How did infantry stop charging cavalry?

[Justin Swanton]

So it doesn't say that the Roman cavalry 'charged through' the infantry.

The key sentence is: 'P. Sulpicius with his cavalry broke the enemy's centre.'

In Latin: P. Sulpicius per mediam hostium aciem cum equitatu perrupit.

The keyword here is perrupit, from perrumpere, which means: 'to break or rush through; to force one's way through; to break though or force one's way through anything.'

Translating it as 'break' is inaccurate. The Roman cavalry definitely burst through the Volscian infantry centre then needed to decide whether they were going to break through it again and return to  their own lines or whether they would wait for the Roman infantry to attack the Volscians from the front whilst they attack them from the rear, turning the Volscians into a hamburger patty and defeating them in short order. The arrival of the Volscian and Aelan cavalry scotched that plan.

The passage makes clear that breaking through infantry does not rout them but disorders them, which disorder proves fatal in the ensuing infantry vs infantry fight.

And whatever formation the Roman cavalry adopted, the leading horsemen were going to have to punch their way individually through a lot of infantry, which they did with ease. I doubt equipment had anything to do with it since if the horses had been stopped in the middle of a mass of foot, that would have been tickets for the riders regardless of how expensive their equipment was.

[Jim Webster]

So it doesn't say that the Roman cavalry 'charged through' the infantry.

The key sentence is: 'P. Sulpicius with his cavalry broke the enemy's centre.'

In Latin: P. Sulpicius per mediam hostium aciem cum equitatu perrupit.

The keyword here is perrupit, from perrumpere, which means: 'to break or rush through; to force one's way through; to break though or force one's way through anything.'

Translating it as 'break' is inaccurate. The Roman cavalry definitely burst through the Volscian infantry centre then needed to decide whether they were going to break through it again and return to  their own lines or whether they would wait for the Roman infantry to attack the Volscians from the front whilst they attack them from the rear, turning the Volscians into a hamburger patty and defeating them in short order. The arrival of the Volscian and Aelan cavalry scotched that plan.

The passage makes clear that breaking through infantry does not rout them but disorders them, which disorder proves fatal in the ensuing infantry vs infantry fight.

And whatever formation the Roman cavalry adopted, the leading horsemen were going to have to punch their way individually through a lot of infantry, which they did with ease. I doubt equipment had anything to do with it since if the horses had been stopped in the middle of a mass of foot, that would have been tickets for the riders regardless of how expensive their equipment was.

I'll leave others to argue about the meaning of the words in Latin, but the fact that the infantry were reforming nearly as fast as the cavalry indicates that they weren't in a particularly bad way.
The problem with the source is that it is about 400 years adrift from the author, so getting too picky about what his words meant is a bit fruitless as he isn't describing something he'd seen.

What we have is a small force of cavalry breaks through the enemy infantry. We know Roman cavalry were supposed, on occasion, to have defeated enemy infantry that they couldn't charge because they'd pushed their way through the ranks of their own infantry to get into combat. There's nothing to say that this isn't what happened this time.
They could have forced their way through moving at a walking pace. Actually not too difficult if they're up against a javelin armed 'auxilia'
But the javelin armed auxilia weren't defeated by this and were reforming almost as fast as the cavalry (in spite of being engaged by Roman infantry to the front) Indeed it could be read that the cavalry had come in fast and the infantry had merely scattered to let them through and were reforming, leaving them for their own cavalry to deal with.
This would fit in with everything else in the text

The Roman cavalry then charge fiercely at the other cavalry, (but aren't mentioned even charging the infantry if we want to be particular with words)
They then attack the enemy infantry from the rear and the infantry line begins to 'waver' because this attack leaves the infantry 'disordered'
Livy doesn't mention that the previous attack disordered the infantry,it certainly didn't upset them as they were reforming.

[Patrick Waterson]

I suppose the question here is what we are trying to establish.

Is it that Roman cavalry could break through contemporary Italian infantry, which indicates the said infantry were not that great at stopping charging cavalry, or that the said infantry, despite being penetrated, rermained unbroken, which indicates they had morale proof against being broken by cavalry ploughing through their ranks? 

As far as I can see, the passage demonstrates both.  The Roman cavalry charge through the infantry centre of the Volsci and Aequi, albeit without breaking it.  Perrupit, from perrumpo, to break through, is a definite penetration verb, demonstrating that Livy's source clearly stated that the Roman cavalry ploughed through the infantry facing them - only to find themselves in a self-inflicted pickle which they overcame by heroism, quality, inspired leadership or whatever.  It could easily have gone the other way.

I do remember there are a number of occasions when Roman cavalry does this sort of charge directly against enemy infantry - at Cremona in 203 BC they do it to 'shake' the opposing Gauls.

If the question is how fast they were moving at contact, it would be more surprising if they could push through and break the enemy ranks at slow speed than at fast speed.  All of this anyway suggests that infantry opposition in Italy was not of hoplite quality, which in turn leads one to wonder what happened when Roman cavalry first encountered Greek hoplite infantry.

[Jim Webster]

I suppose the question here is what we are trying to establish.
which in turn leads one to wonder what happened when Roman cavalry first encountered Greek hoplite infantry.

Well Polybius wasn't particularly impressed by Roman Cavalry, and at Cannae they were so confident in their horsemanship they dismounted and fought on foot 

But by definition he was two centuries after the combat with the Volscians and a lot can change in 200 years. Look at how Hellenic cavalry changed from 450BC to 250BC

[Patrick Waterson]

But by definition he was two centuries after the combat with the Volscians and a lot can change in 200 years. Look at how Hellenic cavalry changed from 450BC to 250BC

That is true.  I get the impression that in the intervening centuries the Romans lost a fair bit of their previous elan and picked up a useful change of equipment, courtesy of the Greeks.  This suggests they did not do so well in their initial encounters with Greek cavalry.

Greek infantry might also have been something of a surprise to them.

[Jim Webster]

But by definition he was two centuries after the combat with the Volscians and a lot can change in 200 years. Look at how Hellenic cavalry changed from 450BC to 250BC

That is true.  I get the impression that in the intervening centuries the Romans lost a fair bit of their previous elan and picked up a useful change of equipment, courtesy of the Greeks.  This suggests they did not do so well in their initial encounters with Greek cavalry.

Greek infantry might also have been something of a surprise to them.

Part of the change could have been the infantry they had to deal with. Remember we're not dealing with large numbers of cavalry here so it might have been common practice to allow the cavalry through for your own cavalry to deal with (I remember reading something which said in Italy at one point cavalry seems to have been held back in the reserve.)
The other situation would be when the hillmen closed up to fight Roman infantry and under these circumstances the cavalry seem to have been told to push through their own infantry, so they'd fight with no real momentum and may even have been on foot

[valentinianvictor]

Professor Philip Rance has an excellent paper on this. Basically, infantry that stands firm and are prepared for a mounted charge will not be broken through. He cites a number of historical examples to illustrate this.

[Justin Swanton]

Professor Philip Rance has an excellent paper on this. Basically, infantry that stands firm and are prepared for a mounted charge will not be broken through. He cites a number of historical examples to illustrate this.

My take thus far is that spear-armed hoplites could stop javelin-armed cavalry by targeting the riders (there are several Greek vases showing a hoplite outreaching a horseman - he always goes for the rider) but sword- or javelin-armed infantry could not. This possibly suggests why the triarii were spear-armed - precisely to prevent enemy cavalry from penetrating the Roman lines.

My own impression is that missile weapons were pretty useless against fast-moving targets as it was impossible for the shooters to accurately calculate their missiles' flight trajectories with the target constantly closing the distance. So you needed effective melee weapons to stop cavalry.

Which also indicates why lance-armed cavalry were so dangerous against infantry - their lances could outreach the footmen's spears and neutralise the front ranks, allowing the cavalry to burst through the infantry lines before the rear ranks could do anything (KTB or not TB, that is the question..... )

A final note: this might suggest why chariots were good shock weapons against spear-armed infantry: the chariot riders were too far back to be targeted by the spearmen. It all points to spears held overarm not being especially good against horses (and why mediaeval pikemen and others held their pikes underarm and braced the butts in the ground).

[Erpingham]

Professor Philip Rance has an excellent paper on this. Basically, infantry that stands firm and are prepared for a mounted charge will not be broken through. He cites a number of historical examples to illustrate this.

Adrian, is this the Foulkon paper or another one?  We had some discussion of the Foulkon and Arrian's prototype earlier in the thread.

[valentinianvictor]

Rance appears to have expanded upon his paper as it's no longer available on the 'Net.

[Duncan Head]

Rance appears to have expanded upon his paper as it's no longer available on the 'Net.

It's still here.

[Dangun]

I do not understand what is being claimed/posited in this thread.

It is often unclear as to whether we are claiming that the infantry was defeated by melee from horseback, or defeated by "charging" which I assume we mean is the physical momentum of the horse.

Just as an example...

Which also indicates why lance-armed cavalry were so dangerous against infantry - their lances could outreach the footmen's spears and neutralise the front ranks, allowing the cavalry to burst through the infantry lines before the rear ranks could do anything.

The paragraph begins with talking about reach, which only makes sense from the perspective of melee. But then moves to bursting through which sounds like charging.

The thread seemed to begin with the claim that we could trade horse and rider for at least 8 infantry - a trade so incredibly profitable that a general would throw cavalry away all day for that result. Or is it now we are talking about effectively melee from horseback vs infantry.

[Patrick Waterson]

The thread seemed to begin with the claim that we could trade horse and rider for at least 8 infantry - a trade so incredibly profitable that a general would throw cavalry away all day for that result. Or is it now we are talking about effectively melee from horseback vs infantry.

From what I understand, it was outlining the problem faced by infantry because charging horses, or rather men on horses who are moving forward at any sort of useful speed, are incredibly difficult to stop without some sort of coordination by the men on foot.  It moved on to how that coordination could be achieved, which essentialy involves the infantry maintaining a formation and hence providing dynamic resistance; a bundle of sticks instead of a mass of single easily-snappable twigs.

Incidentally, I did not see anything to suggest a 'trade' of so many infantry per cavalryman; rather the observation from calculation that an average man on a average horse moving at speed has the capability to knock down 7-8 isolated men in quick succession unless the men on foot act together to resist such occurrences.  Hence the proposal that infantry formations acted as a counter to cavalry, and that the considerable depth of early formations gave way to the shallower depths of men who were better protected and coordinated.

Then there is the matter of equipment: even if one's infantry are effectively coordinated to resist the onset of cavalry (which in Greece usually did not mean outright physical contact), is this still effective if the cavalry's weaponry significantly outreaches that of the infantry, transferring the knockdown capability from the impact of the mount to the impact of the lance tip?

If an infantry formation is disrupted by a succession of lance-tips, or indeed any other cause, it can, and presumably does, degrade the infantry to the default state of ordinary men on foot contacted by men on horseback, i.e. uncoordinated individuals easily knocked down or pushed aside.

It is often unclear as to whether we are claiming that the infantry was defeated by melee from horseback, or defeated by "charging" which I assume we mean is the physical momentum of the horse.

Maybe because it is a case of 'both and' rather than 'either or'?  The charge breaks, or is intended to break, the infantry into a mass of individual targets.  This is achieved through a combination of psychology, physical intervention (e.g. lance tips) and a cohesive formation prevailing over a crumbling formation (the cavalry do need their formation; an individual rider ploughing into an infantry unit has a short life expectancy as soon as he slows or is slowed down).  Striking down infantrymen may be part of breaking the formation, or the formation may break at contact, allowing the cavalry to strike down infantry without fear of effective retaliation.  This killing will happen before, during and after the infantry disintegrate (assuming they do) so can be considered part-cause and part-effect of the infantry formation's disintegration.

For obvious reasons it is difficult to get re-enactors to help clear up the finer - or even the broader - points regarding this.

[Justin Swanton]

I do not understand what is being claimed/posited in this thread.

It is often unclear as to whether we are claiming that the infantry was defeated by melee from horseback, or defeated by "charging" which I assume we mean is the physical momentum of the horse.

Just as an example...

Which also indicates why lance-armed cavalry were so dangerous against infantry - their lances could outreach the footmen's spears and neutralise the front ranks, allowing the cavalry to burst through the infantry lines before the rear ranks could do anything.

The paragraph begins with talking about reach, which only makes sense from the perspective of melee. But then moves to bursting through which sounds like charging.

The thread seemed to begin with the claim that we could trade horse and rider for at least 8 infantry - a trade so incredibly profitable that a general would throw cavalry away all day for that result. Or is it now we are talking about effectively melee from horseback vs infantry.

Cavalry had different ways of attacking infantry, and the idea of the thread is to examine how the infantry dealt with the various categories of mounted assaults.

• Heavily armoured cavalry like cataphracts charged infantry then hung around to melee, keeping in formation and deploying in close order so the infantry couldn't surround them.


• Lance-armed Macedonian heavy cavalry and mid-Republican cavalry would charge straight through enemy infantry, delivering a shock charge but not stopping to melee.


• Other cavalry move up in a charge then break off immediately, adopting an open formation to enable horses to retire down their file gaps or otherwise just breaking off as a unit. If a charge was successful in routing the infantry then the cavalry would not break off but press the attack. This seems to have been the case for the Norman knights at Hastings.

How did infantry deal with charges? Several techniques:

• Deploy in very deep lines. Since a horse could smash through only so many infantry ranks before being brought to a halt (with fatal consequences for the rider) it makes sense to use deep formations with 20 or more ranks. The advantage of this is that is requires no additional training of the infantry. Raw recruits - like the conscript armies of the Fertile Crescent - could stand on the battlefield confident the enemy chariots or cavalry would (probably) not charge them provided they simply stood their ground.


• Use weapons effectively. This was done either by fixing the butt-end of a spear in the ground or by using very long spears or pikes. Spears fixed in the ground stopped the horse dead in its tracks (hopefully), whilst long spears or pikes killed the rider before his own weapon could kill the infantryman. A combination of long spears/pikes and butt-ends in ground would be especially effective.


• Bunch up, creating a compact mass a horse could not smash through. This seems to have been the method of the fulkon, which also added spear-in-ground to its anti-cavalry repertoire.

Dealing with cavalry willing to melee seems to have involved the infantry keeping their nerve and getting close and personal with the horsemen, as they could then fight them on more equal terms.

[Erpingham]

Couple of points.

Do we know that only "Lance-armed Macedonian heavy cavalry and mid-Republican cavalry" aimed to break through enemy infantry without melee?  It seems to me we lack evidence on the matter.  From the dark days of the "KTB wedge" debate, I recall we have very few detailed examples of the interaction of Macedonian cavalry and infantry, so this emphasis seems strange.  And what is the purpose of the break through?  Is it just an attempt to break up the formation that has had the good fortune to break through, rather than get bogged down, rather than a completely separate tactic?