Could the Persian Empire logistically support an army several million strong?

[Erpingham]

You will believe what you want to believe of course, and nothing anyone here says will change your mind, but you are not convincing anyone either, so it's at a bit of an impasse.

You have to treat it like WWI Aaron.  Man the fire step and keep the MGs supplied with ammunition and water.  Eventually they falter and you can stand down but you know that sometime soon they'll charge across that same shell-blasted terrain and it will all begin again 

Trying a slight indirect approach but has anyone looked at campaigns with more generally agreed figures in the pre-industrial age for context?  I must confess, I'm a bit stuck because my main knowledge is of medieval armies and they were doubtless much smaller than those of the great empires of the past.   From what I've read, they seem to talk of forces in the low 6 figures.

[Jim Webster]

You will believe what you want to believe of course, and nothing anyone here says will change your mind, but you are not convincing anyone either, so it's at a bit of an impasse.

You have to treat it like WWI Aaron.  Man the fire step and keep the MGs supplied with ammunition and water.  Eventually they falter and you can stand down but you know that sometime soon they'll charge across that same shell-blasted terrain and it will all begin again 

Trying a slight indirect approach but has anyone looked at campaigns with more generally agreed figures in the pre-industrial age for context?  I must confess, I'm a bit stuck because my main knowledge is of medieval armies and they were doubtless much smaller than those of the great empires of the past.   From what I've read, they seem to talk of forces in the low 6 figures.

what has intrigued me is that the larger the number of Greeks involved in Persian armies, the smaller the armies got.

[Andreas Johansson]

what has intrigued me is that the larger the number of Greeks involved in Persian armies, the smaller the armies got.

Well, that if nothing else makes sense: since relatively few Greeks could beat millions of Asiatics, it stands to reason that increasing numbers of the former in Achaemenid armies should lead to a disproportionate reduction in the numbers of the latter needed.

[Justin Swanton]

There is also the issue of choke points as mentioned by pretty much everyone. H 7.176 mentions the route narrowing to a space the width of a wagon in two places. Try getting 1,700,000 fighting men let alone the other 3.5M plus  followers, cavalry horses, baggage animals, food on the hoof, and baggage carts through spaces that narrow in timely fashion!

Herodotus mentions the chokepoint being at Trachis, which is just before Thermopolae. It is there precisely that Xerxes' problems began, not during the trip from the Hellespont to Greece.

Good, so you do agree that chokepoints are an issue.

What I took away from Maurice was that the whole stretch from before the Bridge until after you get to the river after the Gallipoli  peninsular was that the whole thing was a choke point. Pretty much the whole army has to follow the same road. When he talks of pack animals in single file marching alongside infantry you realise how choked the area is.

Some examples of the Gallipoli countryside here and here.

The western edge of the peninsula mountainous and steep but the eastern edge (street view here) is flat enough - at least, I can't see any real problems crossing it once you clear a path through the trees.

[Jim Webster]

what has intrigued me is that the larger the number of Greeks involved in Persian armies, the smaller the armies got.

Well, that if nothing else makes sense: since relatively few Greeks could beat millions of Asiatics, it stands to reason that increasing numbers of the former in Achaemenid armies should lead to a disproportionate reduction in the numbers of the latter needed.

That works, but the cynic might also comment it presents more naysayers who would mock the reporter when they got home. Especially as in some of the campaigns there were Greeks on both sides

actually it would be interesting to re-read the accounts of the Persian attempts to invade Egypt when the Greeks were involved

[Jim Webster]

There is also the issue of choke points as mentioned by pretty much everyone. H 7.176 mentions the route narrowing to a space the width of a wagon in two places. Try getting 1,700,000 fighting men let alone the other 3.5M plus  followers, cavalry horses, baggage animals, food on the hoof, and baggage carts through spaces that narrow in timely fashion!

Herodotus mentions the chokepoint being at Trachis, which is just before Thermopolae. It is there precisely that Xerxes' problems began, not during the trip from the Hellespont to Greece.

Good, so you do agree that chokepoints are an issue.

What I took away from Maurice was that the whole stretch from before the Bridge until after you get to the river after the Gallipoli  peninsular was that the whole thing was a choke point. Pretty much the whole army has to follow the same road. When he talks of pack animals in single file marching alongside infantry you realise how choked the area is.

Some examples of the Gallipoli countryside here and here.

The western edge of the peninsula mountainous and steep but the eastern edge (street view here) is flat enough - at least, I can't see any real problems crossing it once you clear a path through the trees.

Not being nasty, but having read the opinion of a man who served with the British Army in India, South Africa and saw action in France,  and who walked the ground, I'm sticking with Maurice
To the best of my knowledge none of us in this discussion has commanded an infantry battalion or moved cavalry, and I don't think any of us have been to Gallipoli (although my Grandfather was there at Sulva Bay), so in this case I think we have to have really good evidence to dismiss the opinion of somebody who had done all of these

[Prufrock]

Peter Green (the historian, not the guitarist) in his Greco-Persian Wars page 62 gives some of them for this particular instance (basically, Xerxes had every reason to exaggerate the numbers, while the Greeks after they won had no reason to revise them downwards, and that the numbers were for before the entrance into Europe).

Just to play the man not the ball here, Phil Sabin was wholly unimpressed with Peter Green's conclusions about the Granicus.  Are you sure you really want to rely on Peter Green for anything, particularly when the conclusions amount to little more than a recitation of Peter Green's opinions?

Well, anyone can have a bad idea day! Generally, I think Peter Green is pretty good, but you need be critical as well, of course. With regards to our topic, he neatly summarizes the main objections to large numbers, so that's why I would refer skeptical people to his reasoning rather than anything I could say.

Thus far in this thread I haven't seen any killer argument - backed up with proof - that demonstrates the impossibility of such an enormous army marching, camping and being fed and watered from the Hellespont to Greece.

You probably have, but choose not to see it as such

Although to be fair Aaron does not point to anything that might be considered as such.

Thank you, Patrick! Shall we call this the Methuselah proof?

Notes to the Landmark Herodotus (p.577) translating Herodotus' grain figures into modern quantities indicate the army required 4,700 tons per day (470,000 for 100 days; 1,715,500 for a year). These supplies are coming through beaches, in potentially unfriendly territory, and without dedicated unloading crews at the drop off point, and without troops in place to secure depots in advance (if advance depots is part of the argument) so it doesn't really compare to Imperial Rome's 420,000 tons coming through a purpose-built port with organized shipping and regular crews at both ends.

Couple of assumptions here:
1) potentially unfriendly territory
Prior to Thermopylae, the only unfriendlies were the mauntain lions who attacked baggage animals (with a distinct preference for camels).  The presence of a 1.7 million strong army had already made the relevant areas friendly; Thracians and Greeks were rushing to join Xerxes; local Greek cities were supplying his army (Herodotus VII.118-119).
2) without troops in place to secure depots in advance
Up to Acanthus, the local populations secured 'depots'.  At Thermopylae, the army and fleet looked after their own security.
3) a purpose-built port with organized shipping and regular crews at both ends
The only real difference is the lack of a purpose-built port at one end.  I hope nobody would be so uncharitable as to suggest that Phoenicians and the like were unpractised at unloading ships over beaches, because this is how they conducted most of their trade.

The Thessalians at least were a medizing 'work in progress', so they weren't going to have four year grain stockpiles built up there. Other areas also by the looks of it, but more noticeable once into Greece itself. At Thermopylae there are four days of waiting, three days of fighting, and a lot of supplies needed to cope with that. Perhaps they could skimp on rations temporarily, but not on water, and the terrain was not going to get much better thereafter either. A good planner would perhaps want a smaller force at this point?

There is also the issue of choke points as mentioned by pretty much everyone. H 7.176 mentions the route narrowing to a space the width of a wagon in two places. Try getting 1,700,000 fighting men let alone the other 3.5M plus  followers, cavalry horses, baggage animals, food on the hoof, and baggage carts through spaces that narrow in timely fashion!

Or, to give it its more commonly known name, Thermopylae.  Once the Persians had cleared away the Greek defenders, they did not all go through it, but went round it, campaigning against the Phocians en route (Herodotus VIII.30-34).

Acccording to the Landmark H there are points before and after Thermopylae, but no matter where they are, the effect would be the same in that it would take a very long whack of time to feed 1.7M fighting men plus horses, 3.5M hangers on, food on the hoof, and carts through narrow gaps. H doesn't mention an alternative route that I can see (but that's no guarantee – I might've missed it!), but if there were, where would you see the move into Phocian territory occurring, and would it be much more easily manageable?

There are of course other objections too, but one that I don't think has been noted in this thread so far is the 'shock and awe factor' that 10 white horses, a chariot, 10 more white horses, 1000 picked cavalrymen, 1000 picked foot, and the 10,000 Immortals elicits in 7.40-41 & 7.55. If the army was really 1,700,000 strong, would so much be made of these comparatively small elite contingents?

Very much so, because they are the 'bravery' part of the Persian 'bravery and numbers' equation.  In any event, in the passages quoted their effect is spectacular display; they do not seem to be shocking anyone, although they would be very useful for aweing the contingents from the further-flung reaches of the Empire.

That's one way to look at it, but it doesn't make sense to me: if numbers are important enough that 1.7M fighting men (and a fleet on top of that) are considered necessary, then why are those numbers not being emphasized here? If you've got them, why not flaunt them more obviously?

[Prufrock]

Not being nasty, but having read the opinion of a man who served with the British Army in India, South Africa and saw action in France,  and who walked the ground, I'm sticking with Maurice
To the best of my knowledge none of us in this discussion has commanded an infantry battalion or moved cavalry, and I don't think any of us have been to Gallipoli (although my Grandfather was there at Sulva Bay), so in this case I think we have to have really good evidence to dismiss the opinion of somebody who had done all of these

I've been to Gallipoli, but only as a visitor, so stick with Maurice!

[Jim Webster]

Not being nasty, but having read the opinion of a man who served with the British Army in India, South Africa and saw action in France,  and who walked the ground, I'm sticking with Maurice
To the best of my knowledge none of us in this discussion has commanded an infantry battalion or moved cavalry, and I don't think any of us have been to Gallipoli (although my Grandfather was there at Sulva Bay), so in this case I think we have to have really good evidence to dismiss the opinion of somebody who had done all of these

I've been to Gallipoli, but only as a visitor, so stick with Maurice!

To be fair my Grandfather didn't spend long there. Just one damn big hill after another 

[Justin Swanton]

Not being nasty, but having read the opinion of a man who served with the British Army in India, South Africa and saw action in France,  and who walked the ground, I'm sticking with Maurice
To the best of my knowledge none of us in this discussion has commanded an infantry battalion or moved cavalry, and I don't think any of us have been to Gallipoli (although my Grandfather was there at Sulva Bay), so in this case I think we have to have really good evidence to dismiss the opinion of somebody who had done all of these

I've read Maurice and on several crucial points he is wildly out. He affirms the Scamander outputted 50 000 gallons per hour at its lowest ebb, about the time Xerxes' army arrived. I've read a study on the Climate Change Impacts On Streamflow of Karamenderes (Scamander) River and the minimum output of the river was at least fifty times that, most likely more since the flow of the Scamander has been decreasing in modern times. He also puts the throne of Xerxes in the wrong place - there's no hill on the site he marks on his map but there is one further south which gives a fine view of the plain below and the Hellespont. He also maintains that a British force of 72 000 men with 22 000 animals camped as close together as possible and occupied an area of 20 square miles. That's 45 square kilometers or 625 square metres per man excluding the animals. Let's give the beasties 16 square metres each. That leaves 620 square metres per man. To put it colloquially, what was Maurice smoking?

I've been told I won't change my mind no matter how many facts are pushed my way. I will, if they're facts. Is anyone interested in me doing a more detailed analysis of Maurice from the angle of getting facts right? Or do we leave this as kettle and pot?

[Patrick Waterson]

Just walk me through the process of how these extra sailors would be trained- are we  looking at setting up a series of maritime training colleges or similar?

First point: I am not sure there would have been any need for expansion; the Achaemenids could simply have requisitioned the services (and crews) of existing vessels.

Second point: if a need for extra vessels had been identified, the cities building them would be responsible for providing the crews, which they would do from the available pool of men who were currently between ships and as many younger citizens as they could find currently unattached.  They would effectively train on the job in the year or years before the campaign was launched.  The job?  Probably moving extra grain to the store cities which would be supplying the campaign ...

In this context, it may be worth noting that Phoenician merchant ships had a straight post at stem and stern, to which a carved wooden bird's head would be attached in time of war.  My impression is that requisitioning (or volunteering) for war was pretty standard and merchant vessels were even built with the change of role in mind.

[Jim Webster]

Not being nasty, but having read the opinion of a man who served with the British Army in India, South Africa and saw action in France,  and who walked the ground, I'm sticking with Maurice
To the best of my knowledge none of us in this discussion has commanded an infantry battalion or moved cavalry, and I don't think any of us have been to Gallipoli (although my Grandfather was there at Sulva Bay), so in this case I think we have to have really good evidence to dismiss the opinion of somebody who had done all of these

I've read Maurice and on several crucial points he is wildly out. He affirms the Scamander outputted 50 000 gallons per hour at its lowest ebb, about the time Xerxes' army arrived. I've ready a study on the Climate Change Impacts On Streamflow of Karamenderes (Scamander) River and the minimum output of the river was at least five times that, most likely more since the flow of the Scamander has been decreasing in modern times. He also puts the throne of Xerxes in the wrong place - there's no hill on the site he marks on his map but there is one further south which gives a fine view of the plain below and the Hellespont. He also maintains that a British force of 72 000 men with 22 000 animals camped as close together as possible and occupied an area of 20 square miles. That's 45 square kilometers or 625 square metres per man excluding the animals. Let's give the beasties 16 square metres each. That leaves 620 square metres per man. To put it colloquially, what was Maurice smoking?

I've been told I won't change my mind no matter how many facts are pushed my way. I will, if they're facts. Is anyone interested in me doing a more detailed analysis of Maurice from the angle of getting facts right? Or do we leave this as kettle and pot?

according to the paper quoted the maximum flow rate of the river is 1530 m3 s-1

but interesting table 2 has some far lower figures, below 3 m3 s-1

https://wikivividly.com/wiki/Karamenderes_River also has some figures
Like the other locations of the Mediterranean Region annual precipitation is mostly in the spring, so the flow rate is highly irregular depending on the season. While the average rate is quite low, 303 m3/s had been recorded during the flood of 2001.

Maurice's 50 gallons per hour apparently (according to google) translates as 6.3 m3 s-1
Which puts it well above the table 2 figures, and seems reasonable for a formulae,  used in military reconnaissance to estimate water sufficiently accurate results 

[Patrick Waterson]

They were specialised for optimisation in a specific role, but arguing from form to function (or perhaps vice versa) there is no reason large grain ships could not have existed earlier, when bulk grain transportation at the behest of national and/or imperial authorities seems to have taken place.

So, as we have no proof such large ships didn't exist before the Romans, we can assume whole fleets of them under the Persians?  Still doesn't make them suitable for beach landings, though.

Whether or not the Persians had such ships, the Athenian expedition to Syracuse in 415 BC had "thirty ships of burden (strogguloi) laden with corn" which look like specialised grain carriers (Thucydides VI.44).  Must I incidentally point out again that they do not have to land, but can discharge cargoes into boats which do?

Interestingly enough, the Athenians 'drew their ships on shore' at Rhegium.  Do we take this statement to include the corn-carriers, or to exclude them?

Isn't that the approach commonly advocated here regarding Herodotus?

No, not seen any evidence of it.  Most people just seem to want to use a critical approach on Herodotus' work, as opposed to an inerrancy approach.

Except that the critical approach seems to smack of falsus in unum, falsus in omnibus, which is essentially a fallacy:

"It may be said, once for all, that the maxim is in itself worthless, first, in point of validity, because in one form it merely contains in loose fashion a kernel of truth which no one needs to be told, and in the others it is absolutely false as a maxim of life; and secondly, in point of utility, because it merely tells the jury what they may do in any event, not what they must do or must not do, and therefore it is a superfluous form of words. It is also in practice pernicious, first, because there is frequently a misunderstanding of its proper force, and secondly, because it has become in the hands of many counsel a mere instrument for obtaining new trials upon points wholly unimportant in themselves." - John Henry Wigmore, Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law

[Erpingham]

Just checking on the importance of the Scamander on the progress for Northern Greece.  The Scamander/Karamenderes is in Asia Minor.  Am I missing something?

[Justin Swanton]

Not being nasty, but having read the opinion of a man who served with the British Army in India, South Africa and saw action in France,  and who walked the ground, I'm sticking with Maurice
To the best of my knowledge none of us in this discussion has commanded an infantry battalion or moved cavalry, and I don't think any of us have been to Gallipoli (although my Grandfather was there at Sulva Bay), so in this case I think we have to have really good evidence to dismiss the opinion of somebody who had done all of these

I've read Maurice and on several crucial points he is wildly out. He affirms the Scamander outputted 50 000 gallons per hour at its lowest ebb, about the time Xerxes' army arrived. I've ready a study on the Climate Change Impacts On Streamflow of Karamenderes (Scamander) River and the minimum output of the river was at least five times that, most likely more since the flow of the Scamander has been decreasing in modern times. He also puts the throne of Xerxes in the wrong place - there's no hill on the site he marks on his map but there is one further south which gives a fine view of the plain below and the Hellespont. He also maintains that a British force of 72 000 men with 22 000 animals camped as close together as possible and occupied an area of 20 square miles. That's 45 square kilometers or 625 square metres per man excluding the animals. Let's give the beasties 16 square metres each. That leaves 620 square metres per man. To put it colloquially, what was Maurice smoking?

I've been told I won't change my mind no matter how many facts are pushed my way. I will, if they're facts. Is anyone interested in me doing a more detailed analysis of Maurice from the angle of getting facts right? Or do we leave this as kettle and pot?

according to the paper quoted the maximum flow rate of the river is 1530 m3 s-1

but interesting table 2 has some far lower figures, below 3 m3 s-1

https://wikivividly.com/wiki/Karamenderes_River also has some figures
Like the other locations of the Mediterranean Region annual precipitation is mostly in the spring, so the flow rate is highly irregular depending on the season. While the average rate is quite low, 303 m3/s had been recorded during the flood of 2001.

Maurice's 50 gallons per hour apparently (according to google) translates as 6.3 m3 s-1
Which puts it well above the table 2 figures, and seems reasonable for a formulae,  used in military reconnaissance to estimate water sufficiently accurate results

A few more sums. The average lows for the Scamander in modern times according to the chart sit at about 7 m3 s-1. That's 25200 m3 per hour. There are 220 imperial gallons per cubit metre so we are looking at 5 544 000 gallons per hour, more than 100 times Maurice's estimate.