The Mediaeval English System

[Patrick Waterson]

This kind of tactful consideration is also seen in Salisbury's treatment of his Burgundian allies in the Cravant campaign (1423): he had the same rules apply to everyone, split duties equally and appointed two marshals - one English and one Burgundian - to control movement and discipline of the troops.  He thus gained and retained the enthusiastic cooperation of the Burgundians at a time when English national chauvinism and contempt of foreigners made Macedonian contempt of Persians look mild.

The Battle of Cravant is interesting in itself http://uk.ask.com/wiki/Battle_of_Cravant.  [Note: the Wikipedia entry could use a little help if anyone has the time, sources and inclination.]

[Erpingham]

The Battle of Cravant is interesting in itself http://uk.ask.com/wiki/Battle_of_Cravant.  [Note: the Wikipedia entry could use a little help if anyone has the time, sources and inclination.]

It's a bit better now.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Cravant

[Patrick Waterson]

Certainly better. 

[Bohemond]

In 1994 I published a piece called 'The Development of Tactics during the Hundred Years War' (although it covered earlier material on Hastings and the 12th century as well) in Arms, Armies and Fortifications in the Hundred Years War, editors Anne Curry and Michael Hughes. I think I published something derived from that in Slingshot as well. I may have invented the term 'the English system' (or I may have read it somewhere else!). This is available on the De Re Militari website, I think. It is only a brief overview of the topic, but I try to bring out how the French were thinking about winning a battle and not just see it from the English point of view. In this strand I like the approach of building up from 'choose a good battlefield' etc. Of course, there is no battle unless both sides decide to engage and many campaigns were 'no battle' events, despite what Clifford Rogers says about the Dialectics of Medieval Strategy. Chevauchees were not always intended to bring about a battle, indeed the chevauchier usually wanted to avoid them IMHO. Matt Bennett (doh, you now know who Bohemond is...) P.S. why does this system have over a dozen stupid face icons and no spellcheck or cut + paste facility?

[aligern]

'In 1994 I published a piece called 'The Development of Tactics during the Hundred Years War' (although it covered earlier material on Hastings and the 12th century as well) in Arms, Armies and Fortifications in the Hundred Years War, editors Anne Curry and Michael Hughes. I think I published '

I just copied and pasted that  from your response


I just copied and pasted that from my sentence above. I could have cut and pasted it but that would leave no trail.
So right click gives me cut and paste.
Roy

[aligern]

The point of view of both French and English in the HYW is a very interesting study because it shows action and reaction plus potential borrowing from foreign campaigns such as Nicopolis, but often the learning takes a long time to be implemented because the interval between field battles is long, though there are brief flurries when several occur and we can see the French trying different routes.
In England Edward II is an interesting case because ,looking with the benefit of hindsight we see Edward I as beginning the longbow system and then Edward II taking a backward step towards ignoring those longbows and sending knights forward. Of course They are both doing much the same thing and Edward I is in control of his army whereas his son is not.
Roy

[Erpingham]

It is only a brief overview of the topic, but I try to bring out how the French were thinking about winning a battle and not just see it from the English point of view. In this strand I like the approach of building up from 'choose a good battlefield' etc.

Your 1994 paper is influential on one person in this debate at least (me).  BTW, I'd like to see you update it at some point, given some of the stuff which has been published since e.g. by Rogers.  Your point that the French weren't complete idiots and were trying to win too is well made - the English do have to win most of these battles, they aren't handed over on a plate.  On the French system, there is a nice summary by Matthew Strickland in Great Warbow comparing Christine de Pisan, the French Agincourt Plan and the Burgundian standing orders of 1417.  Read that and it becomes clear that the French side have been developing their tactical system too.

As to the development of the strand, I think the deliberate decision at the beginning to say the English didn't have longbows, they had a system - lets talk generalship, lets talk command & control, lets look at what the men-at-arms were doing rather than whether or not longbows could pierce plate armour at 300 yds - has been a distinct benefit.

[Patrick Waterson]

As to the development of the strand, I think the deliberate decision at the beginning to say the English didn't have longbows, they had a system - lets talk generalship, lets talk command & control, lets look at what the men-at-arms were doing rather than whether or not longbows could pierce plate armour at 300 yds - has been a distinct benefit.

Very much agreed, and it sets a good pattern for considering other military systems.

While still on the subject of the English system, perhaps someone can explain to me how it was that, following Valmont (1416), the exiguous English force, while returning to Harfleur, scored an impressive success over the French forces of 1) de Loigny and 2) Armagnac at the cliffs of St Andress.  It seems that de Loigny's men, who were lining the clifftop while the English made their way along the base of the cliff, charged down by paths and goat-tracks and were one-sidedly slaughtered by the English upon arrival at beach level.  Then, it seems, Armagnac's force put in an appearance, and this time the English swarmed up the paths and goat-tracks and put the fresh French force to rout - no mean achievement for men who had just completed a long and tiring march and were apparently significantly outnumbered by each of the French contingents.  The uphill attack was the more impressive because the English commander, Thomas Beaufort, Earl of Dorset, had been taken off by boat on account of being wounded, and command had devolved upon another captain (Fastolf?).

Militarily, the English achieved the seemingly impossible.  But how?

Patrick
P.S. - M'lord Bohemond, the associated 'iconography' results from the site being an off-the-shelf system rather than an expensive custom-designed one, hence the de rigeur concomitants of modern taste and depth of culture.  That apart, it is not at all bad for those of us who do not need spell checkers ... 

[aligern]

What is the battle where the English and Burgundians are facing the 'French', attempt to cross a bridge and then march off to the flank and arrive and cut down their opponents including most of the Scots.
I recall this as being remarked upon as very tough because the Scots obligingly stood and fought to the death whilst their colleagues ran away.  One is reminded of other super-troops, guards in the Crimea, Ss in Normandy, Caesar's tenth.  There is something about elan and self belief and unit integrity that carries you through hunger, privarion and tiredness.  The Japanese achieved this in WW2 too.  Similarly in a way the men of 1914 who charged machine guns  had the same irrational grit. I think that the English in the early XVth century had that irrational self belief that could make light of exhaustion.
I wonder, also, if in an age of religious  belief the victory against odds at Agincourt  convinced them that their cause was God's cause.  it is possible to see some of that in  crusade or jihad, though there we might add that dying could be seen as almost preferable to living on as you went straight to paradise.
Roy

[Erpingham]

What is the battle where the English and Burgundians are facing the 'French', attempt to cross a bridge and then march off to the flank and arrive and cut down their opponents including most of the Scots.

Cravant, 1423 .  Discussed a few posts above.  What the Anglo-Burgundians do is, after a missile exchange which drives the enemy back from the waters edge, attack across a waste deep river and a narrow bridge.  The Scots on the bridge hold, the French and assorted mercenaries leg it, leaving the Scots flank in the air.  The river assault party drive in the flank and it is goodbye Scots.    One might suggest that English shouldn't have been able to win this battle - men-at-arms charging across a waist deep river and up the far bank.  Combat modifiers must have been dreadful

[Erpingham]

While still on the subject of the English system, perhaps someone can explain to me how it was that, following Valmont (1416), the exiguous English force, while returning to Harfleur, scored an impressive success over the French forces of 1) de Loigny and 2) Armagnac at the cliffs of St Andress. 

Ah, Valmont! Another victory (or at least draw) from the jaws of defeat.  I have pondered this on a number of occassions and, while I haven't got the answer, I can identify a few factors.

• The English are desperate and their goal is nearly in their grasp
  Any mounted advance guard that doesn't wait for its main body but charges down a cliff at a formed enemy deserves anything it gets
  The English morale is boosted by defeating one lot of French but have still got to get past the second lot, so situation is still desperate
  Speculating, the English may attack before the French can fully marshal their force on the cliff top
  Unknown factor - at what point did the sally from Harfleur appear?  Were the French fighting on two fronts?
  

[Patrick Waterson]

Interesting thoughts: conventional wisdom has it that the Harfleur garrison saw the routed French streaming past and decided to have a go at them; if on the other hand the garrison had organised a sortie a la Cravant it would have had a considerable impact on French cohesion and morale.

Streaming down the cliffs against a formed opponent would indeed have been asking for trouble: the English up-cliff assault would presumably need to know that there were Frenchmen to assault at the top of the cliff (i.e. they would need to have made their presence known somehow).  Would it be reasonable to suggest that the English archers concentrated their attentions on French men-at-arms holding the tops of the cliff paths, causing casualties, disruption and the odd chap falling down the cliff, hence inducing the French to pull back just as the English men-at-arms made their climb to the top?

Then there is an observation by Lt-Col. Alfred Burne that "The French were utterly routed, the English making great play with their axes".  (This may be what gave me the impression that English men-at-arms preferred axes during this period.)  Might weaponry of significantly greater penetrating power (or at least concussive effect) have conferred a combat advantage to add icing to the cake of determination, desperation, combined-arms action and a firm belief that when all is said and done, Englishmen who do not flinch from danger are properly invincible?

[Erpingham]

  Would it be reasonable to suggest that the English archers concentrated their attentions on French men-at-arms holding the tops of the cliff paths, causing casualties, disruption and the odd chap falling down the cliff, hence inducing the French to pull back just as the English men-at-arms made their climb to the top?

Remember, there won't be many arrows left - they had fought a long battle near Valmont then slunk off at night, with no chance to resupply.

Then there is an observation by Lt-Col. Alfred Burne that "The French were utterly routed, the English making great play with their axes".  (This may be what gave me the impression that English men-at-arms preferred axes during this period.)  Might weaponry of significantly greater penetrating power (or at least concussive effect) have conferred a combat advantage to add icing to the cake of determination, desperation, combined-arms action and a firm belief that when all is said and done, Englishmen who do not flinch from danger are properly invincible?

While axes were almost certainly the weapon of choice for English men-at-arms, we don't know what the French had.  As dismounted cavalry, they might have used their lances (but probably no time to cut them down).  Long lances at the top of the cliff should have given them an advantage one would have thought.

BTW, Patrick, have you got a copy of Sumption's Divided Houses?  It contains a piece by Walsingham which seems to quote a participants letter describing a skirmish at Montebourg in 1379.  Much of this is about how effective the English were with their axes "Brave men everyone of them, they laid about the French with their axes, slaughtering them like cattle."  It goes on about not wasting a blow, never having to strike twice, splitting helmets and crushing the heads in them.  Read that, and you'll definitely think the English favoured axes   Bit of a topos maybe but the economy of effort of these professionals rings true.

[Patrick Waterson]

Thanks for that, Anthony: I lack Divided Houses, so had missed out on that little gem, whether it is a sparklingly faceted piece of information or simply a rough diamond. 

Remember, there won't be many arrows left - they had fought a long battle near Valmont then slunk off at night, with no chance to resupply.

I would expect two or three each, if that - but a couple of volleys at the right moment could work wonders.

Mention is made of the Earl of Dorset being evacuated by boat.  What was the boat doing there?  I do wonder if an alert garrison commander thought to send along a few sheaves of arrows by the same method (and for that matter the same vessel) on the offchance that Dorset's force might be returning that way.   Conjecture, of course.

In any event, we seem to be left with the likelihood that adept axe-wielding provided an effective edge to the up-cliff assault, and the conjecture that a few shafts in the right place at the right time may have helped, especially if the French had formed up dismounted with long lances.

Patrick

[Erpingham]

Thanks for that, Anthony: I lack Divided Houses, so had missed out on that little gem, whether it is a sparklingly faceted piece of information or simply a rough diamond. 

Patrick

I got mine when it came out in paperback recently.  It has a chapter devoted to men-at-arms and their activities, which is where the quote came from.  He devotes a number of pages to wounds and their treatment, another topic we have discussed.  There is a nice piece about Guy de Chauliac, a learned physician, who scorned the ignorant battlefield medicine of soldiers - cleaning wounds with wine or spirits then wrapping them in clean white bandages to keep dirt out indeed!