The Mediaeval English System

[Patrick Waterson]

Good points - and please keep commenting. 

[gavindbm]

Just a quick comment on the secure flanks.  At Verneuil the English did not have secure flanks and the French (or rather specially heavy Lombard cavalry) went either through the English centre or a bit of a wing.  If centre then amazing professionalism to close the breach and keep fighting. 

[Patrick Waterson]

Good observation, Gavin.

It seems to have been the right flank, and the breakthrough force promptly made for the English camp (and its 2,000-archer guard) to begin looting.  Deprived of the support of its heavily-armoured cavalry, the French left crumbled under the spirited counterattack of the English men-at-arms, and the English right, after a heartening pursuit of the fleeing foe, returned to take the Scots in the rear.  All in all, the English exhibited much better control and coordination in this battle, as in many others.

At Patay in 1429 (http://uk.ask.com/wiki/Battle_of_Patay) the French displayed much improved command and control, which enabled them to ride down English archers on the right flank rather than just ride through them en route to the baggage.  Note also the part played by a stag in handing the French the battle.

Patrick

[Erpingham]

Just a quick comment on the secure flanks.  At Verneuil the English did not have secure flanks and the French (or rather specially heavy Lombard cavalry) went either through the English centre or a bit of a wing.  If centre then amazing professionalism to close the breach and keep fighting.

Verneuil is indeed a tribute to the quality of the English army of the period.  It is a battle won on an open plain and it is won by a counter attack after enemy heavy cavalry had gone through part of the army and disappeared to the rear to do who knows what.  Almost certainly, Bedford's original plan had been to stand with his rear covered by his baggage and he has put in a large guard to protect this.  He realises that the lack of co-ordination of the French attack means he has a window of opportunity, so he takes his confident English (some of whom are Burgundians and some Norman French) and goes on the offensive.  Archers certainly play a part in this victory but the lead role has to be down to the men-at-arms.

[aligern]

Were the Lombard cavalry working with the French left?   I think Patrick has a point about the camp guard, perhaps dealing with that held the Lombards from turning on the rear of the men at arms?
Certainly the aggression of the English  looks to have yurned what should have been defeat into victory, though they had missed one of the key criteria for "english System" in that the archers who were charged apparently could not stake into the hard ground?/
Roy

[Erpingham]

Verneuil is one of those battles were details are maddeningly opaque.  The accepted interpretation of the battle has also gone through a major revision in the last decade in an article by Michael Jones (very good, though I think he stretches some conclusions too far).

In the Jones version, the Lombards form across the front of the French army and charge straight through the English, going on to chase fugitives or attack the baggage.  The English then reform and attack.  This makes little sense to me - it seems unlikely that men-at-arms could have charged through close-order troops unless they were in very shallow formation.  Could they have been deployed that shallow?  Burnes more traditional interpretation that the French cavalry were in advance of the flanks and were tasked with stripping the flanks would fit what we know of French tactical thinking better.  Or all the cavalry could have been on one flank.   How much the Lombards were working with the rest of the army is, of course, a good question.  Doubtless they should have been but it seems the timing is wrong.  The English have time to recover and, in fact, to take the battle to the enemy.  It's a bit like those WWI battles where the creeping barrage got too far ahead of the advance.

On the reserve, it is significant in neutralising the effect of those bits of the Lombard army that don't hare off into the distance (interestingly, as they are supposed in the Jones version to have fully plate barded horses - suggests to me there are more orthodox MAA in the mix).  Doubtless Bedford could see he was at risk of having his flanks turned and planned accordingly.  Incidentally, Jones debunks Burne's view that the the baggage guard was made up of super heroes who beat off the enemy cavalry then mount a flank attack that finishes the battle.  He believes there is no reason to conflate the two actions, and the flank attack is when one wing of the French army collapse, allowing some of the English on side that to join the remaining battle.  If the side the collapses is the French, it explains why more French seem to survive than Scots - the English can't mount a full pursuit until the Scots are dealt with.  And, of course, the Scots had declared "no quarter" - the rule was give no quarter, receive none.

[aligern]

I wonder if too much is expected of the Lombards (by us). If their plan was to carry out the initial charge and sweep away the archers (the original plan was to do this on both flanks at Agincourt) then presumably they understood that getting the cavalry back in hand and  falling on the English rear was a non starter a nd best that could be hoped for was that the Lombards would  break the archers and then fall on the camp, possibly distracting the English. The camp guard or reserve would keep theLombards fixed and occupied and so would not need to be heroes. From the French point of view removing the archers and preventing the degradation of their dismounted knights and the Scots ( who possibly have a low level of armour protection.)by the arrow storm and give them the best chance of beating the English men at arms.

Roy

[Erpingham]

I broadly agree with that.  Stripping the archers then going after the camp would fit the Agincourt model (assuming the French analysis of that battle was that the tactics were OK, the terrain and execution being the problem).  Bedford's strong baggage guard suggests he realised that such a strike was likely.  What does seem to go wrong for the French is the co-ordination.  If the cavalry had stuck with the infantry until a long bowshot (300 yds or so) from the English, then charged, the English would have struggled to reorganise before the infantry arrived.  Instead the English seem to have attacked them, perhaps with the intention of beating the enemy before there was any danger of the cavalry returning.

[aligern]

Yes, very sensible tactics by the English general, rather than waiting for worse things to happen to him he sets his men in motion towards the advancing French and gets into melee because he probably expects to win that. Salisbury holds the Scots and it all comes good when the French flee and Bedford's Men at arms can swing round and trap the Scots.

It does make one wonder about the composition of the forces. Were the French opposite Bedford comprising some rather inferior types?  Perhaps he looked at their advance and decided that he could take them??
Roy

[Jim Webster]

It does strike me that one thing this battle shows is that the English captains were able to avoid being trapped like a rabbit in the headlights. "Yes things have gone wrong, but we can still win this."

Jim

[Erpingham]

It does strike me that one thing this battle shows is that the English captains were able to avoid being trapped like a rabbit in the headlights. "Yes things have gone wrong, but we can still win this."

Jim

I think the good ones were able to adapt but that is one of the things that separates a good general from a poor one.  Poitiers is also a very adaptive battle - the English are very much fielding their command A-team there.  It is also interesting to see how many examples of not doing it by the "system" there are, some successful e.g. Auberoche, Cravant others not e.g. Bauge,Castillion.   The English are sometimes accused of being too rigid in their tactics in the HYW, and maybe they were towards the end, but they could be imaginative  under the right commander.

[TDF]

I think Agincourt and Crecy are interesting examples in regards to this discussion as, for me, the English did not so much win these battles, but rather the French lost them.

Both were essentially defensive battles for the English, something which favours the archer set behind stakes.  I do think the English made the best use of the geography and forces in both cases, a reflection of sound tactics, but French tactics simply seemed dogged and undermined by pride, ego and 'chivalry'.  Their disdain and derision for the lowly archer, and their apparent fervour for glory is what threw it all away for them in my book.  Self-confidence has been offered up as a pro in the English camp, but I think it has more relevance as a con in the French camp.  The jostling and competition to get stuck in horribly hindered any hope of a successful, or organised, closing with the enemy in the light of withering arrow storms.  At Agincourt the mud compounded this, at Crecy it was the ridgeline and the inefficient use of the Genoese crossbowmen (forced forward without their pavises, thus undermining their ability to screen the knights).

The following book is an interesting one too on the subject of tactics, although I'm sure it's not new to many of you.
http://www.scribd.com/doc/29854877/Armies-of-the-Middle-Ages-1

[Erpingham]

  I do think the English made the best use of the geography and forces in both cases, a reflection of sound tactics, but French tactics simply seemed dogged and undermined by pride, ego and 'chivalry'.  Their disdain and derision for the lowly archer, and their apparent fervour for glory is what threw it all away for them in my book. 

We have to be careful about the attribution of "pride" as the reason for the French failure.  Playing up the pride of the French and their contempt for the lowly fitted the moral narrative the English were building, as the victories could be seen as God humbling the proud and lifting up the humble (i.e. the English).  It also fitted the French moral narrative, as the nobles, whose place in the social order is dependent on them protecting the realm, instead are seized by vainglory and so France is punished by God.  That said, the French are clearly overconfident at both Crecy and Agincourt and the class tensions in the French army are much worse than in the English.  At Agincourt, the professional soldiers have produced a sound tactical plan.  Unfortunately, they are only middle ranking men and the royal princes think they automatically outrank the Marshal and Constable.  Everyone thinks victory will be so easy that the lower orders are kept back to allow all the glory to go to the nobility.  But not everything is straightforwardly to do with pride.  Burgundian and Armangnac factions are reluctant to serve under each others command, so tended to absent themselves from their stations and go off to some other part of the battlefield.  The result is chaos.  But the English don't just let the French beat themselves.  Henry V takes the risky decision to take the offensive to provoke a French counter attack.  A bit of desperation in there perhaps but certainly tactically pro-active.

[TDF]

Fair points there, especially with regards to the narratives. 
But I think the pride argument is perhaps semantic, as in my book,

this...

Everyone thinks victory will be so easy that the lower orders are kept back to allow all the glory to go to the nobility... 
Burgundian and Armangnac factions are reluctant to serve under each others command...

...smacks of pride. 

But perhaps 'greed' would make an interesting substitute?

the professional soldiers have produced a sound tactical plan...

I'm also not suggesting there was no sound tactical plan, but certainly poor execution (and an apparent inability to learn and adapt?), which played notably into the English hands.

[Erpingham]

I don't think we disagree much on this.  Pride and vainglory were curses of the medieval military system and it was up to a good leader to control them.  At Crecy, Poitiers and Agincourt we see the English do this much better than the French.  It's not that the English were immune - read the sorry tale of the 1383 Crusade.  But a good leader could get the nobles to play for the team.  There is a good example in the run up to Auray, where Calverley refuses to take the rearguard because it would dishonour him (the man is a mercenary leader, not a knight errant, for goodness sake).  However, his old friend and commander John Chandos takes him aside and explains that only the best soldier can do the job and if Calverley doesn't do it, he would need to do it himself, which could jeopardise victory.  Calverley gives way and, as Chandos knows he will, as one of the most experienced soldiers on the field, he handles the reserve with great skill.