Leuctra and the Thebans

[Keith]

This will be my first post on this forum, as a recently joined member. I am also fairly new to wargaming the ancient period. I hope a wargaming question in the historical section is not inappropriate.

I have been fortunate enough to meet and game with Roy Boss, and we discussed the issue of the 50 deep Theban phalanx. I have had a look at some forum discussions on the subject of how depth could make a phalanx more effective (in particular 'Depth: What Is It Good For?'). What I have heard recently seems to indicate that any kind of shoving would be ineffective beyond about 8 ranks - so why 50?

Roy's explanation was one I had not heard before, being based on exploitation. The value of the succeeding ranks would be to exploit the success of the leading ones by a sort of blitzkrieg-style expanding torrent, attacking the flanks of a hole in the defending line created by the leading hoplites.

Roy's idea gives a logical reason for the use of super-deep phalanxes whether you believe in 'othismos' or not. In a wargame context, a 50 deep phalanx could be represented by 'stacking' maybe 3 or 4 separate 'normal' phalanx units, so that success by the front unit could immediately be exploited. Could this also be true historically - that there was not a single 50 deep phalanx but maybe 6 x 8 deep phalanxes one behind the other?

In what other ways would members see a 50 deep phalanx being more effective than one of a more usual depth?

As a coda to this post, it seems to me that the success of the Thebans at Leuctra was far from guaranteed, 50 deep phalanx or not. It would seem the opposing Spartans were disordered in some way by their defeated cavalry retreating through them, or an ill-advised formation change, or the death of their senior commanders - or a combination of all three. So maybe the extra deep phalanx wasn't the deciding issue?

To conclude - if a 50 deep formation was an effective concentration of force, in what way was this effectiveness realised, and how could this be represented in a set of miniature wargames rules?

Thanks in advance for any pointers!

[Patrick Waterson]

To conclude - if a 50 deep formation was an effective concentration of force, in what way was this effectiveness realised, and how could this be represented in a set of miniature wargames rules?

One might point to two fundamental effects: steadiness and 'weight'.

'Steadiness' simply means that a 50-deep formation can be exceedingly hard to shift provided the quality of men composing it is reasonably consistent. This is more of a hedge against disaster than a battle-winning quality, but it keeps one's army on the field, at least until the enemy get around the flanks.  Having a lot of men behind adds a strong element of inertia provided of course that they do not get worried and start leaving.  The Greeks had ouragoi  - file-closers - whose tasks included discouraging early departures.

'Weight' is the effect of many ranks applying pressure (physical and psychological) against fewer.  Even when 25 deep rather than 50 deep, the Thebans usually pressed back the opposition, e.g. at Delium in 424 BC.  This makes me think that depths of more than eight could add effective pressure, because the Thebans' opponents were themselves usually eight deep, and if only eight men in a file could usefully contribute, then the Thebans should be forced back as often as they force back their opponents.  The Thebans settled on 25 as their most popular depth, and the fact that Epaminondas added another 25 indicates that he expected great things from the increase.  Interestingly, the Thebans achieved them.

This suggests that the Thebans found some way of making men contribute when 25 deep and later even 50 deep.  I can offer a hypothesis about this, namely that the Thebans trained extra-large files to operate together to deliver a stronger push.  One would expect there to be a point of diminishing returns, and 25 men was probably it.  This however does not explain why Epaminondas added another 25 - if he already had a system which worked well enough, why add to it?

Here we proceed from hypothesis to guesswork - Epaminondas found a way to make the second 25 push the first 25.  He may have instructed the second 25 to push the rear man of the first 25 as if they were the enemy line, and hence added useful additional weight to his army's push.  So much for guessing the how, but we still have the why.  Regarding this, I would see the Second Battle of Coronea in 394 BC as a possible stimulus: the Thebans. having defeated the Orchomenan contingent in the Spartan army and reached the Spartan baggage train, found the Spartan army across their return path and had a very difficult struggle to break free.  Epaminondas may have concluded from this that a depth of 25 men was not sufficient against Spartans, although it served well enough against anyone else.

Those are my thoughts.  Other members will hopefully add their own cogitations and explanations.

[Dangun]

In what other ways would members see a 50 deep phalanx being more effective than one of a more usual depth?

Welcome to the forum!

One thought from previous threads - command & control. Narrow frontages may be easier to control, lead and form, possibly particularly for less experienced troops.

Another from a previous thread - morale and the handling of losses.

I think though it might be more revealing to ask the question in reverse. Why does the 50 deep phalanx sometimes go backwards? The fact that it ever does get "pushed" backwards, suggests to me that weight is only one of a long list of factors.

[RichT]

Welcome Keith, and by asking such a question you are coming in at the deep end!

You'll have seen from the other threads that there are is a range of possibilities, and some strongly held opinions. A list of the options might include:

- the extra ranks acted as replacements for casualties, or for tired hoplites, in the front ranks. Pros - it's an intuitively obvious answer. Cons - casualties are never high enough to require 50 (or even eight) ranks, and no mechanism is known by which ranks could be replaced.

- the extra ranks pushed the ones in front ('scrum' or 'othismos'). Pros - sources do talk of weight and pushing. Cons - experiments sugggest ranks beyond the first eight couldn't add much to a push, and the whole concept of pushing rather than fighting with weapons is controversial.

- the extra ranks provided psychological support and solidity to the formation, making it less easy for those in front to run away. Pros - this sort of psychological explanation fits with evidence for close quarters fighting in other periods. Cons - 50 ranks still seems like overkill, and it is rather a negative explanation, that Thebans won because it was harder for them to run away, not because they were better.

- the deep formation made marching and manoeuvre easier, maintaining cohesion especially in difficult terrain. Pros - this explanation matches what we know of manoeuvre in columns in other periods. Cons - it seems to provide benefits in manoeuvre, but not in melee, so doesn't really explain why the Thebans won.

- the deep formation made command control easier. Pros - as above, matches what we know from other periods. Cons - as above, not much command control seems necessary once melee has begun.

- the deep formation allowed a small number of high quality hoplites (the Sacred Band in this case) to be spread across a large frontage, backed by a larger mass of lower quality. Pros - while the deployment of the Sacred Band is uncertain, this makes sense. Cons - doesn't really explain why the formation was so deep.

- (your/Roy's suggestion) the extra ranks were reserves for exploitation. Pros - avoids many of the difficulties above, and that the formation was 50 deep but not necessarily in files of 50 makes sense. Cons - what we think we know of hoplite warfare suggests that once the line was first broken, it was all over, so exploitation would not be of great importance, and hoplite armies so far as we know didn't use reserves.

I expect there are other explanations I've missed or haven't thought of.

Further thoughts are that the 50 deep formation was not adopted generally so its advantage was not decisive, or its corresponding disadvantages - chiefly the narrow front and so vulnerability to outflanking - perhaps outweighed its advantages, and that there was no clear conceptual or practical advantage to deeper formations, but rather a process of experimentation with different depths (around the common standard of eight), and single tests - a single pitched battle could be decisive in terms of winning a war, without settling the question of what is the best depth at which to form up.

My own view is that the psychological answer is most likely, combined with an element of physical solidity (bracing the formation). But elements of all these explanations might have been involved - perhaps the most likely explanation is 'all of the above'. Other opinions are available.

[Patrick Waterson]

I think though it might be more revealing to ask the question in reverse. Why does the 50 deep phalanx sometimes go backwards? The fact that it ever does get "pushed" backwards, suggests to me that weight is only one of a long list of factors.

Can anyone think of any instances when it actually gets 'pushed' backwards?

[Andreas Johansson]

Further thoughts are that the 50 deep formation was not adopted generally so its advantage was not decisive, or its corresponding disadvantages - chiefly the narrow front and so vulnerability to outflanking - perhaps outweighed its advantages, and that there was no clear conceptual or practical advantage to deeper formations, but rather a process of experimentation with different depths (around the common standard of eight), and single tests - a single pitched battle could be decisive in terms of winning a war, without settling the question of what is the best depth at which to form up.

As Patrick (I think it was he - sorry for any misattribution!) pointed out in another thread, pre-Epaminondan Thebans already used deeper formations than usual elsewhere, yet didn't derive any (now) obvious advantage therefrom. One might be tempted to leap to the conclusion that it was the commander and not the formation that made the difference.

This of course leaves the question open why Epaminondas and other Theban commanders thought deep phalanxes a good idea. Since we have trouble thinking of a military rationale, might there be a political one? Perhaps the extra ranks provided place for men who, because youth or lacking equipment weren't suited for the front ranks to take part, widening the hoplite class invested in the political project of the state?

[Erpingham]

Coming at this from the comfort (if that is the correct term) of how medieval infantry fights worked, 50 deep is a very dangerous place to be.  Unless you can control the physical mass (essentially control its crushing tendency) it works against you.  So, internal command and control is important.  Patrick points to the file closer system.  This certainly worked well at 8 ranks but would a file of a foundation, 48 rows of rubble and a roof work?  I think therefore we should look for signs of more internal structure to the fifty ranks.  If we can find that, it might give us clues as to how the 50 ranks worked.  For example, if they normally had 25 deep phalanxes, have they just drawn two up one behind the other?

[RichT]

This of course leaves the question open why Epaminondas and other Theban commanders thought deep phalanxes a good idea. Since we have trouble thinking of a military rationale, might there be a political one? Perhaps the extra ranks provided place for men who, because youth or lacking equipment weren't suited for the front ranks to take part, widening the hoplite class invested in the political project of the state?

Yes that's a good point - which I think comes under my 'allowed a small number of high quality hoplites to be spread across a large frontage' - though I'm not aware off the top of my head of any Theban franchise expansion or such at this point. And we can think of lots of military rationales but have trouble deciding which might be true! But yes I think there is mileage in a suggestion of this kind - if the Thebans had a small good quality hoplite corps but wanted a lot of citizens involved in battle, then a deep narrow formation would achieve this, and would avoid the typical situation where some hapless Spartan allies are left to get stomped on the left wing while the Spartiates have a bloodless victory on the right, or where the collapse of some unwilling contingent fatally compromises the position of their better motivated neighbours.

Another thought is that writers of battle accounts, ancient and modern, are keen on single explanations - Side A won because it was 50 deep, or because the sun was in their opponents' eyes, or because they had had a proper breakfast, or because their spears were made of better wood, and so on. It is doubtful such a clear, simple cause and effect would be quite so clear on the battlefield. When the dust settled and commanders and men exchanged stories of what happened, various factors might emerge, some or one of which might get picked up by a historian - but it is unlikely this was ever the whole story. In the case of Leuctra, Xenophon talks of his beloved Spartans defeated by the Theban 'mass' (the word he uses has a slightly pejorative sense - 'mob' might convey it) so we look to tactical, technical, physical explanations. But maybe in this case the Thebans fought better, were braver or stronger, or better led and motivated, and the depth of the formation chiefly served, as you suggest, some other purpose.

[Mark G]

I think the cavalry are the really decisive bit here.

As noted above, the greater depth doesn't seem to help other times for the thebans, and the 50 is not adopted after this battle.

That suggests that the extra depth may be be an obvious but irrelevant factor, noted by observers as significant because it was notable, but actually not important.

[Dangun]

Can anyone think of any instances when it actually gets 'pushed' backwards?

It was dug up for one of the other threads.
The 50 deep phalanx was attacked and initially beaten. Not ultimately beaten, but initially.

[RichT]

It was dug up for one of the other threads.
The 50 deep phalanx was attacked and initially beaten. Not ultimately beaten, but initially.

Presumably Xen Hell 6.4.13: "Nevertheless, the fact that Cleombrotus and his men were at first victorious in the battle may be known from this clear indication: they would not have been able to take him up and carry him off still living, had not those who were fighting in front of him been holding the advantage at that time."

[Keith]

Thanks to all responders for taking the trouble to post such thoughtful replies.

With the greatest of respect to Patrick, whose knowledge is far in excess of mine, I find the theory of 50 ranks being capable of some sort of additional push rather hard to fathom. More appealing is the theory that this was an experimental period for the Thebans and Epaminondas, and victory in this case may have occurred for other reasons than the 50 ranks (see my original post).

Anthony's mention of internal structure is interesting, in that in fits in with Roy's suggestion. I find this a very tempting line of thought. But the idea that such a deep formation has an irresistibility all of its own also appeals.

[Patrick Waterson]

Coming at this from the comfort (if that is the correct term) of how medieval infantry fights worked, 50 deep is a very dangerous place to be.  Unless you can control the physical mass (essentially control its crushing tendency) it works against you.  So, internal command and control is important.  Patrick points to the file closer system.  This certainly worked well at 8 ranks but would a file of a foundation, 48 rows of rubble and a roof work?  I think therefore we should look for signs of more internal structure to the fifty ranks. 

The Greeks, or at least classical Greeks, seem to have taken extreme care in the placement of individuals within their formations.  I was particularly struck by this anecdote:

After he had drawn up his men-at-arms, one of them went out far in advance of the rest, and then was stricken with fear when an enemy advanced to meet him, and went back again to his post. 'Shame on thee, young man,' said Phocion, 'for having abandoned two posts, the one which was given thee by thy general, and the one which thou didst give thyself.' - Plutarch, Life of Phocion 25.2

This, together with hints in Plutarch's Life of Pelopidas 18.2:

And a pleasantry of Pammenes is cited, in which he said that Homer's Nestor was no tactician when he urged the Greeks to form in companies by clans and tribes,

    That clan might give assistance unto clan, and tribes to tribes,

since he should have stationed lover by beloved.

indicate that Greek generals may even have specified who stood in front of whom in individual files, it being not too difficult to make such assignments knowledgeably in a city where everyone knew everyone else.  This kind of attention to detail would make the file a highly efficient and cohesive entity, and seemingly allowed benefits to having 12 or 16 or even 25-deep files, as all these were in use during this period (see Xenophon, Hellenica IV.2.12 and 18 and VI.4.12).  Xenophon's remark that the Spartans at Leuctra were trained to fall in with an form up on anyone in a crisis also indirectly indicates the default condition as the individual being assigned a specific place in the file.

If we can find that, it might give us clues as to how the 50 ranks worked.  For example, if they normally had 25-deep phalanxes, have they just drawn two up one behind the other?

In view of the fact that our sources say they were 50 deep, implying one formation, as opposed to 25 deep with another such formation behind, we can take it that Epaminondas had reconfigured the 25-deep phalanx as a 50-deep phalanx and had done so for a reason and because there was a tangible benefit.  I can only guess at what the benefit may have been, but since the 25-deep formation was sufficiently steady and did not run in any of the battles where it is specified, extra steadiness would not seem to be the answer.  Ergo, I am left to conclude that there was a clear benefit in offensive capability, enough to make it worth halving the battlefield frontage on which the Theban army could operate.

As noted above, the greater depth doesn't seem to help other times for the thebans, and the 50 is not adopted after this battle.

It is not specified in Xenophon's account of Second Mantinea in 362 BC - which the Thebans also won with a pretty much identical; battleplan, albeit at the cost of Epaminondas himself.  None of our sources tell us what depth they used in actions subsequent to Second Mantinea, so it is unclear whether they kept Epaminondas' 50 deep or reverted to their previous 25 deep.  But Xenophon does mention that at Second Mantinea Epaminondas 'also formed his cavalry into a strong column', suggesting a continuity of the 50-deep practice.

I find the theory of 50 ranks being capable of some sort of additional push rather hard to fathom.

Well, it seemed to manage an additional something, which Xenophon (Hellenica VI.4.14) refers to as "the pressure of the Theban mass" (okhlou ōthoumenoi), so however hard it may have been to fathom, it seems to have been easier to perform.

That said, Greek cities other than Thebans presumably felt that whatever additional thrust or other tangible benefit could be gained was not worth the considerable additional manpower required, not least because they lacked the cavalier attitude of the Thebans to letting their allies get outflanked.  And for a Greek hoplite army, to be outflanked was to be defeated on that flank, a price not everyone was willing to pay.

[Keith]

My own purely personal conclusion, in wargaming rather than historical terms, is that a very deep formation has the advantage of 'steadiness' (as you put it Patrick), or 'staying power' (as Adrian Goldsworthy has expressed it). In other words, it might be very difficult to force back such a mass and it would keep coming at you, assuming the troops composing it were of reasonable quality.

How to represent this in a set of rules? The way my rules function, Roy's idea of a stack of units (i.e. a very deep formation but with an internal structure) would work well - beat the leading unit, but then you have to deal with the one behind. This may not be exactly how things were historically, but it would perhaps produce the same effect.

Thanks again for all the responses.

[Patrick Waterson]

Thanks Patrick for your comments.  If one so knowledgeable as your self can find nothing on the internal organisation of the Theban mass, I conclude we don't know

The Pelopidas quote presumably references the Sacred Band, which we know was organised in couples.  Some accounts claim the Sacred Band formed the first two of the 50 ranks, though if the formation really was organised in 50 deep files with no internal divisions, I don't know how that worked.

Apologies, Anthony: I accidentally deleted your post while trying to delete one of mine.  Smacked wrist!   Fortunately the content was still in memory as a quote so I preserve it above and promise to be more alert in future.

The Sacred Band is recorded as acting independently at Leuctra (Plutarch, Life of Pelopidas 23.2), so could not have formed the first two ranks of the main phalanx.  The main phalanx itself has not had the kind of detailed treatment lavished on, say, Spartans by the likes of Thucydides and Xenophon, so we have no specific details of any 'under-officers' at points along the file and can only surmise that certain individuals in whom particular trust was reposed would be stationed at intervals to help things along - files 25 deep require few file leaders and closers in comparison with files 8 deep, so there should have been a number of potential 'helpers' spare.

We really are reduced to guessing from basic principles about the internal composition of the 50-deep formation.  My guess, as previously mentioned, is that Epaminondas took the existing 25-man file, set one behind the other and told it: henceforth, instead of pushing the enemy, you push the file ahead of you in much the same way but without the sharp pointy things.  Xenophon in his description of Leuctra makes reference to Theban lokhoi, which in his 401 BC-based Anabasis are companies of 100 men; if this is also the case for the Thebans, it implies a small unit organisation of four 25-man files, who at Leuctra would be doubled up into 50-man file combinations.

The Sacred Band itself was the 'hieros lokhos', and was 300 strong, although being a special formation it might or might not reflect the 'standard' Theban lokhos at the time.  If it did, then a Theban 'lokhos' would be 300 men in six double-files of 50 (previously twelve files of 25).  Essentially, take your pick - unless we can unearth a clue buried deep within our sources.