What happens at the flanks of a line?

[Patrick Waterson]

Another factor we have not really considered is the movement dimension.  On the tabletop, units teleport from one position to another with the aid of a tape measure, and bases can then trickle round a stationary flank.  In real life one has two masses of men colliding with impetus, noise, dust and above all a somewhat fluid situation as lines heave back and forth, men shout, trumpets blow and everyone tries to keep focussed on a changing situation.

While the situation is dynamic - one or both sides are moving and everyone is still evaluating what is going on - soldiers are going to stay put rather than move out to a potential outflanking position (unless the manoeuvre has been re-planned, which is not easy unless you know just how wide your opponent's army will be, as Hannibal seems to have done at Cannae).  Once things get stuck into a pattern (like the French at Agincourt, who provided the English with a large immobile column's open flanks) it becomes much easier for officers to order, and troops to perform without apprehension, effective flanking manoeuvres.

Hence in a situation like Hastings, with Normans surging forwards, a short but sharp melee at the shieldwall and then a flowing back of the repulsed attackers, there is not going to be the time nor the permanence of positional and psychological orientation for that base of Blades to swivel onto the flank of the Knights.  However in a a hoplite battle, as soon as the lines have clashed the situation is no longer dynamically changing and the outflankers on the right know exactly what to do, having a tradition that has covered this situation many times before.  As Nick points out, the troop type can make a significant difference.

[aligern]

The Romans can move around a lank because thy have small units wit commanders of those units who can take action with one initiative. Others, hoplites, Gauls etc do not have the substructure o break he line at a point and swing a unit around.
Roy

[Nick Harbud]

The Romans can move around a lank because thy have small units wit commanders of those units who can take action with one initiative. Others, hoplites, Gauls etc do not have the substructure o break he line at a point and swing a unit around.
Roy

This is precisely my point.  We all know (or at least assume) that this is what happened.  However, the rules we use to recreate this on the wargaming table tend not to reflect this.  Indeed, the only concession I can recall being made with respect to a target's flanks is in earlier (ie, up to ca 1992) rules where there was typically 1 figure overlap on a shielded flank and 3 figures on an unshielded one.

Surely we should be able to be more sophisticated than this?

Nick

[Mark G]

I'm not sure i agree with you Nick, it depends on the rules.

the point is not individual men within a unit overlapping - and frankly, the evidence for anyone being prepared to step out of their ranks to be the overlapper is pretty dubious becuase of the personal risk to the man.

Its the unit itself overlapping that matters.

And then you are looking at larger units being pinned by these smaller units, while another smaller unit seeks a chance to come around the flank of the large unit.

I see that in quite a few rules - just not the ones which force frontages to conform on contact.

[Nick Harbud]

Its the unit itself overlapping that matters.

And then you are looking at larger units being pinned by these smaller units, while another smaller unit seeks a chance to come around the flank of the large unit.

As you say, this is the heart of the disagreement.  I believe it is not only the unit doing the overlap that is important, but also that the unit being overlapped should also affect the outcome.  The type of unit will affect their response.

Your example of small units pinning much larger ones (as favoured by quite a few players of WRG 7th and FoG to name but two examples) adds further weight to my argument.  I mean, is a unit of mounted troops really going to be too concerned about a small group of any infantry type ambling around in their flank, rear, wherever, providing they are not already engaged with enemy to front or totally surrounded?

[Patrick Waterson]

Indeed - how often do we hear of cavalry being outflanked by infantry?  The reaction time of cavalry is far superior (as a rule) and if they notice infantry trying to trickle round their flank then the usual response would be to pull back a bit from whatever they are doing or thinking of doing and ride down the errant foot, or at least chase them back into position.

Actually there was one case when cavalry did get outflanked by infantry: Lucullus vs Tigranes at Tigranocerta, 69 BC: Lucullus sent his cavalry round Tigranes' right flank and the Armenian cataphracts obligingly redeployed to face them, whereupon Lucullus led a rapid advance by his infantry left, which was now perforce facing the flank of the cataphracts, and the latter broke and ran out of sheer surprise as much as anything else.

This was, of course, cheating, but it is worth noting that for it to work the cataphracts had to be pinned by a contingent faster/more lively/more reactive than themselves.

It may be that the concept of 'flexibility', 'reactivity' or whatever it eventually gets called - basically the ability of a unit to take action to nullify or ameliorate a threat to its flank - is worth building into rules to reflect what could and could not be done by certain types against certain types.

[Erpingham]

There seem to be three types of flanking being discussed at the moment

1. Overlap on the flank of an engaged unit
2. A unit being outflanked while pinned in combat to the front
3. A unit being outflanked while being pinned by threat to the front

I'd suggest 1 is a different thing for rules to capture - it is at a different level of tactics.  I do remember the old 3:1 overlaps and in more recent times single element overlaps.  But it seems to me that these were abstractions based on "it must have been a disadvantage that the ends of a unit were overlapped" without a clear rationale of what is being modelled.  If A overlaps B, are we saying that the men on the ends of A will rush forward to attack on B's flank?  Do that many extra A soldiers get into combat, or are we modelling a disruptive effect on B?  Does the same thing happen in all situations or just where A and B are on the end of the line or meet one-on-one outside a formal battleline?   The usual plea goes out for detailed examples.

Personally, I think it is an interesting question of how far the evidence will take us. 

[Mark G]

Well Nick, you have to get your head around the concept of non continuous melee before you can get anywhere with this.

if you cannot understand the concept of units breaking apart by mutual consent to rest before re engaging, then you are always going to see front lines meeting and then a lot of men hanging around with no one in front of them - and therefore assume that those men must want to put themselves in great danger in order to win the battle.

Personally, I think this is nonsense.  as men, they must rest.  as units, they will agree to separate mutually to allow that rest to happen.
Therefore, those men who happen to find themselves without an opponent during a melee are going to be happy to be out of the risk for that flurry far more than they are going to be looking through all the dust and violence for a chance to turn someone's flank.

its different when an entire formation finds itself unengaged, then there is a chance for a local commander to look for an opportunity.  but the most basic thing any fighting man is going to be aught, is to remain in the ranks.  and that is going to stay with them.

it works the other way also - your unit makes its attack - there are men overlapping on the edges, that's not the concern, as the corner guys just remain that half step back again. 

remember also, once you start to make your inward turn, you are now facing the side of the enemy - and your side is facing where you expect the rest of the enemy army to be.  you have to be quite certain that there is no chance of anything coming up on you before you make that turn.

no individual is going to do that, especially in the middle of a line.

[aligern]

It is also a matter of fighting style. There are various advantages and disadvantages to beiing closed up as opposed to loosely ordered and vice versa. Closed up pike get two to three men fighting against a looser ordered Roman, but the Roman can dance in and out, parrying and seeking advantage, the pike are immobile. The soldiers also work together in their formations, they protect each other and seek to take out opponents by ganging up on them. So individual actions (pike have least chance of and Romans most) are actively dangerous to the formation as a. Whole if they b
Eak the pattern of team fighting. Hence the soldiers stay in line.  Beyond that, to form to flank, there must be a commander who can order it and a unit that can perform the manoeuvre. Wheeling is quite hard on the parade ground, it must be even harder on a battlefield. As Mark says the unit that is wheeling will have to detach from units either side of it , march forward, wheel, potentially in front of an enemy reserve that it cannot see and then attack. If it falls into disorder and a rescuing cavalry unit appears, which it could do in seconds! Then those men are doomed.
For me the big risk in ancient warfare is falling into disorder because  that will dramatically reduce fighting effectiveness. Even the Gauls and Germans form up close for mutual protection and assistance.
Thus I can see why the 'old' overlaps rule was a good one because having a longer line is a definite advantage. The men at the end of the overlapped line must hold back and that disrupts the formation of the men next to them and they are more likely to lose because of that. Overlapping is not a killer advantage on its own , whereas a full blown flank attack is a big advantage, but that is hard to bring off because a whole unit must get around the flank, most likely starting from some point behind the enemy flank and that is hard to arrange.
Roy

[Justin Taylor]

An example comes to me from my own rules.

I remember on one occasion a unit of Numidian light cavalry charging a unit of Republican Roman legionaries. I decided the Romans did not even need to bother to throw their pila to see off the Numidians (back in those days pila were one-shot weapons that needed to be re-supplied to use again) and much to my surprise the Romans were massacred. Afterwards I thought about it and rationalised it like this, the Romans were isolated and the Numidians (in real life) would have been able to envelop and surround the Romans. In game terms a unit is allowed to add up to three figures per flank in combat against a stationary enemy, so the Numidians effectively doubled the number of figures they had fighting.

But (in the Die is Cast) against an enemy who is themselves charging or in square, the overlap allowed is only one figure on each side. So a moving foe is hard to overlap.

I think what convinced me about the advantage of a longer line, is the battle of Zama where Scipio seeing that Hannibals line was longer than his own, formed all three lines of Roman heavy infantry to extend his own line. So there had to be some advantage in being able to overlap the enemy. But note at that point in the battle, the cavalry of both sides is off doing their own things.

But so long as the battleline is fairly continuous there are only two places that the enemy are going to be able to get that advantage.

[Nick Harbud]

Some little time ago the then Slingshot Editor (the redoubtable John Graham-Leigh) invited members to refight Alfred the Great's famous battle of Eddington 878 assuming equal forces of 5,000 warriors per side.  Attached is something I scribbled at the time that may illustrate the difficulty in translating history onto the wargames table.  Yes, I know that for most of you WRG 7th is not your favourite rule set, but you get much the same results under say, DBx, and it highlights the key issues of this discussion nicely.

Essentially the problem you face is that the Saxons and Vikings can match up fairly well frontally, but the Vikings form up in a shallower formation and, hence, always outflank their opponents, which is where all the decisive action ends up.  The Vikings always have the advantage here and are therefore odds-on to win.

So there you have it.  How would you craft the rules that save Alfred's cakes?

[Erpingham]

Essentially the problem you face is that the Saxons and Vikings can match up fairly well frontally, but the Vikings form up in a shallower formation and, hence, always outflank their opponents, which is where all the decisive action ends up.  The Vikings always have the advantage here and are therefore odds-on to win.

Given parity in numbers and the fact that the two sides used similar battle formations, why should the Saxons form a shorter line?  Is this a rules created problem?  We know in early medieval warfare that armies worried about being outflanked might thin their line to widen their front but there is a trade off by making them prone to breakthrough.  Indeed, medieval cavalry might close up tight confonted with a long line with the intention of smashing through the centre before the wings could envelop them.  Similarly, the Scandinavian pigsnout formation as described by Saxo Grammaticus was for punching through the enemy, while echeloning back the remaining troops to prevent envelopment.  So, using period tactics, I would suggest Alfred either conformed his line and trusted to being able to outfight his opponents or he echeloned back his forces on either flank and tried to settle the outcome in the centre, leading with his hearthtroop, before the Viking wings could overcome his wings.

[Nick Harbud]

Given parity in numbers and the fact that the two sides used similar battle formations, why should the Saxons form a shorter line?  Is this a rules created problem? 

Hi Tony,

It is a rules problem in as much as most rule sets require spearmen to form in two element ranks whereas axemen form in one, so even assuming the same number of axemen as spearmen in an element (a fairly rash assumption) the axemen elements will always have a wider frontage than the spearmen.

Having said that, in real life one might expect that axemen would form in a shallower formation with greater individual frontage than a body of spearmen, so one cannot simply place all the blame with current rule writers.

What I am trying to illustrate here is a real battle which seemed to have at least one indisputably open flank and the difficulties faced by the close-order wargames player in trying to achieve a historical outcome.  I do not have a solution to offer.  All I suggest is that we need to think of some radical mechanisms to simulate what went on.

[Erpingham]

It is a rules problem in as much as most rule sets require spearmen to form in two element ranks whereas axemen form in one, so even assuming the same number of axemen as spearmen in an element (a fairly rash assumption) the axemen elements will always have a wider frontage than the spearmen.

This may be the problem. I wouldn't make as big of a distinction in armament - both sides would be spear-armed shieldwall infantry. So numbers of ranks etc. wouldn't be an issue. 

In terms of deployment, it is an interesting question whether the Vikings would be so confident that they would draw up half the depth of the Saxons in the real battle for reasons already stated.  We can also refer back to some of the earlier messages in this thread - how quickly could a big, hinged outflanking move deliver the critical advantage, compared with the speed your opponent could cave in your centre.

[aligern]

I have been to Edington, I configure it as an ambush with the Saxons coming down a wooded slope at the Danes!
Roy