What happens at the flanks of a line?

[Justin Taylor]

OK my take on the battle. Considering how it plays under different rules systems. Under some rules heavy infantry would form up in slightly denser formation than the loose order but similarly armoured Vikings, giving slightly wider frontage to the Vikings. But I suggest that in Shieldwall the Vikings would have been (in real life) as densely packed as the Saxons.

But if you go for elements, you would get roughly the same number of elements with no difference of frontage for either side. So if the rules give an advantage for two ranks of spearmen, thats the only reason that the Saxon line would be shorter. However would the advantage of the supporting rank of spears outweigh the disadvantage of being out-flanked?

Under my rules there is little advantage to either side, the Saxons are armed with javelins (perhaps with swords as well) and hit the Vikings on a 4 or less (on a D12). Vikings with axes would be hitting on 5 or less. No advantage (in terms of fighting ability) for javelin armed troops to fight in a deeper formation, just a greater ability to take losses. If the Vikings were fighting uphill then the advantage would be with the Saxons.

I found this podcast which suggests that Alfreds army was 4,500 - 5,000 strong as opposed to Guthrums 3,500?
http://podbay.fm/show/463700741/e/1112860800

[Chuck the Grey]

In his book Lost Battles, Phil Sabin makes the comment that massive combat bonuses for flank or rear attacks may be exaggerated (pages 54-55). As examples, Prof. Sabin mentions the battles of Ibera, where the Romans handled encirclements after routing their frontal opponents, and Telamon and Ruspina where troops fought for a long time despite having enemies to their front and rear.

Prof. Sabin does believe that certain types of any troops seem to be more vulnerable to attacks from other directions. He points out that the Spartans rolled up several hoplite units from their unshielded flank at 1st Mantinea, Nemea and 2nd Coronea. Prof. Sabin also mentions the emphasis that Polybius and Livy place on the vulnerability of phalangites to flank or rear attacks. He also feels this vulnerability to flank and rear attacks was probably also true for close-order archers if the enemy could evade the "beaten zone" of the arrows.

Prof. Sabin's conclusion is that attacks by heavy infantry on hoplites, phalangites and close order archers would seem to justify a modest combat bonus. In his game Lost Battles, a flank or rear attack rear attack on those types of units merits a +1 bonus of the die roll.

So the question is, do you agree with Prof. Sabin's analysis and if you do, do you think wargame rules need to be modified to reflect this reduce combat effect?

[Mark G]

If you get into Prof Sabins earlier papers (pPlenty from me and Roy on this in the next two slingshots, I am afraid to say), he gets right into the detail of this, and concludes that it is the surprise which is the effect, not the flank itself.

I was reading Ross Cowan's osprey battle tactics over the weekend (by far a better book that the one on the republican battle tactics, which surprised me as I much prefer that period of Rome).  Anyway, that has loads of examples of Romans (expecially Caesar) changing the battle line, simplex, duplex lines depending on the width of the enemy, of detaching the entire third line to face to  flank, or forming orbis mid battle to counter encirclement etc.

In each of those, Caesar (etc) can see the threat coming, and has time to anticipate it and reconfigure the legions to face it.

That is the level of command and control that most ancient armies do not have - and we see the same thing with helenistic armies.  if they have time to react to a threat to flank or rear, they do so quite happily.  when an army does not have that - either because the threat emerges too swiftly (cavalry, ambush), or because they cannot communicate this to the threatened point - then the army falls apart.

Sabin has a term for this which escapes me, but is basically the necessity in any model of warfare of having a reason for the battle to be won.
Surprising new threats, loss of the general, total exhaustion - that pretty much sums up all ancient battles turning from a contest into a victory.  hardly ever from simply being better at fighting frontally (e.g. Rome breaking straight through at the loss at trebia - a frontal victory on the table, but a lost battle)

If you can represent that on your table, the adaptability of an army or not to a new threat, you are on to a winner.

[Justin Taylor]

I have just been reading some books on Mongol battles. In those they use just about every trick you can think of to bring victory.

Some troops seem especially vulnerable to being attacked in the flank (I think particularly of phalangites). That can be provided for by having lighter troops or cavalry protecting the flanks.

So troops that require to maintain a particular formation (say phalanx or shieldwall) should be particularly degraded if attacked in the flank or rear (in a good set of rules).

[Mark G]

I'm pretty sure that a forewarned phalanx of either description would be quite happy to have some rear ranks face backwards.

flanks, however... 

[Patrick Waterson]

This all seems to be pointing towards the effectiveness of flank attacks being in inverse proportion to troops' ability to react effectively to them.

In Gallic War II.25 the Nervii attack Caesar's right.

"Caesar proceeded, after encouraging the tenth legion, to the right wing; where he perceived that his men were hard pressed, and that in consequence of the standards of the twelfth legion being collected together in one place, the crowded soldiers were a hindrance to themselves in the fight; that all the centurions of the fourth cohort were slain, and the standard-bearer killed, the standard itself lost, almost all the centurions of the other cohorts either wounded or slain, and among them the chief centurion of the legion P. Sextius Baculus, a very valiant man, who was so exhausted by many and severe wounds, that he was already unable to support himself; he likewise perceived that the rest were slackening their efforts, and that some, deserted by those in the rear, were retiring from the battle and avoiding the weapons; that the enemy, though advancing from the lower ground, were not relaxing in front, and were pressing hard on both flanks; he also perceived that the affair was at a crisis."

The Nervii are coming in "in front, and ... on both flanks" and we see 1) defenders pushed too closely together to fight effectively, 2) increased casualties, particularly among officers and 3) a significant drop in morale.  These seem to be the effects of the Nervii's flank attacks, because the frontal attacks by the Atrebates and Viromandui against the Roman left and centre were repelled with relative ease.

Once Caesar managed to redispose his troops to counter the Nervii's flanking dispositions, matters stabilised and Roman superiority in equipment and training soon reasserted itself.  Labienus sent the 10th legion to assist and the two legions with the baggage turned up, catching the Nervii in a nutcracker - and from then it was the Nervii who were flanked and without insight, command, training and discipline comparable to Caesar and his men they had no answer except to keep on fighting, so were piling up their corpses on the battlefield for the rest of the battle. 

[Justin Taylor]

And indeed some other classic flank attacks,

Trasimene

[22.5]In the universal panic, the consul displayed all the coolness that could be expected under the circumstances. The ranks were broken by each man turning towards the discordant shouts; he re-formed them as well as time and place allowed, and wherever he could be seen or heard, he encouraged his men and bade them stand and fight. "It is not by prayers or entreaties to the gods that you must make your way out," he said, "but by your strength and your courage. It is the sword that cuts a path through the middle of the enemy, and where there is less fear there is generally less danger." But such was the uproar and confusion that neither counsel nor command could be heard, and so far was the soldier from recognising his standard or his company or his place in the rank, that he had hardly sufficient presence of mind to get hold of his weapons and make them available for use, and some who found them a burden rather than a protection were overtaken by the enemy. In such a thick fog ears were of more use than eyes; the men turned their gaze in every direction as they heard the groans of the wounded and the blows on shield or breastplate, and the mingled shouts of triumph and cries of panic. Some who tried to fly ran into a dense body of combatants and could get no further; others who were returning to the fray were swept away by a rush of fugitives. At last, when ineffective charges had been made in every direction and they found themselves completely hemmed in, by the lake and the hills on either side, and by the enemy in front and rear, it became clear to every man that his only hope of safety lay in his own right hand and his sword. Then each began to depend upon himself for guidance and encouragement, and the fighting began afresh, not the orderly battle with its three divisions of principes, hastati, and triarii, where the fighting line is in front of the standards and the rest of the army behind, and where each soldier is in his own legion and cohort and maniple. Chance massed them together, each man took his place in front or rear as his courage prompted him, and such was the ardour of the combatants, so intent were they on the battle, that not a single man on the field was aware of the earthquake which levelled large portions of many towns in Italy, altered the course of swift streams, brought the sea up into the rivers, and occasioned enormous landslips amongst the mountains.

And Cannae

Without a moment's pause they followed up their broken and hastily retreating foe till they took to headlong flight. Cutting their way through the mass of fugitives, who offered no resistance, they penetrated as far as the Africans who were stationed on both wings, somewhat further back than the Gauls and Spaniards who had formed the advanced centre. As the latter fell back the whole front became level, and as they continued to give ground it became concave and crescent-shaped, the Africans at either end forming the horns. As the Romans rushed on incautiously between them, they were enfiladed by the two wings, which extended and closed round them in the rear. On this, the Romans, who had fought one battle to no purpose, left the Gauls and Spaniards, whose rear they had been slaughtering, and commenced a fresh struggle with the Africans. The contest was a very one-sided one, for not only were they hemmed in on all sides, but wearied with the previous fighting they were meeting fresh and vigorous opponents.

[Mark G]

Polybius 3:65

"The cavalry charged each other front to front, and for a long time maintained an equal contest ...
The Numidian horse, however, having outflanked the Romans, charged them on the rear: ...
while the front ranks originally engaged with the Carthaginians, after losing many of their men and inflicting a still greater loss on the enemy, finding themselves charged on the rear by the Numidians, broke into flight: most of them scattering in every direction, while some of them kept closely massed round the Consul. "


Polybius 11.1

"Meanwhile Claudius, who was stationed on the right wing, found himself unable to advance and outflank the enemy, owing to the rough ground in front of him ...
He withdrew his men from the right wing, and marched them on the rear of the field of battle; and, after passing the left of the Roman line, fell upon the flank of the Carthaginians who were fighting near the elephants. Up to this point the victory had been doubtful; for both sides fought with desperation, the Romans believing that all would be over with them if they failed, and the Iberians and Carthaginians holding exactly the same conviction for themselves. Moreover the elephants were being of disservice to both sides alike; for finding themselves between two forces, and exposed to a crossfire of javelins, they kept throwing both the Carthaginian and Roman lines into confusion. But as soon as Claudius fell upon the rear of the enemy the battle ceased to be equal: for the Iberians found themselves attacked on front and rear at once, which resulted in the greater part of them being cut down on the ground"


Livy 21.55

"and Mago and his Numidians, as soon as the Roman army had passed their ambuscade without observing it, started up in their rear, and caused the wildest panic and confusion."


22.48

"About five hundred Numidians, who, in addition to their customary arms and missiles, carried swords concealed under their corslets, pretended to desert. [3] Riding over from their own side, with their bucklers at their backs, they suddenly dismounted and threw down bucklers and javelins at the feet of their enemies. Being received into the midst of their ranks they were conducted to the rear and ordered to fall in behind. [4] And while the battle was getting under way at every point, they kept quite still; but no sooner were the minds and eyes of all absorbed in the struggle, than they snatched up the shields which lay strewn about everywhere amongst the heaps of slain, and assailing the Romans from behind and striking at their backs and hamstrings, effected a great slaughter and a terror and confusion that were even greater. [5] And now in one place there was a panic rout and in another an obstinate though hopeless struggle,1 "


25.34

"But the Numidian cavalry, whose notice the general had thought he had escaped, by outflanking them inspired great alarm, and in addition, when they had entered a fresh battle with the Numidians, a third enemy also arrived, the Carthaginian generals, who from the rear overtook them when already engaged. [10] And the Romans found themselves between two battles, uncertain against which enemy and in which direction they should choose to break through in a mass. "


27.1

"But Hannibal gave the order to his cavalry, that when the infantry lines should have concentrated the eyes and attention of the enemy upon the immediate conflict, they should turn the flanks and attack, some of them the enemy's camp, some the rear of the wavering troops. [9] ...
For when many of the Romans had fallen in the close contact of the lines during [11??] the infantry battle, while the ranks and standards nevertheless held their ground, the wild charge of the cavalry was heard in the rear, and at the same time the shouts of the enemy from the camp. This routed first the sixth legion, which was posted in the second line and was the first to be thrown into disorder by the Numidians; and then it routed the fifth legion and the men who were with the front-line standards. [12] Some scattered in flight, some were slain in the centre of the battle,"


30.35

"At the right moment Laelius and Masinissa, who had pursued the routed cavalry for a considerable distance, returned and dashed into the rear of the enemy's line. That charge of the cavalry finally worsted the enemy. [2] Many were overpowered [p. 499]and slain in the battle-line, many were scattered in 1 flight over the open plain all around, and as the cavalry were in complete possession, they perished everywhere"

[Mark G]

Sabin, Mechanics of Battle
(some formatting oddities, but it should come out OK)

"I suspect that the explanation for the deadly effect of flank and rear attacks lies in a
combination of factors which I have already mentioned. For one thing, attacks from two or
more directions at once would catastrophically disrupt the cohesion of the affected formation,
making it impossible for the ranks and files to exert coordinated pressure in either direction,
and depriving them of the flexibility to withdraw to a comfortable 'safety distance' without
squeezing into a congested and helpless mass. ''

The importance of simultaneous pressure
from two directions in causing this disruption is shown by the fact that some Roman
legionaries escaped the consequences of encirclement at the Trebia and Lake Trasimene, and
actually won the battle of Ibera, when they were able to defeat their frontal opponents before
the flank and rear attacks could take full effect."'

In addition, onslaughts from flank or rear would have a pronounced moral impact, with the
attackers being encouraged and with the defenders being rudely surprised by the unexpected
direction of the attack, especially those in the new 'front line', who would not have prepared
themselves psychologically for this highly dangerous position.

I't is interesting that when
troops were properly prepared to fight enemies to both front and rear, as at Telamon and in
Caesar's battle against Labienus in Africa, they could do so much more effectively, moreover
usually, the onslaught would come as a nasty shock, and one can easily see the troops involved
panicking, trying to flee, and being cut down from behind as they ran."

[Nick Harbud]

This may be the problem. I wouldn't make as big of a distinction in armament - both sides would be spear-armed shieldwall infantry. So numbers of ranks etc. wouldn't be an issue. 

In terms of deployment, it is an interesting question whether the Vikings would be so confident that they would draw up half the depth of the Saxons in the real battle for reasons already stated.  We can also refer back to some of the earlier messages in this thread - how quickly could a big, hinged outflanking move deliver the critical advantage, compared with the speed your opponent could cave in your centre.

OK my take on the battle. Considering how it plays under different rules systems. Under some rules heavy infantry would form up in slightly denser formation than the loose order but similarly armoured Vikings, giving slightly wider frontage to the Vikings. But I suggest that in Shieldwall the Vikings would have been (in real life) as densely packed as the Saxons.

But if you go for elements, you would get roughly the same number of elements with no difference of frontage for either side. So if the rules give an advantage for two ranks of spearmen, thats the only reason that the Saxon line would be shorter. However would the advantage of the supporting rank of spears outweigh the disadvantage of being out-flanked?

Under my rules there is little advantage to either side, the Saxons are armed with javelins (perhaps with swords as well) and hit the Vikings on a 4 or less (on a D12). Vikings with axes would be hitting on 5 or less. No advantage (in terms of fighting ability) for javelin armed troops to fight in a deeper formation, just a greater ability to take losses. If the Vikings were fighting uphill then the advantage would be with the Saxons.

I found this podcast which suggests that Alfreds army was 4,500 - 5,000 strong as opposed to Guthrums 3,500?

Forgive me, but all this strikes me as trying to avoid the question of how we deal with flanks on a wargames table by arguing that either the element types are incorrect or the scenario is badly posed or that one side should form up in a less than optimal formation.  I would really prefer to concentrate on the problem, but these arguments cannot go unanswered. 

1. The element types are those defined by the authors for the rule sets quoted.

2. The scenario as posed generally produces balanced points armies.  (Incidentally, Roy's suggestion of an ambush is appealing given what happened at Stamford Bridge.  However, not only was the scenario posed differently, but such an ambush is difficult to recreate under the rules unless one assumes a night attack or something similar.)

3. No wargamer and by implication Viking or Saxon general, would be this stupid.  Under the rules quoted, the spearmen have to be in two ranks to withstand the frontal attack of the foaming axemen.  In real life, I doubt if even the most heroic, I-will-never-make-it-to-Valhalla-without-slaying-my-enemy-frontally head banger would pass up the opportunity of an enemy who cannot fight back.

Incidentally, thanks to the wonders of march moves, loose elements can wander around the open flank of a pinned element and be in contact within 2-3 moves.

[Erpingham]

Forgive me, but all this strikes me as trying to avoid the question of how we deal with flanks on a wargames table by arguing that either the element types are incorrect or the scenario is badly posed or that one side should form up in a less than optimal formation.  I would really prefer to concentrate on the problem, but these arguments cannot go unanswered. 

Apologies Nick, but your original question was about crafting rules to save Alfred's cakes.  So the replies were rule based, not history based.   In general terms, I'm sure there is plenty to be getting on with in the proceeding posts.  In particular, the role of confusion and disorientation when troops are suddenly attacked from the "wrong" direction and whether certain troop types were more prone than others is a useful observation.  It strikes me that a shieldwall, like a phalanx, is designed for action to the front and has poor awareness of what is going on other than straight ahead (and if you are in the middle not even that) so would be quite prone to be rolled up, which would explain the recorded concern about not having a line much shorter than the enemy.

[Justin Taylor]

3. No wargamer and by implication Viking or Saxon general, would be this stupid.  Under the rules quoted, the spearmen have to be in two ranks to withstand the frontal attack of the foaming axemen.  In real life, I doubt if even the most heroic, I-will-never-make-it-to-Valhalla-without-slaying-my-enemy-frontally head banger would pass up the opportunity of an enemy who cannot fight back.

Simple the rules are wrong then  and I will explain. You have the historical situation where flank attacks or out-flanking have discomforted the enemy (sometimes resulting in victory, sometimes not). Thats history, it happened.

So the question is what do rules do about it? If the rules cannot simulate history, then they are not accurate are they?

Wargames rules do not have to simulate history of course, they could just be there to make a fun game. Points values, irrelevant to an historical battle - and for various reasons points values never work anyway, different terrain will see to that.

There are various mechanisms of playing the situation (overlaps, reduction of combat effectiveness, disorder) but the important thing (in terms of history) is does it get you something like the historical battle.

Now from my own point of view once you have rules that you can play out a known battle and get close to what happened on the day. Then you can take those rules and play what-ifs, with a degree of confidence that that is what could have happened.

[Patrick Waterson]

Actually the problem lies not in the rules but in the army lists.  Up to WRG 5th Edition, Vikings were close formation types like the Saxons, and the two sides were much more evenly matched.  For 6th Edition (and carrying on into 7th), Phil Barker was "persuaded by the arguments of others" to reclassify Vikings as loose formation troops, which has a number of effects under 7th Edition:
1) They have 3 figures per element rather than 4.  Points values being more or less equal, they will always be able to flank a similar-sized force of Saxons.
2) Their impetuous charges are not only +2 instead of +1, they can be launched from 120 paces away before the Saxons (80 paces charge range) can hope to initiate a charge - they can only countercharge, and countercharges cannot be impetuous.
3) Combine the above with Viking huscarls in wedge, and the Vikings are almost impossible to stop.

Reclassify Vikings as close formation troops (MI and HI) and these problems disappear.  Their axes still give them an advantage, but not terrifyingly so.

The only problem I see with the rules themselves is that 7th Edition is a big battle rules set - it does not shine with less than 10,000 men (200 figures) per side.  Trying to fit a 5,000-man-per-side engagement into it is stretching it a little.

That said, one point that does seem to be emerging is that Alfred may well have had the numbers at Edington.  Against an equal number of Vikings he will lose under almost any wargames system, especially uphill.  I would suggest giving him an approximately 40% numerical advantage (increase his forces or slim down the Vikings) and seeing what happens.  Even with 7th Edition there may not be a lists problem or a rules problem - rather just an OB problem.

Hope this gets us somewhere.

Patrick
[Edit: 'argiments' changed to 'arguments' - in case anyone was reaching for their dictionaries!]

[Justin Taylor]

And the requirement for the Saxons to fight two elements deep to be effective.

Numbers should not be a problem, simply multiply the number of elements.

[aligern]

If I remember correctly the Viking problem was akin to that of the  deployment distance of Celta and goes back to an original piece of both wisdom and potential error in the erly WRG rule sets.  As a reaction to the old Tony Bath rules which were based upon relationships between weapon ranges and movement quite arbitrarily decided the new school of thinking , in 1970, was that there should be a time/ground scale that was based upon researched distances of moves, ranges and deployments.
That led to debates about the size of bases for various units, but it commenced with a basic error, that was that Roman legionaries should be 'close order'. Thus Celts who were swinging long swords had to be in loose order because psiloi were in open order. The whole schema was flawed from the start because it was based upon the Roman legionary and should have started with the phalangite pikeman  in close order. Here the rule writers, at least some of them, tried to backwards engineer a solution and create dense order . The trouble with that was that  the figures that existed at the time could not be placed closer than the chosen close order.
The Viking problem, if memory serves, was because, having agreed to Celts ceding in 'loose' the argument that one needed space to swing an axe held sway. Of course it was all nonsense because you do not swing a Danish axe laterally, but vertically as is shown on the Bayeux tapestry. The romanticises and re enactors (all too often interchangeable terms :-)) held sway and created this problem whereby for equal points, the Vikings o'erlapped the Saxons and that in a rule set which rewarded the longer line.
As to Viking axemen fighting in less depth than Saxons well, we all know that s nonsense.
The DB relies of rules largely  dealt with the nonsense of numbers on the base because we no longer counted the number of figures on the base, but used them as an indicator of fighting characteristics.

The problem that the then new rules concept brought in was that apparently small units from a Battlegroup could detach themselves and move round on the flank of an enemy in a devastating manoeuvre. Gamers being what they are they became adept at designing their battle groups so that the required types of units were in the appropriate types of unit were in the right place at the right time. Rule writers would, of course, point to the advantage that overlapping on the flank conferred in real life. However, as has been said before here, the Ancients may have had gaps between units in a line, but that conferred little or no advantage to the overlapper unless it was on the end of a battle line because the opponent just conformed. Only overlap at the end of the main line would really matter.
Roy