The bow (ehrmm...CRESCENT) at Cannae

[Erpingham]

I think Jim has a good point.  This goes back to our "D" class infantry discussion.  If we take stereotypical Romans and stereotypical Gauls then we are doing it wrong.  These are raw Romans and veteran Gauls. The gauls are quite well controlled and cohesive, the Romans struggle with anything but the basics.  How differently the Gauls fought to their tribal traditions is probably moot - we know that wild charging, big sword swinging, easily knackered barbarians weren't the whole story.  But certainly playing about with the usual list descriptions of troops in this battle may make it easier to refight.

[Prufrock]

Cannae is one of those battles that you read about so much that you almost absorb it by osmosis. That familiarity notwithstanding, it does seem to be relatively straightforward, especially when you take into account the fact that in the previous two large-scale clashes between Hannibal and Rome a portion of the Roman heavy infantry had managed to break through and make good its escape.

This time around Hannibal didn't want that to happen again, so he devised a plan which would draw the Roman infantry forward in such a way as to crowd them together, allow him to fall on their flanks with his best troops, and give himself the best chance of inflicting maximum damage and casualties.

I quite like Delbruck's account of it, actually.

[Imperial Dave]

Seriously are we looking at it from the wrong side.

I have no problem with the Carthaginian army, including Spanish and Gauls, being decent regular heavy infantry who'd been constantly under arms for well over a year

The Romans on the other hand?

How about the Romans were a pretty poorly trained and motivated militia, a lot of whom had no combat experience, which is why their commanders decided to keep them in deep columns and just send them forwards.
Hannibal knew enough about the quality of the army that he faced to know that if he pinned them, they were probably competent to roll forward but would probably be a nightmare to stop and even worse to turn or expand

When we had the discussion about Cannae on the DBMM list I suggested that rather with creating Gauls as Regular auxiliaries you ought to start with legionaries being Horde superior

And no, I'm not bitter

a good point re the Roman infantry Jim and one I had not considered previously. If the Roman infantry was made up of mainly newly raised troops this could help explain Hannibal's thinking or at least the outcome of the formations when they clash

[Mark G]

I'm still trying to understand why everyone views the Numidians as incapable of fighting like heavy cavalry.

They seem to do it a lot, and be placed where heavy cavalry would be placed a lot, almost as often as they are used for light cavalry duties when they are not in North Africa.

[Justin Swanton]

I think Jim has a good point.  This goes back to our "D" class infantry discussion.  If we take stereotypical Romans and stereotypical Gauls then we are doing it wrong.  These are raw Romans and veteran Gauls. The gauls are quite well controlled and cohesive, the Romans struggle with anything but the basics.  How differently the Gauls fought to their tribal traditions is probably moot - we know that wild charging, big sword swinging, easily knackered barbarians weren't the whole story.  But certainly playing about with the usual list descriptions of troops in this battle may make it easier to refight.

I would posit that Roman infantry - unlike phalangites - didn't need much training. Working on the legion deploying in continuous open-order lines and not compact maniples with maniple-wide gaps means that all a recruit had to learn was a) how to form a file, b) how to deploy in open order (this actually is not necessary if the velites' files are intercalced with those of the heavy foot - when the velites advance to skirmish the heavy foot are left in open order), and c) how to double from open to intermediate order, a simple process.

And we are back to line relief but what can I do?

[Justin Swanton]

I'm still trying to understand why everyone views the Numidians as incapable of fighting like heavy cavalry.

They seem to do it a lot, and be placed where heavy cavalry would be placed a lot, almost as often as they are used for light cavalry duties when they are not in North Africa.

It's just that they were never mixed with medium cavalry types that themselves were combined without a problem. This suggests, not that they couldn't fight heavier cavalry (they kept the Roman right flank cavalry guard at bay) but that they didn't fight in the same way as medium cav.

[Erpingham]

I would posit that Roman infantry - unlike phalangites - didn't need much training.

Even if this were so (I hear the shade of Vegetius wailing), it just means that the best they can hope for is the basics.  Perhaps more critical is their lack of combat experience vis-a-vis Hannibal's army.  If troops have neither been trained how to perform nor experienced action, they are doubly disadvantaged.

[Mark G]

To me it suggests they were deployed in sufficient numbers to not need anyone else

[Justin Swanton]

I would posit that Roman infantry - unlike phalangites - didn't need much training.

Even if this were so (I hear the shade of Vegetius wailing), it just means that the best they can hope for is the basics.  Perhaps more critical is their lack of combat experience vis-a-vis Hannibal's army.  If troops have neither been trained how to perform nor experienced action, they are doubly disadvantaged.

Sure, I mean training in executing manoeuvres. Once they formed up in a triplex acies that was it - they advanced, executed line relief if necessary, and did nothing else. The point is that line relief - the essential item in a legionary's repertoire - was a simple manoeuvre to learn. And most of the time it was all that was necessary.

It was only veterans like Scipio's troops that could do the fancy stuff as at Ilipa and Zama (and Flaminius' troops at Cynoscephalae). The legions at Cannae were about as trained in formation and manoeuvring as citizen hoplites. They seem to have fought well enough though.

[nikgaukroger]

I would posit that Roman infantry - unlike phalangites - didn't need much training.

Even if this were so (I hear the shade of Vegetius wailing), it just means that the best they can hope for is the basics.  Perhaps more critical is their lack of combat experience vis-a-vis Hannibal's army.  If troops have neither been trained how to perform nor experienced action, they are doubly disadvantaged.

Yeah, I think the statement is way to generalised and somewhat putting the cart before the horse in terms of what was possible.

At Cannae the legionarii were very raw so it would have been very foolish to try anything even slightly sophisticated with them (and the Romans did not try) - and the same would apply to any other troops as raw. If they were more experienced you can be more sophisticated as, say, Scipio demonstrates. The Romans in general seem to have been quite keen on significant training of troops before combat - its a bit later time but look at the way Caesar kept his newer legions away from combat to begin with.

Given how the Romans approached this battle I wonder if they even tried to use their normal legionarii tactics in any way, shape or form or just went for a very deep sledgehammer with zero subtlety (which I think is what is suggested) - and in a refight you wouldn't classify them in the way you might normally.

[RichT]

The idea that the Celts (and Iberians) necessarily were still in place (or that a second line of them was still in place) is obviously appealing (else why didn't the Romans just escape?) but it isn't what Polybius says:

"For a short time the Iberian and Celtic lines stood their ground and fought gallantly; but presently overpowered by the weight of the heavy-armed lines, they gave way and retired to the rear, thus breaking up the crescent. The Roman maniples followed with spirit, and easily cut their way through the enemy's line ... The Romans, however, going in pursuit of these troops, and hastily closing in towards the centre and the part of the enemy which was giving ground, advanced so far, that the Libyan heavy-armed troops on either wing got on their flanks ...  Thus it came about, as Hannibal had planned, that the Romans were caught between two hostile lines of Libyans — thanks to their impetuous pursuit of the Celts. Still they fought, though no longer in line, yet singly, or in maniples, which faced about to meet those who charged them on the flanks ... [Hasdrubal] hastened to the part of the field where the infantry were engaged, and brought his men up to support the Libyans. Then, by charging the Roman legions on the rear, and harassing them by hurling squadron after squadron upon them at many points at once, he raised the spirits of the Libyans, and dismayed and depressed those of the Romans."

All of which, strictly speaking, suggests that the Celts/Iberians weren't a factor at this point and the victory was down to the Libyans and the cavalry. The Celts/Iberians might have rallied once the Libyans attacked - but Polybius doesn't say so. Why didn't more Romans escape as they had at Trebia? I'd rather just accept that we don't know than make up an explanation (but I expect it has to do with the events on a real battlefield being more complex and chaotic than a few hundred word account, or a diagram, or a wargame, make them seem).

Roman quality - absolutely, I think they should rate as very low quality, a hastily levied militia, with little more in their favour than innate Roman bloodlust (to indulge a stereotype).

'Roman line relief' - if it consists of both a fighting withdrawal in the face of the enemy, and a simultaneous passage of lines - would be one of the most difficult, complicated and dangerous manoeuvres in military history, and I'm sure would be beyond a completely untrained militia (I don't know if the Romans at Cannae were completely untrained). I suspect therefore that the Romans didn't attempt their usual manoeuvres, and this is why they formed unusually deep (the usual procedure for poor quality infantry), and with smaller than usual gaps between maniples (which suggests they weren't planning any line relief).

I don't believe Hannibal could have foreseen exactly how the Romans would act, least of all the further closing in toward the centre, and may have intended his African infantry to defeat the Roman flanks, then envelop, and that the Roman bunching to the centre was an added bonus. I'm also not convinced by the common depiction of the Libyans in column, not least because I can't find anything in Polybius to suggest that they were.

[Jim Webster]

I would posit that Roman infantry - unlike phalangites - didn't need much training.

Even if this were so (I hear the shade of Vegetius wailing), it just means that the best they can hope for is the basics.  Perhaps more critical is their lack of combat experience vis-a-vis Hannibal's army.  If troops have neither been trained how to perform nor experienced action, they are doubly disadvantaged.

Yeah, I think the statement is way to generalised and somewhat putting the cart before the horse in terms of what was possible.

At Cannae the legionarii were very raw so it would have been very foolish to try anything even slightly sophisticated with them (and the Romans did not try) - and the same would apply to any other troops as raw. If they were more experienced you can be more sophisticated as, say, Scipio demonstrates. The Romans in general seem to have been quite keen on significant training of troops before combat - its a bit later time but look at the way Caesar kept his newer legions away from combat to begin with.

Given how the Romans approached this battle I wonder if they even tried to use their normal legionarii tactics in any way, shape or form or just went for a very deep sledgehammer with zero subtlety (which I think is what is suggested) - and in a refight you wouldn't classify them in the way you might normally.

Just to add that hastily trained phalanxes (That of Mithridates and also, from memory, the Achaeans,) actually fought well and took experienced legionaries to beat them.
So I'm not sure it is a road we can usefully go down

[Andreas Johansson]

depth was of no use in mounted engagements.

This clearly can't be quite true, or multi-rank formations wouldn't be standard throughout history.

[Imperial Dave]

depth was of no use in mounted engagements.

This clearly can't be quite true, or multi-rank formations wouldn't be standard throughout history.

although here I think we have to clarify whether we means multi-ranks to give relief/support or 'othismos' type momentum

[Andreas Johansson]

although here I think we have to clarify whether we means multi-ranks to give relief/support or 'othismos' type momentum

You give me little choice but to invoke the Strategicon again ...

As we've discussed in various O-word threads, Maurice notes that unlike infantry, rear-rank cavalrymen cannot push on the ranks in front. Nevertheless, he insists that cavalry needs to be at least five ranks deep - albeit noting that in the good old days when men were real men and goats were nervous, four was enough - and that weaker units need more ranks, up to ten.

He also insists that it be employed in multiple lines, at least two and preferably three, so he sees utility in total depths of up to thirty ranks.

(Even greater line depths have been advocated by others; Nicephorus Phocas would have his cataphracts - who were surely not in any sense weak troops - twelve deep, and in the Northern Seven Years War Swedish regulations called for cavalry to be no less than fifteen deep, irrespective of quality.)

As for the purpose of the depth, the 2nd to 4th ranks can, Maurice implies, reach the enemy with their lances, as well as shoot effectively. This, of course, may not be very relevant to Cannae, where cavalry had no bows, and, I believe, rather shorter spears than what Maurice is implying (a lance that can reach past three ranks of horses is pretty damn long!). The later ranks, he makes it sound like, are mostly there to have somewhere to put men who are not up to fighting at the front. This is presumably not the whole story - if it were, why bring these guys along at all?