographic size of city states fostered strong group identity.

[Justin Swanton]

Off the top of my head, and pretty much repeating the previous post, a combination of heavy protective armour and a file system that allowed for a continuous battleline not easily pierced. And - according to several authorities  - the tactic of othismos that enabled the hoplites to push back and break their opponents' line.

[Imperial Dave]

nooooooooooo! 

Long spear, large shield, small area of vulnerability (especially in close order) and a capability of operating in open or close order

[Erpingham]

And - according to several authorities  - the tactic of othismos that enabled the hoplites to push back and break their opponents' line.

Although we remain as divided as ever over the "Big O" (as Rich T called it), I think it is clear that it is a stage of battle rather than a tactic i.e. hoplite tactics led to othismos. 

[RichT]

My $0.02

One set of possibilities (the 'hardware' explanation): a combination of equipment (armour, aspis, spear) and tactics (coordinated shoving by files  ) that gave tactical battlefield superiority over other infantry of the period.

Or an alternative (the 'software' explanation): an ethos of mutual dependence and shared commitment to the cause, combined with a tradition of close quarters hand to hand fighting and getting stuck in, which gave moral, reputational superiority over other infantry - infantry facing hoplites expected to lose, and often ran away without putting it to the test.

The truth, in that boring way it has, probably lies somewhere in between. But I'm not a believer in there being massive hardware or tactical differences between hoplites and other infantry - either contemporary or later - since it would have been so simple to copy such differences (rather than hiring Greeks, or carrying on losing). Which doesn't mean I think hardware made no difference at all (and the Macedonian version of the hardware seems to have been widely regarded as superior), just that it's not the whole story, or even the biggest part of the story. And I'm deeply unconvinced by the idea that hoplites had a method of fighting that was unique in human history (as I may have mentioned elsewhere already).

[Patrick Waterson]

Good points, gentlemen.

Our hoplite apparently had his genesis in the shift from monarchies to tyrannies in the Greek world in the overall mess following the Trojan war, giving us an armoured warrior in bell cuirass, Corinthian-style helm, aspis shield, greaves and not a lot of underwear, but carrying two spears, one at least of which was thrown.  He also seems to have fought in unison with his comrades rather than being an out-and-out combat individualist, or at least we might so surmise from the vase depictions of files of hoplites sharing the same pose, and expressions such as:

"Men wear their helmets and their breastplates for their own needs, but they carry shields for the men of the entire line." - Plutarch, Moralia

This was the type of warrior, the 'man in bronze', who transformed the fortunes of a petty Egyptian kinglet and made him ruler of the whole country and effective founder of a new dynasty.

In WRG terms, he was "Regular C" HI, LTS, JLS, Sh.  This breaks down into English as follows:

"Regular C" - disciplined, perhaps drilled, ordinary morale.  (We may note that WRG elite hoplites are "B" and Spartans "A".)
HI - infantry wearing metal armour conferring protection for the vital areas (head, chest, torso) but not the entire limbs.
LTS - Long Thrusting Spear, a weapon of at least 9' length which would usually get the first strike against opponents not so equipped, and hence imposed a first-round combat penalty on them.
JLS - Javelin/Light Spear, a weapon suitable for thrusting or throwing, usually employed for the latter.  Confers a first-round melee combat bonus (being assumed to be thrown just prior to contact).
Sh - a Shield sufficiently substantial to confer appreciable protection against missiles and in melee.  Troops so equipped do not count as shieldless (which would confer a bonus upon opponents) except when attacked from the right or behind.

In WRG rules, the key to hoplite superiority lay in the LTS; Achaemenid opponents had JLS and, often, armour (HI), and Immortals were regular, so the LTS represented the hoplite's margin of superiority.  Other things (including random factors) being equal, the -1 for facing LTS at contact would lose the Achaemenids the first round of melee - just - which would cause them to recoil, so the hoplites would get +1 for following up on the next round of melee and, again, other things being equal, this would allow the hoplites to keep pushing until their opponents cracked.

In a historical fight, epitomised by Plataea in 479 BC, the hoplite is noted as having three clear advantages over his opposition.

"While he was still in the act of praying, the men of Tegea leapt out before the rest and charged the barbarians, and immediately after Pausanias' prayer the sacrifices of the Lacedaemonians became favorable. Now they too charged the Persians, and the Persians met them, throwing away their bows. [2] First they fought by the fence of shields, and when that was down, there was a fierce and long fight around the temple of Demeter itself, until they came to othismos [es ho apikonto es ōthismon]. For the barbarians laid hold of the spears and broke them short. [3] Now the Persians were neither less valorous nor weaker, but they had no armor [anoploi]; moreover, since they were unskilled and no match for their adversaries in craft [sophiēn], they would rush out singly and in tens or in groups great or small, hurling themselves on the Spartans and so perishing.

Where Mardonius was himself, riding a white horse in the battle and surrounded by a thousand picked men who were the flower of the Persians, there they pressed their adversaries hardest. So long as Mardonius was alive the Persians stood their ground and defended themselves, overthrowing many Lacedaemonians. [2] When, however, Mardonius was killed and his guards, who were the strongest part of the army, had also fallen, then the rest too yielded and gave ground before the men of Lacedaemon. For what harmed them the most was their lack of armor*, so they fought, as it were, naked against men fully armoured." - Herodotus IX.62-3

*literally 'clothing without armour'; the hurried nature of the Persian pursuit may have led the Persians to neglect donning their armour.

The Greek advantages are given as 1) protection, 2) training and 3) othismos.  The advantage conferred by longer spears was negated by the Persians' catching hold of them and breaking them short.  Sorry, WRG - you got it wrong.

On the same day, on the Asia Minor mainland, was fought the Battle of Mycale.  Here the Achaemenids, far from advancing confidently to what they imagined was a pursuit, had tucked themselves behind field defences.  The result was pretty much the same.

"As for the Athenians and those whose place was nearest them, that is, for about half of the line, their way lay over the beach and level ground; for the Lacedaemonians and those that were next to them, their way lay through a ravine and among hills. While the Lacedaemonians were making a circuit, those others on the other wing were already fighting. [2] As long as the Persians' shields stood upright, they defended themselves and held their own in the battle, but when the Athenians and their neighbors in the line passed the word and went more zealously to work, that they and not the Lacedaemonians might win the victory, immediately the face of the fight changed. [3] Breaking down the shields they charged all together into the midst of the Persians, who received the onset and stood their ground for a long time, but at last fled within their wall. The Athenians and Corinthians and Sicyonians and Troezenians, who were next to each other in the line, followed close after and rushed in together. But when the walled place had been razed, the barbarians made no further defense, but took to flight, all save the Persians, [4] who gathered into bands of a few men and fought with whatever Greeks came rushing within the walls. Of the Persian leaders two escaped by flight and two were killed; Artayntes and Ithanitres, who were admirals of the fleet, escaped; Mardontes and Tigranes, the general of the land army, were killed fighting." - Herodotus IX.102

Here the Persians and their associated contingents are not noted as being deficient in armour, and managed to hold their attackers at the wall of shields, but the deciding factor appears to have been the increase in motivation among the Athenians when they thought the Spartans might carry off the laurels of the day.

These examples suggest that equipment, skill, technique and morale all mattered in giving the hoplite his superiority over non-Hellenic opponents.  One might be able to copy the equipment, and even the organisation, but copying the skill, morale and the ethos of mutual cooperation that seems to stand out in the above accounts would be much more of a challenge.

Some tried, of course: the Carthaginian Sacred Band was presumably not doing too badly until it met real hoplites at the Battle of the Crimisus in 341 BC.  This, incidentally, gives us another at least occasional reason for the hoplite's customary superiority: leadership.

[RichT]

The Greek advantages are given as 1) protection, 2) training and 3) othismos.

Actually (and it seems we just can't avoid the O word) othismos is not given by Herodotus as one of the Greeks' advantages. It's not really clear how the account of Plataea is supposed to divide up temporally or spatially, but the disadvantages (lack of armour, lack of craft) just seem to have kicked in 'when they came to othismos' (in my interpretation, when the fighting became close, confused and hand to hand - in the scrum-theory interpretation, when the Greeks started coordinated pushing (while the Persians did what?) - take your pick).

It's worth pointing out that while Patrick (reasonably enough) transliterates 'othismos' the translation (which is Godley's, as found on Perseus) is "until they came to blows at close quarters".

It's also worth reading Macan's notes on this passage, also on Perseus (but this is a big enough digression already).

[Chris]

Not being fluent in ancient Greek or  even well versed in the authors, I wonder if  it  would be advisable or profitable to take a closer look at the training mentioned by Patrick in a previous post?

Are there lines from authors describing the training that hoplites participated in? Should we also examine the depth of a  hoplite phalanx to determine its ability to "push" an enemy formation more  effectively - or not, as the case and context may be?

I wonder about coordination of efforts in the front lines - and here I understand I might be shouted down as I am referencing Hanson's description (don't have the pages in front of me) but seem to recall the noise and confusion of  the fighting in the front lines of a  phalanx versus phalanx contest . . . There was something  too, about the helmet worn by the fighting soldier and how  this might impede vision and hearing - especially hearing, so if the command came down to "give me one more push" - it might be very hard to hear it.

Again, I have more digging, reading, and thinking to do . . .

Hmmmm . . . it's a bit like being back in school/class again.

Chris

[eques]

I'm always a bit surprised that a lot of rulesets make non-Spartan Hoplites undrilled.  Same for Sparabara Infantry actually.

[Erpingham]

It is interesting that in both the Plataea accounts, the author puts the fact that the Greeks were armoured and the Persians weren't up there as a key factor.  We may emphasise the "software" - training, cohesion, elan - but they thought the kit was important, so we shouldn't easily dismiss it.

[Mark G]

Are we assuming hoplites dud nit change until they became phalangites?

[Imperial Dave]

I think in full panoply and in close order there is only about 5% of the hoplite vulnerable/unarmoured from the front. I suggest that form and function have co-developed with the hoplite's kit. It may even be a chicken and egg moment ie did the hoplite phalanx clump together because their armour was so heavy and not easy to move in or did the hoplite's kit get heavier due to them normally fighting in close order. or something else?

[Patrick Waterson]

The Greek advantages are given as 1) protection, 2) training and 3) othismos.

Actually (and it seems we just can't avoid the O word) othismos is not given by Herodotus as one of the Greeks' advantages. It's not really clear how the account of Plataea is supposed to divide up temporally or spatially, but the disadvantages (lack of armour, lack of craft) just seem to have kicked in 'when they came to othismos' (in my interpretation, when the fighting became close, confused and hand to hand - in the scrum-theory interpretation, when the Greeks started coordinated pushing (while the Persians did what?) - take your pick).

The way I read Herodotus' account is:
1) The Account of the Action (IX.62): "First they fought by the fence of shields, and when that was down, there was a fierce and long fight around the temple of Demeter itself, until they came to [ōthismon]. For the barbarians laid hold of the spears and broke them short."

This I read as the fight being hotly contested - not necessarily equal, just fiercely fought - because the Persians were breaking the Greek spears and denying them their reach advantage until it came to othismos.  Once it came to othismos, the Persians lost.

2) Reflections on Why it Went as it Did (IX.63): "Now the Persians were neither less valorous nor weaker, but they had no armor [anoploi]; moreover, since they were unskilled and no match for their adversaries in craft [sophiēn], they would rush out singly and in tens or in groups great or small, hurling themselves on the Spartans and so perishing. "

We may note in passing that rushing out singly or in groups is not really compatible with an othismos stage of the battle, however one understands the term.  Ergo, the way I read it is that this behaviour preceded the othismos stage and the Greek advantages were apparent prior to othismos, but once othismos began the Greek superiority became crushing and indeed decisive.  This is why I rate othismos as an additional Greek advantage: when it occurred it effectively finished off the Persian ability to resist - although the loss of Mardonius and the resultant collapse of his bodyguard was also a major contributor to this and one gets the impression that he and his bodyguard did manage to hold against Spartan othismos albeit at considerable cost in lives, i.e. annihilation.

Not being fluent in ancient Greek or  even well versed in the authors, I wonder if  it  would be advisable or profitable to take a closer look at the training mentioned by Patrick in a previous post?

Are there lines from authors describing the training that hoplites participated in? Should we also examine the depth of a  hoplite phalanx to determine its ability to "push" an enemy formation more  effectively - or not, as the case and context may be?

If there is ever a subject neglected by historians, it is the training of troops.  The ex-soldier historians assume the reader knows how it was done, and the more scholarly types do not themselves know, so mentions of training in any army are exceedingly rare and usually indirect.  What does appear to be the case is that Greek hoplites - and here I refer to the ordinary Athenian, Corinthian or Theban as opposed to Spartans or select Argive 'professionals' who were always ready to go at immediate notice - were habitually kept in a state of training that permitted instant mobilisation at need, i.e. no need to spend time training before moving out on campaign.

Concerning the content of that training, we have even less to work on.  We have to surmise back from what hoplites are noted as doing in battle.

Regarding depth, there does seem to be a correlation between depth and prevailing in a push (there are other considerations, notably troop quality, so that eight ranks of Athenians proved superior to sixteen ranks of Syracusans; depth alone is not sovereign).  25 ranks of Thebans push back 8 ranks of Athenians at Delium in 424 BC.  50 ranks of Thebans prevail over 12 ranks of Spartans at Leuctra in 371 BC.  By the time of the Nemea in 394 BC Sparta's opponents are agreeing to deploy sixteen ranks deep to give the whole line a fighting chance against the Spartans and their Peloponnesian allies (the Thebans renege and deploy 25 deep, leaving the Athenians outflanked - the Theban contingent prevails, but Sparta wins the battle).

I wonder about coordination of efforts in the front lines - and here I understand I might be shouted down as I am referencing Hanson's description (don't have the pages in front of me) but seem to recall the noise and confusion of  the fighting in the front lines of a  phalanx versus phalanx contest . . . There was something  too, about the helmet worn by the fighting soldier and how  this might impede vision and hearing - especially hearing, so if the command came down to "give me one more push" - it might be very hard to hear it.

It is worth noting how helmet design changed over the 5th century BC away from the Corinthian type with its full ear coverage to the Chalcidian and Attic helmet types, which left the ears free.  By Epaminondas' time, every hoplite would have had his ears free and the leader's command could be repeated by those near him and conveyed throughout the formation.

It is interesting that in both the Plataea accounts, the author puts the fact that the Greeks were armoured and the Persians weren't up there as a key factor.  We may emphasise the "software" - training, cohesion, elan - but they thought the kit was important, so we shouldn't easily dismiss it.

A good observation.  The challenge for a non-Hellenic opponent trying to grow his own hoplites was not so much the equipment as the culture: the equipment could be copied; the culture could not.  Hence the tendency of some to take equipment for granted.   Perhaps the most important consideration is that it was not a case of the 'soft' or the 'hard' factors conferring superiority, but the combination of the two.

[Patrick Waterson]

Are we assuming hoplites dud nit change until they became phalangites?

During the 5th century BC the hoplite's equipment underwent considerable change: the second spear was abandoned, the helmet style changed considerably and linen armour almost universally replaced the metal cuirass.  The key question is whether hoplite technique also changed: attack at the run [dromon] does not appear to have occurred prior to Marathon in 490 BC, and hoplite equipment seems to be changing more or less from that point (helmet changes from the Corinthian to the Chalcidian type may be earlier).

All of this points to increased battlefield tempo and a more rapid deployment and fighting style.

The 4th century BC hoplite seems to have changed more in quality than in equipment: mass Persian hirings encouraged the raising of professional epilektoi, fully-trained, drilled and disciplined hoplites on the Argive model.  These had an edge in skill over the average citizen hoplite, but even the latter seem to have improved in quality, notably the Thebans, who were encouraged to spend much of their time on gymnastic exercises to improve fitness.  Iphicrates' much-debated reforms do not seem to have been in evidence on the Greek mainland, but may have served as the basis for the Macedonian phalangite.  The versatility of the 4th century hoplite is evident from Xenophon's writings: younger Spartan hoplites of this period could catch peltasts, which would be hard to envisage for the metal-armoured 6th and early 5th century hoplite.