An article on the harrying of the north - post 1066 and all that......

[Imperial Dave]

interesting article on horses and feed here:

https://www.academia.edu/8115899/Feeding_the_Ancient_Horse

[Jim Webster]

interesting article on horses and feed here:

https://www.academia.edu/8115899/Feeding_the_Ancient_Horse

It's interesting, the nutritional data used for feeding German army horses in 1914 is the same as is used now :-)

[aligern]

Jim,
England in 1066 has a lot of horses. There are Royal and noble stud farms. The English thenselves have the capability of putting whole mounted armies, perhaps 15000 men into the field. That would involve  more horses than 1 per man because there will have been mounted servants and pack horses too. Both of us will have read Sawyer on the horsing of the Danes way back when. He makes the point that the Danes of Guthrum's army were able to mount significant forces on landing. The important point there is that they could land from the Humber, The Trent, East Anglia, the South coast, the Severn and get mounts where they put ashore.
Moreover, when William arrives and moves up the Thames via Great Berkhamsted and Wallingford he has no oroblem with supplying his horses.
So . lots if horses in England in 1066, lits of fodder and lots of stires if food for the winter.
First Crusade...yes they lost lots of horses, but still mount a successful cavalry arrack at Antioch with several mounted divisions. England has a much more amenable geography and one doesn!t have the same situation as in Anatolia where the opponent has lots of mounted archers to hem the Crusaders in and prevent foraging....which s a prime cause of the horse loss.
Mick is quite right,you have to understand how aggressively the Normans use castles as a grand tactical device.  They are quite capable of studding a district with fortifications in a short period.  As Mick says they can use existing cut timbers from demolished houses. Their fortifications differ fromnthe Anglo Saxon ones in that the English proceed rather ponderously with burhs that need several hundred men to defend them.
The point about them being in a hostile country with diminishing supplies do not stand. The Danes in at least three invasions overwinter substantial armies in England. It is obviously possible and no one is going to carry an argument that they could not do it. The Normans simply distribute their men, build castles and levy contributions by agreement with their 'hosts'. Just lije the Danes did.

[Patrick Waterson]

The Normans simply distribute their men, build castles and levy contributions by agreement with their 'hosts'. Just like the Danes did.

Or rather, not like the Danes did.

The Danes seem to have kept their army largely together as an infantry force (cf. Chippenham etc.) rather than distributed it in castles.  The sticking-point I see for the Normans is that their 'hosts' will not be willing to contribute: William opened his campaign by devastating Sussex, which was intended to bring Harold to battle to defend his ancestral lands, William knowing that a protracted campaign would not be in his favour (which is why he sought to entice Harold into battle for a quick decision).  If Harald had beaten Harold and Harold had retired westwards, William's devastation of Sussex would suddenly have looked remarkably stupid, because William would have just destroyed his supply base and warned the rest of England's population to hide their foodstuffs and themselves (in woods, marshes or behind the walls of burghs) whenever he approached.

Mick is quite right,you have to understand how aggressively the Normans use castles as a grand tactical device.  They are quite capable of studding a district with fortifications in a short period.

There are two problems with this in the context of England in AD 1066 with William not being king.  The first is that in order to establish these garrisons he has to drain his field army - probably not a very good move while the other contenders still have their forces intact.  The second is that he is not king and hence is not entitled to divide up lands which are not his: not only are his awards not yet worth the breath used in making them (the promise is that the lands will change ownership when William becomes king), there is also the matter that the local population (when not besieged or in hiding) have their own king and so are not going to part with anything except when confronted with naked force.  And they are going to do their level best to hide their resources and stay clear of William's naked force, in whatever terrain or burghs they can find.  So yes, the Normans could set up a network of castles, but at the price of being most likely defeated in the field - and it would still not solve the looming supply difficulties.  Only keeping on the move could do that, at least for the time being.

Historically, the Men of Kent did compound with William, which is the basis for Kent's motto 'Invicta', but that was when the list of available kings had already been whittled down to 1.5 (Edgar Atheling being still in the process of being chosen), and the prospects of the .5 did not look enticing.

[aligern]

But, as I pointed out,bcastles are a considerable force multiplier require small garrisons for a considerable effect. It might also be a good idea to decide what date you are going to put on the arrival of winter and what effect that will have on campaigning. William is easily established in the Southern shires unless Harold comes and fights him and wins. I can't see much chance of Harold winning, but Patrick can. Harold's power base is where William is sitting so Harold needs the victory or to do an Alfred and retire to Somerset, there to await William and Harald fighting and hopefully weakening one and destroying the other. William does not  have a huge supply problem, the South is rich and fertile. and he has not only the ability, but the mental vision to protect his bases with castles.
The weakness of Godwinsson  is something mentioned by several of the chroniclers that Harold was under strength at Hastings because many of the English chose not to turn up. It might be that, cut ff from his own holdings, Harold does not have the legitimacy that the house of Cerdic gave Alfred.
Roy

[Imperial Dave]

as an aside (and taking proper history for a second), do we know if Morcar and Edwin were told to engage the Norse army or to harry them when/if they turned up? Was Fulford too early or against Harold's orders? Was there some opportunistic thought behind the 2 earls bold attempt?

If they hadnt given battle but just 'loitered' would it have made a difference in our alternate future past?

[aligern]

Morcar is earl of Earl of Northumbria, having benefited from the rebellion against Tostig in 1035. We can see Edwin and Morcar as a rival house to the Godwins and as having their own agenda. With Harold's approval, or at least acceptance, as plenipotentiary for Edward the Confessor, they had done a deal with the Englissh Bernicians and Danish Deirans.  Harald Hardrada had invaded Morcar's earldom and if he stood idly by Morcar was not going to be Earl much longer. Remember Tosti was with Harald and if they supported Harald then if he was beaten by Harold the Godwins would most likely finish them off afterwards. So all the motivation is for Edwin and Morcar to fight against Harald and be in Harold G's good books even if they lost. Together they have the forces of Mercia and Northumbria which should be enough , numerically, to take on a Norwegian expedition.
Roy

[Patrick Waterson]

But, as I pointed out, castles are a considerable force multiplier require small garrisons for a considerable effect.

They are good for holding conquered territory, but even Crusaders were not busy building castles at the sieges of Antioch and Jerusalem - apart from a certain hopeful chap in Edessa, whose absence created problems for the army.  My point is that castles go up in the absence of an opposing army in the field, not while it is heading your way.  Historically, Normans seem to have erected castles only when the land on which they were built was already won, i.e. no serious opponent in the field and/or their side has ample troops and total initiative.

It might also be a good idea to decide what date you are going to put on the arrival of winter and what effect that will have on campaigning.

Good point.  Do we have any hints in historical sources regarding this?  Effects might also be different in different parts of the country.

William is easily established in the Southern shires unless Harold comes and fights him and wins.

I would see 'established' as misleading here: William is no more 'established' than Julius Caesar.  He has a base, yes and nobody is going to kick him out of it (yet), but can he maintain it?  Given that he has just laid waste to much of the land in the vicinity, probably not.  He is a bit late in the season to be collecting corn, most of which will by now have disappeared into invisible dene holes, and his fleet faces a presumably stormy winter (if it can put off Hitler it can presumably cause problems for William).

I can't see much chance of Harold winning, but Patrick can.

As can Wace.

Harold's power base is where William is sitting so Harold needs the victory or to do an Alfred and retire to Somerset, there to await William and Harald fighting and hopefully weakening one and destroying the other.

Realistically, in our lose-at-Stamford-Bridge scenario, Harold would have to retire westwards and leave Harald and William to fight it out.  Or he could set up around Ely ...

William does not  have a huge supply problem, the South is rich and fertile. and he has not only the ability, but the mental vision to protect his bases with castles.

The caveats about castles and food I have already mentioned.   We may remember that when Ralph the Timid was operating around Hereford in AD 1055 he built a motte-and-bailey castle to 'protect his base'.  Having fought (mounted) at Hereford and lost, he left the scene and Llewellyn promptly took and burned the motte-and-bailey castle.

The weakness of Godwinsson  is something mentioned by several of the chroniclers that Harold was under strength at Hastings because many of the English chose not to turn up. It might be that, cut ff from his own holdings, Harold does not have the legitimacy that the house of Cerdic gave Alfred.

I grant his hold on the kingship would be shaky, perhaps akin to that of Edmund Ironside after losing his first battle.  There would nevertheless still be many Englishmen who would prefer him to Harald or William, and unless and until William won a significant engagement very few Englishmen would countenance 'the outsider' at all.  ("Ee don't want 'im, 'e's a baastard!")

One thought about horses: England would have had sufficient horses to remount horseless Normans, but - and this is a rather important but, considering previous discussion - how many of these were trained cavalry horses?

[aligern]

I get your point about trained cavalry horses because its the biggest argument against the Anglo Danes having effective battlefield cavalry. However,training takes place all year and it would be a priority.  At least the Normans would know what they wanted the horse to do.
To cite an example of active castle building on the 1st Crusade at the seige of Antioch  Fulcher of Chartres XVI 9 : Our leaders constructed castles before the city from which they often rushed firth vigirously to keep the Turks from coming out . By this means the Franks took the pastures from their animals (one of the fortresses was constructed on a bridge.)
Its just an example of the aggressive use of castellation by the 'Normans' and shows how forward they could be with fortification.
Let us remember too that William is not necessarily constructing such works with Harald or Harold in his face, he is securing his base of operations. Oh and only a relatively small area of  Sussex in Hastings rape was devastated. William had the rest of Sussex, Kent and Surrey to occupy and live from.
Also I think Patrick is being far too fanciful in his estimation of how the population would take to an occupying army. There is not much evidence of resistance at a grassroots level to the occupation by the Danes, Sweyn and Canute. The warfare was cartied on by an elite group who operated above the day to day concerns of the folk in the countryside. Having visited Hastings recently I was surprised at the partisan reaction of people in the interactive theatre in the visitor centre. I assume that this was something created by or perhaps generative of Brexit feelings, though, logically both Normans and Saxons ( and Danes Welsh and Irish and Scots) were very likely the ancestors of those cheering for Harold .

Roy
'

[Erpingham]

I think Harold the doomed romantic hero, William the evil tyrant long predates Brexit.  I blame the Victorians.

[Imperial Dave]

Good point.  Do we have any hints in historical sources regarding this?  Effects might also be different in different parts of the country.

Not specifically winter as such but the general consensus is that the period 1000-1300AD was particularly warm - now whether that translates into hot summers/cold winters or hot summers/warm+wet winters I am not sure

Generally though, things stop growing in the late autumn (ie post October and our 'start' date for a three way tie possibly) plus reading around the subject I get the inference that populations were on the rise and that pressure on most things (foodstuffs especially) was possibly a factor in our period

[Mark G]

The for and against seems pretty well set out.

How about setting up a poll and have done with it. (pending legal challenge and the actual deal being out to the house after a manifesto election, of course)

[Duncan Head]

My point is that castles go up in the absence of an opposing army in the field, not while it is heading your way.  Historically, Normans seem to have erected castles only when the land on which they were built was already won, i.e. no serious opponent in the field and/or their side has ample troops and total initiative.

ISTE JUSSIT UT FODERETUR CASTELLUM AT HESTENGA

[Patrick Waterson]

My point is that castles go up in the absence of an opposing army in the field, not while it is heading your way.  Historically, Normans seem to have erected castles only when the land on which they were built was already won, i.e. no serious opponent in the field and/or their side has ample troops and total initiative.

ISTE JUSSIT UT FODERETUR CASTELLUM AT HESTENGA

Granted, but castellum (singular), as opposed to the network Roy envisages.  Caesar built a fortified camp around his fleet, securing just as much local supply as William's solitary erection.

I take Roy's point about the following:

To cite an example of active castle building on the 1st Crusade at the seige of Antioch  Fulcher of Chartres XVI 9 : Our leaders constructed castles before the city from which they often rushed firth vigirously to keep the Turks from coming out . By this means the Franks took the pastures from their animals (one of the fortresses was constructed on a bridge.)

although I would point out that this was not a means of safeguarding territory and/or supply for the besiegers but of denying it to a besieged enemy, which is quite a different matter.  More to the point is that this circumcastellation of the foe did absolutely nothing for the Crusaders' own supplies, which had reached crisis point before Bohemond finally bought his way into the city.  Nor were they of any use when Kerbogha turned up with his army.

Let us remember too that William is not necessarily constructing such works with Harald or Harold in his face, he is securing his base of operations. Oh and only a relatively small area of  Sussex in Hastings rape was devastated. William had the rest of Sussex, Kent and Surrey to occupy and live from.

Assuming they let him.  The dwellers in Harold's ancestral lands would be particularly inclined to hide their food and themselves, having seen the stamp of their conquerors.

Also I think Patrick is being far too fanciful in his estimation of how the population would take to an occupying army.  There is not much evidence of resistance at a grassroots level to the occupation by the Danes, Sweyn and Canute.

But did Sweyn and Canute start their bid for kingship by devastating the lands in which they landed?  Or did they arrive in the potentially sympathetic old Danelaw area and operate from there?

The warfare was carried on by an elite group who operated above the day to day concerns of the folk in the countryside.

But the king in charge of this elite group did react to his own lands being laid waste, which suggests a level of concern in such matters.  I suggest this concern would have been reciprocated.  Historically, the English population in areas other than the south seemed inclined to resist Norman prescence when they had a leader.  The south would almost certainly have followed this pattern.

The root point of discussion about Norman castles seems to be the idea that they can spring up all over south-eastern England as soon as Hardrada wins a hypothetical success at Stamford Bridge.  Even if this is feasible, I can think of no more disastrous course of action for William: dividing his army, complicating his already potentially dire supply situation and allowing his forces to be defeated in detail.

This in turn brings in Hardrada's likely or intended movements after a hypothetical success at Stamford Bridge.  William is now his chief competitor: the final reckoning with Harold can wait until the major threat is dealt with.  Is there any reason for Hardrada not to move against William, perhaps in slightly more leisurely fashion and with more manpower than was done by Harold?

[RichT]

The for and against seems pretty well set out.

How about setting up a poll and have done with it. (pending legal challenge and the actual deal being out to the house after a manifesto election, of course)

Good idea. Proposed question: "Should England remain an Anglo Saxon kingdom or be some other sort of kingdom?" That would sort everything out.