How did infantry stop charging cavalry?

[Patrick Waterson]

[1] I would add that where both sides are brimming with elan and self-belief, neither will flinch and there will be a clash of almighty proportions and mutual injuries.  [2] If this proves to be an irresistible force hitting an immovable object, then the irresistible force will reconsider, as Anthony has previously indicated.

Aren't these two points at odds with each other?

No, simply before and after.

If the infantry do not waver, the cavalry are unlikely to close?

This depends upon the cavalry's training, equipment and self-belief (the latter being backed by experience).  If trained to put plenty of impetus into a charge at the point of impact, that is what will be done.  If trained to put the brakes on, that is what will happen.  This will differ between cavalry types and traditions.  French gensdarmes of the early 16th century would put a weighty charge into anything, even pikemen.  German reiters of the same period would not contact steady infantry at all until they had worked them over heavily with a sustained caracole.  Different weaponry, training and tactics produced different approaches by these contemporary troop types.

I did point out that in the majority of cases enthusiasm for contact is reflexive (enemy determination seeds friendly doubt and vice versa), but where both sides have high morale and determination the cavalry will force the issue.  Wace's description of Hastings gives the impression of such charges; if one believes Wace is inventing this, then there is no more to be said.  If on the other hand he was writing from knowledge of historical Norman cavalry tradition, then we have a good example of a battle where cavalry did move hard and fast into contact with steady infantry.

One thing to remember about Hastings is the English have chosen a position on a steep hill.  The Norman's can't easily charge with momentum, so combat probably means individual conrois making a short dash into action, mixing it with the front line and then falling back if they don't create an opportunity and letting another lot have a go, rather than a massed charge. 

This is a valid point.  I would still suggest the first charge would from considerations of organisation and enthusiasm have involved everyone, or at least the bulk of the line, after which the in-and-out approach by conroy gives a good match with Wace's interim description prior to the 'feigned flight' (which whether planned or improvised had to be a substantial manoeuvre in order to lure a whole English wing) and the Duke's final charge.

[aligern]

Descriptions of charges are to be treated with caution. They are prone to be exaggerated in the mind of the reader because:
A writer may see an action as a fast charge where a more analytical observer might see a pretty  round trot. To an extent it depends on what the ideology of a charge is at the time of writing.
An author might wish to confey action and aggression and portray more drama than was actually happening, particularly as most authors did not take part in battles, let alone cavalry charges.
A tactic whereby a unit adcances in a determined , controlled , fashion with the officers observing the enemy reaction and taking a decision in the last few yards whether to go in against a wavering foe ir break off against a staunch opponent whose spears remain steady might well be described differently according to the outcome without the writer telling us that there was a choice available.
I believe it was Duncan, a long time ago, who pointed out that, senantically, a charge might not reach the opposing line or be just a walk in and push ( like police horses) and yet be described as a charge ( and translated as a charge) . Someone with the appropriate Greek and Latinmight care to tell us if there are actually  words or phrases that provide a nuanced version of the act of moving to contact ir threatened contact with an opponent.
We can be pretty certain that charges did go home, or rather that armoured cavalry made contact because , as said orevioysly the Byzantines felt the need to orovide those squads of menaulion wielders because cataphracts would break the thinner spears of standard infantry. That does nit tell us what degree of monentum cataphracts adavanced with.
Matt Bennet , in his presentation at the first recent  Society Conference in  2016 analysed more than just Wace and concluded that the Normans were using something like the later 'Tour Francaise' in which they advanced on horseback, traded blows with the Englush front line, with the advantage of having them pinned by the threat of contact, then conducting a very fast turn and getting away. If, as I believe,bthe English are a front rank of braced spearmen with a second rank of axemen, tgen the Nirman has jabbed at the oassive spearman and turned before the axeman can step firward and damage the 'knight'. If I recall correctly, this may nit have been a Breton tactic and they may have suffered more in the interchange than the Normans and French, thus precipitating the first and real flight. Having walked the steep slopes on both putative Hastings sites I suggest that the Normans would not have ridden into the English line hard until  late in the day when the English were stressed tired, disordered and showing gaps, because the balance of risk was too great and we do not need to imagine such risky tactics to achieve the desired result.
Roy

[Erpingham]

We might note here the Battle of Jengland in 851, between the Carolingians and the Bretons.

The Bretons were a cavalry army, the Carolingians largely infantry.  The Carolingians drew up in a solid phalanx.  The Bretons attacked using feint charges and retreats, throwing javelins.  Some of the carolingian infantry lost their discipline and pursued the cavalry, only to be cut off and killed.  But the Bretons couldn't deliver the coup de grace and darkness saved the Carolingians.  Overnight, the Frankish king fled and, when this was discovered by the rest of the army, they ran away too, many being done for by the pursuing Bretons. 

[Duncan Head]

We might note here the Battle of Jengland in 851, between the Carolingians and the Bretons.

The Bretons were a cavalry army, the Carolingians largely infantry.  The Carolingians drew up in a solid phalanx.  The Bretons attacked using feint charges and retreats, throwing javelins.  Some of the carolingian infantry lost their discipline and pursued the cavalry, only to be cut off and killed.  But the Bretons couldn't deliver the coup de grace and darkness saved the Carolingians.  Overnight, the Frankish king fled and, when this was discovered by the rest of the army, they ran away too, many being done for by the pursuing Bretons.

So very like Hastings, including the pursuing fyrd being cut down, except that "Harold" survived till dusk and then legged it? Interesting.

[Erpingham]

So very like Hastings, including the pursuing fyrd being cut down, except that "Harold" survived till dusk and then legged it? Interesting.

I thought so too.  One difference was the carolingians had a force of cavalry but not enough to challenge the Bretons.  They seem to have been held behind the infantry, perhaps to deter attempts to flank the main infantry line?  The other difference is that the Normans seem more keen to get stuck in than to skirmish.  Would the Normans have proved more decisive against the disintegrating Frankish line?

I've found a few Carolingian infantry/cavalry battles of interest.  At the battle of Montpensier in 892, the Franks attacked a Danish force by first advancing archers to shoot at them, followed by an infantry assault and finally finishing off with a cavalry attack .  Sound familiar?  It does fit a pattern of cavalry success against infantry - first soften them up then hit them.

At Suntel Mountain in 792, the Franks were campaigning against the (Old) Saxons.  The Carolingian cavalry vanguard came upon the Saxon infantry in formation and, rather than waiting for the rest of the army, charged.  The result was a disaster as, instead of charging together, every man spurred on his horse and attacked as an individual.  The Saxons absorbed the charge then enveloped the Franks, nearly wiping them out.

Finally, we might observe the battle of Lenzen in 929.  The Franks (in the form of Saxons, who were loyal Eastern Frankish subjects by this time) found themselves facing a large Slav infantry force deployed in close formation.  The Saxons tried a probing attack with cavalry but it failed to make in impact, in part because heavy rain had made the ground conditions treacherous for the horsemen (quite rare example of rain having a noted impact on the terrain here).  The Saxons therefore attacked with their infantry, holding the regrouped cavalry in reserve.  The battle was long and evenly balanced, with both sides achieving local success but unable to make a decisive break through.  Eventually, the Slavs exposed their flank and the Saxon cavalry charged, routing the Slavs, who were cut down in the pursuit.

The morals for the cavalry seems to be 1) Don't tangle frontally with confident close-order foot - instead probe, skirmish, look for an opportunity to deliver a decisive blow 2) Work in conjunction with other arms 3) If you do charge, do it as a group, not a bunch of individuals.

[Justin Swanton]

To sum up the thread thus far:

1. Infantry without discipline and motivation tend to scatter at a cavalry charge even before the charge hits home, turning it into an easy pursuit.

2. Infantry with discipline and motivation may stop a cavalry charge. But to be sure of doing so requires a couple of other factors:

a) Tight formation - ranks and files bunched up together. The manuals speak about close formations for infantry ranks as well as files. Close formation ranks were of no use for infantry vs infantry combat as they denied the footman freedom of depth to wield his weapons, which is why surrounded and compressed infantry were invariably slaughtered. The one exception is othismos, and that wasn't really a formation, just a natural progression from spear fencing to closing to contact (following Paul Bardunias). Close formation ranks as a formation seems applicable only as a cavalry-stopper, by making the individual men part of a stable mass a horse could not knock down and hence penetrate.

b) Long spears or pikes. These were very effective in nearly all cases. Still leaves open the question of how infantry not equipped with them managed against cavalry.

c) Nerve. The nerve required of the front ranks was of a special kind in that they stood a good chance being killed by charging cavalry even if their formation as a whole managed to stop the charge.

Looking at the other side of the coin, cavalry 'charging' infantry seem to have happened in several ways:

1. Hit the infantry line at full gallop and try to burst through it without stopping (Republican cavalry).

2. Hit the infantry line hard and strive to break its morale by sparring with the front rankers (Mediaeval knights). The aim is not to burst through but get the infantry to panic as burst through foot are disordered but do not necessarily rout. This approach must allow for a speedy breaking off if the charge fails.

3. Run up to the infantry at a moderate pace, spar briefly with the front rank, then retire before the infantry can envelope the horses and kill the riders. This approach would seem to imply a looser cavalry formation allowing horses in each file to disengage and fall back quickly through their file gaps. The horses are in constant motion, preventing the foot from surrounding them and killing the riders.

Is that about it?

[RichT]

Roy:

I believe it was Duncan, a long time ago, who pointed out that, senantically, a charge might not reach the opposing line or be just a walk in and push ( like police horses) and yet be described as a charge ( and translated as a charge) . Someone with the appropriate Greek and Latinmight care to tell us if there are actually  words or phrases that provide a nuanced version of the act of moving to contact ir threatened contact with an opponent.

I don't believe so, no - as usual Koon's Infantry Combat in Livy's Battle Narratives is the place to look (though note, 'infantry'), and his point is that words like 'impetus' or 'concurrere' don't necessarily mean what we might think they mean from their English translations (they can just mean 'attack' and cover a multitude of sins). Greek is similar (and here Lendon on the combat metaphors involved - Greek all about depth and weight, Latin all about virtus and impetus - is of interest). Which means that anyone hoping that a high level literary description along the lines of 'the cavalry charged the infantry and broke them' is telling us anything much about the actual combat mechanics involved is kidding themselves.

[RichT]

Justin:

Is that about it?

As a summary of the thread or as a summary of reality? I don't think so as the latter - your Infantry: 2. a) is controversial in virtually every point. Your Cavalry 1. begs the question.

[Erpingham]

I thought this might be interesting in answering the question from a different tradition.  This is from Abu Bakr al-Turtusi' Lamp for Princes describing Almoravid tactics

This is the battle order that we use  and which seems most efficacious in our battles with our enemies. The infantry with their shields, lances, and iron-tipped and penetrating javelins are formed in ranks. Their lances rest obliquely on their
shoulders, the shaft touching the ground, the point aimed at the enemy. Each one kneels on his left knee and holds his shield in the air. Behind the infantry are the elite archers, whose arrows can pierce coats of mail Behind the archers are the cavalry... When the enemy comes near, the archers let fly against them a shower of arrows, while infantry throw their javelins and receive the charge on the points of their lances. Then infantry and archers open their ranks right and left and the Muslim cavalry, charging through the space, routs the enemy, if Allah so decides


Some similarities with Roman and Byzantine practice there - a co-incidence of similar solutions to similar problems?

[Patrick Waterson]

Some similarities with Roman and Byzantine practice there - a co-incidence of similar solutions to similar problems?

Could well be: the Muslims were assumed to have learned much of their military stock-in-trade from the Byzantines.

At Suntel Mountain in 792, the Franks were campaigning against the (Old) Saxons.  The Carolingian cavalry vanguard came upon the Saxon infantry in formation and, rather than waiting for the rest of the army, charged.  The result was a disaster as, instead of charging together, every man spurred on his horse and attacked as an individual.  The Saxons absorbed the charge then enveloped the Franks, nearly wiping them out.

This is one factor we have not so far emphasised, namely that the effective impact of a charging formation is greater than the sum of its parts.

The morals for the cavalry seems to be 1) Don't tangle frontally with confident close-order foot - instead probe, skirmish, look for an opportunity to deliver a decisive blow 2) Work in conjunction with other arms 3) If you do charge, do it as a group, not a bunch of individuals.

Not a bad checklist.  Of course, with numerous different cavalry cultures and traditons this formula will vary considerably, but as a generic giude to using cavalry it nicely covers the essentials.

Matt Bennet, in his presentation at the first recent  Society Conference in  2016 analysed more than just Wace and concluded that the Normans were using something like the later 'Tour Francaise' in which they advanced on horseback, traded blows with the Englush front line, with the advantage of having them pinned by the threat of contact, then conducting a very fast turn and getting away. If, as I believe, the English are a front rank of braced spearmen with a second rank of axemen, then the Norman has jabbed at the passive spearman and turned before the axeman can step forward and damage the 'knight'.

Although the accounts of the batle have Norman knights being 'damaged' by axemen, so I suspect use of this tactic was confined to Bretons, who do not seem to have improved their technique since Jengland in AD 851 (see Anthony's earlier post).

[Imperial Dave]

Descriptions of charges are to be treated with caution. They are prone to be exaggerated in the mind of the reader because:
A writer may see an action as a fast charge where a more analytical observer might see a pretty  round trot. To an extent it depends on what the ideology of a charge is at the time of writing.
An author might wish to confey action and aggression and portray more drama than was actually happening, particularly as most authors did not take part in battles, let alone cavalry charges.
A tactic whereby a unit adcances in a determined , controlled , fashion with the officers observing the enemy reaction and taking a decision in the last few yards whether to go in against a wavering foe ir break off against a staunch opponent whose spears remain steady might well be described differently according to the outcome without the writer telling us that there was a choice available.
I believe it was Duncan, a long time ago, who pointed out that, senantically, a charge might not reach the opposing line or be just a walk in and push ( like police horses) and yet be described as a charge ( and translated as a charge) . Someone with the appropriate Greek and Latinmight care to tell us if there are actually  words or phrases that provide a nuanced version of the act of moving to contact ir threatened contact with an opponent.
We can be pretty certain that charges did go home, or rather that armoured cavalry made contact because , as said orevioysly the Byzantines felt the need to orovide those squads of menaulion wielders because cataphracts would break the thinner spears of standard infantry. That does nit tell us what degree of monentum cataphracts adavanced with.
Matt Bennet , in his presentation at the first recent  Society Conference in  2016 analysed more than just Wace and concluded that the Normans were using something like the later 'Tour Francaise' in which they advanced on horseback, traded blows with the Englush front line, with the advantage of having them pinned by the threat of contact, then conducting a very fast turn and getting away. If, as I believe,bthe English are a front rank of braced spearmen with a second rank of axemen, tgen the Nirman has jabbed at the oassive spearman and turned before the axeman can step firward and damage the 'knight'. If I recall correctly, this may nit have been a Breton tactic and they may have suffered more in the interchange than the Normans and French, thus precipitating the first and real flight. Having walked the steep slopes on both putative Hastings sites I suggest that the Normans would not have ridden into the English line hard until  late in the day when the English were stressed tired, disordered and showing gaps, because the balance of risk was too great and we do not need to imagine such risky tactics to achieve the desired result.
Roy

exactly my thoughts. I really cant take Wace or any 'biased' writer at full face value. Thats not to say I dont believe his accounts per se, just that certain elements will definitely be exaggerated for dramatic (and patron pleasing) effect

[willb]

[1] I would add that where both sides are brimming with elan and self-belief, neither will flinch and there will be a clash of almighty proportions and mutual injuries.  [2] If this proves to be an irresistible force hitting an immovable object, then the irresistible force will reconsider, as Anthony has previously indicated.

Aren't these two points at odds with each other?

I agree more with the second, than the first.
If the infantry do not waver, the cavalry are unlikely to close?

We have the example of Carrhae where the Parthian cataphracts charged the Roman infantry then broke off when the Romans remained steadfast.

[aligern]

It is worth quoting the section on Carrhae in Plutarch's life of Crassus in full. It suffers a bit from the convention that advances to contact are desctpribec or rather translated as charges, whereas it is not actually necessary ro go in at speed to acheive the effects described.  Young Crassus, for example likely made quite a gentle advance as he was not going to gain much from impetus.

'24 1 While the Romans were in consternation at this din, suddenly their enemies dropped the coverings of their armour, and were seen to be themselves blazing in helmets and breastplates, their Margianian steel glittering keen and bright, and their horses clad in plates of bronze and steel. 2 Surena himself, however, was the tallest and fairest of them all, although his effeminate beauty did not well correspond to his reputation for valour, but he was dressed more in the Median fashion, with painted face and parted hair, while the rest of the Parthians still wore their hair long and bunched over their foreheads, in Scythian fashion, to make themselves look formidable. 3 And at first they purposed to charge upon the Romans with their long spears, and throw their front ranks into confusion; but when they saw the depth of their formation, where shield  p389 was locked with shield, and the firmness and composure of the men, they drew back, and while seeming to break their ranks and disperse, they surrounded the hollow square in which their enemy stood before he was aware of the manoeuvre. 4 And when Crassus ordered his light-armed troops to make a charge, they did not advance far, but encountering a multitude of arrows, abandoned their undertaking and ran back for shelter among the men-at‑arms, among whom they caused the beginning of disorder and fear, for these now saw the velocity and force of the arrows, which fractured armour, and tore their way through every covering alike, whether hard or soft.

5 But the Parthians now stood at long intervals from one another and began to shoot their arrows from all sides at once, not with any accurate aim (for the dense formation of the Romans would not suffer an archer to miss even if he wished it), but making vigorous and powerful shots from bows which were large and mighty and curved so as to discharge their missiles with great force. 6 At once, then, the plight of the Romans was a grievous one; for if they kept their ranks, they were wounded in great numbers, and if they tried to come to close quarters with the enemy, they were just as far from effecting anything and suffered just as much. For the Parthians shot as they fled, and next to the Scythians, they do this most effectively; and it is a very clever thing to seek safety while still fighting, and to take away the shame of flight.

25 1 Now as long as they had hopes that the enemy would exhaust their missiles and desist from battle or fight at close quarters, the Romans held  p391 out; but when they perceived that many camels laden with arrows were at hand, from which the Parthians who first encircled them took a fresh supply, then Crassus, seeing no end to this, began to lose heart, and sent messengers to his son with orders to force an engagement with the enemy before he was surrounded; for it was his wing especially which the enemy were attacking and surrounding with their cavalry, in the hope of getting in his rear. 2 Accordingly, the young man took thirteen hundred horsemen, of whom a thousand had come from Caesar, five hundred archers, and eight cohorts of the men-at‑arms who were nearest him, and led them all to the charge. But the Parthians who were trying to envelop him, either because, as some say, they encountered marshes, or because they were manoeuvring to attack Publius as far as possible from his father, wheeled about and made off. 3 Then Publius, shouting that the men did not stand their ground, rode after them, and with him Censorinus and Megabacchus, the latter distinguished for his courage and strength, Censorinus a man of senatorial dignity and a powerful speaker, and both of them comrades of Publius and nearly of the same age. The cavalry followed after Publius, and even the infantry kept pace with them in the zeal and joy which their hopes inspired; for they thought they were victorious and in pursuit of the enemy, until, after they had gone forward a long distance, they perceived the ruse. For the seeming fugitives wheeled about and were joined at the same time by others more numerous still. 4 Then the Romans halted, supposing that the enemy would come to close quarters with them,  p393 since they were so few in number. But the Parthians stationed their mail-clad horsemen in front of the Romans, and then with the rest of their cavalry in loose array rode round them, tearing up the surface of the ground, and raising from the depths great heaps of sand which fell in limitless showers of dust, so that the Romans could neither see clearly nor speak plainly, 5 but, being crowded into a narrow compass and falling upon one another, were shot, and died no easy nor even speedy death. For, in the agonies of convulsive pain, and writhing about the arrows, they would break them off in their wounds, and then in trying to pull out by force the barbed heads which had pierced their veins and sinews, they tore and disfigured themselves the more.

6 Thus many died, and the survivors also were incapacitated for fighting. And when Publius urged them to charge the enemy's mail-clad horsemen, they showed him that their hands were riveted to their shields and their feet nailed through and through to the ground, so that they were helpless either for flight or for self-defence. 7 Publius himself, accordingly, cheered on his cavalry, made a vigorous charge with them, and closed with the enemy. But his struggle was an unequal one both offensively and defensively, for his thrusting was done with small and feeble spears against breastplates of raw hide and steel, whereas the thrusts of the enemy were made with pikes against the lightly equipped and unprotected bodies of the Gauls, since it was upon these that Publius chiefly relied, and with these he did indeed work wonders. 8 For they laid hold of the long spears of the Parthians, and grappling with the men, pushed them from  p395 their horses, hard as it was to move them owing to the weight of their armour; and many of the Gauls forsook their own horses, and crawling under those of the enemy, stabbed them in the belly. These would rear up in their anguish, and die trampling on riders and foemen indiscriminately mingled. 9 But the Gauls were distressed above all things by the heat and their thirst, to both of which they were unused; and most of their horses had perished by being driven against the long spears. They were therefore compelled to retire upon the men-at‑arms, taking with them Publius, who was severely wounded. And seeing a sandy hillock near by, they all retired to it, and fastened their horses in the centre; then locking their shields together on the outside, they thought they could more easily defend themselves against the Barbarians. 10 But it turned out just the other way. For on level ground, the front ranks do, to some extent, afford relief to those who are behind them. But here, where the inequality of the ground raised one man above another, and lifted every man who was behind another into greater prominence, there was no such thing as escape, but they were all alike hit with arrows, bewailing their inglorious and ineffectual death.

11 Now there were with Publius two Greeks, of those who dwelt near by in Carrhae, Hieronymus and Nicomachus. These joined in trying to persuade him to slip away with them and make their escape to Ichnae, a city which had espoused the Roman cause and was not far off. But Publius, declaring that no death could have such terrors for him as to make him desert those who were perishing on his account, ordered them to save their own lives, bade them farewell, and  p397 dismissed them. Then he himself, being unable to use his hand, which had been pierced through with an arrow, presented his side to his shield-bearer and ordered him to strike home with his sword. 12 In like manner also Censorinus is said to have died; but Megabacchus took his own life, and so did the other most notable men. The survivors fought on until the Parthians mounted the hill and transfixed them with their long spears, and they say that not more than five hundred were taken alive. Then the Parthians cut off the head of Publius, and rode off at once to attack Crassus.

26 1 His situation was as follows. After ordering his son to charge the Parthians and receiving tidings that the enemy were routed to a great distance and hotly pursued, and after noticing also that his own immediate opponents were no longer pressing him so hard (since most of them had streamed away to where Publius was), he recovered a little courage, and drawing his troops together, posted them for safety on sloping ground, in immediate expectation that his son would return from the pursuit. 2 Of the messengers sent by Publius to his father, when he began to be in danger, the first fell in with the Barbarians and were slain; the next made their way through with difficulty and reported that Publius was lost unless he received speedy and abundant aid from his father. 3 And now Crassus was a prey to many conflicting emotions, and no longer looked at anything with calm judgement. His fear for the whole army drove him to refuse, and at the same time his yearning love for his son impelled him to grant assistance; but at last he began to move his forces forward.

p399  At this point, however, the enemy came up with clamour and battle cries which made them more fearful than ever, and again many of their drums began bellowing about the Romans, who awaited the beginning of a second battle. 4 Besides, those of the enemy who carried the head of Publius fixed high upon a spear, rode close up and displayed it, scornfully asking after his parents and family, for surely, they said, it was not meet that Crassus, most base and cowardly of men, should be the father of a son so noble and of such splendid valour. This spectacle shattered and unstrung the spirits of the Romans more than all the rest of their terrible experiences, and they were all filled, not with a passion for revenge, as was to have been expected, but with shuddering and trembling. 5 And yet Crassus, as they say, showed more brilliant qualities in that awful hour than ever before, for he went up and down the ranks crying: "Mine, O Romans, is this sorrow, and mine alone; but the great fortune and glory of Rome abide unbroken and unconquered in you, who are alive and safe. And now if ye have any pity for me, thus bereft of the noblest of sons, show it by your wrath against the enemy. Rob them of their joy; avenge their cruelty; be not cast down at what had happened, for it must needs be that those who aim at great deeds should also suffer greatly. 6 It was not without bloody losses that even Lucullus overthrew Tigranes, or Scipio Antiochus; and our fathers of old lost a thousand ships off Sicily, and in Italy many imperators and generals, not one of whom, by his defeat, prevented them from afterwards mastering his conquerors. For it was not by good fortune merely that the Roman state reached its present  p401 plenitude of power, but by the patient endurance and valour of those who faced dangers in its behalf."

27 1 Even as he spoke such words of encouragement, Crassus saw that not many of his men listened with any eagerness, but when he also bade them raise the battle cry, he discovered how despondent his army was, so weak, feeble, and uneven was the shout they made, while that which came from the Barbarians was clear and bold. Then, as the enemy got to work, their light cavalry rode round on the flanks of the Romans and shot them with arrows, while the mail-clad horsemen in front, plying their long spears, kept driving them together into a narrow space, except those who, to escape death from the arrows, made bold to rush desperately upon their foes. 2 These did little damage, but met with a speedy death from great and fatal wounds, since the spear which the Parthians thrust into the horses was heavy with steel, and often had impetus enough to pierce through two men at once. After fighting in this manner till night came on, the Parthians withdrew, saying that they would grant Crassus one night in which to bewail his son, unless, with a better regard for his own interests, he should consent to go to Arsaces instead of being carried there.'

[Dangun]

We have the example of Carrhae where the Parthian cataphracts charged the Roman infantry then broke off when the Romans remained steadfast.

Would you describe this as the cavalry:
* charging, impacting and withdrawing; or
* charging, not-impacting and withdrawing; or
* advancing, meleeing and withdrawing?

Do cavalry charge AND impact multiple times?

[Andreas Johansson]

This is the battle order that we use  and which seems most efficacious in our battles with our enemies. The infantry with their shields, lances, and iron-tipped and penetrating javelins are formed in ranks. Their lances rest obliquely on their shoulders, the shaft touching the ground, the point aimed at the enemy. Each one kneels on his left knee and holds his shield in the air.

How does one lean one's lance on one's shoulder while pointing it at the enemy? Are they somehow holding their lances behind their backs?

(Incidentally, to connect to an exchange Duncan and I had in the Currently reading thread back in summer, if Turtusi is describing Almoravid troops in the narrow sense - i.e. Lamtuna or other Saharans - then this passage would justify the supporting archers in the DBMM list.)