Could the Persian Empire logistically support an army several million strong?

[Mark G]

I'm not talking about whipping, that's for 300.

I'm thinking of many of the listed contingents in herodotus being the sort of peoples likely to engage in a bit of pillage and then clear off back home at the first opportunity.

If you had as much loot as you could carry, why stay longer?

So they would have to be kept under observation to stay in line, or order would collapse .

[Patrick Waterson]

Talking about clarifications, I'm a little concerned that operational manoeuvers in proximity to the enemy and the long route march through territory with no real threat of attack are being assumed to use the same type of deployment.

Not quite: operational manoeuvres in proximity to the enemy occurred when both sides expected a battle.  Anything else was transit.  Occasionally someone got it wrong and their 'transit' turned into an unexpected engagement, e.g. Herodotus IX.69:

"So the Greeks, now having the upper hand, followed Xerxes' men, pursuing and slaying. During this steadily growing rout there came a message to the rest of the Greeks, who were by the temple of Hera and had stayed out of the fighting, that there had been a battle and that Pausanias' men were victorious. When they heard this, they set forth in no ordered array, those who were with the Corinthians keeping to the spurs of the mountain and the hill country, by the road that led upward straight to the temple of Demeter, and those who were with the Megarians and Philasians taking the most level route over the plain. [2] However, when the Megarians and Philasians had come near the enemy, the Theban horsemen (whose captain was Asopodorus son of Timander) caught sight of them approaching in haste and disorder, and rode at them; in this attack they trampled six hundred of them, and pursued and drove the rest to Cithaeron."

It is notable in Thucydides, who describes events half a century later, that Greek armies of his period tend to be a bit more careful when heading towards a known or suspected enemy.

Personally, I continue to be uncomfortable with a Persian army that is the most efficient military machine logistically in the pre-modern era, whose march discipline and routine is so precise, yet when it comes in sight of the enemy, it becomes "a horde of locusts".  Unless "horde of locusts" is a practiced tactic performed on command, I think we have a dissonance here.

Actually when not in sight of an enemy it is moving freely in what we might consider 'horde of locusts' or 'transit' mode.  This is essentially what wargamers would call 'irregular loose formation' as opposed to complete individualistic confusion.  If the enemy is in sight, the army forms up, and in Herodotus armies seem to form up pretty quickly when danger threatens (overenthusiastic Megarans and Philasians excepted).  I would estimate the standard travel formation for a contingent as a 'box' with little attempt to keep alignment but reasonable effort to keep cohesion.  The two are not necessarily one and the same.

On Ramses II's Kadesh reliefs his army is shown on the move.  The infantry are shown in square formations with chariots in the spaces between the infantry blocks.  This raises interesting possibilities about the use of mounted troops being used to prevent straggling and generally keep contingents in shape.

[Patrick Waterson]

Leaving side the idea of just how regular the 1,700,000 or so Persian Infantry were apart from Herodotus is there any other evidence for these whip men? whipping a large number of armed men seems to be an invite for disaster.

To give one example, Diodorus XVII.60.4, at Gaugamela:

"As both flanks became closed, the king himself was alarmed and retreated. The flight thus became general. Dust raised by the Persian cavalry rose to a height, and as Alexander's squadrons followed on their heels, because of their numbers and the thickness of the dust, it was impossible to tell in what direction Dareius was fleeing. The air was filled with the groans of the fallen, the din of the cavalry, and the constant sound of lashing of whips."

Disciplinary measures depend upon what one is used to and how fairly or capriciously they are administered.  The Roman centurion with his vine-stick or a Royal Navy bosun with his 'starter' would have been at no greater risk than a Persian whip-man.

[Patrick Waterson]

Oh they could have been built, but we'd struggle not to find them. Because there'd be a lot of internal walls (and good thick internal walls because grain 'pushes')
Granaries survive well in the archaeological record because they have to be so well built. 

Which puts a premuium on excavations in Asia Minor, an area which significantly lags with regard to archaeology (for example: as far as I know, the number of Lydian helmets found still remains at one).  Asia Minor coastal city archaeology suffers from the same problem as archaeology in Damascus and Jerusalem - there are people living on the sites you really want to dig up.

[Patrick Waterson]

I thought that might be what you meant, but is there really evidence of large- to pick an example- Hebrew armies?  Also these large armies are considerably smaller than Xerxes which I think we are all agreed was an extraordinary event. What make you think that 'biblical' methods of logistics would be scale up to the efficiency needed to support Xerxes army of 2 or so million?

Because they managed to support quite large armies locally.  The only proof for the size of these armies is in written sources (notably palace and temple inscriptions and archives) but they have a certain consistency about them - it is not one culture claiming huge forces, but all of them.

Store cities were the order of the day: just looking in a Concordance turns up about eleven Old Testament references to store cities Hebrew kings were using or ordering to be built.  Various tablets from Sumeria to Assyria refer to drawing materials from royal storehouses.  Egypt stored grain like a squirrel stocking up on nuts.  Storing up material - and grain - on a large scale for contingencies and future use was second nature to these cultures.  The standard modus operandi on campaign was to require nearby cities (never mind their notional affiliation) to supply the army from their own grain stocks - they usually complied, because the alternative was not pleasant.

We may note that Xerxes was really 'pushing the envelope' with his expedition: he was using an army twice the size of anything the Achaemenid Empire had fielded before, and seemingly doing so mostly out of vanity (it was his power and he wanted to see it in action - besides, who was going to resist such numbers as were under his command?).  It is very noteworthy that future Persian expeditions, essentially those to reconquer Egypt, were on a much more modest scale (220,000 or 330,000 plus fleet) and the really large armies of a million or so were reserved for defence of the Empire's heartland (Cunaxa 401 BC; Gaugamela 331 BC), where logistics were easier to arrange.  Xerxes managed to supply his army up to Salamis - but only just.  Once he lost naval superiority his system crashed with a venegeance.  Even so, Mardonius' 300,000 were sustained over winter by Thessaly and Boeotia, leading one to suppose that had Xerxes come with just 300,000 he would not have had the post-Salamis supply crisis that he did.

[Patrick Waterson]

While exploring amphorae I chanced upon this.  Interesting because its all about amphorae as shipping containers, rather than about types and sequences.

Nice find, Anthony.

Incidentally, if anyone is still interested in camp sizes, Herodotus gives the Persian fortified camp at Plataea in 479 BC as 10 furlongs by 10 furlongs (2,200 yards by 2,200 yards).  His army partly occupied the camp and partly spread out over the adjacent countryside (Herodotus IX.15).

[Patrick Waterson]

I'm thinking of many of the listed contingents in herodotus being the sort of peoples likely to engage in a bit of pillage and then clear off back home at the first opportunity.

They might wish to do this, but there would be some obstacles.

To begin with, whether or not the camp was internally policed, there would be guards on the perimeter, and anyone leaving without a very good reason (e.g. being a King's Messenger) would be detained.  If they were clanking with purloined spoil, their future would shortly involve a sharp stake.

Then there was the matter of exactly where any plunder would be kept once plundered.  It would be loaded onto the baggage train and would be guarded.  One gets the impression from Herodotus' account of the Persian expedition to Euboea in 490 BC that the Persian nobility pretty much had a monopoly on plunder.  Anyone among the lower ranks trying unauthorisedly to help themselves might expect a short, sharp shock from which they never recovered.

This is not to say that Achaemenid soldiery would have passed up opportunities to slip a bit of jewellery into their girdles.  However attempting unauthorised departure to turn this into a good life at home would run afoul of camp perimeter guards, and even if these were bypassed the fellow's troubles are only just beginning.  He has to make his way back home through country where the locals will happily slaughter him for his ill-gotten gains and any King's officers will just as happily relieve him of them - and his life - for desertion.

Achaemenid troops, even those of remote rustic origin, do not seem to have been willing or able to commit serious acts of indiscipline.  Whether this was submissive temperament when outside their home territories, awe of those in power, effective officering or whatever, this problem which so affected soldiery like Montrose's Highlanders does not appear to have been a problem in an Achaemenid army.

[Flaminpig0]

Leaving side the idea of just how regular the 1,700,000 or so Persian Infantry were apart from Herodotus is there any other evidence for these whip men? whipping a large number of armed men seems to be an invite for disaster.

To give one example, Diodorus XVII.60.4, at Gaugamela:

"As both flanks became closed, the king himself was alarmed and retreated. The flight thus became general. Dust raised by the Persian cavalry rose to a height, and as Alexander's squadrons followed on their heels, because of their numbers and the thickness of the dust, it was impossible to tell in what direction Dareius was fleeing. The air was filled with the groans of the fallen, the din of the cavalry, and the constant sound of lashing of whips."

Disciplinary measures depend upon what one is used to and how fairly or capriciously they are administered.  The Roman centurion with his vine-stick or a Royal Navy bosun with his 'starter' would have been at no greater risk than a Persian whip-man.

As always I am in awe if your mastery of ancient sources however the quote you provide  could easily refer to whipping horses rather  than  men - it is not definitive proof of a Persian military police corps that could push armies of millions of men forward. The Roman Centurion and the Royal Navy Bosun both exist within regular organisations and the vine-stick etc is as much as symbol of authority as anything else;It is not quite the same as a Persian whip man should such exist  trying to force Ethiopian or Thracian irregulars forward to fight Hoplites or to leave off pillaging a village or bothering local women.

[Jim Webster]

Oh they could have been built, but we'd struggle not to find them. Because there'd be a lot of internal walls (and good thick internal walls because grain 'pushes')
Granaries survive well in the archaeological record because they have to be so well built. 

Which puts a premuium on excavations in Asia Minor, an area which significantly lags with regard to archaeology (for example: as far as I know, the number of Lydian helmets found still remains at one).  Asia Minor coastal city archaeology suffers from the same problem as archaeology in Damascus and Jerusalem - there are people living on the sites you really want to dig up.

I assumed these five depots would be along the coast of what is now Greece. I'm not sure Herodotus explicitly says. But there would have to be depots in Asia minor as well as these troops gathered there even if they came from somewhat different directions, the armies of the eastern Satrapies concentrated in Cappadocia and then marched to Sardis where they over-wintered. The armies of the Western Satrapies concentrated in Abydos and the other armies joined it. I assume that 'Eastern Satrapies' probably included anybody not Asia Minor

But Abydos and Sardis would need major granaries. Abydos would be easy to provision by sea, Sardis less so, I don't know how navigable the river was.

[Flaminpig0]

Because they managed to support quite large armies locally.  The only proof for the size of these armies is in written sources (notably palace and temple inscriptions and archives) but they have a certain consistency about them - it is not one culture claiming huge forces, but all of them.

I think the operative words here are quite and locally. My admittedly poor research skills have not found much evidence for 'biblical armies' around a million or so- Sargon of Akkad is meant  to have fielded a force of 5,400 men which was considered a mighty host at the time.I am a little suspicious of temple inscriptions as by their nature they are not meant as historical documents giving a realistic depiction of events. For example Rameses  is not some 20 times the size of  a Egyptian or Hittite soldier from the lower classes.

Store cities were the order of the day: just looking in a Concordance turns up about eleven Old Testament references to store cities Hebrew kings were using or ordering to be built.  Various tablets from Sumeria to Assyria refer to drawing materials from royal storehouses.  Egypt stored grain like a squirrel stocking up on nuts.  Storing up material - and grain - on a large scale for contingencies and future use was second nature to these cultures.  The standard modus operandi on campaign was to require nearby cities (never mind their notional affiliation) to supply the army from their own grain stocks - they usually complied, because the alternative was not pleasant.

At the risk of starting a religious row can I respectfully point out that the Old Testament isn't universally considered a historical document  some people even doubt the the existence  of an extensive Kingdom of Israel pointing to lack of archaeological evidence in spite of  Israeli archaeologists best efforts to unearth it. There are certainly no royal inscriptions proving evidence of enormous Hebrew forces off roading. Also theses societies are not really that  similar  Egypt was probably good at organising lots of men due to being a society that existed around irrigation.  Urartu, the Sea Peoples  and David's Hebrew Empire should it have existed were different beasts.

It is also the case that  Kadesh one of the better recorded battles from the 'biblical ' period the Egyptian army didn't swarm across the countryside like locusts but split into 4 segments following roads/tracks presumably due to supply issues.

We may note that Xerxes was really 'pushing the envelope' with his expedition: he was using an army twice the size of anything the Achaemenid Empire had fielded before, and seemingly doing so mostly out of vanity (it was his power and he wanted to see it in action - besides, who was going to resist such numbers as were under his command?).  It is very noteworthy that future Persian expeditions, essentially those to reconquer Egypt, were on a much more modest scale (220,000 or 330,000 plus fleet) and the really large armies of a million or so were reserved for defence of the Empire's heartland (Cunaxa 401 BC; Gaugamela 331 BC), where logistics were easier to arrange.  Xerxes managed to supply his army up to Salamis - but only just.  Once he lost naval superiority his system crashed with a venegeance.  Even so, Mardonius' 300,000 were sustained over winter by Thessaly and Boeotia, leading one to suppose that had Xerxes come with just 300,000 he would not have had the post-Salamis supply crisis that he did.

Taking the numbers as read it is obvious that where the Persian Empire attempted to campaign away from home the numbers involved were in the low or mid  hundred thousands rather than in the millions. Perhaps that might give you  reason to doubt  the numbers claimed by Herodotos?

I suspect not!

[Flaminpig0]

Store cities were the order of the day: just looking in a Concordance turns up about eleven Old Testament references to store cities Hebrew kings were using or ordering to be built.  the army

If we could work out the size and population of the store cities we might  be able to guestimate the  size of the army they were supporting. Jerusalem at the supposed time of David has been calculated as having a population between 2,000 - 5,000 and as that was the capital we can only assume that the satellite store cities would be smaller. In comparison modern Staines -upon -Thames would be a mighty metropolis (not just the cultural/intellectual /artistic centre of the entire universe) The idea that there was a Biblical tradition of warfare involving super-size armies and hyper efficient logistics is very dubious and doesn't really support the HHAH

[Patrick Waterson]

As always I am in awe if your mastery of ancient sources however the quote you provide  could easily refer to whipping horses rather  than  men

Doubtful; as far as I know whips were not part of cavalry equipment at the time and the Persian army at Gaugamela was predominantly infantry - besides, by this point in the battle the Persian cavalry left had run away and their cavalry right was off-stage busy with Parmenio.

it is not definitive proof of a Persian military police corps that could push armies of millions of men forward.

We may be looking at this the wrong way.  The whip-men may be integral to the unit, effectively NCOs given power over their fellow-countrymen.  I never saw them as a 'military police corps' as such, although they may have had such responsibilities, but rather as members of that contingent who had NCO rank and Achaemenid loyalty.

Of course there may have been some of each: the King may have had his own band of whip-men to help out on special occasions, e.g. the crossing of the Hellespont.  But our sources are not specific enough for us to conclude that.

The Roman Centurion and the Royal Navy Bosun both exist within regular organisations and the vine-stick etc is as much as symbol of authority as anything else;It is not quite the same as a Persian whip man should such exist  trying to force Ethiopian or Thracian irregulars forward to fight Hoplites or to leave off pillaging a village or bothering local women.

Perhaps my use of 'Persian' was misleading; there is nothing in our sources which gives any particular nationality to the whip-men, and in any event to get their contingents as far as Sardis in the first place they would presumably have to be integral to the unit or contingent whose discipline (or discipline substitute) they were providing.  I suspect this was just the normal Achaemenid way of officering (or rather NCO-ing).

[Patrick Waterson]

I assumed these five depots would be along the coast of what is now Greece. I'm not sure Herodotus explicitly says. But there would have to be depots in Asia minor as well as these troops gathered there even if they came from somewhat different directions, the armies of the eastern Satrapies concentrated in Cappadocia and then marched to Sardis where they over-wintered. The armies of the Western Satrapies concentrated in Abydos and the other armies joined it. I assume that 'Eastern Satrapies' probably included anybody not Asia Minor

They would also need to draw on store-cities across the Empire for this initial concentration, so those on the Euphrates, for example, would need to be well stoocked to supply the transiting Eastern satrapies troops.  In Greece, I am not sure about 'depots' but Herodotus does (Book VII, especially 118-120) note that certain of the the local Greek cities had each made extensive advance arrangements to feed the Achaemenid army for a day as it passed through, often in cooperation with other cities and islands.

But Abydos and Sardis would need major granaries. Abydos would be easy to provision by sea, Sardis less so, I don't know how navigable the river was.

Sardis could have been challenging to provision by sea; the river Hermus (currently 'Gediz') flows close to the city but not through it, so any large-scale Achaemenid storage facilities might be along the banks of the Hermus (the second largest river in Asia Minor) as opposed to in Sardis itself.  The Pactolus, which flows directly through Sardis, is a stream which as far as I know usually carried nothing larger or heavier than gold dust from Mount Tmolus.  Whether it was considered worthwhile transshipping grain onto barges to carry up the Pactolus would have depended upon whether the army was being quartered in Sardis (potentially a rather tight squeeze) or just around it.  I do not exclude the possibility of the Achaemenids having both stocked up Sardis via the Pactolus and erected additional storage facilities along the banks of the Hermus.

[Erpingham]

Talking about clarifications, I'm a little concerned that operational manoeuvers in proximity to the enemy and the long route march through territory with no real threat of attack are being assumed to use the same type of deployment.

Not quite: operational manoeuvres in proximity to the enemy occurred when both sides expected a battle.  Anything else was transit. 

No, I don't think so.  Arrangements for marching through friendly territory are rarely those of operating within striking distance of the enemy.  Why do you think the Persian army before Plataea is operating in the same way as on the march from the Hellespont?

[Erpingham]

I assumed these five depots would be along the coast of what is now Greece.

So if we assume five in Greece, which are presumably not identical to the cities who feed the army for a day, which Patrick identified.  That isn't enough for a one week between restocking march.  So are we looking at a hierarchy of supply dumps?  Or are there only five?  If only five, we are looking at a different mechanism for feeding the army on the march.  A longer supply train, for example, or that supply ships actually accompanied the army, rather than just operating a conveyor to Asia Minor?