Another one of those 'what ifs' - Zama this time

[Imperial Dave]

https://www.warhistoryonline.com/war-articles/hannibal-won-zama-carthaginian-empire-rome-destroyed.html

Found this and although its not scintillatingly detailed it does offer a talking point for another 'what if' alternative future......

[Patrick Waterson]

Probably a bit pessimistic about Carthage's post-Zama chances: the Romans were becoming rather unpopular in Spain and would continue to do so, which suggests Hannibal might have gained rather more cooperation, alliances and recruits than the article suggests.  With Scipio dead the Romans were a bit short of talented generalship and what they had was mainly of the stay-at-home variety, so (for example) do they send Flaminius, who historically managed to beat the Macedonians at Cynoscephalae, to Greece or to Spain as of 197 BC?  If the latter, does Philip prevail over whichever Roman is sent against him?  Ramifications increasingly start to ripple through the tapestry of history.

The main thrust of the article is that Carthage would have anyway sued for peace - this I would question.  Following the posited complete success at Zama, Hannibal would have been in a very influential position in Carthage: much as he was when he successfully ran the city's finances after the war and paid off the massive tribute imposed by the Romans.  With Hannibal in charge of the city and the war effort, the money from the reformed finances would be going into Carthage's war chest, not Rome's - we should perhaps remember that it was Rome, not Carthage, which was nearing financial exhaustion as of 202 BC (they seem to have needed Carthage's tribute to finance the war against Macedon).

So, given Hannibal in charge of policy and finances, the Carthaginians could have sustained war almost indefinitely, and while Hannibal remained in charge would do so.  The next question is how successful they would be.

Spain would in all likelihood be the main theatre of war: contrary to the article's assumptions, it was the most difficult theatre for the Romans to support (Africa, by contrast, was a day's sailing away from Sicily, but Fabius Maximus etc. would have ensured no further Roman expeditions were despatched to Africa) and the unreliability of the Iberian inhabitants tended to make life easier for an invader, at least up to a point.  With the loss of Scipio the Romans would have lost the one Roman general who really understood Spain, so I think Hannibal would have worked his way up the peninsula and into the friendlier territory of Gaul and possibly even Liguria.  There he would have run into difficulties unless the Carthaginians could wrest sea superiority from Rome, because the Romans could slip armies past him to raid and/or raise the more vulnerable or less well-affected Spanish tribes, which would have a cramping effect on his operations.

Would he have been able to invade Italy again?  He would certainly want to, although detaching cities from their alliance with Rome was, as the article notes, no longer a realistic option.  I think he would have managed to penetrate northern Italy, i.e. Gallia Cisalpina, and wipe out the Roman colonies there.  Establishing himself further south would be problematical - too many sieges, not enough troops.

It would be at about this juncture that peace would probably be established, because the closer Hannibal got to Rome, the further away he would be from Carthage and the harder it would be for him to keep control there.  I suspect that either the anti-Barcids in the Carthaginian senate would seize power and make a treaty with Rome (essentially the status quo in return for exiling Hannibal) or that Hannibal would make a truce with the Romans so he could regain power.  Either way, the Romans would doubtless erode Carthaginian allies and holdings in northern Italy until war broke out again sooner or later.  If Hannibal was successful, this would be sooner; if he ended up exiled, later.

[Mark G]

I cant see Rome accepting Hannibal in office.

Victory might have brought Rome accepting better terms, but they would still require exile for hannibal.

I think he knew it too, and would have accepted it.

What might change, was the whole delenda Est thing.

Two landings in Africa, two thumping defeats.  Rome might have thought twice before a third invasion, so maybe no third punic war.  Maybe.

[Dangun]

I agree with Mark, I don't think it would have changed much.

Carthage was a lost cause economically.
So much military success, and so little impact on the trajectory of the Roman Empire.

[Tim]

From what I read of the Romans, Hannibal could win 3 'Zamas' and it would not have stopped the Romans invading Africa.  After all Trebbia, Lake Trasimene, and Cannae (and another couple I can't remember just now) did not stop them fighting on AND invading Macedonia for good measure.  I suspect the Romans would have gone on and on until total victory.

The more interesting What If, is Metaurus.  Now if the Barca brothers had united that might well have changed history... (as might Lilybaeum)

[Swampster]

A Punic victory at Zama would likely have put an ally of theirs back in control of the Numidian etc. lands, making further Roman campaigns in Africa harder. So innstead of a definite Roman victory in the war, a peace treaty might have been arrived at in which the Romans kept their gains but the Carthaginians would make no payments or had a restricted navy.

Carthage managed to recover economically remarkably quickly in the real world - they offered to pay the remaining 40 years reparations back as a lump sum only 10 years after the war. This recovery may, in part, have been from not having to fund an army whereas a post 2nd PW cold war would have seen them requiring some kind of force. This would likely have been smaller than pre-war - I don't know if this would have been maintained for less than the 200 talents p.a. that Carthage sent to Rome.

If this alternate Zama had been of the scale of Cannae, the Romans would have lost a considerable number of veterans and possibly a very able general. It may also have had enough of a dint in its prestige to make the occupation of Spain even harder. Taking on Macedon and then the Seleucids may also have encountered more domestic resistance while also being hampered by the danger of Punic interference instead of receiving materiel aid from Carthage.

I think, then, that while Carthage would have found it difficult to recover its empire folowing a successful Zama, the main impact would have been at least a slowing of the Roman conquest of the east.

[Patrick Waterson]

Carthage's economic recovery post-Zama seems to have owed much to Hannibal being placed in charge of its finances and running them honestly and effectively in lieu of the usual Russian-oligarchy-style arrangements.  It may be a bit of a stretch to assume he could do this straight after Zama, but if he could then Carthage could have financed a war almost indefinitely, whereas Rome had already to a great extent shot its financial bolt: its senators had sent in their gold plate, the allies had been bled dry and the Republic was drawing on Spain and Africa (the latter mainly in plunder) to finance its campaigns.

Peter's is probably the most realistic scenario, although it may be worth noting that the Carthaginian senate did not of itself attempt to make peace after Zama: Hannibal told them to make peace (Polybius XV.19), and that is when they did.  Had he won Zama, I do not think anyone in Carthage would have felt peace to be necessary or even desirable: they had previously been keen enough to dump peace arrangements when they knew he was coming back to Africa (Polybius XV.2).

Ergo, with Rome struggling to make ends meet, its best general dead and picked clean by the vultures and its best troops gone while Hannibal's veterans were now without equal, Carthage could have attempted the reconquest of Spain with some success.  As in the First Punic War, eventual victory - short of total victory - would probably have gone to the side with the more effective navy, and as Peter points out, without a subdued Carthage any Roman expansion eastwards would be on a tenuous leash.

Hannibal's oath would not allow him to contemplate peace unless he really had to, which suggests he would have campaigned for as long as he could keep his hold over Carthage.

The more interesting What If, is Metaurus.  Now if the Barca brothers had united that might well have changed history... (as might Lilybaeum)

Funnily enough, I was thinking the same thing ... for that to work, Hasdrubal has to give Livius and Nero the slip and Hannibal has to tumble to what Nero is up to, but neither is outside the bounds of probability, the key element being Hasdrubal's guides, who betrayed him on the night in which he was attempting to evade the united Roman armies.  Had they been loyal, or had he obtained better guides, he would have managed to avoid his united opponents and start making his way down Italy or, at worst, back to Cisalpina/Liguria, while Hannibal would sooner or later realise that the Roman army facing him was not under command and was ripe for the taking.  A few weeks of frantic manoeuvring up and down Italy would have resulted in either the two brothers linking up or Hasdrubal settling into what later became Mago's ecological niche around Liguria, with plans to try again the following year.

206 BC could thus have been the decisive year of the war.  Would Scipio have been recalled from Spain to deal with the problem, missing out on Ilipa and handing back to Carthage control of the peninsula?

[aligern]

The primary psychology of the Romans is insecurity bordering on paranoia. They could not accept for long that a potential enemy was not hostile or thwtba modus vivendi could be found. Defeat at Zama would only convince them that they had to finish off the war in Spain and then send two armies tonAfrica. If that gets beaten they come back with another army until Carthage is de fanged. They could not accept just being a power in Italy, they could brook no rival in Spain. then they had to destroy Macedonia and then the Seleucids. Against this monstrous machine Carthage was doomed. However rich it was Carthage was just one territory.
The decisive battles in the Punic War were the naval battles in the first war. Once Rome commanded the sea it could cut off Carthaginian trade and move its armies to where it chose.
Roy

[Patrick Waterson]

The primary psychology of the Romans is insecurity bordering on paranoia. They could not accept for long that a potential enemy was not hostile or that a modus vivendi could be found. Defeat at Zama would only convince them that they had to finish off the war in Spain and then send two armies to Africa. If that gets beaten they come back with another army until Carthage is de fanged.

I think this overstates matters, given that peace was made after the First Punic War and was being negotiated in the Second when Hannibal arrived in Africa.  The First Punic War had anyway made Rome paranoid about sending armies to Africa: witness the struggle Scipio had to launch his own campaign in 204-202 BC and how the senate effectively washed their hands of it (Rome's allies were keener and fitted out the naval side from their own resources - but then it seems it was only Roman, not allied, troops which were lost under Regulus in 255 BC).  Even Spain was regarded with mixed feelings: the senate had allies in Spain but not colonies, and the elder Scipios had not been very well supported in 212-211 BC.  The way I see it, the Romans regarded Italy (and Sicily) as non-negotiable, but anything beyond was to be thrashed if it sent an army into Italy and ignored otherwise: this was pretty much their outlook at the start of the Second Punic War, remembering how they spent two years debating whether to go to the aid of their ally Saguntum.

They could not accept just being a power in Italy, they could brook no rival in Spain. then they had to destroy Macedonia and then the Seleucids.

They were still a power in Italy, not as yet sending proconsuls to govern overseas.  Against Macedon and the Seleucids they went to war in support of an ally (presumably having had a rethink about their conduct over Saguntum) and withdrew their forces once the campaign was over.  It was not until after 146 BC and the end of the Third Punic War that they came to stay, and despite their freely intervening diplomatically with the Seleucids after the Hasmoneans made an alliance with them I think it is a mistake to read their late second century BC outlook and actions into the late third and early second centuries BC.

Against this monstrous machine Carthage was doomed. However rich it was Carthage was just one territory.

So was Rome, but both had allies and dependent colonies.  Carthage's allies however mostly lived in tents.  Of the two powers, Carthage seems to have had the greater financial resources, and manpower for Carthage was largely a matter of mercenaries, so the two powers were not so imbalanced as may appear at first sight.  The war was ultimately decide by generalship, not resources.

The decisive battles in the Punic War were the naval battles in the first war. Once Rome commanded the sea it could cut off Carthaginian trade and move its armies to where it chose.

Here we agree: naval superiority was decisive in the first war (largely because the forces in Sicily had 100% dependence on naval support) and significantly influenced matters in the second, but I would question whether Rome would in fact cut off Carthaginian trade.  We tend to have ideas of blockade in the tradition of Drake and Nelson, but Roman fleets stayed together (and mostly in port) rather than lying off promontories to snap up passing merchants, the exception being when the army was operating in enemy territory a few miles away.  Also, not all Carthaginian trade went in and out in Carthaginian vessels: would the Romans, for example, seize an inbound/outbound Corinthian or Ptolemaic vessel?  I think not, as they, too, needed to trade with these nations.

It could however move its armies more or less where it chose, and this would be a significant curb on Carthaginian campaigning.

[aligern]

We agree that blockade is not really feasible for galley forces . It can be maintain ned for a while, but contrary winds can disperse fleets and they have to leave station to water and to rest the rowers.
However, those trading with Carthage could be threatened with military action against their merchant shops or even their ports.

the huge difference between Rome and Carthage was that Rome had many thousands of citizen soldiers (and allies) and a new class became available every year. The economic comparison is rather like that between Nato and the Warsaw Pact. In theory Nato spent far more on armaments, in practice costs such as wages in the Communist bloc were far less than those in the West. So the comparison was skewed. Troops...the main cost of armies in the Ancient period ....... were cheaper for the Romans than for the Carthaginians . This s the Roman economy might or might not be greater than the Punic, but I contend that Rome was more productive in raising manpower.
Ladtly, Hannibal was a genius, other Carthaginian generals were not. Rather lije the Allied armies in 1813, who only attacked where Napoleon was not in direct comnand, the Romans could win on all the other fronts.  and pen Carthage back into Tunisia. If Hannibal left for Spain, the Romans could invade. F He stayed in Africa they took Spain.

[Dangun]

Hannibal could win 3 'Zamas' and it would not have stopped the Romans invading Africa.

Relatively small states just can't keep this up.
If after the successes Tunis, Trebbia, Trasimine and Cannae, you have nothing other than your reputation, what was victory ever going to look like?

This s the Roman economy might or might not be greater than the Punic, but I contend that Rome was more productive in raising manpower.

While we are arguing in the same direction, isn't it clear that Roman economy was far, far larger.

[Jim Webster]

it's interesting to  ponder the Roman v Carthaginian economy.

We see the Rome, in the interminable wars in Spain after  Carthage had fallen, struggled to keep troops motivated in the face of no loot and hard fighting merely for conquest. Similarly whilst each year you do get another age class to push into the mincer, you're drawing men from the land and because of lack of success you're not replacing them with slaves.


On the other hand, was Carthage the trading nation it had been? Or was it an agriculture based African Empire exporting surplus grain, wine and figs?

But I'd recommend to anybody 'Rome Spreads her wings, Territorial expansion between the Punic Wars.' by Gareth C Sampson  £25

He doesn't technically answer this question but he looks deeply into the relationship between the two countries

Jim

[Patrick Waterson]

However, those trading with Carthage could be threatened with military action against their merchant shops or even their ports.

Although this would involve Rome in another war and we see anyway no mention of any such measures in Livy's interminable lists of senatorial resolutions, so I think the idea of blockading trade was not really considered.  Senators did not have our grasp of economics, and it was not until the 1st century BC that we get a senatorial orator stating that 'the sinews of war are infinite money', and this only after significant changes to the way in which Rome operated.

the huge difference between Rome and Carthage was that Rome had many thousands of citizen soldiers (and allies) and a new class became available every year. The economic comparison is rather like that between Nato and the Warsaw Pact. In theory Nato spent far more on armaments, in practice costs such as wages in the Communist bloc were far less than those in the West. So the comparison was skewed. Troops...the main cost of armies in the Ancient period ....... were cheaper for the Romans than for the Carthaginians . This s the Roman economy might or might not be greater than the Punic, but I contend that Rome was more productive in raising manpower.

I would be inclined to agree.  The next consideration is, of course, getting the manpower to where it matters and maintaining and using it effectively there.  My impression is that Carthage had the edge in this regard.

Lastly, Hannibal was a genius, other Carthaginian generals were not. Rather like the Allied armies in 1813, who only attacked where Napoleon was not in direct command, the Romans could win on all the other fronts and pen Carthage back into Tunisia. If Hannibal left for Spain, the Romans could invade. If he stayed in Africa they took Spain.

Quite true in theory, but invalid in practice on account of the very real Roman psychological block about invading Africa, which would have received incalculable reinforcement from Scipio's posited demise (the gods have reminded us ...).  This leaves only one major front: Spain.  Here the Romans, deprived of the services of both generations of Scipii, would be at a significant disadvantage both logistically and in terms of generalship and understanding of the locals.  As Hannibal pushed further, through Gaul and Liguria and into northern Italy, those advantages would progressively reverse themselves, creating conditions reminiscent of the southern Italy stalemate seen in 210-202 BC.

If after the successes Tunis, Trebbia, Trasimine and Cannae, you have nothing other than your reputation, what was victory ever going to look like?

Marching on, besieging and taking Rome as prompted by Maharbal.  Even the Romanophile Livy reports the Romans seriously considering evacuating the city to flee elsewhere.

P.S. - Tunis???  Ticinus, presumably.

... isn't it clear that Roman economy was far, far larger.

I am not sure that it is.  There is a tendency to view Carthage as a single city surrounded by a few fields and villages, but it held sway over about as much of northern Africa as Rome did over Italy.  Italy seems to have been more densely populated (and perhaps significantly Polybius does not roll off a 700,000-man list of accessible manpower for Carthage) but prior to the Third Punic War, when Carthage was down to just itself plus a few fields and villages in contrast to what it had held before, it put 50,000 men into the field against Masinissa and attracted the envy of Rome (the senators apparently starting to have a grasp of economics) so if a similar relationship held at the time of the Second Punic War then the Carthaginian economy was probably larger.

[Tim]

Dangun

The economy quote I don't believe was mine.

Regards
Tim

[aligern]

As I intimated earlier, it all depends upon how you count GDP. We are interested in measuring the military output of the two states. This is not the same as the traded economy. Clearly Rome could raise and maintain far more troops than the Carthaginians, because the Punic armies are largely paid in coin (allies such as Gallic tribes are a very efficient addition.)
In the the end what matters is that the Romans have the men, money and motivation to continue the death grapple until they win. they suffer losses. It is not neceessary for them to have genius generals, only good ones. Carthage suffers from having  to put together armies from disparate nations that require a Hannibal to win great victories. Even  Hannibal cannot put Rome down after winning three stunning victories in the field. He cannot firce them to terms and thus the Romans gain years to recuperate by avoiding battle, even whilst Hannibal is moving around Italy.
Rome does not accept defeat, so a lost Zama is a pause in an inevitable rise.Very occasionally a great man diverts the course of history, but it is very occasional. The war for dominance in the Western mediterranean was one of those conflicts in which the large considerations dominated and so economy, manpower, motivation and a good enough fighting technique were always going to see Rome through.
Roy