How continuous was combat?

[Erpingham]

Mrs Erpingham here, making one of her occasional contributions.  One of the things worth remembering is that everything moved more slowly in the past.  You don't believe me - remember that it was thought within our lifetime that no man could run a mile in four minutes!!

Evidence from experimental archaeology and anthropological research - admittedly to do with agriculture - is that absolutely no bugger went at it like modern Olympic boxers, judoku, wrestlers or what have you.  People talked slowly. They walked slowly. The cadences of work songs, whether reaping or raising an anchor are slow. Old boys who still knew how to use a scythe moved with a regular and slow pace that at the end of the day cut more grass than Monty Don going at it like a bull at a gate. 

Mostly (and this evidence comes as much as a side effect as those awful tv shows that put a group of city slickers in a swamp as anything else) this is because people in the past didn't have access to enough calories to go at it like Kilkenny Cats. We know from Isandlwana that Cetshwayo instructed his impis to "move slowly". We know from Rorke's Drift that while some of the reason Dabulamanzi failed to take the station was a " short chamber Boxer Henry .45 miracle", part of it was that his impis hadn't eaten for two days.

People in the past had much more endurance than modern folks, but they didn't go at it fast.  It's outside living memory now just, but accounts suggest that labouring men could keep up a slow steady pace that would kill modern chaps, but like labourers these days (removals men are the ones I've worked with) they do it by working at a steady speed and taking regular breaks.

My guess is that both sides in a prolongued contest regularly fought each other to a standstill, drew off, then started again at the same slow, attritional pace. Occasionally, as with baresarks or Alexander's Forlorn Hopes, you got guys hyped up on something, who went at it like mad march hares - but if they didn't break through must have either had some method of retreat (which the baresarks had behing a shieldwall) or dropped in their tracks. The rest, particularly for men at arms/legionaries, must have been a slow plod, and a slow swing - like a woodsman - and some mechanism by which there were small breaks.

[Dangun]

Xenophon, our principal source, gives no casualty figures, so we are left with Diodorus XIV.84.2, which states "There fell of the Boeotians and their allies more than six hundred, but of the Lacedaemonians and their associates three hundred and fifty."  As usual, only the dead are listed, and the wounded - who could be many times the dead - are not noted.  Hence in looking at Krentz's listings (which should still be in date as his sources have not changed; his problem is that he does not look at actions in enough detail) we should remember that anything up to 90% of casualties (as opposed to lethalities) are not mentioned.

It is important to note that at Coronea the left wing of each army ran at or just before contact, so as far as that part went the action was of very brief duration, the main fight (and producer of casualties) being the subsequent contretemps (dare one say othismos?) between the Thebans and Spartans as Agesilaus sought to prove a point about who was superior rather than take the sensible course of using his troops' better discipline to win cheaply with a flank attack.  It is this portion of the action, by a minority of each army, which provided the majority of casualties on each side and percentages and loss rates should be adjusted with this in mind.

I am sure there are data and interpretation issues with any one of the battles surveyed by Kerantz, and probably issues with the whole endeavor - like how did the ancients define casualties or were they more likely to inflate combatants or casualties.

But... the casualty rates are SO low, I think it begs a high level explanation, rather than trying to unpick each datum.

Alternatively, I propose a thought experiment! If 100 hoplites faced another 100 hoplites, how long would it take them to produce 19 deaths/casualties? (5 for the winners and 14 for the losers as per the Kerantz data). I would have guessed less than 10 minutes or approximately 2 deaths per minute (1% casualties per minute).

It suggests to me that the low casualty rates support the idea of short engagement times (your idea, I believe Patrick ) and/or that in-group fighting was more ritualistic/less existential than we might assume.

So while hoplite vs hoplite is only a small subset, the low casualty rates, suggest to me that fighting could have easily been continuous because it could have also been very short in duration.

...and with some risk of dragging the thread into painfully familiar territories, short/low casualty engagement times might help us with othismos because we don't have to explain why a quarter of the hoplites weren't crushed/suffocated at the bottom of the scrum.

[Erpingham]

Hoplite warfare seems to be a very formalised affair (to some extent social ritual).  We should be wary of generalising from it.  Rout and pursuit seems to have been a much more serious killer in the Middle Ages, for example (more cavalry available may have been an element).

[RichT]

Hello Mrs E - it's a good point about endurance v performance - and why sport analogies may be less useful since all modern sports optimise for speed or performance over a fixed distance or duration, rather than endurance (only exceptions being various ultra marathons I suppose). Ancient combatants may well have optimised for endurance. But even so - regular breaks gets us back to discontinuous combat, while the tradition, whatever its worth, of 'barbarians' going at it hammer and tongs, plus the adversarial nature of combat (the pace is largely determined by the faster), plus the descriptions of what sounds like quite active fighting, mean I still can't envisage multi-hour melees.

[Jim Webster]

yes, I've worked with the old men who did keep up their job for hours, but they worked slowly and methodically. When you're carrying twenty stone sacks up a ladder you don't rush it 

I think that most combat was fought by people who wanted to stay alive. So I would see the two lines standing close but not touching, then occasionally the line advancing with most men concentrating more on their shield than their spear.

Sometimes somebody would die, or be wounded and fall back leaving a gap, but the other side would be wary about stepping into it because you're likely to get stabbed in the flank because it's not covered.
The advantage of leaders and veterans who knew each other would be that they could step forward, because they knew their flanks would be covered.

Jim

[Mick Hession]

I've been looking through the Irish accounts to get a "barbarian" perspective but they are not much direct help - even battles of unusually long duration (Clontarf, maybe Dysert O'Dea) are described in terms of continuous combat, though it's hard to see how the sheer level of activity described could have been kept up for any length of time. One passage that may indicate something more measured is in the Pharsalus account I wrote about in the most recent Slingshot: 
Of the borders of the battle on each side were then made serried edges in the likeness of a hacked tree; for wherever were the stubborn braves and the high-spirited soldiers and the champions of battle and the valorous heroes in the forefronts of the battalions, great breaches were broken and huge gaps were brought in the battalion in front of them, so that the forefronts of the battalions made for the hands of the other, as sea-promontories on the land or lands on sea. The braves then grew wearied of making those gaps at once in the breasts of the foreign battalions, so that the bulwark of shields was closed after them, that the line of the shield-backs might come again in the same order on the forefronts of the battalions.

So the mutual battle lines get broken up with multiple small salients and re-entrants, but eventually the tired and exposed men at the tip of each salient "rally back" behind the shieldwall - the implication is that both sides are doing this (with equally tired men, presumably) as there's no hint that one side is following up as the other retires. This would have the effect of creating a space (and probably a fairly local space, rather than one along the battle line as a whole) for men to take a breather. But that's implicit, not explicit.

Cheers
Mick 

[Patrick Waterson]

We do have one source for how one particular army trained, or at least the training recommendations for that army based on previous experience, and this gives some insights into what was expected on the battlefield.  Enter Vegetius.

THE POST EXERCISE

We are informed by the writings of the ancients that, among their other exercises, they had that of the post. They gave their recruits round bucklers woven with willows, twice as heavy as those used on real service, and wooden swords double the weight of the common ones. They exercised them with these at the post both morning and afternoon.

This is an invention of the greatest use, not only to soldiers, but also to gladiators. No man of either profession ever distinguished himself in the circus or field of battle, who was not perfect in this kind of exercise. Every soldier, therefore, fixed a post firmly in the ground, about the height of six feet. Against this, as against a real enemy, the recruit was exercised with the above mentioned arms, as it were with the common shield and sword, sometimes aiming At the head or face, sometimes at the sides, at others endeavoring to strike at the thighs or legs. He was instructed in what manner to advance and retire, and in short how to take every advantage of his adversary; but was thus above all particularly cautioned not to lay himself open to his antagonist while aiming his stroke at him.

Note the apparent duration of the exercise: "morning and afternoon".  Did this involve breaks, apart from the customary midday meal?  Vegetius does not say.  One gets the impression that the goal was a combination of endurance and technique: an energy-efficient technique coupled with a high degree of endurance.

NOT TO CUT, BUT TO THRUST WITH THE SWORD

They were likewise taught not to cut but to thrust with their swords. For the Romans not only made a jest of those who fought with the edge of that weapon, but always found them an easy conquest. A stroke with the edges, though made with ever so much force, seldom kills, as the vital parts of the body are defended both by the bones and armor. On the contrary, a stab, though it penetrates but two inches, is generally fatal. Besides in the attitude of striking, it is impossible to avoid exposing the right arm and side; but on the other hand, the body is covered while a thrust is given, and the adversary receives the point before he sees the sword. This was the method of fighting principally used by the Romans, and their reason for exercising recruits with arms of such a weight at first was, that when they came to carry the common ones so much lighter, the greater difference might enable them to act with greater security and alacrity in time of action.

We may note the arms of double weight, intended to give the troops a margin of spare capability when they went into action.

THE DRILL CALLED ARMATURA

The new levies also should be taught by the masters at arms the system of drill called armatura, as it is still partly kept up among us. Experience even at this time convinces us that soldiers, perfect therein, are of the most service in engagements. And they afford certain proofs of the importance and effects of discipline in the difference we see between those properly trained in this branch of drill and the other troops. The old Romans were so conscious of its usefulness that they rewarded the masters at arms with a double allowance of provision. The soldiers who were backward in this drill were punished by having their allowance in barley. Nor did they receive it as usual, in wheat, until they had, in the presence of the prefect, tribunes, or other principal officers of the legion, showed sufficient proofs of their knowledge of every part of their study.

Unfortunately Vegetius does not tell us exactly what armatura was.  Looking elsewhere (specifically at the Roman Infantry Tactics Wikipedia article), armatura is explained as "a term for sparring that was also used to describe the training similar one-on-one training [sic] of gladiators. Unlike earlier training, the wooden weapons used for armatura were the same weight as the weapons they emulated."

The key to armatura seems to be, apart from the use of service-weight practice weapons, the substitution of a one-on-one opponent for the wooden post.

Vegetius seems to be telling us that Romans soldiers were (at least before his time) trained to hone the economy of their technique and boost their endurance (he adds swimming, vaulting and marching with burdens as endurance-developing exercises).  We shall examine his observations on battle in another post but here is a preview:

Above all, a general must never attempt to alter his dispositions or break his order of battle during the time of action, for such an alteration would immediately occasion disorder and confusion which the enemy would not fail to improve to their advantage.

What does this tell us about the likelihood of mid-action breaks?

[Erpingham]

Well, if we are quoting training regimes, Here is the Norwegian Kings Mirror c.1250 on the subject of infantry combat

But if you are in a borough or some such place where horses cannot be
used for recreation, you should take up this form of amusement: go to your
chambers and put on heavy armor; next look up some fellow henchman (he
may be a native or an alien) who likes to drill with you and whom you know
to be well trained to fight behind a shield or a buckler. Always bring
heavy armor to this exercise, either chain-mail or a thick gambeson, and
carry a heavy sword and a weighty shield or buckler in your hand. In this
game you should strive to learn suitable thrusts and such counterstrokes
as are good, necessary, and convenient. Learn precisely how to cover yourself
with the shield, so that you may be able to guard well when you have to
deal with a foeman. If you feel that it is important to be well trained
in these activities, go through the exercise twice a day, if it is convenient;
but let no day pass, except holidays, without practicing this drill at
least once .....

But in ordinary warfare on the lawful
command of your chief, you need to shun manslaying no more than any other
deed which you know to be right and good. Show courage and bravery in battle;
fight with proper and effective blows, such as you have already learned,
as if in the best of humor, though filled with noble wrath. Never fight
with feigned strokes, needless thrusts, or uncertain shots like a frightened
man. Heed these things well that you may be able to match your opponent's
skill in fighting. Be resolute in combat but not hot-headed and least of
all boastful.

....If you are fighting on foot in a land battle and are placed at the point
of a wedge-shaped column, it is very important to watch the closed shield
line in the first onset, lest it become disarranged or broken. Take heed
never to bind the front edge of your shield under that of another. You
must also be specially careful, when in the battle line, never to throw
your spear, unless you have two, for in battle array on land one spear
is more effective than two swords.


We may detect perhaps the echo of Vegetius here but it isn't a copy in any way.  Train hard in full gear, use measured stokes, don't waste effort.  Note the importance of thrusting with the spear as against sword blows - a question of reach?  It all
seems measured and methodical.

Above all, a general must never attempt to alter his dispositions or break his order of battle during the time of action, for such an alteration would immediately occasion disorder and confusion which the enemy would not fail to improve to their advantage.

What does this tell us about the likelihood of mid-action breaks?

Not a lot?  This is surely about high level decisions on troop disposition, not nitty-gritty low level combat. 

[Patrick Waterson]

I am sure there are data and interpretation issues with any one of the battles surveyed by Kerantz, and probably issues with the whole endeavor - like how did the ancients define casualties or were they more likely to inflate combatants or casualties.

But... the casualty rates are SO low, I think it begs a high level explanation, rather than trying to unpick each datum.

I would give protection as a 'high-level explanation'.  Remember what Justin said about a hoplite being 95% protected from the front?  This would considerably lower the casualty rates in a basically frontal action.  Granted that later hoplites in felt caps and linen corselets had a lesser degree of protection, but they were still quite hard to kill.

It suggests to me that the low casualty rates support the idea of short engagement times (your idea, I believe Patrick ) and/or that in-group fighting was more ritualistic/less existential than we might assume.

Hoplite battles were often - but not always - over quite quickly, especially when each side broke the other's left at or before contact, like First Mantinea (418 BC).  Others (e.g. Delium in 424 BC) went on rather longer with the Theban right os ... oth ... er ... thrusting back the Athenian left while the Athenian right carved up the Thebans' allies.  One should be wary of automatically correlating low casualties with short engagement times: if an army runs at first contact, it can suffer heavily from pursuit even in a brief battle.

It may be illuminating to look at what happened at Sphacteria.  Here 400 Spartans were assailed with missiles by "... all the crews of rather more than seventy ships, except the lowest rank of oars, with the arms they carried, eight hundred archers, and as many targeteers, the Messenian reinforcements, and all the other troops on duty round Pylos, except the garrison on the fort."  The vastly superior Athenian force (c. 8,000 armed rowers and c.3,000 other troops) avoided close combat, dividing into 200-strong units which used harassment and skirmishing tactics for a whole day.

"For a long time, indeed for most of the day, both sides held out against all the torments of the battle, thirst, and sun, the one endeavoring to drive the enemy from the high ground, the other to maintain himself upon it." - Thucydides IV.35.4

The final score? 

"The number of the killed and prisoners taken in the island was as follows: four hundred and twenty heavy infantry had passed over; three hundred all but eight were taken alive to Athens; the rest were killed. About a hundred and twenty of the prisoners were Spartans. The Athenian loss was small, the battle not having been fought at close quarters." - idem 38.5

So an afternoon's shooting by several thousand men, albeit not all were shooting all the time, produced 98 dead Peloponnesians (another 30 were overrun when the Athenians landed).  This suggests that hoplite protection, even the attenuated version then in vogue, was quite effective and responsible for much casualty reduction.  A similar afternoon's harassment of a 600-strong Spartan mora by Iphicrates' 3,000 peltasts at Lechaeum in 390 BC resulted in a rout and 250 dead Spartans (Xenophon, Hellenica IV.5.11-17).  Hoplite melee was quite lethal by comparison, and we have no reason to suppose that combat was in any way tentative.

Hoplites famously went into action with commitment, being frequently described as doing so dromon, i.e. at the run, which rather excludes any possibility of tentativity (or tentativeness).  They did keep their battles fairly brief compared to most others, largely it would seem by the process of reverting to the shove (othismos) as a means of decision instead of spending the whole afternoon fighting in place until everyone dropped* or one side felt overmatched and left in a hurry.

*Except for one man on one side.  This was what was meant by a 'Cadmeian victory', after an early period engagement in which such mutual almost-annihilation is said to have happened.

Thucydides does describe one hoplite battle (Laodicium, 425 BC) of extended duration, but frustratingly does not provide details.

"During the winter following the Athenians and Lacedaemonians were kept quiet by the armistice; but the Mantineans and Tegeans, and their respective allies, fought a battle at Laodicium, in the Oresthid. The victory remained doubtful, as each side routed one of the wings opposed to them, and both set up trophies and sent spoils to Delphi. [2] After heavy loss on both sides the battle was undecided, and night interrupted the action; yet the Tegeans passed the night on the field and set up a trophy at once, while the Mantineans with drew to Bucolion and set up theirs afterwards." - Thucydides IV.134

Moving on to the greater generality of infantry combat, I think what we are all finding is an emphasis on keeping it steady and effective, making one's energy last (and building up stamina and endurance in the first place), which is, as our esteemed Mrs Clipsom and Mr Webster observe, the way things were traditionally done.  Mr Clipsom's 'measured and methodical' summarises it perfectly.

What we are not finding is an emphasis on getting yourself and/or your troops out of combat for regular breaks/breathers to keep them fit for action.  An exception might be found among the 'barbarian fringes': Mick's 'Irish Pharsalus' has champions being received back into the cover of the shield wall once they have had enough, which makes sense if your opponent is also a bit jaded and not pressing hard enough to prevent such a move, and the shield walls seem to be slightly apart as opposed to pushing against each other.  One gets the impression the champions are doing the lion's share of the fighting while the rank-and-file mainly get to provide the targets.

Such differences in fighting style are a good reason for treating each military system on a case-by-case basis, albeit there are some with useful similarities.

[Erpingham]

Mick's 'Irish Pharsalus' has champions being received back into the cover of the shield wall once they have had enough, which makes sense if your opponent is also a bit jaded and not pressing hard enough to prevent such a move, and the shield walls seem to be slightly apart as opposed to pushing against each other.  One gets the impression the champions are doing the lion's share of the fighting while the rank-and-file mainly get to provide the targets.

I think we should be careful not to see the attacks as just by individuals.  Individual assaults wouldn't produce the promontory effect - more like wedges or groups.  I think we are seeing the medieval tendency to focus on the hero and crediting him with all success of the men he led. 

[Jim Webster]

Mick's 'Irish Pharsalus' has champions being received back into the cover of the shield wall once they have had enough, which makes sense if your opponent is also a bit jaded and not pressing hard enough to prevent such a move, and the shield walls seem to be slightly apart as opposed to pushing against each other.  One gets the impression the champions are doing the lion's share of the fighting while the rank-and-file mainly get to provide the targets.

I think we should be careful not to see the attacks as just by individuals.  Individual assaults wouldn't produce the promontory effect - more like wedges or groups.  I think we are seeing the medieval tendency to focus on the hero and crediting him with all success of the men he led.

I suspect that the named individual was leading a group of followers who watched his back and flanks.

Jim

[Mick Hession]

Mick's 'Irish Pharsalus' has champions being received back into the cover of the shield wall once they have had enough, which makes sense if your opponent is also a bit jaded and not pressing hard enough to prevent such a move, and the shield walls seem to be slightly apart as opposed to pushing against each other.  One gets the impression the champions are doing the lion's share of the fighting while the rank-and-file mainly get to provide the targets.

I think we should be careful not to see the attacks as just by individuals.  Individual assaults wouldn't produce the promontory effect - more like wedges or groups.  I think we are seeing the medieval tendency to focus on the hero and crediting him with all success of the men he led. 

I agree. At this period individual "champions" are an anachronism, though of course a favourite topic for bards writing (and paid for) praise-poems. Medieval texts make it clear that chieftains and nobles fought surrounded by their immediate retainers so any "promontory effect" is achieved by a group. For example, At the very outset, Conor mac an togha of the thick spear and broad blade with two hundred men hurtled among them, maiming some, beheading others, (Battle of Corcomroe, 1317AD in The Triumphs of Turlough; the same passage contains several similar descriptions).

Cheers
Mick

[Erpingham]

Mick's 'Irish Pharsalus' has champions being received back into the cover of the shield wall once they have had enough, which makes sense if your opponent is also a bit jaded and not pressing hard enough to prevent such a move, and the shield walls seem to be slightly apart as opposed to pushing against each other.  One gets the impression the champions are doing the lion's share of the fighting while the rank-and-file mainly get to provide the targets.

I think we should be careful not to see the attacks as just by individuals.  Individual assaults wouldn't produce the promontory effect - more like wedges or groups.  I think we are seeing the medieval tendency to focus on the hero and crediting him with all success of the men he led.

I suspect that the named individual was leading a group of followers who watched his back and flanks.

Jim

A bit like this - Egil at the Battle of Vinheath (aka Brunanburh)

Then did he keenly spur them on to the charge, himself foremost in the van. He had in his hand his sword Adder. Forward Egil pressed, and hewed on either hand of him, felling many men. Thorfid bore the standard close after him, behind the standard followed the rest. Right sharp was the conflict there. Egil went forward till he met earl Adils. Few blows did they exchange ere earl Adils fell, and many men around him. But after the earl's death his followers fled. Egil and his force pursued, and slew all whom they overtook; no need there to beg quarter.

[RichT]

All of which seems to leave us right where we started - if combat was long lasting (and we still don't know how long 'long' is - no source says, and nobody seems to have hazarded a guess - but I'm assuming at least one hour, possibly multiple hours) then this might have been possible if fighting was very tentative, the emphasis was on saving energy not killing the enemy, and most of the time nothing much really happened. Then whether two lines fought actively for a bit then pulled apart a few paces before having another go, or whether they stood face to face the whole time, but didn't actually hit each other (or even try to hit each other) very often, seems largely immaterial - this is the hidden consensus again, of combat being mostly inactivity (or not what we would think of as combat activity), whether at a distance of a few yards, or toe to toe. The toe to toe version though seems to me more unlikely given what we know from other periods about the instability and psychological stress of close combat. And neither seems wholly satisfactory.

[Patrick Waterson]

... we still don't know how long 'long' is - no source says, and nobody seems to have hazarded a guess ...

Define 'short'.  'Long' is longer than that.

Seriously, we have quite a few battles which are interrupted by the onset of darkness, and it is reasonable to assume that unless an approach march is mentioned (e.g. Argentoratum) the battle would have started in the morning after both sides had breakfasted and deployed, say 10am-ish by our reckoning.  This is the long side of 'long'.

then this might have been possible if fighting was very tentative, the emphasis was on saving energy not killing the enemy

There is an important difference between 'tentative', which essentially means hesitant, and being energy efficient, which the training texts tend to emphasise.  I would point out that it is not a case of 'saving energy not killing the enemy' but saving energy while killing the enemy.  This is what the whole Roman system was about.

... this is the hidden consensus again, of combat being mostly inactivity (or not what we would think of as combat activity), whether at a distance of a few yards, or toe to toe.

This kind of idea seems to creep in once a country has not fought a major war for at least a generation.  It is noticeably absent when the historians have themselves participated in such an event.

The toe to toe version though seems to me more unlikely given what we know from other periods about the instability and psychological stress of close combat. And neither seems wholly satisfactory.

One lesson of military history is that troops close to the enemy feel a need to attack, to prove themselves and get on with the action.  It is more stressful standing close to the enemy and doing nothing than it is piling into him and doing something.  Close combat in the classical period was the expected norm which everyone who was anyone trained for.  Men were expected to fight until they dropped, and in some cases would even get up for another go.  Yes, it was stressful and some people could not take it, but it was also exhilarating and probably the most exciting and rewarding activity available to man outside marriage or wargaming.