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How long was the battle of Towton?

Started by Erpingham, November 20, 2016, 06:43:47 PM

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Erpingham

I've been doing some reading on battlefield archaeology and wound trauma (as you do) and serendipitously came across a 2010 paper by Tim Sutherland (of Medieval Dead series) on reinterpreting the Battle of Towton.  Dr Sutherland is a great believer in Acedemia.edu and has a lot of very interesting papers there.

https://www.academia.edu/3854289/Sutherland_T.L._2010_Killing_Time_Challenging_the_Common_Perceptions_of_Three_Medieval_Conflicts_Ferrybridge_Dintingdale_and_Towton_The_Largest_Battle_on_British_Soil_Journal_of_Conflict_Archaeology_5_No.1_1-25

His central suggestion is that Ferrybridge/Towton wasn't a two day battle at all, just a long day's fight in three phases, with the Battle of Towton as we know it occupying an afternoon.  He even quotes one source that implies it was all over bar the shouting (and gratuitously massacring the fugitives) in an hour.  This will be music to the ears of the short battles proponents but it is a little more complicated in that the fighting started before dawn and finished after dark but was sequentially in three places.  Worth a read.


Patrick Waterson

Ir seems a bit confused, not to mention puzzlingly inclined to avoid key considerations required by the author's hypothesis.

"[The author's] interpretation, if correct, would necessitate a major reconsideration of either the numbers of combatants involved or the capabilities of Medieval forces to move around the landscape and conduct organised warfare on a large scale. Such considerations will not be discussed within the current paper."

The key to his redistribution of time (which he does discuss ad nauseam) seems to be this:

"It is proposed within this paper that the generally perceived time frame for a single day, during the period in question, was from approximately 6 am until 6 pm for a 'day' and 6 pm until 6 am for a 'night', and that this was used by contemporaries of the conflicts. There remain vestiges of this time frame in modern terminology. The terms 'midday' and 'midnight' reflect this 6 am to 6 pm and 6 pm to 6 am time frame respectively; together they make little sense in a modern day beginning at 12 o'clock at night or 0.00 hours"

As to the reckoning of a day, this site provides the following statement:

"The midnight-to-midnight system came from pagan Rome , along with many other heathen customs of today.

Other cultures determined the start of their day in various ways. The Babylonians and Egyptians reckoned it from sunrise to sunrise; the Umbrians from noon to noon; the Athenians, Numidians, and Phoenicians reckoned a day from evening to evening (sunset to sunset). The Hebrews also started their day at sunset."


So no reason to question a midnight-to-midnight day (or a midday-to-midday day, as used of yore by the Royal Navy.)  His interpretation of 'eve' is also at variance with tradition, e.g. 'Christmas Eve' does not begin at 6pm on 24th December.

The whole paper seems laden with confusion and special pleading, together with the author's inability to appreciate that Ferrybridge and Dintingdale were comparatively minor actions; preliminaries to the Towton battle.  The whole sequence is probably best described by Hall's Chronicle, but even this is misrepresented by the author, probably because he does not understand the chronicler's usage.

" ... the lord Clifforde determined with his light horsemen, to make an assaye to suche as kepte the passage of Ferybridge, and so departed from the great army on the Saturday before Palmsondaye, and early or his enemies were ware, gat the bridge, and slew the kepers of the same ..."

So this takes place on Saturday, the 28th.  Fauconbridge outflanks the position, but Clifford then suffers a mishap while probing further, presumably still 'with his light horsemen', having apparently been caught between the retreating Lancastrians and Henry's army.

"The lord Fawconbridge, ... with the forward, passed the ryuer at Castelford, iii. myles from Ferebridge, ... but [the Lancastrians] departed in great haste toward kyng Henries army, but they mete with some that they loked not for, and were attrapped .... For the lord Clifforde, ... and all his company almost were there slayn, at a place called Dintingdale, not farr from Towton."

This again took place on the same day, the 28th.

"When this conflict was ended at Ferebridge, the lord Fawconbridge, valeauntly upon Palm-sunday in the twylight, set furth his army, and came to Saxton ... So the same day about. ix. of the clocke, which was the. xxix. day of Marche, being Palmsundaye, both the hostes approched in a playn felde, betwene Towton and Saxton."

Once the fight at Ferrybridge was over, Fauconbridge rested his men and then set out early the following morning ('upon Palm-sunday in the twylight'), arriving at the Towton battlefield 'about IX of the clocke', covering about eight miles in five or six hours which seems reasonable.  Following deployment (say an hour) the battle could commence about 'x of the clocke'.  Unfortunately the author tries to make out that the 'same day' is the day during which Ferrybridge and Dintingdale were fought, as opposed to the same day that Fauconbridge set out from his camp at Ferrybridge, i.e. Palm Sunday.

"This deadly battayle and bloody conflicte, continued, x. hours in doubtfull victorie ... [The Lancastrians] ...fledde toward Tadcaster ... a great number were drent and drowned, ... The chace continued all night, and the most parte of the next day ... For in this. iii. dayes were slayn (as they knew it wrote) on both partes xxxvi. M. vii. C. lx. and xvi. [ 36,776 ] persons."

This takes the actual Battle of Towton, as distinct from the previous day's actions, from perhaps 10am to maybe 8pm, with the Lancastrians breaking very late in the day, the oncoming darkness probably contributing to their inability to find an effective escape route.  Hall's Chronicle has the pursuit continue into the night, which is entirely consistent with a battle ending after sunset (c.18.30 for Towton in late March).
"Men occasionally stumble over the truth, but most of them pick themselves up and hurry off as if nothing had happened." - Winston Churchill

Dangun

His stuff on the location of Agincourt is interesting.

Erpingham

I have to admit, I thought dismissing quite so many sources that say it was a two day battle by stating they were confused about two different ways of telling time was a stretch.  I'm also not sure all the shifts in the axis of advance, repairing bridges etc. could have been done within a 12 hour period.

I think there may be room for speculation as to when Clifford began his withdrawal, whether he was aware of the Yorkist van crossing at Castleford or whether he was falling back on his main force according to plan, having given them the time to deploy on their chosen ground.  Was this on Saturday or Sunday morning?


Patrick Waterson

Quote from: Erpingham on November 21, 2016, 10:10:16 AM
I think there may be room for speculation as to when Clifford began his withdrawal, whether he was aware of the Yorkist van crossing at Castleford or whether he was falling back on his main force according to plan, having given them the time to deploy on their chosen ground.  Was this on Saturday or Sunday morning?

That is a good question: frankly, I would have to guess; my best guess, based on the sequencing of Hall's narrative, would be to assign it to Saturday.

My assumed sequence of events would run as follows:

Saturday - Clifford seizes the bridge at Ferrybridge; Fauconbridge crosses at Castleford; Clifford becomes belatedly aware of the crossing and pulls back.

Speculation (could be either day) - Clifford pulls back to Dintingdale where he feels safe and either unexpectedly runs into a Yorkist vanguard already present with dire results or makes camp and settles down, being surprised by the sudden arrival of the Yorkist van.  Assign this to Saturday afternoon/evening or very early on Sunday as preferred.  I think it would make more sense as an unexpected encounter late on Saturday, given the challenge of having both contingents criss-crossing the countryside in the hours of darkness that a Sunday encounter would require.

Sunday - Yorkist main body advances from Ferrybridge, its progress presumably screened by the van.  Battle of Towton.

I would plump for a late Saturday surprise (following a Saturday withdrawal) as being more in keeping with Hall's Chronicle's sequencing and general tenor, but take your pick.
"Men occasionally stumble over the truth, but most of them pick themselves up and hurry off as if nothing had happened." - Winston Churchill

Nick Harbud

Quote from: Erpingham on November 21, 2016, 10:10:16 AM
I think there may be room for speculation as to when Clifford began his withdrawal, whether he was aware of the Yorkist van crossing at Castleford or whether he was falling back on his main force according to plan, having given them the time to deploy on their chosen ground.  Was this on Saturday or Sunday morning?

Was it still snowing at the time?
Nick Harbud

Jim Webster


I think the only answer to the question in the subject line is


'The rest of your life'

Patrick Waterson

Quote from: NickHarbud on November 21, 2016, 03:12:49 PM
Was it still snowing at the time?

Not sure, but it could be a reason why Clifford may have ridden into the wrong force.  Interesting thought.
"Men occasionally stumble over the truth, but most of them pick themselves up and hurry off as if nothing had happened." - Winston Churchill

Nick Harbud

Personally I feel the snow is somewhat overlooked as an influence on the battle.  I mean, everyone concentrates on the wind giving extra range to the Yorkist archery, but tend not to mention the effect on visibility.  IMHO this was the key reason it was so bloody. 

BP Hughes in 'Firepower' advanced the arguement that the  bloodiest exchanges of musket fire occurred when both sides were enveloped in clouds of smoke, could not see that they were losing and so carried on firing.  Notwithstanding treatment under some wargames rules, most archery exchanges were relatively bloodless because any attackers charged home before too many shots had been fired.  They became bloody when the archers could fire many arrows.  Sometimes this accurred because of mud (Agincourt) or more frequently because the attackers were trying to charge up a hill.  At Towton, the Lancastrians were also disadvantaged by the ground, but one can imagine that individuals could only see a relatively short distance around them and had little idea of how the battle as a whole was proceeding. Therefore they kept on fighting.

Of course, poor visibility could also lead to bodies of troops blundering into one another unexpectedly....
Nick Harbud

Patrick Waterson

The limited visibility permitted by ongoing snow would make shouting the main form of orientation on the battlefield, and while everyone was managing their traditional war-shouts and general hubbub, the done thing would be to carry on fighting.  Once the tenor of the shouting changed (Mowbray's late arrivals are committed - probably including the source who has his opponents collapse after an hour's fighting - and the Lancastrians begin to feel pressed) one side would be disheartened and the other proportionately encouraged.  So - inclined to agree with everything apart from BP Hughes:

Quote from: NickHarbud on November 23, 2016, 04:15:59 PM
BP Hughes in 'Firepower' advanced the argument that the  bloodiest exchanges of musket fire occurred when both sides were enveloped in clouds of smoke, could not see that they were losing and so carried on firing.

The problem with Mr Hughes' assessment is that with musketry a general tendency to fire high was exacerbated by loss of sight of the target.  The first volley, with the target unobscured and a minimum of misfires, was universally considered the most effective, hence the 18th century insistence on getting the other side to fire first so one could then get really close and properly let them have it while they were reloading and helpless.  Once it degenerated into both sides firing into smoke, casualty rates seem to have dropped precipitously, although the extended duration of firing when both sides were shrouded in smoke meant that losses would eventually mount up over time.

That said, the density, or rather depth, of mediaeval formations and the curved trajectory of massed archery would mean that this shooting high aspect of musketry should not have been a problem for longbowmen, so their ability to stand and shoot over an extended period of time, even or perhaps especially in limited visibility, would add to the casualty lists.

I suspect that at Towton most casualties would anyway have occurred during the rout (many self-inflicted crossing a flooded river in the near-dark) and the pursuit.  In every way, a sanguinary day.
"Men occasionally stumble over the truth, but most of them pick themselves up and hurry off as if nothing had happened." - Winston Churchill