The mechanism of Roman line relief

[aligern]

The descriptions of the later battles in Pausanias talk of the Gauls being surrounded and destroyed by javelins. That would fit rather well with them adopting a static formation , held by the Greek heavy infantry in front and galled by missiles to the lank. Best I can do with their earlier victory is that the Macedonian commander Ptolemy Keraunos was knocked off his elephant, captured and killed.

The topos (conventional set of epithets) for Gauls is that they are wild and disorganised, they flash fierce looks , have courage but no endurance, have huge bodies and no armour and are drunken, cruel, superstitious and perfidious. Oh and they are in impossibly high numbers. This is to be directly contrasted with the virtues of the civilised Greeks and Romans who are disciplined, stoical, deploy all arms on the battlefield in combination, make rational plans and are outnumbered.
When an Ancient Historian has to describe an action for which he has a fairly bare description he raises the rhetoric by describing the Barbarians as having all the appropriate attributes.  This is easy for an audience , to whom the work is being declaimed, to relate to.  It is no different from our newspapers who depict the Germans as arrogant, the Italians as corrupt and cowardly, the Greeks as chaotic .



Roy

[Patrick Waterson]

At the risk of repeating myself, there is a difference between a unit in whose formation unplanned gaps appear and one that trains to fight with gaps.  Actually, I'm not sure that the line in contact had gaps (certainly not all the time) but I don't think what happens when gaps happen/or are forced on a phalanx is actually conclusive about what the Romans did.

But which armies in the classical period used gaps?  The only references to gaps I have been able to find in the sources are to unplanned ones, unless one counts Scipio's unique deployment at Zama (even then he filled the gaps with velites).  And why would Roman legionaries survive in a situation where Greek hoplites did not?

Again, part of the problem is a fundamental difference in understanding of what "staying in a fight for extended periods" means in the sources.  In the view of some here (and in secondary literature) a unit can be in a fight while shouting abuse, hurling missiles, spear fencing, sending out the odd idiot to moon at the enemy etc. as well as when hammering away with the shield and jabbing with the sword at breath-smelling range.  The unit is out of the fight when it collectively ceases to think it's next move will be engaging the enemy in some way, either because of fatigue or fear or disorder or its leaders say "You've done enough lads - somebody else's turn"

This kind of fighting seems to have been the province of skirmishers, not formed heavy troops.

Gallic ferocity and Gallic-Roman interaction might with benefit form a new topic.

Patrick

[Justin Swanton]

Speaking of the blood-maddened Gaul, wasn't it his Galatian relatives who, alone in the ancient world, were able to defeat a phalanx frontally by getting their front ranks to run straight into the sarissas, enabling the rear ranks to step over them and, um, incapacitate the hapless phalangites?

No.

That sounds like complete fiction to me. There are no surviving narratives of Galatian victories over the Macedonians that give any tactical detail.

Interesting. I had read somewhere (but cannot remember the source) that Gaulish mercenaries in the period c400-200 BC were amongst the most feared warriors of that era, capable of defeating a phalanx (not necessarily a Macedonian one). Any truth in that, or is it just more Roman hyperbole?

This might be worth a separate thread, as Patrick suggests.

[Erpingham]

True, but one needs to read the account of the Zulu assault at Rorke's Drift, where the Zulus attacked an improvised fortified position from 4.30 pm until 2.00 am the following morning, clambering over the bodies of their fallen to get at the British. The mopping up of individual British soldiers in the aftermath of Isandlwana was done when the heat of the battle was over, and could be accomplished economically. When the battle was at its height losses were not a primary consideration for the Zulu. One could fit Gauls into this category of fighter.

While we need to be careful in comparing Zulus to ancient troop types, their endurance in the Isandlhwana and Rorke's Drift action is remarkable  The regiments in action at Rorke's Drift had been on the move for the whole day before they started to fight, with very little food.  To suggest that they constantly attacked over such a wide period isn't true though.  They attacked and withdrew, manoeuvering against different parts off the post, and attacks became less frequent and less determined as time wore on (they were tired, hungry and had taken a lot of casualties).  The battles of the first part of the Zulu war were a shock to the Zulu army - they weren't used to the level of casualties and, in a society where heroism and heroic leadership were expected, casualties among officers and the natural leaders left many units the shadow of their former selves.  We may wish to take that back as a reflection on our Gauls too - even in a heroic society, not all warriors are equally brave.

[Patrick Waterson]

Speaking of the blood-maddened Gaul, wasn't it his Galatian relatives who, alone in the ancient world, were able to defeat a phalanx frontally by getting their front ranks to run straight into the sarissas, enabling the rear ranks to step over them and, um, incapacitate the hapless phalangites?

No.

That sounds like complete fiction to me. There are no surviving narratives of Galatian victories over the Macedonians that give any tactical detail.

Actually it is complete conjecture, and the conjecture is mine.  Apologies to Justin if he gained the impression it was source-based or source-backed.

The reason for the conjecture was my premise that a Gaul impaled on a sarissa would act similarly to a boar impaled by a spear (and for that matter Mordred at Camlann, if the account of his last duel is based on anything historical), running up the shaft to strike at the owner.  Even if he did not make it (the other 4-9 sarissa points he would be facing would probably stop him) it would give the sarissa wielder a problem, because having a dead Gaul half-way up your pike is not going to do much for your ability to hold it up against the next attacker.

Given Ptolemy Keraunos' demonstrated level of generalship and prudence, we need not confine ourselves to attributing his defeat to a single cause, though it is interesting to speculate on some of the mechanics of this first interaction between Gauls (Galatians) and Macedonians.

Patrick

[aligern]

Perhaps it is significant that the British at Roeke's drift fired off some 20,000 rounds and yet only 400 Zulu died (that's an estimate of course.  Apparently a lot of Zulu casualties were from bayonet wounds as they tried to get over the mealie bag and biscuit tin fortifications and were disadvantaged against the firmly planted men of the 24th.

Surely, if the Zulu had been  so keen on being in the face of the British they would have suffered many more casualties as there is really no place for long range shooting, the Zulu are generally in cover until  a distance that varies from 30 yards to ten.

Even if I misremember the rounds shot it was still an awfully high number.  It argues that a lot of the time the Zulu were keeping their heads down and the British were shooting to keep them from moving.
Had the Zulu been indifferent to their own lives they could easily have swamped the post and probably lost about 1000 men doing it, simply by assaulting everywhere and disregarding casualties. Instead they probed at different points at different times, accumulating casualties, but then rotating in new units.

I think the problem here is that  the language of the description of battles is ill suited to factual analysis because it concentrates on the moments of action rather than on the systematic accounting of each phase and sub action. So charges and  shouting and heroic actions predominate. Also, only certain men give accounts.  The Zulu, apparently told David Rattray a lot about Isandlhwana but little about Rorke's drift because it was a shameful, illegal action against Cetewayo's orders.

In WW2 in Normandy the books that have been published major on the accounts of literate individuals and heroes and personal action. It gives the impression that all German guns are 88mm, all tanks Tigers.  Airpower is overestimated because it has dramatic effect. A more scientific analysis suggests that artillery did most of the work, but then it wouldn't be much of a story to say that a German company re occupies a village, ten batteries of artillery  hit it and then there are effectively no survivors.   Similarly the casualties in tanks that ,light first time' and are death traps for the crews are very dramatic and feed the need for a war is hell narrative, but I now hear that they were relatively rare (though horrid and dramatic) .  Similarly the costs of the bomber offensive in the allies best young men and costly machines probably vastly outweighed the benefits, but for years that story could not have been told.

One of the best scientific analyses of a battle is Mark Adkin's Charge of the Light Brigade. I was surprised to learn that charging  across the front of the Russian guns was surprisingly low risk given that the target was well spaced out and the guns have a low rate of fire and you need to be a bloody good gunner to hit a target that is not standing still. Charging guns frontally is, of course, not advisable, but even there the gunners have to get the grape fire timed just right and, if you know what you are doing, the first line of cavalry gets massacred, but the gunners cannot reload before the second line is on them, sabres flashing.

So with the ancient accounts we have to import as much science as we can and that means  using comparanda  and reason as well as looking for what is key truth and what is simply rhetoric in the accounts.  When the Gauls are described with all the to poi and flourishes  I'd not believe it unless the source specifically says that the Gauls charged en masse and wildly.

Look Justin at Vercellae where the Gauls come on in a huge block, perhaps square and chant as they go. That's a Gallic (or German) attack, but it is in ranks and in order. 

And yes, a Gallic attacks thread with some sourced quotes would be useful.

Roy

[Justin Swanton]

One thing came to mind on the subject of wearier lines of infantry giving way before a more robust foe: if a front rank soldier steps back, the soldier behind him, in order not to have his bossed shield poke into the front chap's back, will naturally step back too, as will the fellow behind him, and so on. Only in some armies were the rear ranks meant to press against the front ranks and create an othismus.

This being the case, one can envisage a line of outfought infantry backing up quite a distance before a superior foe, as happened historically. No need for a push-o-war.

[Erpingham]

Only in some armies were the rear ranks meant to press against the front ranks and create an othismus.

There are other interpretations of othismos too - the degree to which deliberate pushing went on in any ancient formation is another theme we could pick up sometime in the future

This being the case, one can envisage a line of outfought infantry backing up quite a distance before a superior foe, as happened historically. No need for a push-o-war.

When is a pushback not a pushback?  When it's a retrograde movement   I would see this with fitting in with a concept of different intensities of combat.  The line falling back can rally and go in again or, if the time is right, exchange with the support line.  The degree to which the enemy followed up would be telling - if they press hard enough you'd have difficulty making the exchange.  If they are tired but overenthusiastic, you've just drawn them in to a mincing machine.  If they don't follow at all, you have a choice of breaking contact or attacking with your fresh troops.

[Justin Swanton]

Only in some armies were the rear ranks meant to press against the front ranks and create an othismus.

There are other interpretations of othismos too - the degree to which deliberate pushing went on in any ancient formation is another theme we could pick up sometime in the future

I'm all ears (or all eyes in this case).

This being the case, one can envisage a line of outfought infantry backing up quite a distance before a superior foe, as happened historically. No need for a push-o-war.

When is a pushback not a pushback?  When it's a retrograde movement   I would see this with fitting in with a concept of different intensities of combat.  The line falling back can rally and go in again or, if the time is right, exchange with the support line.  The degree to which the enemy followed up would be telling - if they press hard enough you'd have difficulty making the exchange.  If they are tired but overenthusiastic, you've just drawn them in to a mincing machine.  If they don't follow at all, you have a choice of breaking contact or attacking with your fresh troops.
[/quote]

There is a certain hypothetical system proposed at the beginning of this thread that makes it possible to do line relief even when under pressure from the enemy. The idea is that you need to do a line relief in precisely that situation - when the enemy is pressing your front ranks and threatening to break them. If the front ranks are holding their own then no need for the relief operation.

[Erpingham]

I'm all ears (or all eyes in this case).

Well, as I understand it (and I've only really come across it peripherally), there are at least three schools of thought
1. Rugby scrum - a mass push by the two opposing phalanxes
2. Individual push - any pushing is in the context of a series of individual combats/pushes
3. There was no physical othismos - it was metaphorical/a literary device or psychological (I suppose that could be two different schools of othismos denial )

It really needs a thread of its own and some serious Classical Greek enthusiasts to do the arguments justice - as I say, I've seen enough in passing to know a debate rages but can't tell you the current front runner.

[Mark G]

can I plede that we leave othismos until 2015.

[Erpingham]

can I plede that we leave othismos until 2015.

I thought we'd got 2015 down for "The range and armour piercing capabilities of the Longbow", for the Agincourt 600th anniversary? May have to be 2016

[Justin Swanton]

Can't we do it now-ish? At least a bit? Pretty please?

[Justin Taylor]

I defy anyone to fight well whilst someone else is pushing them in the back.

[aligern]

Its likely not such a problem if the man at the front is crouched inside his shield pushing too.  I agree that wielding a spear might be a problem, but then that may have occupied the  first phase and when that declines through fatigue and spear breakage, the  best the back ranks can do is push because they do have energy.
Which Theban says 'Give me one more push'?

Think of the description by Ammianus of Roman troops at Argentoratum pushing with their knees. That sounds like direct power transmitted via the shield??
Roy