Why would non-flanked formations rout?

[aligern]

Tough times at Dotheboys Hall Aaron. I was so bad at Rugby that the players welcomed my non attendance. There was no great animus against non participants, especially if you would run the line as a touch judge.
Roy

[Prufrock]

No, no animus if a person is off field, but if you were on field and didn't participate, it was different

[Justin Swanton]

If Justin were to see Patrick fall then he girds himself to step forward. into the breach  :-)) .

He who fights and runs away
Can count on his retirement pay. 

[Prufrock]

If Justin were to see Patrick fall then he girds himself to step forward. into the breach  :-)) .

He who fights and runs away
Can count on his retirement pay. 

You just have to avoid mum and all that with it or on it shield nonsense

[Prufrock]

But the larger point is that Roy is right, and young people playing sport is probably not a good comparison.

[Erpingham]

Just the usual caveat that traditional British sporting behaviour is a cultural phenomenon and other cultures may do things differently.

However, the idea that some men are braver than others is probably not in question. How that manifests in war may depend on a lot of factors - as Roy has said, the unit (or the group) is key.  So if your hero just dashes off and does his own thing he may not contribute a lot.  But if there is a structure, not necessarily a formal hierarchy, the brave can motivate the less brave.

Part of the answer to the "why units rout under pressure" question is probably to be found in social nature of units.  More modern psychological studies, for example, identify that not letting your mates down is a powerful motivator.  So is not being seen to be a coward (which isn't the same as being seen as brave).  So is playing the role expected of you, which may have been a more powerful motivator in some societies than our own. 

[Imperial Dave]

which links nicely into the old mantra 'the family that plays together stays together' ie in terms of the unit 'family' if you train, eat sleep and fight with the same people for long enough you develop deep bonds with them and will fight more collectively than say newly raised units, unfamiliar troops banded together etc. This will also have a bearing on what certain units may or may not do when faced with unexpected battlefield traumas

[Erpingham]

Time for an in-period quote to demonstrate this isn't just a modern view

You love your comrade so much in war. When you see your quarrel is just and your blood is fighting well, tears rise to your eyes. A great sweet feeling of love and pity fills your heart on seeing your friend so valiantly exposing his body to execute and accomplish the command of our Creator. And then you prepare to go and live or die with him and for love not to abandon him. And out of that there arises such delectation, that he who has not tasted it is not fit to say what a delight is. Do you think that a man who does that fears death? Not at all: for he feels strengthened, he is so elated he does not know where he is. Truly he is afraid of nothing. 
The Jouvencel by Jean de Bueil.

Sounds romantic but de Beuil was a career soldier and ultimately Admiral of France.

[Prufrock]

Time for an in-period quote to demonstrate this isn't just a modern view

You love your comrade so much in war. When you see your quarrel is just and your blood is fighting well, tears rise to your eyes. A great sweet feeling of love and pity fills your heart on seeing your friend so valiantly exposing his body to execute and accomplish the command of our Creator. And then you prepare to go and live or die with him and for love not to abandon him. And out of that there arises such delectation, that he who has not tasted it is not fit to say what a delight is. Do you think that a man who does that fears death? Not at all: for he feels strengthened, he is so elated he does not know where he is. Truly he is afraid of nothing. 
The Jouvencel by Jean de Bueil.

Sounds romantic but de Beuil was a career soldier and ultimately Admiral of France.

Nice quote, Anthony. It does seem to be a recurring theme. Does everyone feel this way though, or is it the preserve of those who love the fight, and the rest pay lip service to it?

[Erpingham]

Does everyone feel this way though, or is it the preserve of those who love the fight, and the rest pay lip service to it?

It is, of course, hard to say, because not many other soldiers wrote their views down.  But the chivalrous classes operated within a world view where their military function was fundamental and their expectations of themselves and others may have been along these lines, even if they thought them aspirational rather than practical.

[Imperial Dave]

Battlefields have always been and will remain nasty atrtional places and soldiers from any age soon learn that banding together and looking after each other is the best way to survive
The longer they were together the stronger  this thought became

[Prufrock]

Does everyone feel this way though, or is it the preserve of those who love the fight, and the rest pay lip service to it?

It is, of course, hard to say, because not many other soldiers wrote their views down.  But the chivalrous classes operated within a world view where their military function was fundamental and their expectations of themselves and others may have been along these lines, even if they thought them aspirational rather than practical.

Battlefields have always been and will remain nasty atrtional places and soldiers from any age soon learn that banding together and looking after each other is the best way to survive
The longer they were together the stronger  this thought became

Absolutely agree. But this is the stuff that keeps people in place: Justin's asking what it is that, despite all this, can make people such as these run. Quite a fascinating question. 

[Justin Swanton]

Correct me if I'm wrong, but thus far the consensus seems to be that, in the absence of unexpected events like death of general, flank attack, etc., it is the performance of the file leader (and his second should he die) that determines whether the morale of the men behind them holds or cracks. If the first and second man of a file goes down before the gorilla(s) in the opposing enemy file(s), man No. 3 will be very reluctant to pitch in as he knows he will in all probability be outfought. In a looser formation like a legionary line, this translates into him falling back, seeking protection within his own line.

In a more compact formation like a shieldwall it translates into the same thing, breaking the shieldwall and leaving the files leaders on either side of him exposed - especially the file leader on his left. Those file leaders give way in their turn, falling back to the man who recoiled first in order to recreate the shieldwall. But then he falls back again.....and the soldiers start getting the idea that the line can't hold against the enemy.

With a phalanx engaged in othismos (presuming that othismos is a thing) none of this applies of course. The hoplites keep shoving until one phalanx is pushed back and becomes disordered, eventually breaking. Though there are some cases of phalanx lines getting pushed back quite a distance without breaking. I suppose in the other cases the men of a phalanx decide to cut and run if they see they're getting outpushed - no point carrying on.

[Erpingham]

Correct me if I'm wrong, but thus far the consensus seems to be that, in the absence of unexpected events like death of general, flank attack, etc., it is the performance of the file leader (and his second should he die) that determines whether the morale of the men behind them holds or cracks. If the first and second man of a file goes down before the gorilla(s) in the opposing enemy file(s), man No. 3 will be very reluctant to pitch in as he knows he will in all probability be outfought.

Talking of files and positions in them may be too rigid.  The key is the loss of the leaders and "figures of inspiration" - the men you would turn to in a crisis.  A barbarian comitatus may not have files and file leaders but it would still have these.  We have talked of surprise and the unexpected.  We might also consider shock caused by casualties and the rate at which they were suffered.   If we look at Captain Naumann's Regiments Kriegspiel based on analysis of casualties in the FPW, the rate at which casualties are suffered has an impact.  Rapid losses are harder to take than gradual ones.

[Imperial Dave]

good points Anthony. Not all formations are equal and we must take into account those differences and how they translate into reaction to battlefield pressure