What happens at the flanks of a line?

[Justin Swanton]

Another one I've always been curious about. Presuming that troops need to be in a line to fight effectively, with friends on either side of them, what about the troops on the very edges? If they are even slightly overlapped they are in big trouble. Would two opposing lines adjust their frontage to match each other exactly, or would the flanks hold back in a slightly convex bow to avoid the nasty surprise of discovering that the enemy is longer than they are? (I seem to remember this being done at Hastings)

Any examples from the sources that shed light on this problem?

[Mark G]

blimey, talk about picking all the big ones to start off with...


consider the basics of tactics.

a refused flank is much safer than an advanced one.

supporting lines cover flanks

Cavalry cover flanks.

then look at some relevant examnples.

major battles from the renaissance are not too badly documented for this, the 18th century is quite relevant, since they formed a solid line of battle, and yet did not have to many flank attacks on their ends except at the more strategic level of Frederick's Oblique (which was about a concentrated attack point, rather than an exposed flank roll-up)

but mostly, look at the Napoleonics - with division sized attacks against army sized defensive lines.

Its not as easy to nip out of your own line to gobble up an exposed flank as we sometimes think it is, and units will only do it when they are sure they will not open their own flank at the same time - hence, supporting lines etc.

look at the master of this - Hannibal - and you get a good idea of the options for and against.

a lot depends on command and control, and a lot is misunderstood (I think) becuase our first models of combat all came from hoplite battles which were two lines of men from neighbouring cities meeting at equal and agreed places and times and fighting frontally.

that has coloured a lot of what most historians expected to find subsequently.  Even the shieldwall, Hastings (able to anchor flanks on terrain) apart, I'm not at all sure that there is a safe comparison with equal and continuous lines as we understand them to be made there.

Overlapping shileds, sure - but one single line of battle?

not so much.

for a body of men to get between another body of men, and then turn in on its flank, it has to know that the turn will not expose itself to the same problem. 

that alone makes the necessity for a single solid continuous line become unecessary.

and once you get your head around the idea that both sides are a series of groups of men a mutually supporting distance apart rather than a single line - and that both sides groups of men will need to pullback from the fight regularly for physical reasons, a lot more possibilities open up.

[Duncan Head]

Would two opposing lines adjust their frontage to match each other exactly...

Thucydides' classic passage on "rightward drift" (V.71) shows that even lines that did at the start  match each other might not avoid the overlapping issue.

All armies are alike in this: on going into action they get forced out rather on their right wing, and one and the other overlap with this their adversary's left; because fear makes each man do his best to shelter his unarmed side with the shield of the man next him on the right, thinking that the closer the shields are locked together the better will he be protected. The man primarily responsible for this is the first upon the right wing, who is always striving to withdraw from the enemy his unarmed side; and the same apprehension makes the rest follow him.

[Erpingham]

Another one I've always been curious about. Presuming that troops need to be in a line to fight effectively, with friends on either side of them, what about the troops on the very edges? If they are even slightly overlapped they are in big trouble.

Overlapping in a real battle seems far more difficult in real life than on a wargames table - a quick pivot of the end element and you're in:) .  Secondly, if you look at medieval battles (which I will 'cos you mentioned Hastings), there is a lot of effort put into having a battlefield where the enemy come at you from the front.  The real danger is not a bit of argy-bargy on the ends but a sweeping move round your flank and behind you.  You see this in late medieval battle plans where part of the force is sent to outflank (Somme Plan 1415, Burgundian Plan 1417) - some real life examples include Poitiers, Castagnaro and Othee.  A third point is you can stretch the line to prevent your flank being turned only to find you weaken the centre for a break through, so there is a balance point.  There is some Viking stuff about this (e.g. the legendary battle of Bravellir) but we also discussed examples of it in the thread on tactics of medieval men-at-arms. 

[Patrick Waterson]

There is also the matter of human orientation - it is much easier for the man on the end to line up against the opponent on the end  than to, as it were, progress in vacuo.  Psychologically, men want to look at their opponents, and this is easier if they are in front of them.  This could well result in an army that deploys with wings overlapping its foe actually narrowing down to its opponent's frontage as it advances unless it has something else to orient itself on, e.g. large, spectacular banners or standards.

That said, if when the lines met one overlapped the other (as Duncan pointed out hoplite battles did this quite often) the overlapped line tended to lose (invariably lost in a hoplite battle unless 50 deep and commanded by Epaminondas).  A variation on the theme showing just how vunerable 'gapped' lines are occurred at First Mantinea in 418 BC, when the Spartan commander tried to make some last-minute adjustments to his line and succeeded in extending it but not in filling the resultant gaps.  The 'gapped' contingents were swarmed from three sides and went down like ninepins.

"As soon as they came to close quarters with the enemy, the Mantinean right broke their Sciritae and Brasideans, and bursting in with their allies and the thousand picked Argives into the unclosed breach in their line cut up and surrounded the Lacedaemonians, and drove them in full rout to the wagons, slaying some of the older men on guard there." - Thucydides V.72.3

Patrick

[Justin Swanton]

So the bottom line is: if there's something to cover the flanks, like cavalry or a second line, they're fine; if there isn't, they get chewed.

[aligern]

Which does make one wonder if linear formations had some drill or deployment that protected the flanks such as stationing a small guard unit just behind the flank. If overlapping in even a tiny way (shades of DBM) is so devastating then everyone is going to aim to do it, yet clearly we do not have lots of battles decided by one side having  ten more men on a flank than the other.

Roy

[Erpingham]

If overlapping in even a tiny way (shades of DBM) is so devastating then everyone is going to aim to do it, yet clearly we do not have lots of battles decided by one side having  ten more men on a flank than the other.

Roy

While I can't say we've bottomed this one, I do think it is clear that small overlaps on the very edges of the line aren't battle winners.  They may convey some small local advantage but the real dangerous flanking moves are by having either units who have no opponents to the front who can turn a line or detached flanking forces ditto.

[Patrick Waterson]

Also, given that the average infantry deployment through much of pre-gunpowder history sdeems to work out at about ten deep, give or take a few men, I think the real damage done by an outflanker is when he starts wrapping round the rear.  The reason is that if one has, say, ten men outflanking and they line up obediently against the ten men on the outside of the line and stab them in the dextral vulnerability zone, that is ten men gone down.  This is going to take some time to make any impression on a defender deployed 1,000 men wide, though it would be very bad news for, say, a 100-man subunit, especially if it happened on both of the subunit's flanks.

Wrapping round the rear is far more dangerous.  The rear ranks have to face about, removing impetus, support and morale from the front ranks.  The unit is squeezed from front, flank and rear, the men becoming compressed together and unable to use shield or weapon effectively.  The attackers can bite off a chunk, swallow it and, if nothing intervenes to stop them, move on to the next.

As Justin says, if you have flank cover this cannot happen.  If not, a wrap around the rear creates real problems for the defender.  A slow mastication up the flank alone is cost-effective but would take so long to have any serious effect that it is probably best considered as a casualty-increaser with respect to the main melee than as a decisive element on its own.

Getting down to the individual level, one would imagine that the file being flanked would turn to meet their attackers, with the exception of the chap squeezed in the corner who would perhaps try to adopt a half-way stance to face off against his foes to front and flank (I would not give much for his chances).  The file just inward from the one flanked would be looking over their shoulders.  Remaining files would probably carry on as usual after one glance towards the source of the noise.

If we work on the principle that soldiers would automatically face the most immediate threat, we shall probably not go far wrong.  This will result in a flanked unit having its outermost men face their new opponents, and they will fight at something of a disadvantage, lacking impetus, supporting ranks and, in the case of the chap in the corner, an extra weapon and shield arm.  When outflankers start pouring round the rear, the picture becomes much worse for the defenders.  Even assuming everyone on the outside faces their immediate foe (the corner chaps having two) the unit starts to get compressed between the opponents to front and rear with weapon use starting to become impossible, the file on the flank cannot be supported, all of which means the unit becomes as helpless as sardines in a net.

At least that is how I see it.

Patrick

[Justin Swanton]

Yes, that is how I would see it as well. Just one thing about the sardine compression effect - surely the chaps in the front who are doing the fighting don't suffer from this? All that happens is that they cannot recoil. If they are fighting then their opponents will continue to give them a healthy space.

I suspect though that the inability to recoil will hamper their fighting technique - they cannot dodge blows, enabling their opponent to stick them the moment he has an opening.

[Erpingham]

Yes, that is how I would see it as well. Just one thing about the sardine compression effect - surely the chaps in the front who are doing the fighting don't suffer from this?

But they would suffer being pushed forward onto their opponents in an uncontrolled manner.  This may be OK if they are winning, with the enemy yielding ground but if not - if they are held or being pushed back - it will be murder (possibly quite literally).

[aligern]

An army  taken in the rear has a huge psycholological deficit.  Onlty a small force appearing behind you could well destabilise a whole line as Totila does at the Po battle with just 300 men.

Also compression does have an effct on fighting ability. to cite another thread here on Roman fighting technique, there is a lot going on in the battle line with groups moving backwards and forwards  and  being able to retire and mutually rest or replace. Once physically compressed that cannot take place and the teamwork that is necessary for effective combat breaks down and then you start to lose the fight, heart and hope.

Roy

[Patrick Waterson]

Plus the possibility of 'friendly stab' when men and weapons are squeezed together, as seems to have happened at Adrianople.

[Erpingham]

Around 1410, Christine de Pisan wrote

Two great evils .... can follow from a disordered formation:one is that enemies can easily break into it; the other is that the formations may be so compressed that they cannot fight. Thus it is important to keep the formation in ranks and tight and joined together like a wall
   

Five years later the French at Agincourt delivered a practical demonstration.  The French main van had been halted by their English opponents.  They may have recovered from this and gone on to win except for the fact that their main battle advanced straight into their rear.  The front ranks, unable to advance or go back found them fighting in a pile of their own dead and wounded.  At the same time, they were under attack from archers on the flanks, so their ranks were compressed laterally too. Soon men were unable to lift their weapons and were slaughtered where they stood.  At the earlier battle of Roosebeke (1382), the Flemings were completely hemmed in by the French and suffered the same fate (this is probably the battle that de Pisans comment is most influenced by).  At Roosebeke, when the piles of dead were picked apart, it was noted many had no wounds - they had been crushed to death.

This is what commanders were afraid of - that their army would deteriorate from a fighting force into a helpless mob, whose very numbers were a danger to itself.

[Nick Harbud]

I suspect that what happens at the flank of line would largely depend upon the type of troops being outflanked.  For example, a group of skirmishers would probably react differently to a phalanx of spearmen.  (Run away versus form square/schiltron.)

Some time ago it was argued in Slingshot that the Romans switched from hoplite type formations/fighting methods to the blade/pilum as a resulting of facing hordes of hairy barbarian type who regularly outflanked them, but I know of no rule set that reflects this.

Similarly, medieval knights did not seem to be too concerned about their flanks when charging into an enemy provided they have a safe haven of spearmen, etc, to rally behind afterwards.

Hope this helps...