An article on the harrying of the north - post 1066 and all that......

[Patrick Waterson]

Agree with Roy on the Danes.  In fact, I thought this was a standard interpretation - that Harald had beefed up his professional forces with hires from abroad.  If we view the Housecarles in a similar way to an Anglo-Norman familia regis, there would be an established core which could be boosted for war service.

I take it we mean Harold rather than Harald?

If so, this is how I would see them: as an integral part of his own forces and not as a distinct and separate national contingent which decided to do its own thing on the day of the battle, the latter being how William of Poitiers has it, this being one of my reasons for having reservations about William of Poitiers.

a leaderless mob of Norman knights for hire.....

"I shall be your leader!" Pause.  "Oh and by the way, I take it you have no objection to charging axe-armed infantry which can cut you in half with a single blow?  Excellent, then we have a deal.  And could you just swear loyalty on these saint's bones?  A mere formality, of course, but - if you renege on your oath your purses will fall open and your coins drop out."

[Erpingham]

I take it we mean Harold rather than Harald?

Indeed.

[Jim Webster]

could William have continued to finance his army?
He'd had the force together since about the 12 August, perhaps 10,000 men AND all the ships etc
The battle wasn't until the 14th October

Now assuming that the battle was drawn, or at least very tight, the Normans are going to struggle for supplies in the SE of England in Winter. Cavalry superiority will make foraging easier, but will almost by definition wear out their horses. Forced to forage they'll be at risk from local strikes against their foragers. Fetching supplies from the continent will be more expensive and risky given weather conditions.

So William is going to have to struggle to keep his army together, keep it paid and fed. He could probably do it, but probably not without totally alienating the people of the SE who he'd have to plunder to achieve it.

Jim

[Imperial Dave]

Agreed Jim, of all the 3 leaders, William was least able to afford to have a drawn out struggle especially coming into winter

[aligern]

Err No.
People keep forgetting the Norman way of war which was based on castles and cavalry. William pushes inland, building castles as he goes and garrisoning them. The harvest is in so his raiders spread out from their castle bases and feed themselves from the Saxon peasants' stores.
Let us remember that Guthrum's and Sweyn and Canutes armies could subsist in England across the winter, so William will have the same opportunity. Moreover he has his fleet and can slipbacross the Channel if its calm. A lot of his men are fighting for the promise of land , so the expedition is lije a joint stock enterprise with the payoff coming from military success, not necessitating much in the way of cash wages on campaign. In any campaign William's superior ability to hold ground and deny it to an opponent is crucial. Hardrada had come to an agreement with the Danes of York after Stamford Bridge and could likely count on economic support from there, but less likely from  former Bernicia or from East Anglia or the East Midlands unless his army is actually there to enforce cooperation.
Roy


Roy

[Patrick Waterson]

A lot of his men are fighting for the promise of land, so the expedition is like a joint stock enterprise with the payoff coming from military success, not necessitating much in the way of cash wages on campaign.

I think Roy has a point here (yes, really!) in that William can to a great extent pay in land and promises and thus keep his army together for a couple of years at least.  If by the end of that time he looks like a loser then no amount of promises (or even pay) would really help, but for the crucial period of the campaign he can probably keep going by promising his followers land and concomitant titles while they in turn waste their substance maintaining their men.

Supply is another question, and I am with Jim and Dave here: if William raises supplies with his typical slash-and-burn technique, it will work for one season but after that he will run into scarcity as what is left will be hidden by the surviving (and alienated) population.  Unless and until he is king, it will be hard for him to get supplies by order as he has no sympathetic English lords commanding their populace to provide.  I see this being an increasing difficulty for the Normans if the campaign slips into a second year without a significant shift in their favour.

Castles and the standard Norman methods of rule are unlikely to confer much of a controlling advantage while competitors with armies remain in the field.  Such castles at this stage are just wooden motte-and-bailey affairs which can hold off unorganised locals but are deathtraps against any significant force, not least because of the relative ease of burning down a wooden fortification.

Hardrada had come to an agreement with the Danes of York after Stamford Bridge and could likely count on economic support from there, but less likely from  former Bernicia or from East Anglia or the East Midlands unless his army is actually there to enforce cooperation.

Tend to agree here: Hardrada would have a relatively firm base in the former Danelaw but extending beyond it would be more challenging.  One advantage he would have would be his navy (Harold's had already gone home): if he decided to take on William directly or indirectly, an attempt to seal off William's continental connection should be very much on the cards.  Whether Harald's ships would cruise the Channel looking for fat Norman transports or attempt to burn Saint-Valery-sur-Somme (William's invasion base) or both, William could expect interruptions to his attempts at reinforcement and sustenance.

[Jim Webster]

Err No.
People keep forgetting the Norman way of war which was based on castles and cavalry. William pushes inland, building castles as he goes and garrisoning them. The harvest is in so his raiders spread out from their castle bases and feed themselves from the Saxon peasants' stores. 
Roy

A remarkable achievement, to build castles with an enemy army in the field.
As well as garrisoning his supply lines to link the castles together in the face of an increasingly hostile and desperate population

[aligern]

No,not a remarkable achievement, Jim. The Nirmans had experienced engineers who coukd throw up a castle in a coupke of days . They could take a town...like Exeter and stick a fortification in the corner of the burh walls and then hold it with relatively few men. A couple of castles  and a river crossing such as Wallingford is guarded. Its fine to think that castles can easily be burned, but its not necessarily easy if its been raining for a week, or if the  defence is enthusiastic. After all , if they were too easy to burn they would not have been as effective in England, Wales and Ireland as they obviously were.
I think you overestimate the ability of an army on the march to conduct sieges. After all, a motte and bailey is of the same order of defensibility as a burh and Alfred used those effectively against Danish armies. Burhs could be taken, but it took time and that enabled the Fyrd to be summoned.

Patrick,
You accuse William of slash and burn, but there is evidence to the contrary. Manor valuations on his line of march show both wasting and no effect at all. It is very lijely that, if you agreed to gve supplies, you were not devastated. It may be that devastation was more a matter of punishing hostiles and the property of those in rebellion than foraging.
Also 'An increasingly desperate and hostile population'? The evidence post the Conquest does not bear you out here. Many of the English were very happyto accept William as king, for whatever reason. The fyrd of Devon fought against Harold's sons and if we look back to Canute there were several occasions when English forces fought for the invader or at least gave tacit support. Do not  project back modern nationalism onto the past. very often regionalism, greed or elite rivalry trumps national solidarity .
As to the Danelaw..do not assume unity there. It is the Yorkshire Danes who pledge to Harald and they had recently rebelled against Tostig, moreover Harald had recently beaten them. York had a Nirwegian  king a century before.   Danes in Mercia and East Anglia had their own earls and may not have been so biddable by a king who was, after all an enemy of and claimant to the Danish throne.
Roy

[Jim Webster]

No,not a remarkable achievement, Jim. The Nirmans had experienced engineers who coukd throw up a castle in a coupke of days . They could take a town...like Exeter and stick a fortification in the corner of the burh walls and then hold it with relatively few men.

with an enemy army in the field?
Sticking men into castles as your field army grows weaker

[Mick Hession]

A remarkable achievement, to build castles with an enemy army in the field.
As well as garrisoning his supply lines to link the castles together in the face of an increasingly hostile and desperate population

Building castles quickly wasn't necessarily a problem: Anglo-Norman armies in Ireland did so regularly. They didn't need to be elaborate affairs - a lot of early 13th century castles were simple ringforts that are hard to distinguish from Irish settlements. In 1213  The castle of Coleraine was erected by Thomas Mac Uchtry, and the English of Ulidia; and all the cemeteries and buildings of the town were thrown down excepting only the church to supply materials for erecting this castle. so you didn't even need to cut timber. And A-S England had a lot more towns than Ireland that could be "repurposed" in this way....

You are right that a defender could mass against a newly built castle and overwhelm it - even the Irish, notoriously weak in siegecraft, managed that occasionally - but when invading an area the Normans would ideally build a network of mutually supporting castles whose garrisons could combine to deal with enemy besiegers. So the combined garrisons in a way _are_ the field army.

But the Saxons would also have had ideal strategies for resistance so the view one takes on the "might-have-beens" for this particular thread does rather depend on how you feel each party's strategy would have approached the ideal. 

Cheers
Mick

[Jim Webster]

I think my problem isn't their ability to do this stuff Mick, it's their ability to do this stuff as they go into winter, with tenuous supply lines, an army that needs paying and hasn't experienced any real success, and with a hostile army in the field.

My guess is that the victory William won at Hastings was the one he needed and perhaps the only one that would have served his purpose

[Imperial Dave]

going back to the overwintering of Williams army - in our hypothetical alternate timeline where he doesnt win but still has his standing army...

dont forget that horses take around 10kg of feed per day depending on breed and since its winter there wont be much pasture around and/or might be risky to let the horses roam. Therefore to keep his cavalry intact, William need much more food than a similar sized infantry army and he is not at home.

Not saying impossible but I fear that William would find it the hardest to keep his forces (and horses) fed

[Jim Webster]

going back to the overwintering of Williams army - in our hypothetical alternate timeline where he doesnt win but still has his standing army...

dont forget that horses take around 10kg of feed per day depending on breed and since its winter there wont be much pasture around and/or might be risky to let the horses roam. Therefore to keep his cavalry intact, William need much more food than a similar sized infantry army and he is not at home.

Not saying impossible but I fear that William would find it the hardest to keep his forces (and horses) fed

The horses would be a major problem. When you read agricultural history from the period, hay was a rare commodity. The vast majority of livestock was slaughtered, and small amounts of hay of a quality suitable for decent horses would be made for thanes and others who had them. A lot of Norman cavalry could be walking by March

[Imperial Dave]

agreed Jim

2000-3000 knights = poss around 10000 horses inc spares = 100000 kg or 100 tonnes of fodder a day to keep them fed plus food for the 2 legged bods

[Jim Webster]

agreed Jim

2000-3000 knights = poss around 10000 horses inc spares = 100000 kg or 100 tonnes of fodder a day to keep them fed plus food for the 2 legged bods

We see with the first crusade how quickly a Norman army can become an infantry force :-)