An article on the harrying of the north - post 1066 and all that......

[Jim Webster]

The difficuly with the North is that the border region is a desert.  By that I meannot a great place for basing troops. Thus it is hard to hold land north or south of it unless you are prepared to be there in strength. The difficulty is the same whether you are the Scots or English ruler. The Scots claimed Cumbria, but could not hold it, the English had a good go in the thirteenth century but could not defeat the geography, long term , without an effort that was disproportionate.
Roy

depends what you mean by the Border area. The Eden valley and Solway plain is excellent agricultural land and a lot of it. There's even good land round the south coast of Galloway. On the other side of the country there's good land along the Tweed and up to Kelso and then to Edinburgh

[Patrick Waterson]

Holly, I rather think that in mediaeval times arms decline when there is no threat and no great opportunity. When England was less under threat from Vikings the fleet decayed, as did the burgh system and most likely the rotational fyrd system. People do not like paying taxes, especially when they can see no immediate need. 

My impression was that the decay actually occurred at the point when the Viking threat was greatest, i.e. during the reign of Ethelred the Unready (Redeless).  This was purely because the monarch was not pulling his weight, and of course it did lead to extra taxes, but not to maintain the system ...

On the basic point of decay, I am not sure that it relates to threat or opportunity: consider the city-states of Italy and the condottieri.  The place was full of threats and opportunities, but the Italians just fell into making war in their own fashion.  The Byzantines were likewise under pretty much continual threat from AD 1071, but their army was if anything declining until the brief revival after AD 1204, the latter being entirely due to Theodore Lascaris and John Vataces.  My observation is that decay accompanies bad sovereigns and development good ones.

With hindsight, we can see that it was impossible for the English to hold down Scotland.  But breaking parts away from Scotland (like Strathclyde or even Lothian) may have been possible.  Certainly possible enough to be considered.

Aethelstan in his AD 934 campaign (fleet and all) took the usual Saxon approach of subduing the man in charge, which essentially gave him the lot at one remove.  Naturally, Constantine did not like being subdued, and collected a package of allies to try and reverse the situation, but found himself even more subdued after Brunanburgh. 

[aligern]

The English defence system had decayed pre Ethelred the Unraed. One could ask whether the burdens were sustainable long term and certainly they must have seemed a lot less necessary after tge Viking kingdom of York was subdued.
Mediaeval army readiness was crucially dependent on how frequently they fought. If your army got lots of practice, both small scale and in a large formation, it was lijely to be a lot better. When there was peace the military decayed. ( politicians are always raiding the budget for projects such as their own palaces.)
One of the advantages of feudal systems was that social status and land ownership were linked to military performance so, as long as kings insisted on their rights, they could raise a force. That would mean campaigning every year like Charlemagne or the Zulu. What you need for that system is enemies around you whom you do not conquer, but can raid annually.  Of course kings of England moved to using their own retainers and mercenaries because that way you got a more experienced and controllable force .

[Patrick Waterson]

Of course kings of England moved to using their own retainers and mercenaries because that way you got a more experienced and controllable force .

And the Normans needed such a force to deal with Wales and Scotland, whereas the Anglo-Saxons seemed able to do the job with what they had.  Was the Anglo-Saxon levy more experienced and controllable than its Norman equivalent?  I suspect it was.

The English defence system had decayed pre Ethelred the Unraed. One could ask whether the burdens were sustainable long term and certainly they must have seemed a lot less necessary after the Viking kingdom of York was subdued.

The real problem in the decade preceding Ethelred was not the 'burdens' of defence but the ongoing succession problem: too may claimants, none of whom lived long enough to promote stability.  That the country was equal to the 'burdens' of defence is shown by its ability to provide successive Danegelds under Ethelred; these appear to have amounted to considerably more than the standard expenditure on preparations for warfare.

Mediaeval army readiness was crucially dependent on how frequently they fought.

Yes and no.  A good king would call regular musters to ensure the readiness aspect did not slip and that everyone was armed and trained to spec.  The quality which did depend upon how often they fought was experience, but even experienced fighting men could be let down by a commander of the Ralph the Timid variety (what Edward the Confessor saw in him I shall never know).

What you need for that system is enemies around you whom you do not conquer, but can raid annually.

Or at least fight frequently.  Interestingly enough, the Scandinavian connection we posit for out hypothetical Anglo-Norwegians/Anglo-Godwinssonians would do just that: Danes and Swedes could be relied upon to provide a regular diet of combat, not all of it comfortably digestible.

Regarding possible continental connections, the Wikipedia article on Edmund I (AD 939-946) is interesting.

"One of Edmund's last political movements of which there is some knowledge is his role in the restoration of Louis IV of France to the throne. Louis, son of Charles the Simple and Edmund's half-sister Eadgifu, had resided at the West-Saxon court for some time until 936, when he returned to be crowned King of France. In the summer of 945, he was captured by the Norsemen of Rouen and subsequently released to Duke Hugh the Great, who held him in custody. The chronicler Richerus claims that Eadgifu wrote letters both to Edmund and to Otto I, Holy Roman Emperor in which she requested support for her son. Edmund responded to her plea by sending angry threats to Hugh. Flodoard's Annales, one of Richerus' sources, report:

    Edmund, king of the English, sent messengers to Duke Hugh about the restoration of King Louis, and the duke accordingly made a public agreement with his nephews and other leading men of his kingdom. [...] Hugh, duke of the Franks, allying himself with Hugh the Black, son of Richard, and the other leading men of the kingdom, restored to the kingdom King Louis."

Anglo-Saxon kings seemed to pull their weight on the continent, albeit principally through diplomacy.  The potential for a continental campaign was, of course there: Duke Hugh took Edmund's threat very seriously.

We may note that Edmund's full sister, Eadgyth, was wife of Otto I, the Holy Roman Emperor.  Arguably, the Norman Conquest actually diminished England's standing, influence and involvement in Europe.

[Darklinger]

We may note that Edmund's full sister, Eadgyth, was wife of Otto I, the Holy Roman Emperor.  Arguably, the Norman Conquest actually diminished England's standing, influence and involvement in Europe.

This is, I think, inarguably right. Previously there had been intermarriage across Europe, cultural influence and exchange everywhere. Again, my favourite room at the British Museum demonstrates this : the Sutton Hoo finds are surrounded by cases of later finds proving that culturally these links were thorough, necessary, common. 
Talk about the Anglo-Saxons being somehow 'insular' is rubbish. Very different from a sense in which military development, latterly, was limited. But in the eleventh century there was the development of a Danish and/or Norse style elite, so if Anglo-Saxon  military thinking was behind, then so was that of the 'Viking' armies.

My impression was that the decay actually occurred at the point when the Viking threat was greatest, i.e. during the reign of Ethelred the Unready (Redeless).  This was purely because the monarch was not pulling his weight, and of course it did lead to extra taxes, but not to maintain the system ...

For at least a partial corrective to this, read Levi Roach's 'Aethelred the Unready' published by Yale University Press in September this year. Like many assumptions about the Anglo-Saxons, it overturns them with a summation of recent scholarship.

[aligern]

Patrick, Edward the Confessor suppirted Earl Ralf because Ralf was his nephew and part  Norman and was a natural supporter against the Godwins. Edward was trying to build up a loyal counterbalance to the overmighty Godwin and his family who had inflicted a Queen upon him. By getting his sons appointed as earls Godwin was squeezing Edward into a position where the only succession would be a Godwinsson, be it his grandchild or a son. The political story of the fall of the Anglo-Danish kingdom is of the hubris and ultimate nemesis of the house of Godwin.
Darklinger, I think the military story of 1066 is not so much of an old fashioned military versus a modern one. The Anglo-Danes were well adapted to the normal threats they faced and were capable of resisting the best that the Scandinavians could put against them. The army was inflexible, like later Flemish firces. The Normans were better at combining, missile power, resistant infantry and aggressive cavalry, but that had been the continental norm for centuries, not some  new method. Had the burhs been fully garrisoned, had the fleet had a bit of luck, had Harold sent Gyrth with an army to Sussex  and stayed in London to build a second force, its highly likely that William would have ultimately lost. However, unless the Anglo-Danes made an eventual transfer  to having decent cavalry and missilemen, would they not have fallen victim to a subsequent continental foray such as that of 1216?
Roy

[Imperial Dave]

agreed, whichever alternate future we follow, the development of cavalry and missile-men is an inevitable one for an 'unmolested' Anglo-Saxon/Anglo-Danish military force

[Patrick Waterson]

Indeed.  Continental commitment would have accelerated the process as the principal foe would cease to be Scandinavian and the army would be reconfigured to deal with a new style of enemy.

I am not sure the Normans did achieve success through 'combined arms'.  We may remember that on the day of Hastings they were being uniformly worsted until the Anglo-Saxon right engaged in its chase of the Bretons and was cut up through being unsupported by the rest of the army.  This I see as a command failure (resulting from an eyeful of arrowhead) rather than a failure of the military system.  Harold knew the systems were dissimilar, he knew he had not had time, whether or not he had inclination, to assemble an effective English cavalry and hence he needed to optimise the army he had.  He did.  In many respects, the wrong side won at Hastings.

It was not until near the close of the battle that the Normans adopted - or rather improvised - some combined-arms tactics which allowed them to break the depleted English line.  This was not their standard procedure: they had been trying their standard procedure all day with mostly very unpromising results.  Not to put too fine a point upon, it, until then they were losing.

[Darklinger]

I wouldn't really differ fundamentally on much of that, and very much agree with Patrick re combined arms and the improvisatory, in-the-moment character of this may have been the most inspired leadership for which William is rightly celebrated. But I think that the pursuit of the Bretons was more to do with the quality of troops Harold had at his disposal, after Stamford Bridge, having done the march again with probably only the core of his army and picked up others on the way.
Also, there is a constant tendency of being rather hard on Harold..... and

The political story of the fall of the Anglo-Danish kingdom is of the hubris and ultimate nemesis of the house of Godwin.

I think too pat to be true, Roy.
Obviously theirs was a power seeking clan, but it's important to see their actions, also, in the context of Edward's bringing Norman and other French into key political and church positions, including Robert of Jumieges as Archbishop of Canterbury.....understandably unacceptable to the English, and essential to the crisis. So if Edward hadn't been exiled thanks to the Sweyn and Cnut......

But what is most striking is how what DID happen is endlessly arguable - Holly is right to hint that this is all a little 'off subject' - but how impossibly complicated things become very quickly is very evident, even when some of the 'facts' are known.

[aligern]

Well, I will completely disagree about the combned arms element and indeed with Patrick's description of William being universally worsted,nthough I will agree with Nigel that William improvised on the day and was better at it than Harold. Perhaps most importantly William had an army that was flexible enough to improvise with, whereas Harold, if we assume that he was still alive, could not act with the subunits of his force, being compelled to sit and take it.
William had a plan and it was a better plan than Harold's. Godwinsson had hoped to surprise William, but was hinself surprised. William had Harold fixed on the hill and he knew what to do about that. First he bombarded the English with arrows and quarrels, then an infantry assault, then cavalry attacks. The plan is clearly to wear the Anglo Danes down and that is how it proceeds. Tornented, the English pursue the Normans, but William has  a reserve in hand and after a dodgy moment, uses it to cut off the uncoordinated English advance. Inspired the Normans convert this into a tactic, ( in which they are already trained) luring some English down to be cut off a further two times.  Eventually the archers are brought back and shoot high so that dropping shots will find targets because their opponents are now too tired to hold up their shields. Once securely up on the ridge William designates a troop of knights to penetrate to Harold and bring it to a close. 
Its a highly effective combined arms operation .
As to the house of Godwin, You paint Edward as initiating the movement of Normans into the country and the Godwins reacting to that. However, the family were already overmighty subjects and I have considerable sympathy for Edward, forced into a Godwin marriage and constantly trying to build a counterbalance to the Godwins, who were aiming at the throne. Perhaps the greatest stain on their bloody character was the murder of the Atheling Alfred. At the end they fell out amongst themselves with Tostig rebelling against Harold and aiding and abetting a Norwegian invasion. 
Roy

[Imperial Dave]

The last point is a good one Roy in that even without the Norman invasion (or at least even if not successful) the Godwins were already clearly at odds with each other and was a pointer towards future instability

[Darklinger]

Ha! That is all beautifully constructed and very believable, (surely you were there?) and would lay a good basis for a fictional account, differing from but convincing as in Julian Rathbone's, 'The Last English King', or Paul Kingsnorth's, 'The Wake'.
But the battle part does not convince me because it does not take account of the wider context and preceding events enough, certainly in its summation of Harold's generalship. Also, "highly effective" would not rule out "improvised". It was a very close run thing, dark was closing in, and if it hadn't been for that lucky arrow, things might have been very different.
And though I admit that Godwin himself was hawkish in the way you describe, Edward was bringing in French from the beginning, and uselessly indecisive for the latter part of his reign. It's a bit unfair to say that the Godwins were intent on power and hold it against them in terms of fault on 'The Road To Hastings'- that was the times, and William's bold and lucky bid bears that out - to the winner, very unfortunately for many thousands in this country for many years, went all.
But I would love to wargame the battle with you one day, Roy!

[Patrick Waterson]

Tormented, the English pursue the Normans, but William has  a reserve in hand and after a dodgy moment, uses it to cut off the uncoordinated English advance.

It was not so much that the English were 'tormented' but that the Normans were fleeing.  The only reason William had a 'reserve' was because the English centre and left did not pursue, and that was a command failure.  Hence William could rally his unpressurised centre and lead it against the flank of the English right.

Inspired the Normans convert this into a tactic, ( in which they are already trained) luring some English down to be cut off a further two times.

The 'training' seems to have been remarkably rapid, arising as it did during the battle.  Again, the spontaneous uncoordinated English sorties point to a command failure at Harold's level, which would seem to be explained by his injury.  As Nigel mentions, Harold's previous record was very good - and he was quite familiar with the Norman army from two years previously.

Eventually the archers are brought back and shoot high so that dropping shots will find targets because their opponents are now too tired to hold up their shields.

But would this not have been just as effective at the outset of the action, when the opponents had their shields wattled together in front of them and hence could not hold them up anyway?  And if your foes are too tired to hold up shields, why not just cut them down in melee anyway?  Or for that matter shoot directly into their faces?

Its a highly effective combined arms operation .

It is an all-day fumble against an unaccustomedly resilient opponent, with 'effective combined arms' appearing only toward the end of the day.  Had Harold remained unwounded, and hence able to control his army, I do not think William would have had a chance.

As to the house of Godwin, You paint Edward as initiating the movement of Normans into the country and the Godwins reacting to that. However, the family were already overmighty subjects and I have considerable sympathy for Edward, forced into a Godwin marriage and constantly trying to build a counterbalance to the Godwins, who were aiming at the throne. Perhaps the greatest stain on their bloody character was the murder of the Atheling Alfred. At the end they fell out amongst themselves with Tostig rebelling against Harold and aiding and abetting a Norwegian invasion. 

Except this was not 'the end', but a potential new beginning with the bad blood out of the family.  If we are to consider dynastic disturbance as a funeral shroud for a new-made ruler, the Duchy of Normandy should have had brass handles attached to its coffin ere the end of William's reign.

But I would love to wargame the battle with you one day, Roy!

That sounds like an excellent idea: I suggest refighting it twice, once each with each participant's favourite rules.

[Darklinger]

It is an all-day fumble against an unaccustomedly resilient opponent, with 'effective combined arms' appearing only toward the end of the day.  Had Harold remained unwounded, and hence able to control his army, I do not think William would have had a chance.

Wow, best description, ever!
And,

I suggest refighting it twice, once each with each participant's favourite rules.

I like it....
Would really like to know, though, from ANYONE who was actually there: did William REALLY wear a load of old Christian relics round his neck all day, despite being unhorsed twice or three times according to accounts; and WHAT WAS Harold's 'Fighting Man' war banner - was it based on the kind of designs stamped into the Sutton Hoo helmet or a Dane axe armed geeser (as LBMS postulate), or was it based on the Cerne Abbas Giant chalk figure, erection and all, as Julian Rathbone would, erm, have it? This is ESSENTIAL for the 28mm Anglo-Dane Army - please let me know.

[Imperial Dave]

I am still unconvinced by the 'feigned flight' account......I am more inclined to believe that the Bretons (first) followed by the Normans (succeeding waves) just got repulsed and chased by poorly commanded/controlled fyrdmen and that the Normans managed to rally and make advantage of the situation