Gauls and Brawls

[aligern]

I think I'd see the Tain as being similar in concept to the chansons de Geste. The deeds of heroes are concentrated upon and the mass of the army ignored. That's necessary for a literary genre in which aristocrats are the subject.  Its not that different from Froissart. I'm not sure that means that only the heroes mattered, but rather that  only they mattered to the bards.   At Mons Graupius there are substantial  numbers of footmen and they do fight albeit not well against the Batavi and other spear armed Roman auxilia.. The chariots in Caesar are apparently trying to isolate and disorganise Roman  units, but presumably they are then normally followed up by warriors on foot or what is the point?
I just wondered if there are any Irish accounts of massed combat or even hints at it like the Clan Calatin?

Roy

[aligern]

Can Mark G remember anything of Maori Warfare. I attended a presentation by Maoris in NZ and the way the heroically tattooed chief described it was that individuals would come out, do a haka , tell the other chap how mighty they were and how he wasn't the shit on their shoes and then fight.   After a while they would all join in. Having your top toff lose would be bad for morale, but not necessarily fatal to your hopes as these chaps were basically fearless.

Roy

[Mick Hession]

At Mons Graupius there were two bodies of Caledonian foot, the first group (leaping about, dodging missiles and generally showing off) and the main body (more restrained souls) back on the hill with the chariots between the two groups. I think it's possible to interpret the first line of Caledonian infantry at Mons Graupius as dismounted chariot warriors - their behaviour is certainly reminiscent of descriptions of the "shield-feats" performed by the Irish heroes of the Tain. 

Massed infantry combat is described in some Irish texts of the Red Branch poem cycle, e.g. the Battle of Cumar, but these tend to be of rather late composition - Viking age, rather than Iron Age - so of little value for this discussion. For what it's worth, they emphasise spear fighting, and the early textual evidence has a similar emphasis on spearcraft: the Irish word for a hero is gaisce, formed from the root gai [spear] + sciad [shield] whilst the Tain notes one formidable body of non-noble infantry called the Gailenga (again with the Gai- root) and these are possibly a body of professional warriors similar to the Gaisati (the Gai- root again) at Telamon.  In other words, nothing to suggest the primary tactic was to slash at an opponent with a sword. Spears are also emphasised in the Tain, though heroes possess swords (pretty essential equipment for headhunters). Those depicted in later art are short (possibly adapted from Roman models - the Irish word for a sword, claidheamh, derives from gladius, IIRC). 

The Clan Calatin tale is very interesting, but hard to interpret. Many years ago, Phil Barker suggested it was some sort of folk memory of Roman intervention; I was initially quite sceptical of that, but Calatin is not an Irish name (or at least doesn't obey standard Irish orthography) and it could conceivably be a Q-Celtic form of Palatin(a). At any rate, I don't think it tells us much about Irish infantry warfare.

Cheers
Mick   

[Mark G]

I don't see much relevance at all from Maori warfare.

tribal warfare is (or was when I last checked) an area of almost no sources, even oral, appropriate for what we are looking for until the introduction of muskets.  There is likely to have been a growth in oral hstory being recorded in print over the last 15 years, but I doubt it has much tactical input, and is certain to not meet the criteria of men necessary to be classed as more than a large skirmishes and raiding.

Warfare against europeans is almost entirely a history of siege warfare, with a few musket based ambushes added.  Any comparisons therefore are pretty much only relevant in the context of asymetrical colonial era warfare.

put sumply, the population dispersal is such that the numbers are simply not there to classify it as a battle until the sieges of later colonial period.

[Erpingham]

I think that's correct - I perceive two distinct styles of Celtic fighting, which I'd dub Insular and Continental. The Insular style is based on a heroic elite of noble chariot warriors with a supporting cast of common folk who don't have much of a role. On the Continent, despite strong cultural similarities in other fields, all classes seem to have had an active role in warfare. Perhaps that is because Insular Celts were fighting each other hence shared the same cultural norms and assumptions; Continental Celts had to evolve methods of warfare that could cope with a range of non-Celtic opponents, or face the fate of the Caledones at Mons Graupius.

It is an interesting speculation to see insular warfare as perhaps more formalised.  One reading of this insular warfare is to see it as primarily small scale raiding and personal challenges, with lots of display, by an elite.  Every now and again, however, as mass mobilisation and a larger scale conflict would occur (for whatever reason).  The elite have a starring role, even in the big picture.   In mainland Britain, one might ask where the cavalry fit in, if the charioteers are the elite?   

[aligern]

As warfare in the British isles didn't provide a description of tactics that was based in a non Roman tradition can we get back to the sweet spot where Patrick was chewing through the sources and quoting the extant descriptions of Celtic battle deployment and tactics as I at least was finding that very useful??

Roy

[Patrick Waterson]

Yessir.

Next I shall crib freely from Julian Lorriman's useful article (After Hannibal) in Slingshot 283 for a coherent and sequential list of engagements (if you are reading this, Julian, take a bow - and feel free to join the discussion).  Following the Second Punic War, Roman armies marched into northern Italy (Cisalpina) with varying fortunes.

201 BC
In Gaul, about this time, the consul, Publius Aelius, having heard that, before his arrival, the Boians had made inroads on the territories of the allies, levied two occasional legions [legionibus subitariis = hastily-raised legions, emergency legions] on account of this disturbance;  and adding to them four cohorts from his own army, ordered Caius Oppius, the prefect, to march with this tumultuary band through Umbria, (which is called the Sappinian district,) and to invade the territories of the Boians. He himself led his own troops thither openly, over the intervening mountains. Oppius, on entering the same, for some time committed depredations with tolerable success and safety.  But afterwards, having pitched on a place near a fort called Mutilum, convenient enough for cutting down the corn, (for the crops were now ripe,) and setting out without having reconnoitred around, and without establishing armed posts of sufficient strength to protect those who were unarmed and intent on their work, he was suddenly surrounded, together with his foragers, by an unexpected invasion of the Gauls [improviso impetu Gallorum = a sudden/unexpected Gallic attack].  On this, panic and flight seized even on those who were furnished with weapons.  Seven thousand men, dispersed through the corn fields, were put to the sword, among whom was the commander himself, Caius Oppius.  The rest were driven by terror into the camp; from whence, in consequence of a resolution of the soldiers, they set out on the following night, without any particular commander; and, leaving behind a great part of their baggage, made their way, through woods almost impassable, to the consul, who returned  to Rome without having performed any thing in his province worth notice, except that he ravaged the lands of the Boians, and made a treaty with the Ingaunian Ligurians. - Livy XXXI.2

Once again, a Gallic army takes advantage of poor (or nonexistent) Roman reconnaissance.  A surprise attack catches the Romans in a compromised position, foragers are slaughtered and the C-in-C slain, and thereafter the rest of the army decamps in no good order, but the Gauls do not manage to mount a pursuit.  They seem to exhibit pre-battle control but not post-battle control or planning.

The following year, the Gauls became more ambitious:

200 BC
The Insubres, the Cenomani, and the Boii had roused the Celines, the Ilvates and the other Ligustini, and these tribes, under the leadership of Hamilcar the Carthaginian, who had remained in that region, a survivor of Hasdrubal's army, had attacked Placentia.2 [3] After plundering the city and burning most of it in their fury, they had left barely two thousand men alive among the flames and ruins, and then had crossed the Po and gone to destroy Cremona. - Livy XXXI.10.2-3

This comes just after the local Roman praetor has disbanded his army on instructions from Rome.  An army was made available and a new commander appointed, and after expiating dreadful portents (including a five-legged colt, a lamb with a pig's head, a pig with a man's head and, worst of all, a hermaphrodite) they marched against the Gallic alliance.  The Gauls, under Hamilcar, showed some initiative, combining a rapid attack with an attempt to envelop a Roman flank.

There was an excellent chance for a victory if he had attacked their camp immediately after his march; the Gauls had scattered through the neighbourhood without leaving a strong guard on duty.  But Furius spared his weary troops because he had made a strenuous march.  The Gauls, called back by the shouts of their comrades, dropped the booty which they had in hand and hurried back to their camp. The next day they moved out in battle-array, nor did the Roman refuse the engagement.  But the Romans had barely time to form in line, with such speed did the enemy advance to the attack.  The right squadron [ala = wing] — he had the allied army divided into squadrons — occupied the front line, with two Roman legions in reserve. Commanders were designated: Marcus Furius of the right squadron, Marcus Caecilius of the legions, Lucius Valerius Flaccus of the cavalry —all were lieutenants.  The praetor kept with him two lieutenants, Gaius Laetorius and Publius Titinius, by whose aid he  planned to watch the whole engagement and meet all sudden attacks of the enemy.  At first the Gauls hoped, concentrating the mass of their force on one place, to be able to overwhelm and destroy the right squadron [ala] which was in the van.  When this did not succeed, they tried to outflank and envelop the enemy's line, a plan which seemed easy on account of their great numbers arrayed against a few.  When the praetor saw this, that he too might extend his front, he threw in two legions from his reserves [subsidariis] on the right and left flanks of the front-line force and vowed a temple to Diiovis [Jupiter] if he routed the enemy on that day.  He ordered Lucius Valerius to send the cavalry of two legions to one side against the flank of the enemy and to the other the allied cavalry, and not to allow the enemy to envelop his lines.  Seeing too that the Gallic centre was weakened by the extension of the line, at the same time he gave his men the order to charge in mass formation [signa inferre confertus = advance the standards (i.e. attack) close together] and to break through [ut perrumpere ordines], and the flanks were thrown back by the cavalry, the centre by the infantry.  The Gauls, suffering heavy losses in every quarter, suddenly broke and in complete rout fled to their camp.  The cavalry pursued them in their flight, and presently the legions too followed and stormed the camp. Less than six thousand Gauls escaped;  more than thirty-five thousand were killed or captured, along with seventy standards and more than two hundred Gallic wagons laden with abundant spoils. Hamilcar the Carthaginian general and three noble Gallic commanders fell in the battle.

The use of entire legions in reserve is interesting and unusual, and parallels their use in 203 BC against Mago's Gallo-Ligurian-Spanish-Numidian force.  The initial Gallic attack looked encouraging, but the Gallic army was as usual at a disadvantage in a sustained battle.

199 BC
The year's portents included another five-legged colt and some chicks with three feet.  The victorious Roman army received a new commander, but no details are given for the campaign, only the result.

During the same year, Gnaeus Baebius Tamphilus, who had succeeded Gaius Aurelius, consul of the preceding year, as governor of the province of Gaul, rashly invaded the territory of the Insubrian Gauls and was cut off with almost his entire army; he lost more than six thousand seven hundred men; such a disaster was suffered in a war that no one any longer feared.

One suspects a well-conducted Gallic ambush rather than a stand-up fight.

Discussion time again ...

[Patrick Waterson]

A few more examples of Gauls in action, or at least the results thereof.  These campaigns all take place in Cisalpina.

197 BC
Consul Cornelius marches against the Insubres, and enlists the covert aid of the Cenomani

On learning this he invited their chiefs to a conference and tried to induce them to break with the Insubres and either return home or go over to the Romans.  He was unable to gain their consent to the latter proposal, but they gave him assurances that they would take no part in the fighting, unless occasion should arise, in which case they would assist the Romans.  The Insubres were kept in ignorance of this compact, but they felt somewhat suspicious as to the intentions of their allies, and in forming their line they did not venture to entrust them with a position on either wing lest they should abandon their ground through treachery and involve the whole army in disaster.  They were accordingly stationed in the rear as a reserve. At the outset of the battle the consul vowed a temple to Juno Sospita in case the enemy were routed that day, and the shouts of the soldiers assured their commander that they would enable him to fulfil his vow.  Then they charged, and the Insubres did not stand against the first shock. Some authors say that the Cenomani attacked them from behind while the battle was going on and that the twofold attack threw them into  complete disorder, 35,000 men being killed and 5200 made prisoners, including the Carthaginian general Hamilcar, the prime instigator of the war. 130 standards were taken and numerous wagons. - Livy XXXII.30.7-12

When it came to treachery, the Romans showed they had nothing to learn from anyone.

Meanwhile ...

Quintus Minucius, they continued, had fought some unimportant battles in Liguria, hardly worthy of mention, and in Gaul had lost a great number of his men; they even mentioned by name Titus Iuventius and Gnaeus Ligurius, military tribunes of the fourth legion, who had fallen in the defeat along with many other brave men, citizens and allies. The surrender of small towns and villages had taken place, but this was fictitious, manufactured for the occasion, and without guarantees. - Livy XXXIII.22.7-8

It is not stated whether Minucius had suffered his losses in a battle or an ambush, or both.

196 BC
In what is starting to become a recognisable pattern, the Gauls win an ambush and lose a battle.  First the ambush.

The consuls left for their provinces. Marcellus entered the territory of the Boii, and whilst he was entrenching his camp on some rising ground, his men worn out with marching all day long, Corolamus, one of the Boian chiefs, attacked him with a large force and killed as many as 3000. Several men of high rank fell in this tumultuary battle; amongst them Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus and M. Junius Silanus, prefects of the allies, and two military tribunes in the second legion-M. Ogulnius and P. Claudius.  The Romans, however, succeeded by great exertions in completing their lines and held the camp against the attacks of the enemy, which his initial success rendered all the more fierce.  Marcellus remained in his camp for some time, in order that his wounded might be cured and that his men might have time to recover their spirits after such heavy losses. - Livy XXXIII.36.4-7

The annoyed Marcellus then manages to bring on a battle.

The Boii —a people intolerant of the tiresomeness of delay —gradually dispersed to their forts and towns.  Marcellus quickly crossed the Po and led the legions into the district of Comum, where the Insubres were encamped after calling the Comenses to arms. The Gauls, encouraged by the success of the Boii a few days before, attacked while still in march formation, and their first charge was so vigorous that it drove in the Roman front line.  When Marcellus observed this and feared that once broken they would be routed, he threw in a cohort of the Marsi and then sent all the squadrons of the Latin cavalry against the enemy.  Their first and second charges dulled the edge of the enemy's spirited attack, and the rest of the Roman line, with renewed courage, first resisted and then charged fiercely. The Gauls did not continue the contest longer, but turned and fled in all directions.  Valerius Antias writes that more than forty thousand men  perished in that battle, and that eighty-seven standards were taken and seven hundred and thirty-two wagons and many necklaces of gold, one of which, of great weight, Claudius says was deposited in the temple on the Capitoline as a gift to Jupiter. The Gallic camp was captured and plundered that day, and the town of Comum was taken a few days later. - Livy idem 8-13

Even at this comparatively late date, we have a Boii charge that is "so vigorous [adeo acriter = 'so much keenly'] that it drove in the Roman front line [antesignanos impulerint]."  So far this seems to be our first clear reference to a 'ferocious charge'.  Driving in the antesignani did more than tumble back the front line: the designation 'antesignani' encompassed the hastati and principes, so things seem to have come 'ad triarios' (down to the triarii) before the Roman cavalry rode to the rescue.  A near-run thing.  One notes that Valerias Antias does not specify how the forty thousand who perished were proportioned between Gauls and Romans.

195 BC
Another campaign against the Boii - a battle, which the Gauls lose.

During the same summer the other consul, Lucius Valerius Flaccus, engaged in pitched battle with a force of the Boii near the forest of Litana and defeated them.  Eight thousand of the Gauls are said to have fallen; the rest gave up the war and scattered to their villages and fields. - Livy XXXIV.22.1-2

Veni, vidi, vici.  The Boii were similarly thrashed in 194 BC, 193 BC, 192 BC and 191 BC, although by way of variety in 194 BC they attacked the Roman camp:

For two days, however, they did nothing more than stand ready to engage if anyone came out to meet them; on the third day they advanced towards the rampart and attacked the camp on all sides at once. The consul immediately ordered his men to take up arms; then he kept them under arms for a while, that he might increase the foolish confidence of the enemy and arrange his forces by the gates through which they would severally make their sally. Two legions were ordered to march out by the two main gates.  But at the actual opening of the gates the Gauls met them in such close array that they blocked the road.  For a long time they fought in these confined spaces; it was a matter not so much of hands and swords as of making their way by pushing against one another with shields and bodies, the Romans trying to force a way out for their standards, the Gauls trying either to enter the camp or to prevent the Romans from leaving it.  Nor could the lines be moved in either direction until Quintus Victorius, a senior centurion, and Gaius Atinius, tribune of the soldiers, the latter of the fourth, the former of the second legion, resorting to a device often tried in desperate encounters, snatched the standards from the hands of their bearers and threw them into the midst of the enemy. In their eager struggle to get back their standard, the soldiers of the second legion were the first to force their way through the gate. - Livy XXXIV.46.7-12

Note the 'othismos' at the gate.  The action continues:

They were now fighting outside the rampart, the fourth legion being still inside the gate, when a new uproar was heard on the opposite side of the camp. [2] The Gauls had broken through the porta quaestoria and after stubborn resistance had slain the quaestor Lucius Postumius, whose surname was Tympanus, and Marcus Atinius and Publius Sempronius, commanders of allied detachments [praefectos socium], and about two hundred of their men. [3] They had gained possession of the camp in that quarter, until an attached cohort, sent by the consul to defend the porta quaestoria, killed some of the Gauls who had entered the camp, drove others outside the rampart, and blocked the entrance against those who were attacking the gate. [4] At almost the same instant the fourth legion with two attached cohorts burst through the gate. So there were three battles at once in different places around the camp, and the confused shouts distracted the minds of the fighters from their own immediate combats to the uncertain fortunes of their comrades. Until noon the battle went on with equal strength and with nearly the same hopes. [5] When fatigue and heat had compelled the Gauls, with their soft and feeble bodies and their small capacity for enduring thirst, to retire from the fight, the Romans charged the few that were left and drove them, broken, to their camp. [6] Thereupon the consul ordered the recall sounded; at this the majority turned back, but part, in their eagerness to fight and their hope of capturing the enemy's camp, pushed on to the rampart. [7] The whole mass of Gauls, in disdain of their small number, rushed out from their camp; the Romans in turn were put to flight and returned to their camp in consequence of their own terror and panic, although they had refused to retire at their commander's order. Thus there were varied fortunes on both sides, now defeat and now victory; yet about eleven thousand of the Gauls fell and five thousand of the Romans. [8] The Gauls retired into the interior of their country, while the consul led his legions to Placentia. - Livy XXXIV.47

In essence this battle, or assault, became a contest of endurance which favoured the Romans.  One gets the impression that in a straight battle the Romans would win simply by outlasting their opponents, an advantage which their multi-line system would accentuate.  The Gauls seemingly needed to win early or they would not win at all.

[aligern]

Very true patrick and it points out a difference in character between the hard training of the Romans and the rather easier regime of the Gauls. what I am not seeing here is gallic impetuosity that renders them uncontrollable by their generals. Theyre rather pointb and click, but the units look as though they are in control until unleashed.
Roy

[Patrick Waterson]

Valid observation, Roy: once they get the word they go at it with a will, but until then they stay leashed.  This may explain the apparently indecisive behaviour at Telamon: the chiefs intended to stand on the defensive, so the Gaesati suffered because the Romans a) were too intelligent to close uphill against fresh Gauls and b) had plenty of missiles.  Had the Gauls actually been uncontrollably impetuous the result of the battle might have been different!

I am reminded of the Jacobites at Culloden, kept waiting for almost half an hour (to the delight of Cumberland's artillerymen) until the order to advance finally came through.  Once unleashed they performed a characteristic 'ferocious' charge but until then they awaited the signal.  (Actually their patience snapped just before the order was given, but they had stayed under control for nearly 29 minutes of being shot at, which was not bad.)

[aligern]

Hi Patrick, can we, for completeness push on to Plutarch's Marius and to Caesar. We would have all the literature in one place then which would be really useful.

Roy

[Patrick Waterson]

Indeed: the Cimbri and Teutones are a little outside the usual Gallic mix, but they left behind the Nervii as their descendants and the Nervii count as Gauls (and we shall soon be meeting them) so here goes ...

The year is 102 BC, and the Teutones and Cimbri have destroyed a Roman army at Arausio in Gaul and are marching on Italy by separate routes.

"But the Teutones, since Marius kept quiet, attempted to take his camp by storm; many missiles, however, were hurled against them from the fortifications, and they lost some of their men. They therefore decided to march forward, expecting to cross the Alps without molestation. So they packed up their baggage and began to march past the camp of the Romans. Then, indeed, the immensity of their numbers was made specially evident by the length of their line and the time required for their passage; for it is said they were six days in passing the fortifications of Marius, although they moved continuously." - Plutarch, Life of Marius, 18.1

Marius followed up and matters came to blows.

"Besides, the most warlike division of the enemy, by whom at an earlier time the Romans under Manlius and Caepio had been defeated (they were called Ambrones and of themselves numbered more than thirty thousand), had sprung up from their meal and were running to get their arms.  However, though their bodies were surfeited and weighed down with food and their spirits excited and disordered with strong wine, they did not rush on in a disorderly or frantic course, nor raise an inarticulate battle-cry, but rhythmically clashing their arms and leaping to the sound they would frequently shout out all together their tribal name Ambrones, either to encourage one another, or to terrify their enemies in advance by the declaration.  The first of the Italians to go down against them were the Ligurians, and when they heard and understood what the Barbarians were shouting, they themselves shouted back the word, claiming it as their own ancestral appellation; for the Ligurians call themselves Ambrones by descent. Often, then, did the shout echo and reecho from either side before they came to close quarters; and since the hosts back of each party took up the cry by turns and strove each to outdo the other first in the magnitude of their shout, their cries roused and fired the spirit of the combatants." - idem, 19.2-4

We note the pre-battle noisemaking and posturing, and incidentally that the Ligurians, who differentiated themselves from Gauls and were considered steadier fighters, seemed to share a common ancestry with some of the invaders.

"Well, then, the Ambrones became separated by the stream; for they did not all succeed in getting across and forming an array, but upon the foremost of them the Ligurians at once fell with a rush, and the fighting was hand-to-hand. Then the Romans came to the aid of the Ligurians, and charging down from the heights upon the Barbarians overwhelmed and turned them back.  Most of the Ambrones were cut down there in the stream where they were all crowded together, and the river was filled with their blood and their dead bodies; the rest, after the Romans had crossed, did not dare to face about, and the Romans kept slaying them until they came in their flight to their camp and waggons.  Here the women met them, swords and axes in their hands, and with hideous shrieks of rage tried to drive back fugitives and pursuers alike, the fugitives as traitors, and the pursuers as foes; they mixed themselves up with the combatants, with bare hands tore away the shields of the Romans or grasped their swords, and endured wounds and mutilations, their fierce spirits unvanquished to the end. So, then, as we are told, the battle at the river was brought on by accident rather than by the intention of the commander." - idem, 19.5-7

The invading Ambrones crossed the stream and began to 'form an array', at which point the Ligurians expertly hit them with a 'rush' (meta dromou = with a run), fixing them in place and allowing the Romans to advance and catch the invaders in a compromising position and cut them up in mid-stream.  (Something not dissimilar would happen to the Atrebates attacking Caesar's left in 57 BC.)  This decided the battle, though the unusually determined resistance of both warriors and women added a tailpiece unusual in these battles.

This action was a preliminary to a much more important fight two days later.

"Meanwhile, since the position of the Barbarians was commanded by sloping glens and ravines that were shaded by trees, Marius sent Claudius Marcellus thither with three thousand men-at-arms, under orders to lie concealed in ambush until the battle was on, and then to show themselves in the enemy's rear. The rest of his soldiers, who had taken supper in good season and then got a night's sleep, he led out at day-break and drew up in front of the camp, and sent out his cavalry into the plain.  The Teutones, seeing this, could not wait for the Romans to come down and fight with them on equal terms, but quickly and wrathfully armed themselves and charged up the hill. But Marius, sending his officers to all parts of the line, exhorted the soldiers to stand firmly in their lines, and when the enemy had got within reach to hurl their javelins, then take to their swords and crowd the Barbarians back with their shields; for since the enemy were on precarious ground their blows would have no force and the locking of their shields no strength, but the unevenness of the ground would keep them turning and tossing about. This was the advice he gave his men, and they saw that he was first to act accordingly; for he was in better training than any of them, and in daring far surpassed them all." - idem, 20 4-6

The Teutones use an uphill charge (after 'quickly and wrathfully' arming themselves) while the Romans use their uphill position to crowd their opponents and attenuate the force of their blows.  Also interesting is the expression 'the locking of their shields [would have] no strength', in Greek 'oute rhomen ton synaspismon', literally 'without strength their close ordering of shields'.  This suggests both a shieldwall and the possibility that it was used for coordinated pushing.

Now the Romans sprang their ambush and won the battle.

"Accordingly, the Romans awaited the enemy's onset, then closed with them and checked their upward rush, and at last, crowding them back little by little, forced them into the plain. Here, while the Barbarians in front were at last forming in line on level ground, there was shouting and commotion in their rear. For Marcellus had watched his opportunity, and when the cries of battle were borne up over the hills he put his men upon the run and fell with loud shouts upon the enemy's rear, where he cut down the hindmost of them.  Those in the rear forced along those who were in front of them, and quickly plunged the whole army into confusion, and under this double attack they could not hold out long, but broke ranks and fled. The Romans pursued them and either slew or took alive over a hundred thousand of them, besides making themselves masters of their tents, waggons, and property, all of which, with the exception of what was pilfered, was given to Marius by vote of the soldiers. And though the gift that he received was so splendid, it was thought to be wholly unworthy of his services in the campaign, where the danger that threatened had been so great." - idem, 20.1-2

In essence, the Teutones were forced back, being at a disadvantage fighting uphill, and when they reached level ground and had hopes of sorting themselves out (kathistamenon eis taxin = getting their formations into some sort of order) they were promptly hit from behind by Marcellus' 3,000-man ambush.  It seems a modest number with which to take 100,000+ men in the rear, but if the Teutones' frontage was 1,000 men wide and Marcellus brought his ambushers in three deep it would have been quite sufficient.  The 'sloping glens and ravines shaded by trees' probably constricted the battle frontage (and also allowed fleeing barbarians to get away via the flanks) in addition to allowing Marcellus to get into position unseen.

So much for the Teutones.  The following year Marius would fight a much better publicised battle in Italy itself, against the Cimbri.

[Patrick Waterson]

Plutarch gives us a fair amount of detail for the Cimbri vs Romans battle at Vercellae in 101 BC.  In some ways it is a very curious engagement, notably because of the huge Cimbri infantry square.  The rather lengthy source account will be split up with hopefully relevant comments.

To summarise the preliminaries ...

Marius changed the legionary pila, taking out one of the two metal pins and replacing it with a frangible wooden one.  This made it strictly a one-use weapon, suggesting that in the previous engagement against the Teutones the Romans had been receiving back what they had thrown, impelled by the greater strength of Teutonic thews.

Boeorix king of the Cimbri and Marius then agreed the date and place of the battle by pre-arrangement.

"When, therefore, the appointed time had come, the Romans drew up their forces for battle. Catulus had twenty thousand three hundred soldiers, while those of Marius amounted to thirty-two thousand, which were divided between both wings and had Catulus between them in the centre, as Sulla, who fought in this battle, has stated.  He says also that Marius hoped that the two lines would engage at their extremities chiefly and on the wings, in order that his soldiers might have the whole credit for the victory and that Catulus might not participate in the struggle nor even engage the enemy (since the centre, as is usual in battle-fronts of great extent, would be folded back); and therefore arranged the forces in this manner." - Plutarch, Life of Marius, 25.4-5

The comment about the centre 'folding back' (kolpoma = bulging) in 'battle-fronts of great extent' is an interesting one.  The battle front in this action certainly promised to be unusually wide.

"As for the Cimbri, their foot-soldiers advanced slowly from their defences, with a depth equal to their front, for each side of their formation had an extent of thirty furlongs; and their horsemen, fifteen thousand strong, rode out in splendid style, with helmets made to resemble the maws of frightful wild beasts or the heads of strange animals, which, with their towering crests of feathers, made their wearers appear taller than they really were; they were also equipped with breastplates of iron, and carried gleaming white shields. For hurling, each man had two lances [dibolia = a double-pointed lance]; and at close quarters they used large, heavy swords." - idem 25.6-7

Thirty furlongs equates to around 6,000 yards, making this one of the most unusual deployments in the history of warfare.  A solid square 6,000 x 6,000 would contain 36 million men, so it is reasonable to suppose this was a hollow square, but how hollow?

Jumping ahead a bit, the Romans (who won) took 60,000+ prisoners and slew about 120,000.  If we add these numbers we are probably close to the actual combatant strength, which would thus be c.180,000.  Dividing this by four (one contingent for each side of the square) gives c.45,000 men per side on a 6,000-man frontage for a depth of 7-8.  Eight is a fairly standard depth, which would give 48,000 per side and a total of 192,000 infantry.

Using this basic guideline we see two things: 1) the rear was over three miles away from the front, so could not support it - and coordination between flanks and centre would not be easy to achieve; 2) there is a huge amount of empty space within the square, even if the Cimbric cavalry starts therein.  Was the Cimbri baggage-train in the middle of the square? (Answer: no, as we shall see later.)

Meanwhile we have the Romans, who would normally deploy on a frontage no greater than 1,600 yards, facing a 6,000-yard deployment.  What follows is puzzling.

"At this time, however, they did not charge directly upon the Romans, but swerved to the right and tried to draw them along gradually until they got them between themselves and their infantry, which was drawn up on their left. The Roman commanders perceived the crafty design, but did not succeed in holding their soldiers back; for one of them shouted that the enemy was taking to flight, and then all set out to pursue them.  Meanwhile the infantry of the Barbarians came on to the attack like a vast sea in motion." - ibid 26.1-2

I suspect a mistranslation here.  Without going into technicalities, I think Plutarch is describing the Cimbri gradually collapsing their square to a much narrower frontage from left and right towards the centre, after which 'the infantry of the Barbarians came on to the attack like a vast sea in motion'.  This interpretation makes sense of what happened next.

"After the attack had begun, however, an experience befell Marius which signified the divine displeasure, according to Sulla. For an immense cloud of dust was raised, as was to be expected, and the two armies were hidden from one another by it, so that Marius, when he first led his forces to the attack, missed the enemy, passed by their lines of battle, and moved aimlessly up and down the plain for some time. Meanwhile, as chance would have it, the Barbarians engaged fiercely with Catulus, and he and his soldiers, among whom Sulla says he himself was posted, bore the brunt of the struggle." - ibid 26.3

Bearing in mind that the Cimbri are stated to have deployed on a c.6,000-yard frontage, Catulus alone would have to cover 6,000 yards with 20,300 men, i.e. deploy less than four deep unless the Cimbri front has substantially contracted.  Also, one cannot imagine Marius setting out to charge empty space - the reason he missed the Cimbri would seem to be that they contracted out of his way, creating a deep column with defended flanks to burst through the Roman centre.  Because of the dust, by the time Marius got to where they had been, he missed them.

However, the best-laid plans gang aft agley, especially when one fails to take account of the effects of climate change.  Or rather a different climate.

"The Romans were favoured in the struggle, Sulla says, by the heat, and by the sun, which shone in the faces of the Cimbri. For the Barbarians were well able to endure cold, and had been brought up in shady and chilly regions, as I have said.  They were therefore undone by the heat; they sweated profusely, breathed with difficulty, and were forced to hold their shields before their faces. For the battle was fought after the summer solstice, which falls, by Roman reckoning, three days before the new moon of the month now called August,  but then Sextilis.  Moreover, the dust, by hiding the enemy, helped to encourage the Romans. For they could not see from afar the great numbers of the foe, but each one of them fell at a run upon the man just over against him, and fought him hand to hand, without having been terrified by the sight of the rest of the host. And their bodies were so inured to toil and so thoroughly trained that not a Roman was observed to sweat or pant, in spite of the great heat and the run with which they came to the encounter. This is what Catulus himself is said to have written in extolling his soldiers." - ibid 26.4-5

So when it came to the crunch, the Cimbri, despite having by accident or design removed Marius' legions from the equation, simply could not muster the impetus to break Catulus' line.  The significant difference in acclimatisation and fitness levels - plus the fact that Catulus' men simply could not see how outnumbered they were (as they would have been had the original (presumed) 8-deep 6,000-yard Cimbri front condensed to 60-deep and 800 yards) so piled in with happy abandon.

"The greatest number and the best fighters of the enemy were cut to pieces on the spot; for to prevent their ranks from being broken, those who fought in front were bound fast to one another with long chains which were passed through their belts. The fugitives, however, were driven back to their entrenchments [kharakoma - palisaded or entrenched camp], where the Romans beheld a most tragic spectacle. The women, in black garments, stood at the waggons and slew the fugitives—their husbands or brothers or fathers, then strangled their little children and cast them beneath the wheels of the waggons or the feet of the cattle, and then cut their own throats. It is said that one woman hung dangling from the tip of a waggon-pole, with her children tied to either ankle; while the men, for lack of trees, fastened themselves by the neck to the horns of the cattle, or to their legs, then plied the goad, and were dragged or trampled to death as the cattle dashed away. Nevertheless, in spite of such self-destruction, more than sixty thousand were taken prisoners; and those who fell were said to have been twice that number." - ibid 27.1-3

The chained together front ranks are to say the least unusual: was the motivation to prevent Romans breaking in or to stop Cimbri enthusiasts breaking out of the battleline?  Was it a way of preventing parts of the line from getting ahead of or behind the rest?  It cannot have helped with redeployment, although it does suggest that the Cimbri did not go in for individual relief of men in the front line.

The 'kharakoma' (fortified camp) suggests that the hollow square did not contain baggage and families, but was a contrivance to get the Romans to deploy on a wide frontage and then let the Cimbri infantry slip into a deep column to batter down (and/or through) part of their army.  Those who would have made it back to the camp would presumably not include any of the chain-linked front rankers.  Judging by the reaction of the women and fugitives, by the time the survivors reached the camp things were basically all over: there was none of the sharp defiance exhibited by the women of the Teutones.

Catulus and Marius engaged in some mutual loathing after the battle, including a dispute over keeping score.

"Now, the enemy's property became the booty of the soldiers of Marius, but the spoils of battle, the standards, and the trumpets, were brought, we are told, to the camp of Catulus and Catulus relied chiefly upon this as a proof that the victory was won by his men. Furthermore, a dispute for the honour of the victory arose among the soldiers, as was natural, and the members of an embassy from Parma were chosen to act as arbitrators. These men the soldiers of Catulus conducted among the dead bodies of the enemy, which were clearly seen to have been pierced by their javelins; for these could be known by the name of Catulus which had been cut into the shaft." ibid 27.4

From this we can surmise that Marius' men, having missed their opponents on the field, nevertheless found the Cimbric camp and numbers of fugitives heading therein.  Catulus' legions (presumably four in number, given their total of 20,000 men) effectively won the battle.

This battle is so non-typical in so many ways as to be worthy of study in itself.  Curiously, neither side's cavalry seems to have played much part in the battle.

[Erpingham]

I'd be very cautious of the idea of a literal square 30 furlongs square.  I don't know the latin word translated by furlong but can it mean something else?  Could thirty by a copist error?  Because, as you say, when the fighting breaks out, the Roman front seems longer, allowing them to flank the Celts (either by accident or design - as most of this account comes from a source hostile to Marius, an actual plan for a double envelopment might be hidden).

Turning to the Celtic tactics, they seem the opposite of wild.  The story of the men chained together implies an intention to stand their ground and not attack at all.  All in all, if I read this without the bit about the numbers and the square, I'd be thinking the Romans probably had a numeric advantage in combatants, with the Celts bulked out by women, children and men so ill equipped they don't even have a sword to fall on.

And what do the cavalry, who seem well equiped, do other than raise dust?

[Patrick Waterson]

The Greek word used is 'stadion' which means about 600 feet, and is often translated 'furlong' (although the latter is 660 feet).  Naturally, if the Cimbri frontage (and sideage and rearage) actually stretched to 6,000 yards per side they would have had major problems keeping it straight, which might account for the chains.

There were several different stadia, as seen here: http://uk.ask.com/wiki/Stadion_%28unit_of_length%29?qsrc=3044  Plutarch and his source probably used the Attic stadion of 200.4167 feet.

The Roman deployment would seem from the numbers involved to put about ten legions (six for Marius - 30,000 men - and four for Catulus - 20,000 men) in line, which given the standard frontage of 200 yards per legion would make a 2,000 yard infantry frontage.  That said, the Romans would almost certainly have had more than 2,300 cavalry (the number remaining if we deduct ten 5,000-man legions).

If we rate the legions as 4,800 men each, this releases another 2,000 men for the cavalry, though the new total of 4,300 still looks diminutive against the Cimbri's 15,000.  And they would have to deploy two deep at most to cover the balance of the Cimbri frontage.

I suspect that Marius may have fielded a higher proportion of cavalry.  If the legions were, say, 4,200 strong (the typical strength under the pre-Marian or Polybian system) then Marius would have had 12,000 cavalry.  This is more than the Republic fielded in any other known action, and would probably require contingents from the by then 'tame' Gallic tribes of northern Italy.

So ...

A better way to account for a larger number of cavalry would be to reset the legions to 5,000 men each but give Catulus and Marius four legions apiece (a total of 8, not 10).  This would be eminently in keeping with standard Roman practice, each consul having two Roman legions and two legions of socii, allies.  It also conveniently leaves Marius with 12,000 men to represent possible cavalry.

These cavalry would be deployed 6,000 per wing.  Each wing would usually deploy ten deep and cover about 1,200 yards if frontage.  Hence the total Roman frontage would be 2x1,200 (cavalry) + 8x200 (infantry), or 2,400 + 1,600, a total of 4,000 yards.  Being outflanked by 1,000 yards on each wing does not seem to have inhibited Marius' confidence: it is noteworthy how Marius' battle planning is said to have emphasised not survivial but being in a good position to grab the glory.  He may in fact have deployed his cavalry at reduced depth, which would add anything up to another 2,400 yards of frontage and actually leave him outflanking (or rather outwinging) the Cimbri square.

If the Cimbri did indeed collapse their frontage down from 6,000 yards to 800 yards, one can see their manoeuvres making a sort of sense: the cavalry rides out to face its Roman counterparts (who are perhaps mainly Gallic), raising a lot of dust to obscure visibility as it does so, the infantry marches its right and left in towards the centre, 'gradually' as Plutarch states.  It would have to be 'gradual' as each side of the square had about a mile to go to get the frontage narrowed down to 800 yards or so.  If Plutarch is right about their numbers (and if the rear was catching up at the same rate) the Cimbri could have ended up with a column 800 wide and 225 deep - which would 'come on to the attack like a vast sea in motion' against Catulus.  Meanwhile Marius' forces march hopefully on ... and on ... and on, into the recently-vacated space, until they chase off the Cimbri cavalry and sight the camp.

This all suggests to me that Boeorix had his own individual and unusual ideas about how a battle should be conducted, but for all his unconventionality it did not work, at least this time.  As I am sure Phil Barker would advise, he might have done better with a standard deployment and historical tactics. 

The women and children are mentioned only in connection with the Cimbric camp, and as their mention is in the same breath, or at least paragraph, as disenchanted Cimbri warriors comitting suicide by the laborious expedient of using the cattle as accessories, I rather doubt that they (or the cattle) would have been anywhere near the front line.  The suicide-bent gentlemen could easily have abandoned their weapons on the battlefield (along with their standards and trumpets), which would explain why they neither fought to the death nor used weaponry for self-destruction.