Missile weapon ranges in WoR Terry Wise

[Dangun]

Notice there's nothing the passage about the French getting disordered by the arrow fire.

Maybe...
But the bit about, "closely pressed against one another," implies that this is not what was intended. Is that disorder?

so closely pressed one against another that none of them could lift their arms to strike their enemies, except some that were in front, and these fiercely pricked with the lances which they had shortened to be more stiff, and to get nearer their enemies.

[Justin Swanton]

Notice there's nothing the passage about the French getting disordered by the arrow fire.

Maybe...
But the bit about, "closely pressed against one another," implies that this is not what was intended. Is that disorder?

so closely pressed one against another that none of them could lift their arms to strike their enemies, except some that were in front, and these fiercely pricked with the lances which they had shortened to be more stiff, and to get nearer their enemies.

Yes, but not by the arrows. I think the general idea is that the narrowing battlefield obliged the French to press together.  Either that or the English archers were shooting from the flanks and the French instinctively moved away from them towards the centre. either way this was a fortuitous once-off. In other battles, arrow fire may slow or even stop an advance but there's no evidence as far as I know that it turns ordered ranks and files into a jumbled mass.

[Erpingham]

Yes, but not by the arrows.

I don't think you can discount the archery, even if its not explicitly referenced. After all, the vast majority of the English archery is coming at them from the flanks.
The French van, for those who wish to count the disorder factors, had to advance on a narrow front across a muddy field while being shot at by large numbers of archers, at the same time has having some of their cavalry routing into them .  If this were not enough, their following main battle collided with their rear ranks.  So, although it doesn't explicitly say they were disordered, I think we accept they were not in parade ground order.

[RichT]

Also depends what you mean by 'disorder'. It's one of those nasty little military history words that gets chucked about without anyone being clear what it means. Justin's only accepted meaning for it seems to be 'had their neat ranks and files messed up'  (would they have been in neat ranks and files?) but (to me) 'disorder' can also encompass being killed and wounded, being slowed down or sped up, being forced to move in some not-entirely-voluntary way, being psychologically shaken etc. etc. So just because Wavrin doesn't say "Les Français étaient désordonnés par les flèches" you can't say they weren't disordered - it is implicit in his account.

[simonw]

Since the 'invention' of 'organised' warfare, archery has been used if available; from the Akkadians, through Assyrians, Persians, Indians, Huns, Sassanians, Byzantines to Mediaeval times. 

Why is this? What effects did archery have that made it so attractive/valuable? Was it the inflicting of 'mass casualties' in a 'shock' effect or  attrition over  more extended periods of time? Was it its effectiveness on the 'open battlefield' or its use for the defence of fortifications. Or was it all of these?

Well personally, I can't think of many situations where simply inflicting 'mass casualties' alone led to the destruction of an opponent.   Ramses III against the Libyans perhaps.

Archery was certainly used to 'goad' opponents into rash advances. The Mongols were expert at this. Agincourt may also be an example.

More commonly, it seems that archery was most successfully employed in combination with other (non=archer) melee 'shock' troops.  Charges could be 'shot-in' or archery could 'soften up' a target for the 'charge' to finish it off.

Then there were 'Sparabara' troops (Assyrians and Persians). How effective were these? Were they only defensive formations or attack-support troops? Were they expected to actually stop, merely by missile fire, the enemy formations from actually closing for melee. (Didin't seem to work against Hoplites) or 'disrupt' enemy formations for 'others' to finish off (Assyrian chariotry for instance).

My personal interpretation is that history' suggests that archery was really only truly 'decisive' when used 'in combination' with other, close combat troops. Archers alone (foot or mounted) were not normally successful in defeating aggressive and reasonably trained and equipped opponents (though there are exceptions).

So what were the actual archery effects that enabled the success of 'combined arms' tactics? The morale effect of 'goading' an opponent into a rash and perhaps disorganised charge such as the Mongols' effects against eastern European Mediaeval knights is a good example, so I don't think that the potential for significant effect on 'morale' is particularly controversial.

What about the 'softening up' of a target by archery for other 'close combat' troops to successfully charge and defeat? How was this achieved? It seems to me that this wasn't always achieved over extended periods of time. There are some examples (Crassus' disastrous eastern campaigns and even Hastings). Often though, it seems that the archery effect was achieved over a relatively short period of time such that it can also be classed as a 'shock' effect in itself.

What was this 'shock' effect? Well, I can only really see it as a the inflicting of a sufficient number of casualties to 'disrupt the cohesion' of a target unit prior to its being successfully charged (by others). Edward I was an exponent of these tactics. The key phrase here is 'disrupt the cohesion'. This is my interpretation but I think that the historical evidence implies that this effect must have been a potentially significant and decisive factor in many ancient battles where archery was employed.

Therefore, I would contend that wargames rules need not to over-emphasize the actual 'killing power' of archery but rather they  must reflect the morale and 'disruption' effects of archery on target bodies of troops that made them vulnerable to attacks/charges and the consequent melees.

[Erpingham]

Therefore, I would contend that wargames rules need not to over-emphasize the actual 'killing power' of archery but rather they  must reflect the morale and 'disruption' effects of archery on target bodies of troops that made them vulnerable to attacks/charges and the consequent melees.

Which, of course, returns us to what effect are we measuring when we say casualty and does it matter?  If we take a unit perspective in the abstract game sense, whether combat effectivness is impacted by men dying, men getting hurt, men soiling their underwear or skulking at the back doesn't matter - its whether unit A impairs the effectiveness of unit B, by how much and how permanently.  In my experience , rules usually use "casualties" as permanent attrition on effectivness and adjustments to combat factors to represent temporary effects (like the old WRG half effect for disorder or -2 charged in flank).

[Justin Swanton]

Also depends what you mean by 'disorder'. It's one of those nasty little military history words that gets chucked about without anyone being clear what it means. Justin's only accepted meaning for it seems to be 'had their neat ranks and files messed up'  (would they have been in neat ranks and files?) but (to me) 'disorder' can also encompass being killed and wounded, being slowed down or sped up, being forced to move in some not-entirely-voluntary way, being psychologically shaken etc. etc. So just because Wavrin doesn't say "Les Français étaient désordonnés par les flèches" you can't say they weren't disordered - it is implicit in his account.

So we need to define our terms.

For me 'disorder' is the opposite of 'order,' and 'order' in a military context means a structured formation. I think a minimum of structure is essential for anything larger than a street mob having a brawl. A large unformed crowd is a danger to its members since they can be easily crushed into helplessness or worse, as Agincourt demonstrated. For a soldier to fight effectively he needs the right amount of space - just enough on his flanks so he can wield his weapons but without being attacked from the sides, and enough behind him so he can give way if necessary (every form of hand-to-hand combat I can find underlines the necessity of being able to recoil from an opponent's blows - if you are backed against a wall you are at a serious disadvantage no matter what your weapon). The way to achieve all this with a large body of men to form up in files. This enables the front men, who do the fighting, to determine how much lateral space they need. It also enables the men behind them to back up if necessary and give them the necessary recoil space. I think this applied even to tribal armies. There are several mentions of Gallic infantry forming phalanxes which implies some kind of structure.

A short burst of archer fire won't disorder a structured formation, but over a longer period of time it might, especially if the infantry is being shot at from different sides. The men instinctively back away from arrows coming from different directions and the formation's structure breaks up.

My own feeling however is that archery fire is principally demoralising in the short term, as it subjects infantry to danger of death without the infantry being able to do anything about it. Their feeling of helplessness very easily translates into heightened fear and even panic, and makes them less resolute when they finally engage in hand-to-hand combat.

In most gaming systems disorder and morale probably equate in effect and don't need to be represented by separate mechanisms, but they do have different causes. Bad terrain disorders troops but doesn't demoralise them. Fighting a superior opponent demoralises troops but doesn't necessarily disorder them.

[simonw]

I interpret unit cohesion to affected by 3 main elements as follows (excl. 'fatigue'):

a. Morale: a unit must have a certain morale level to act coherently in accordance with its orders

b. Physical disruption:  the cohesion of a unit can be 'physically' disrupted by moving over difficult terrain, interpenetration etc.

c. Casualties: the cohesion of a unit can be disrupted by receiving a high rate of casualties causing gaps in the ranks (requiring to be re-filled) as well as also a 'trip hazard' if the unit is moving as well as individuals being physical hampered by wounds and so unable to move at the same rate as the rest. (This also factors into 1. and 2.)

These 3 elements can either be combined into a single measure (e.g. no. of hits) OR monitored discretely. It depends on the game.

An example of a very simple (non archery) effect which could lead to 'disruption' of the cohesion of a unit is having a unit which has been advancing quickly for a couple of turns suddenly halt. I see this done routinely in virtually every game I play but if you think about it, to suddenly halt from a rapid advance towards the enemy (unless ordered onto a particular position), would in my opinion, have potential to  significantly impact morale. What has changed? What has gone wrong? Have we been outflanked?  Why? Uncertainty.

For this last reason, I would suggest that combining all three of the above factors into a single measure is perhaps going too far. There are no doubt other examples of 'non-casualty' related influences that would be 'missed' from a game if the 'unit cohesion' was solely measured by means of casualties carried.

With respect to the influence of archery therefore, then it seems to me that missile fire can influence all 3 of the criteria (of unit cohesion) that I describe (casualties, morale, physical disruption). Therefore, it is potentially an extremely useful 'weapon'. That's maybe why it was so widely employed and for so long.

[Paul_Glover]

An example of a very simple (non archery) effect which could lead to 'disruption' of the cohesion of a unit is having a unit which has been advancing quickly for a couple of turns suddenly halt. I see this done routinely in virtually every game I play but if you think about it, to suddenly halt from a rapid advance towards the enemy (unless ordered onto a particular position), would in my opinion, have potential to  significantly impact morale. What has changed? What has gone wrong? Have we been outflanked?  Why? Uncertainty.

From a re-enactors perspective - manoeuvring with up to 3000 troops, each manoeuvre element is briefed as to the key features of what to expect, and what the plan is.  So an advance followed by a halt has a purpose and it has risks and those involved understand both of these.  An example of this being the forlorn hope, tasked to make a nuisance of itself in order to shield manoeuvre and perceptions of manoeuvre behind its location.  Other elements will poise to give the sense that it is not alone, but the 'real plan' is probably unfolding somewhere else.

[simonw]

Pual,
Yes; exactly. But what happens in games is that players react to a 'new' (and maybe unforeseen) situation that has arisen by halting their unit that has previously been advancing quickly towards the enemy. Now this is a voluntary reaction on behalf of the player but where is the 'penalty' in relation to the morale/cohesion/disorder effects on the unit involved?

Similarly, whether halted Or advancing, suddenly coming under (unexpectedly) heavy missile fire is also potentially going to have a significant effect.
Cheers
Simon

[aligern]

A couple of points
1). Earlier it was mentioned that Greek hoplites moved to contact with the Persian sparabara. That is true, and it compromised the Persian tactical system, but it was most likely  an unusual event until the Greeks did it.  Herodotus  tells us that Marathon was the first time that Greeks ran at the Persians. That implies that the  Ionian Greeks had stood or moved slowly against the Persians, thus spending longer under the arrow storm. Given the Persian predilection for decimal  units  I suggest that bow units are ten men deep potential strike around 24  shots per hoplite target , meanwhile the Persians are  winning the cavalry battle on the flanks .
The Persians most usual enemies were other bow armies such as Babylonians  or Egyptians who were no keener to close , at least until the archery duel had been devided. Steppe opponent were difficult, but Sakae did not have sufficient striking power to charge tgrough a ten deep line and a bow duel would be expensive in horses.
2) I am firmly convinced that order and teamwork are vital to military effectiveness. In two  Roman defeats damaging disorder is reported as a main cause, Cannae  and Adrianople.  In both of which being crushed together  and unable to use their weapons properly are  causes for the extreme defeat. At Carrhae the cataphracts charges force the legionaries into close proximity and prevent tgem defending themselves properly.  I do wonder if the nature of the wargamer's  representation of units as say 24 spearmen all looking the same and at the same  angle, all neatly spaced and aligned, does not show the substructure within the  larger unit. The Greek hoplites had, for example specialist file leaders and closers who may have worn more effective armour . Within the file  was ( in some armies at least)  a younger man trained to run out and deal with annoying peltasts. The second man in the file had a role that involved direct combat and protection of the file leader,  The other chaps  in the ranks certainly had roles, though perhaps less crucial on a good day. The men in the file will have had specific drills that worked together to maximise their effect. The Romans will have had similar team relationships. Apparently casualties amongst centurions were high in hard fought battles. I wonder if this was due to some specific style of fighting  in which centurions took the lead and the effort was organised around them. Were men assigned roles in relationship to this? Certainly if your fighting method depends on the heroic efforts of a front rank leader and you are attacked from the rear he is in the wrong place.. In Vking and Saxon armies of tge tenth and eleventh centuries I would see the relationship between spearmen, axemen  and indeed archers as a drilled and trained method.Similarly in medieval armies with combined units of spearmen, two handed weapon users and swordsmen had roles and positions for each weapon. Order, for me is the ability for the men to operate with their appropriate weapons in their correct positions, with the space to perform properly.  Disorder is not being able to. work the unit effectively.  It might be because a rear attack has keft key warriors in the wrong place, or that the unit has been so crushed together that men cannot use their weapons properly , or that combat casualties, quite possibly of tge best men, have rendered the unit ineffective .  The importance of disorder is it consequence, the reduction  in fighting ability of the unit. Thus a morale collapse could cause disorder if it so unhinged the group that their ability to resist collapsed.  Similarly, for exhaustion, where I believe the Romans were so much better trained and disciplined that they could allow the enemy to exhaust themselves and then slaughter them .
Massed bowfire would kill some enemy, but the effect of many 'punches' delivered on an opposing warrior who also has to trudge across a muddy field in armour or carrying a heavy shield and the loss of order in that men would fall behind and the team lose its shape would  cause 'disorder' and a resultant loss of fighting power.
Roy

[simonw]

Roy,
Pretty much the way I see things too.
Cheers
Simon

[RichT]

Justin:

So we need to define our terms. For me 'disorder' is the opposite of 'order,' and 'order' in a military context means a structured formation.

Fair enough - but it looks to me as if Roy and others are using 'disorder' more in the sense I am using it - to degrade the fighting ability of a unit or formation, potentially in a number of different ways. When you say "the archers didn't disorder the French" that sounds nonsense to me - of course they did, by my definition. But if you mean "the archers didn't impair the neat rank and file structure of the French" that may be true (though I wonder again if there's any evidence they had a neat rank and file structure, and also whether you can have men falling dead and wounded, men halted or 'pushed back', men lowering their heads against the storm, without also impairing the neat rank and file structure).

every form of hand-to-hand combat I can find underlines the necessity of being able to recoil from an opponent's blows - if you are backed against a wall you are at a serious disadvantage no matter what your weapon

Absolutely, I agree. But then what about o.... Auuugghh no! Don't ask! Don't go there!      

In games terms you'll be astonished to hear I'd favour bundling disorder, demoralisation, casualties etc all up into one status.

Roy's post suggests what seems to me a somewhat idealised vision of hoplite armies (except the Lacedaimonians) but I'm aware this is wandeirng far from WoR ranges.

[Erpingham]

At Agincourt, it is recorded (by different sources), that the English were four deep and the French 31.  Regardless of anything else, measuring formations by men deep suggests a conception of ranks, though not necessarily in a formal sense.  On disorder, this was the great fear of medieval infantry.  Keeping the line tight, without bits rushing ahead or opening gaps, was vital.  It was a topos of medieval combat accounts that a unit advanced in a formation so tight that an apple thrown into their midst would be unable to fall to the ground without hitting a helmet (or being impaled on a lance).  Yet clearly, there was enough room to wield weapons freely and if that was impaired, the army was in serious difficulties.  Hence, the contribution of archery to causing the compression at Agincourt would be considered by contemporaries as a serious impairment of effectiveness, whether they called it disorder or not.

[RichT]

Thanks - though I do wonder, does 'four deep' etc really imply a conception of ranks? In modern English we routinely talk about 'crowds n deep' (where n = whatever) where it just means roughly that many deep (and where for example 'ten deep' really just means 'lots of people quite tightly packed'). Is the Agincourt usage likely to be more formal or more like modern English?

Is there evidence of drill in these armies? How would Henry form his men four deep? For Hellenistic armies we know exactly how (form 16 deep in open order, double by men, double by frontage (if necessary), double by men again, double by frontage again (if necessary)). Would Henry's army be more along the lines of 'you lot fill this space'?

31 deep is a mighty odd number. Why 31?