The tactics of medieval men-at-arms

[Erpingham]

Mark Grindlay raised the issue of our understanding of the tactics of medieval men-at-arms when discussing Slingshot 284 elsewhere on the forum.  This seems a good enough reason to create a thread on the topic here.

I've read quite extensively in secondary and primary sources on this subject and there is a lot of information out there.  J.F Verbruggen, Matt Bennett and Clifford Rogers have all written reconstructions of how medieval men-at-arms mounted a charge, for example (and there is a lot of agreement between them).  But as Mark pointed out, there are some basic questions we aren't clear on.  He particularly queried how the ebb and flow of a melee worked - did small units break off, leaving others to maintain a continuous fight, or did whole divisions fall back together - regroup, then go in again together?  There are other controversies, some much more widespread than just medieval cavalry.  Two bodies of cavalry charge at each other - what happens as they contact?  There is the perennial wargames question "Where medieval cavalry particularly impetuous, or harder to control than cavalry of other periods?"  And some about battle experience e.g. how survivable was losing your horse in a melee?

So, there are many questions and much evidence to chew over. 

For beginners to this topic, I would suggest a visit to the De Re Militari site and read Matt Bennetts article http://web.archive.org/web/20100325080811/http://www.deremilitari.org/resources/articles/bennett1.htm

Also worth looking at are the description of the battle of Bouvines, Gitres,Lunalonge and Loudoun Hill in the battles section of this forum, which contain descriptions of cavalry melees and also cavalry v. infantry actions.  Just a few of the examples of the information out there.

[Erpingham]

As a starter to our studies, here are two cavalry skirmishes in the 1310's during the Scottish Wars of independence.  In both we see a small body of men-at-arms encountering a larger one on the march.

The enemy mounted their horses and formed for action, thinking that they [the English] could not escape from them. The said Thomas, with his people, who were very well mounted, struck spurs to his horse, and charged the enemy right in the centre of their column, bearing many to the ground in his course by the shock of his horse and lance. Then, turning rein, came  back in the same manner and charged again, and once again returned through the thick of the troop, which so encouraged his people that they all followed him in like manner, whereby they overthrew many of the enemy, whose horses stampeded along the road. When they [the enemy] rose from the ground, they perceived the grooms of the said Thomas coming up in good order, and began to fly to a dry peat moss which was near, wherefore almost all [the others] began to fly to the moss, leaving their horses for their few assailants.
Gray's Scalacronica

And before mid-morning the mist all suddenly cleared away, and he and his company saw themselves not a bow-shot from the enemy.  Then with a shout they dashed upon them; for  they saw that if they fled, not a fourth part  should well get away, so Sir Edward took the risk of onset rather than of flight, and with a shout the little Scottish company dashed forward.  When the English host saw this band come so suddenly and dauntlessly upon them they were confounded with fear, and their assailants rode so boldly among them that at once they bore many to the earth. Sir Aymer's men were right  greatly dismayed by the force of that first attack, and were put in great fear, and supposed, because they were so assailed, that the Scottish troop  was larger by far. Then Sir Edward's company, having pierced quickly through the enemy, turned their horses' heads stoutly at them again, and at this charge a great number of their foes were borne down and slain. The English were then so much dismayed that they became greatly scattered.  And when Sir Edward and his men saw them in such ill array they pricked on them the third time.  And the enemy, seeing them come on so stoutly, were cast into such fear that all their rout, both greater and less, fled, scattering each one here and there
Barbour's Bruce

Clearly numbers weren't everything.  The small, cohesive bodies are handled aggressively, the larger ones struggling to respond and bring their numbers to bear. Our leaders of the smaller force boldly launch into the middle of the enemy, turn and come back through (in Edward Bruce's case, twice).  The enemy break up and run away. Here the authors are showing us their protagonists are paragons of knightly prowess - courageous, decisive, in command.  On the impetuosity spectrum, I'd invite comparisons with the 21st lancers at Omdurman, or some of the encounter battles between English and German cavalry in the opening days of the First World War.  Yet the latter we would call disciplined regulars.

[Patrick Waterson]

The Scots in each action begin with two significant advantages: they know their enemy's strength and dispositions, and the enemy is strung out and caught by surprise in country that does not allow him to bring his strength to bear (that is about five advantages, really).  The English also do not know the Scots' strength, and opponents believed to be present can be as effective as a reserve that is present.

In each case, the Scots are, or are portrayed as, a single contingent under unified leadership.  When multiple Scots contingents - and leaders of rank - were assembled, questions of precedence and honour together with traditional and occasionally ongoing feuds tended to destroy any chance of cohesion.  This could also be a problem in the English army (Bannockburn), but one that a strong Plantaganet king could overcome.

Might Falkirk be a good battle to examine to see these factors in action?

Patrick

[Erpingham]

Actually, the victors in the first story are English and in the second they are Scottish.  I suspect they could just as easily have been French or German - European men-at-arms have a pretty international set of combat techniques.

[Patrick Waterson]

Oops, that was me not paying attention!  Sorry, a bit distracted today.

In each of these actions, a resolute band penetrates through the foe, turns around, and rides through again - and then a third time.  The melee is not a corps-a-corps shock, but lances nevertheless make contact with targets to good effect.  This suggests relatively loose formations, or formations that loosened rapidly when attacked - or conceivably a lack of formation except on the part of the attackers.

Also in each case, the third charge is the one that scatters the foe.  Cohesion, discipline, inertia or perhaps simply hope hold up for the first two, but the third is decisive.

Can we imagine how this would look on the wargames table, with elements 'skipping' the enemy line as melee is resolved?  And how many pips would be required in DBM(M) to turn them around and charge again?

[Erpingham]

  This suggests relatively loose formations, or formations that loosened rapidly when attacked - or conceivably a lack of formation except on the part of the attackers.

And yet the standard topoi are that the wind can't blow through the lances, or an apple or glove, if thrown into the formation, would not strike the ground without hitting someone.  Clifford Rogers talks about the two cavalry formations in Soldiers Lives.  For cavalry formations to interpenetrate like this, one or both must be in a loose formation.  I suspect the Scots in the first example have spread wide to block the English advance and the English have closed up and gone at a weak point, gaining local superiority.  In the second case, both sides are surprised but the smaller, more cohesive Scottish force get their act together faster.  The English are probably not formed when hit.  There is another example of the two cavalry formations in Van Heelu's poem about Woerringen 1288.  The army of the Archbishop of Cologne advance "thin and wide" but Liebrecht of Dormaal orders his men to close up "thick and tight".  Thin and wide would suggest envelopment tactics, thick and tight break-through tactics.

[Patrick Waterson]

Which brings us to the question of what happens when two forces drawn up in accordance with the standard topoi thunder into contact with each other.  If I remember correctly, the French were considered to be the best at this sort of thing, and given the French emphasis on individual elan throughout much of the period, this might suggest that during the charge formations slackened off a bit as the keener or better-mounted knights got ahead during the final stages of the charge just prior to impact and this loosening would have allowed a degree of interpenetration together with a bit of latitude in picking targets.

The result would thus have resembled a mutual dovetailing, and some less-armoured (or less courageous) knights might have slipped in behind their bolder brethren - this might even have been formalised in the later coustilliers, armigeri falsi and the like.  Such behaviour would have allowed a degree of mutual interpenetration, though whether this would extend to progressing all the way through an enemy formation I do not know.  It would permit the force of a charge to be dissipated in a number of individual shocks rather than in a great line-long clash of horseflesh and metal.

And then there is the question of how they separated again - assuming they managed to do so before one side or the other cracked.

[Mark G]

Medieval face of battle, eh.

evidence for repeated mounted charges does feel more right than wrong.  this is promising to be quite interesting.

If I knew the ancients more, I'd be comparing them with the break off examples we have from then too, to see how they stack up.

[Erpingham]

Medieval face of battle, eh.

Indeed, the fact that Keegan can ask almost identical questions about cavalry at Waterloo suggests there is something fairly fundamental involved.  The text book says the two forces, with the same doctrine, should be in close formation and galloping at each other.  If they do this, there is a large crash and a heap of disabled horses and men.  Doubtless, there are collisions (there are accounts where some horses are killed by running into one another) but this can't be the main thing happening.  Are the two sides "reading" one another, knowing how the other will react on impact and adjusting accordingly?  If so, who is doing the reading and adjusting - leaders?  the troopers collectively? And how does the adjustment transmit in a body moving, if not at a gallop, then quite quickly?

[Patrick Waterson]

Conjecturing here, but there may be an element of elan, skill and self-esteem which brings the best or keenest out in front in the last 20-30 yards, making both a leader-related adjustment (natural deference letting the great man get ahead) and various enthusiasm-related adjustments (some are pushing to the limit, seeking out their first kill of the day) and lack of enthusiasm-related adjustments (trying not to be someone else's first kill of the day).  These may shake out an otherwise tight formation into a series of prongs and gaps shortly before contact.

There may also be a parallel in fighter combat when two aircraft end up heading directly for each other.  In this situation, collisions are extremely rare: it is much more usual for one or both pilots to pull out at the last moment, and I suspect that two knights, with their horses closing head on, would mutually nudge them slightly to the right just prior to impact.  Naturally, there would sometimes be occasions when their part of the line did not loosen up enough to allow this, and then horse would slam into horse to their mutual detriment.

On this basis, I would suggest that the 'reading' is an individual thing, with individuals doing the 'micro-compensation' required to avoid direct collisions whenever there is enough space to do so.  Naturally, if one is a yard or two ahead of one's immediate neighbours, and the enemy is similarly stringing out, there will be room.  The men on one's right or left (usually right if one is nudging the animal right) will try to adjust by either swinging marginally right themselves or holding back a fraction so as to swing into one's wake.  From this point everyone is decelerating one way or another, and a formation that has loosened from front to rear will be better able to lose speed under some sort of control than one that is closing with no interval betwen 'ranks'.

Speed cues will be taken from the riders ahead of and around one, and when the clash becomes imminent care and attention will be given to orientation (seeing how fast those around one are moving, and watching for the sudden appearance of opponents through the riders ahead), so the whole formation should be able to decelerate safely and allow a de facto in-filtering by the leading ranks of both sides.  Knots of men will begin to develop, especially around banners and popular champions, and the melee will proceed from there.

In essence, rather than two lines closing we have something more like two swarms closing.

[Mark G]

in the case on horse and musket era cavalry, once they start charging 'properly' and maintaining a consistent line, there is no real conjecture needed, the accounts of the men themselves are pretty clear, they charged between each other's horses with enough of a gap being allowed to appear in time (hence the emphasis on remaining boot to boot and in line at the 'crash' point).

most wounds demonstrate this in the heavy cavalry - with slashes to forearms and hands - and we see the drilled formation for heavy cavalry showing this as well - the arm our straight and forward and pointed - pretty much like a lance.
(note also the French targetting the backs of Austrian cuirassiers in the earlier Napoleonic wars, when they realised there was no back plate to the cuirass) bad marks for any sculptor who has them waving straight swords above their heads - never happened near the enemy

light cavalry, with their curved sabres take a different approach, but then they are designed for pursuit and scouting, not for battle charges, so its a question of function as much as anything, and the curve is about slashing wounds on unarmoured men.

And of course, if you fail to maintain boot to boot until late enough, it shows you are badly trained - and those guys invariably seem to flinch and expose themselves completely prior to contact - or refuse to meet the charge and bolt - the analogy with dog fights going head on is a good one - turn early and you are done for, but both always just seem to miss each other if they know what they are about.

sadly, I am not aware of any descriptions of lancers charging lancers which we could look at for extrapolation, but the evidence on heavy cavalry is pretty clear - and I would suggest this boot to boot and maintaining frontage is something which we can extrapolate directly onto cataphracts, who the sources do tell us were vulnerable to their sides.

the question of a Sabin like 'hero-leader' taking the front for knights is harder to look into, but there was a strict prohibition amongst French gendarmes about no one being allowed to get ahead of the others (for prestige reasons), was their not? and hence the en-haye (which must have been highly vulnerable to the second line of the enemy if it didn't have one of its own).

[aligern]

There's a battle, in the Barons Wars I think , where one side drops their lances and uses swords as a sign that they really mean business and intend to stay and fight rather than pass with the lance. I rather think that this is what the Vandals are doing at Tricameron when they order their cavalry to use sword rather than lance or spear.
That suggests to me that one might be in closer order with the sword and more cohesive, whereas with the lance the formation is looser because the riders must surely intend to pass as they deliver the point with momentum.

Roy

[Patrick Waterson]

That makes good sense, and there are accounts of lance-armed Napoleonic cavalry throwing away their lances and drawing swords instead when about to engage enemy cavalry.  A contributory factor may have been the greater speed at which a Napoleonic cavalry charge was delivered, making it harder to aim effectively with a (by then considerably lighter) lance.

One interesting battle is Coutras, in 1588 (I draw here on Professor Gerald Mattingly's account in his Defeat of the Spanish Armada).  Anne de Montomorency (yes, he is a chap), commanding the Catholic army, placed his reliance on his lance-wielding gendarmes, drawn up en haye, and charged forward against Henri de Navarre's Huguenot millers (cavalry), who were arranged in tight columns and using sword and pistol.  Henri also had groups of musketeers or arquebusiers drawn up between his cavalry squadrons, a forerunner of similar Swedish and English Civil War tactics.

Montmorency led his glittering cavalry in a charge, speeding up much too soon in the opinion of the experienced Huguenots, who waited calmly as the gendarmes thundered towards them.  At a distance of perhaps 50 yards, the arquebusiers delivered a volley, the millers spurred into a disciplined charge and their tight formations crashed through the disordered gendarmes, subsequently separating to left and right roll up the bewildered Catholics.  It was a smashing Huguenot victory.

Here the close-quarter sword-work (perhaps combined with a little selective pistolling) of the millers seems to have been much more effective than the disoriented lance-wielding of the gendarmes.  What the outcome would have been had the millers not had their supporting arquebusiers is less easy to tell, but the gendarmes seemed confident enough to suggest that they anticipated success.  Would this have been the result of experience or of wishful thinking on their part?

Patrick

[Erpingham]

There's a battle, in the Barons Wars I think , where one side drops their lances and uses swords as a sign that they really mean business and intend to stay and fight rather than pass with the lance.
Roy

Lincoln, 1141.  The contrast made is between jousting and real fighting.  Presumably, one side intended to unseat their opponents but the other were going to kill them.  Likewise, in Van Heelu's Worringen poem, one side identifies the other as coming on as if they are at a tournament - thin and wide.  It seems that, if you meant business, you formed up differently.

[Erpingham]

the question of a Sabin like 'hero-leader' taking the front for knights is harder to look into, but there was a strict prohibition amongst French gendarmes about no one being allowed to get ahead of the others (for prestige reasons), was their not? and hence the en-haye (which must have been highly vulnerable to the second line of the enemy if it didn't have one of its own).

There are several medieval sources which note that advancing ahead of the standards or leaving your place in the ranks was frowned upon.  Regarding en-haye, there is a nice quote, I think from Bouvines, that lines should be spread wide, as it was not right that knights used others' bodies as a shield.  That said, normal formations don't seem to have been one man deep.  There was a clearly a group round the leader and standard - they were protected to the front, sides and rear if the Templar rule is anything to go by.  Other than this clump a formation in which the fully-armed men-at-arms were expected to front the formation and the less well armed (lesser knights, sergeants, turcopoles, varlets, coustilliers depending on when and where you might be) formed one or two ranks behind seems likely.  Germans may, however, have been different as they went on in the late Middle Ages to deep formations and wedges.