An article on the harrying of the north - post 1066 and all that......

[Duncan Head]

My point is that castles go up in the absence of an opposing army in the field, not while it is heading your way.  Historically, Normans seem to have erected castles only when the land on which they were built was already won, i.e. no serious opponent in the field and/or their side has ample troops and total initiative.

ISTE JUSSIT UT FODERETUR CASTELLUM AT HESTENGA

Granted, but castellum (singular), as opposed to the network Roy envisages.  Caesar built a fortified camp around his fleet, securing just as much local supply as William's solitary erection.

William built a fortification at Pevensey, to secure the fleet. If the Tapestry's Castellum at Hestenga is actually at Hastings, not a duplicate of the Pevensey fort (opinions differ), then Pevensey is no longer a solitary construction, and the Hastings work is very much built in the face of an oncoming "serious opponent in the field".

[Imperial Dave]

The for and against seems pretty well set out.

How about setting up a poll and have done with it. (pending legal challenge and the actual deal being out to the house after a manifesto election, of course)

Good idea. Proposed question: "Should England remain an Anglo Saxon kingdom or be some other sort of kingdom?" That would sort everything out.

stop paying out Danegeld and put the money into castle building instead? 

[aligern]

it is an interesting conundrum. Erecting a castle to pin back an enemy force in the field is seen as an immense difficulty, whereas building a camp in exactly the same circumstances is a mere bagatelle.
William also, in some sources , built and garrisoned a castle at Pevensey, within the Roman walls , before moving on to near Hastings.  Presumably this was to secure a bridgehead for reinforcements should he be trapped on the Hastings peninsula. What it demonstrates is how quickly the Normans can do this!
We should also look at his behavioyr after Yastings. In theory there could have been another English army in the field  with Edwin and Morcar an the Londoners and those arriving who missed  Hastings.
Actually these forces failed to congregate, but William cannot know this. However, he marches off into the blue through Kent, Surrey, Hampshire and Berkshire and is at Wallingford before Stigand arrives and then Berkhamstead where the other grandees make a surrender. Despite having suffered casualties he cuts loose from his base and fleet. This is not a man who is going to be wortied about meeting Hardrada or the Mercians and Northumbrians. Ncdentally this is not a man who worries about meeting the Danes later. William has a huge advantage in hs cavalry. He can pin any Anglo Saxon force, on an open battlefield he can surfound and flank them and turn them out of positions. If they hide in a town he can put castles on the roads around and pen them in whilst they starve within the walls. Once William is in open country it really would be difficult for the Anglo Saxon or Norwegian armies to beat him.
Roy

[Jim Webster]

it is an interesting conundrum. Erecting a castle to pin back an enemy force in the field is seen as an immense difficulty, whereas building a camp in exactly the same circumstances is a mere bagatelle.

Probably because they're very different things. The ratio between the size of the garrison and the perimeter of the walls for a start

[Patrick Waterson]

William built a fortification at Pevensey, to secure the fleet. If the Tapestry's Castellum at Hestenga is actually at Hastings, not a duplicate of the Pevensey fort (opinions differ), then Pevensey is no longer a solitary construction, and the Hastings work is very much built in the face of an oncoming "serious opponent in the field".

Rather than while said opponent was en route from Stamford Bridge?  Or did William actually build it while Harold was deployed on Senlac Hill?

I think the basic point here is not so much the need to split hairs over semantics as to establish whether Roy's proposed castle networking would have provided a secure base of supplies for William in the presence of an opposing army (leaving aside for the moment whether the Normans could persuade the supplies out of the locals in the first place).  Given the vulnerability of the wooden motte-and-bailey type as demonstrated at Hereford I think they would have been deathtraps against any organised force.

it is an interesting conundrum. Erecting a castle to pin back an enemy force in the field is seen as an immense difficulty, whereas building a camp in exactly the same circumstances is a mere bagatelle.

I see we are back to a castle as opposed to a network of castles over several counties.  Building a camp, in addition to the consideration Jim mentions, does have the advantage of keeping your whole army together.

William also, in some sources , built and garrisoned a castle at Pevensey, within the Roman walls , before moving on to near Hastings.  Presumably this was to secure a bridgehead for reinforcements should he be trapped on the Hastings peninsula. What it demonstrates is how quickly the Normans can do this!

Quickly enough in the absence of opposition, certainly.  Its value in the presence of opposition remained unproven.

We should also look at his behavioyr after Yastings. In theory there could have been another English army in the field  with Edwin and Morcar an the Londoners and those arriving who missed  Hastings.
Actually these forces failed to congregate, but William cannot know this. However, he marches off into the blue through Kent, Surrey, Hampshire and Berkshire and is at Wallingford before Stigand arrives and then Berkhamstead where the other grandees make a surrender. Despite having suffered casualties he cuts loose from his base and fleet. This is not a man who is going to be wortied about meeting Hardrada or the Mercians and Northumbrians.

This is how he acts when both his main competitors are dead.  He knows that the key to breaking up any further resistance will be getting to London and saying hello to the Witan before they can place anyone else on the throne and allow the new candidate time to assemble his forces (in fact they managed the one but not the other).

Ncdentally this is not a man who worries about meeting the Danes later.

But does he actually fight Sweyn?

William has a huge advantage in hs cavalry. He can pin any Anglo Saxon force, on an open battlefield he can surfound and flank them and turn them out of positions.

Presumably any Danish force, also.  But if they take up a hilltop position with flanks closed by rivers and/or woods, he will have his work cut out.

If they hide in a town he can put castles on the roads around and pen them in whilst they starve within the walls. Once William is in open country it really would be difficult for the Anglo Saxon or Norwegian armies to beat him.

But not impossible: he still has to find provisions, which means sending off detachments which can be ambushed; he still has to concern himself with what happens if he besieges one opponent and the other turns up; he still has to worry about what an army of Danes or Anglo-Saxons would do to any castle network he does manage to erect in his rear.

[aligern]

It. is rather that Sweyn does not fight William.....too sensible by far.
No William does not know what the outcome of the Saxon leaders meeting in Lndon will be. He has to play it as if the English will come up with a king  and an army as both are within their abilities.

Does Hereford show the vulnerability of castles? No, because the key element is that anyone in the castle and that may have been no one military, would find out that Ralf had gone...departed...left and they would get no relief. Had William built castles at strategic points they would have expected relief from any siege whilst doing their job of holding up an incursion.
Alfred built burhs which did much the same job as a network of castles. These worked until good times led to their neglect. I don't see why William cannot do the same thing.
I can  respond to Patrick's comment on moving from many castles to one by pointing out that the examples of Pevensey and Hastings are there to show how rapidly the Normans can castellate...it appears to take a day or two to put up a fortification , but not much more. That they can do this near the enemy sounds logical to me because an army can produce a fortified camp when the distance is only a mile or so from an active enemy and as I have pointed out several times the Norman advantage of having real cavalry gives them an immense advantage against an advancing infantry army, which , of necessity, has to abandon any position with protected flanks.
Even so, there is no restraint at all upon William building castles to hold the hinterland that has been abandoned to him because there is no enemy army there. Was William sent reinforcements? Historiians have thought that some  of the value decline in manors between the Conquest and 1086 was caused by the track of reinforcements arriving.  To follow The trend of enthusiastic imaginings here, lets assume that William is seen as a success because he has not been repulsed and is now building up a base so reinforcement flow to him, giving him plentiful numbers to garrison castles and secure  the South and a bigger army to fght Harold or Harold who are both based in restricted areas, Harald in Yorkshire and Harold in the West and maybe East Anglia.

[Patrick Waterson]

It. is rather that Sweyn does not fight William.....too sensible by far.
No William does not know what the outcome of the Saxon leaders meeting in Lndon will be. He has to play it as if the English will come up with a king  and an army as both are within their abilities.

Although this is in the context of his already having eliminated the best king and army they have and without a Harald, not in a situation where two powerful contenders are still in the field.  The existence of these might make him a bit more cautious, especially with the knowledge that an expensive victory over Harald could leave him relatively easy prey for a resurgent Harold.

Does Hereford show the vulnerability of castles? No, because the key element is that anyone in the castle and that may have been no one military, would find out that Ralf had gone...departed...left and they would get no relief.

But why would the garrison at Hereford have had so little confidence in their Norman-style castle?  I am also puzzled by the idea of a non-military garrison.

Had William built castles at strategic points they would have expected relief from any siege whilst doing their job of holding up an incursion.

And whence would come relief if the main army was outside the castellated zone (e.g chasing Harald)?  Would the entire network be evacuated for lack of expectation of relief?

Alfred built burhs which did much the same job as a network of castles. These worked until good times led to their neglect. I don't see why William cannot do the same thing.

Burghs actually did a different job: they sheltered the population, not the occupiers.  They were also significantly larger and usually better manned.

I can  respond to Patrick's comment on moving from many castles to one by pointing out that the examples of Pevensey and Hastings are there to show how rapidly the Normans can castellate...it appears to take a day or two to put up a fortification , but not much more. That they can do this near the enemy sounds logical to me because an army can produce a fortified camp when the distance is only a mile or so from an active enemy and as I have pointed out several times the Norman advantage of having real cavalry gives them an immense advantage against an advancing infantry army, which , of necessity, has to abandon any position with protected flanks.

We have agreed they can put the things up quickly.  It is their efficacy when an English or Danish army sweeps into the land they are guarding that is in doubt.  And their ability to extort supplies from a reluctant population.

Even so, there is no restraint at all upon William building castles to hold the hinterland that has been abandoned to him because there is no enemy army there.

None whatsoever.  The problem I think he will discover is that with Harald and Harold still very much in the field, these castles in the hinterland are just small, inflammable deathtraps for his men when an enemy army arrives.  And the men garrisonning them have all been detached from his main army.  He would indeed wish to replace them with additional troops, but assuming these exist and are not tied down with a continental problem, fetching them across the channel in winter could be problematic, because if storms do not sink them the chances are the Danes would.

It may be time to move on to other questions, e.g. how long would it take Harold to pull together another army, and from where?  How soon would Harald want to move south and try conclusions with William, who would be public enemy number one following Harold's hypothetical Stamford Bridge defeat?  William would presumably be heading north rather than staying put at Hastings, so where might they meet, and when?

[aligern]

Hereford. The question is whether there was any garrison left in the castle. Ralf had gone out to fight, would he leave his best men in the castle when they would be more use on the battlefield?

Next Why would the Danes be a threat to William's fleet. The Norwegians might, but then they might not wish to up anchor and head South in the winter. William, on the other hand was so close to base he could slip across on a calm night.
Why would William chase Harald in the winter? He is the most likely to hold London and Winchester and can sit and wait. A situation in which he is king in the South, Harald in the North suits William because the South is richer and in the end will dominate the North. If Harold holds London and Winchester then William has to try conclusions with him ...and we know how that turns out.

Burhs act to hold down the invader. Sheltering the population is no great problem, they hide in the woods. Burhs create a block that the invader cannot ignore. Their siting is about control of routes, not as a hidey hole.
Jim, the castle is likely to built with the whole or half of the army to put them up, which is the same for a camp. A camp can be fortified in a day, so can a castle. BTW , as Mick pointed out earlier, castles in Ireland and probably in England are often no different from Irish ring works. They do not have to have a motte to do the job. What is crucial is the mindset of using castles aggressively to control territory, bottle up an enemy,  hinder a route.
Roy

[Jim Webster]

In basic terms

• The perimeter of a castle is safely  designed to be held by the minimum number of defenders possible. This is important because it means that the amount of stores held in the castle can last for the longest possible time.
  A camp is built to give an army time to put their equipment of if somebody attempts to overrun them at night.

[aligern]

Well some camps are more ermanent and more lijely to be assaulted. However, the purpose of a camp and a castle does not affect the conclusion that both can be built  quite close to the enemy. Caesar typically told off up to half the army to protect the build, whilst the others laboured. A Norman casle requires, at minimum only a ditch and bank of suffcient size and a palisade on top.  If a motte is required then picking a sute with a mound would be the ideal, but even without that it would not take long for say 1000 men to throw up a mound  based on earth, turf and beams. It could be done with an enemy nearby and, as mentioned, it is dangerous for Vikings or Saxons to advance against Norman castle builders because they are so vulnerable to cavalry in open country.
Its also worth pointing out that castellation is a prime way that the Franks saw off the Viking and Magyar threat.
You do have a point that the nature of a camp makes it much easier for an army to all take part in construction because all the units can build a section at the same time.

Roy

[Patrick Waterson]

Hereford. The question is whether there was any garrison left in the castle. Ralf had gone out to fight, would he leave his best men in the castle when they would be more use on the battlefield?

Given his general grasp of military matters, nothing would surprise me.   Seriously why build the castle if it serves no purpose?  We are after all considering a situation where William, with two strong opponents in the field, puts a substantial number of his men, best or otherwise, in a chain of castles across south-east England.  Does he abandon these when he goes out to fight?

Next Why would the Danes be a threat to William's fleet. The Norwegians might, but then they might not wish to up anchor and head South in the winter. William, on the other hand was so close to base he could slip across on a calm night.

For the avoidance of doubt, I mean Hardrada's chaps.  If the weather was comparatively mild, and if William was able to make use of the Channel, why would Hardrada not make use of his sea-power?  One obvious reason would be to concentrate his warrior strength, but unless a battle was in the offing he would not feel the need (he left his army and his warrior-manned fleet separated at Stamford Bridge* and would doubtless do so again in our hypothetical campaign) and would be happy to launch a raid against the lands William was trying to control.  This was after all what Vikings did best.

*I suppose the what-if justification for Harald winning would be if an Englishman did not take a boat under the bridge to show that lone Norse defenders do not like it up 'em and hence the bridge was held and Harald was able to unite his army and avoid defeat in detail.

Why would William chase Harald in the winter? He is the most likely to hold London and Winchester and can sit and wait. A situation in which he is king in the South, Harald in the North suits William because the South is richer and in the end will dominate the North. If Harold holds London and Winchester then William has to try conclusions with him ...and we know how that turns out.

Should we assume that following a success at Stamford Bridge Harald would not head for London himself?  He would be fully aware that William is his chief foe and major problem now that Harold's wings are clipped for the rest of the campaign season.  Harold will be a threat the following year, when he can once again turn out his fyrd for forty days.  William is a threat now, and one who, if he gets to London first, could establish himself as at least a quasi-ruler.  Ergo, Harald has to deal with William as soon as possible.

Does William have to deal with Harald?  Sooner or later he has to, if he is to make anything of his claim.  Would William seek out his foe as soon as possible, or would he attempt a strategy of holding the south and hoping Harald will go away?  I think we are looking at a clash, perhaps in the vicinity of London, either in December 1066 or the spring of 1067 as each contender seeks to deny the Witanagemot to his rival.

Burhs act to hold down the invader. Sheltering the population is no great problem, they hide in the woods. Burhs create a block that the invader cannot ignore. Their siting is about control of routes, not as a hidey hole.

Yes, to a great extent.  However the manpower to garrison them is often from the locality, so they serve two purposes within their 'zone of control'.

BTW , as Mick pointed out earlier, castles in Ireland and probably in England are often no different from Irish ring works. They do not have to have a motte to do the job. What is crucial is the mindset of using castles aggressively to control territory, bottle up an enemy,  hinder a route.

But placing a wooden ring work or motte and bailey in an attempt to deny an English or Danish (Norwegian) army a route would seem to be an exercise in optimism rather than constraint.  This 'aggressive control of territory' concept works only in the absence of an enemy army: even Welsh armies managed to pick up castles quite regularly later on, and these were stone, not wooden.  Northern England's stone border keeps could usually fend off a Scottish raid, but even these were no proof against an army (and Edward I's network of castles in Scotland soon fell to the Bruce).  It usually took fortresses of the calibre of Harlech or Caernarvon to be certain of holding off an army, and those represented architecture on a quite different scale.

Hence, aggressive castellation might prove a two-edged sword.

[Imperial Dave]

One thing I have been thinking about on this one is the potential for a three way contest being a real 'slug-fest' In the real timeline, William consolidates his hold on power but in the absence of any real unifying major player on the scene and even then it takes him a few years to achieve it. If he has Harald and Harold in the field it potentially weakens him especially if he does try to cover 'all bases' and expand his network. Remember he would be facing 2 tried and tested commanders with potentially large numbers of troops (possibly after a period of regrouping in Harold's case for sure). He has cavalry but essentially Harald and Harold will have mounted troops so movement of forces could be rapid for all three commanders hence William would have to be very careful where he put his castles and concentrations of forces

[aligern]

Why is Harold restrcted to a 40 day term for his fyrd? Fyrds can be called out repeatedly as they were in the time of Ethelred.

Ralf most likely built the castle to protect himself against the local population and in case of a sneaky Welsh raid.nOnce Ralf is out of the castle there is no point in holding up there, better to flee. You don't get called Ralf the Timid for choosing to ge besieged rather than head for Gloucester.
Holly is, of course, correct ,  all the armies are substantially mounted. William!s advantage is that he will win any mounted action . The Hs must choose battlefields with protected flanks otherwise they have a real tactical problem, though both have forces that can hack their way through the Norman infantry.  In the end it comes down to battles and the evidence we have is Harold beats Harald, William beats Harold.
I don't  think William needs the Witan , it s not a formal king making body.  He needs the submission of the Earls and the senior bishops and London. It would make an interesting board game as competing kings  try and collect a set .  Of course , if a claimant holds lands he can create earls in areas he holds. William has papal blessing. That is not the dealbreaker it becomes for John, but it counts for something.
Yes castles can be taken, but they can also resist. Norman castles were not Harlech or Carnarvon or Krak des Chevaliers, capable of holding for years, they are tactical devices, able to hold an area for contribution, or of blocking a river crossing or a herepath. One could turn the argument on its head and question why the Normans and the Franks at large  built so many of them if, as has been suggested, they can so easily be burnt, or escalated, or just ignored.
Roy

[Patrick Waterson]

Why is Harold restrcted to a 40 day term for his fyrd? Fyrds can be called out repeatedly as they were in the time of Ethelred.

The 40-day limit on continuous service was, if I remember rightly, the reason William was able to get across the Channel at all: Harold's fleet packed up and went home.

Ralf most likely built the castle to protect himself against the local population and in case of a sneaky Welsh raid.nOnce Ralf is out of the castle there is no point in holding up there, better to flee. You don't get called Ralf the Timid for choosing to ge besieged rather than head for Gloucester.

When Harold took over, he built 'a fortification' and then cleaned up the situation, so I think Ralph's motte-and-bailey was meant to be a base, and only a base fellow would have abandoned it.  While Wikipedia is not long on detail, it states that Llewellyn 'took' the castle and burned it, as opposed to just destroying an abandoned and empty castle.  Can anyone shed further light on this?

Holly is, of course, correct ,  all the armies are substantially mounted. William!s advantage is that he will win any mounted action . The Hs must choose battlefields with protected flanks otherwise they have a real tactical problem, though both have forces that can hack their way through the Norman infantry.  In the end it comes down to battles and the evidence we have is Harold beats Harald, William beats Harold.

The difficulty with using this as precedent is that William beats Harold only after Harold is wounded; until then, Harold looks like the favourite to win.  Harold vs Harald is a clear case of superior generalship: surprising the opponent and defeating him in detail, although ironically even here the wounding of a single man (the bridge-holder) determined the course and most probably the outcome of the battle.

I don't  think William needs the Witan , it s not a formal king making body.  He needs the submission of the Earls and the senior bishops and London. It would make an interesting board game as competing kings  try and collect a set .

He felt it was worth getting its approval even with both his competitors dead, and even then he faced a challenge from Edgar Atheling.  How much of England might have supported Edgar had William not been approved by the Witan is an interesting question.

  Of course , if a claimant holds lands he can create earls in areas he holds. William has papal blessing. That is not the dealbreaker it becomes for John, but it counts for something.

Actually he cannot: only a recognised king can create earls.  He can promise titles and even write charters, but he will end up with Earl of Surrey types who owe allegiance only to their swords.  Titles can be confirmed only when a claimant wears the crown.

Yes castles can be taken, but they can also resist. Norman castles were not Harlech or Carnarvon or Krak des Chevaliers, capable of holding for years, they are tactical devices, able to hold an area for contribution, or of blocking a river crossing or a herepath. One could turn the argument on its head and question why the Normans and the Franks at large  built so many of them if, as has been suggested, they can so easily be burnt, or escalated, or just ignored.

Because they are useful for frustrating raiders and/or holding down an unhappy local population, which is pretty much 99% of Norman experience.  Against an organised foe in the field they are as straws in the wind, and as of AD 1066 inflammable straws at that.

If William had, in our hypothetical scenario, managed to lose his life and army at a hypothetical battle, perhaps through being surprised by Harold while he was administering a drubbing to Harald, how long would his network of castles have withstood the armed might of England?  Not long, I am thinking.

[Duncan Head]

Why is Harold restrcted to a 40 day term for his fyrd? Fyrds can be called out repeatedly as they were in the time of Ethelred.

The 40-day limit on continuous service was, if I remember rightly, the reason William was able to get across the Channel at all: Harold's fleet packed up and went home.

Not sure where you get this from.  They were apparently at sea for four months or so, not 40 days.

I only recall 40 days as a post-conquest limit on service.