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Gauls and Brawls

Started by Patrick Waterson, January 03, 2013, 05:09:20 PM

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Patrick Waterson

I am running through our sources' Gallic listings in more or less historical order so that interested readers can see trends for themselves (in addition to inserting my own pointers  ;) ).  What I think wll emerge is how Gallic tactics and battlefield approaches have what we might consider a 'default procedure', namely the fierce impetuous charge exemplified by the Nervii and their allies, but that there is more to the picture than just this (as Roy and Anthony are picking up on).  Did anyone notice Dionysius' reference to Gauls getting in some military training, or at least combat practice?

whenever they undertook to exercise their bodies and to drill in arms their respiration was broken by continual panting, their limbs were drenched by much sweat, and they desisted from their toils before they were bidden to do so by their commanders - Dionysius XIV.8

This is also interesting in light of previous discussions on battlefield stamina, as these out-of-condition Gauls do conform to the modern accepted standard, but this seems to have been an exception and the default condition seems to have been otherwise.

Onward.  We move east for our next expose.

Setting the scene: 189 BC.  Antiochus III has just been defeated at Magnesia.  The Romans move to hunt down his Galatian allies, or at least the Galatian tribes who did not side with Rome's ally, Pergamum.

The chiefs of these three tribes at this time were Ortiago and Combolomarus and Gaulotus. They had adopted this plan particularly for conducting the war —that, when they had occupied the highest peaks in the region, conveying everything there which would be sufficient for their use over however long a period, they would wear down the enemy by exhaustion; [4] for, they were convinced, the Romans would neither venture to climb over such steep and difficult ground, and, if they did attempt it, they could be stopped even by a small force or pushed back, nor would they sit quietly at the foot of cold mountains and endure chill and hunger. [5] And, although the very height of the place was a defence, they also threw a ditch and other fortifications around the summits which they had occupied. [6] They took little forethought for a supply of missile weapons, because they believed that the very roughness of the terrain would furnish stones in abundance. - Livy XXXVIII.19.3-6

So why not try the usual procedure of kit off, sword in hand, charge?  One can write one's own reasons, but lack of confidence against an army that has just thrashed the most powerful monarchy in the Near East may have been a factor.  Or this may have been a standard Galatian response to a punitive expedition, as the Roman consul knew or had been told exactly what to expect, suggesting that someone local predicted the Galatian course of action on the basis of past experience.

The consul, because he had foreseen, as a result of reflection [praeceperat animo = opinion prepared or received in advance], that the fighting would not be done hand to hand but by making attacks from a distance, had prepared a vast quantity of javelins [pilorum], skirmishers' spears [velitarium hastarum], arrows, bullets and stones of suitable size which could be discharged from slings, and equipped with this supply of missiles he led the army towards the Olympus mountain and encamped about five miles away. - Livy XXXVIII.20.1-2

In the event the Galatians were shot to pieces.

Arrows, sling-bullets, darts, coming from all sides wounded them unexpectedly, nor did they see what to do, as their minds were blinded by rage and fear, and they were involved in a kind of battle for which they were very ill-adapted. [8] For, as in hand-to-hand fighting, where they can receive and inflict wounds in turn, passion inflames their minds, so when they are struck by light weapons, coming from unseen and distant sources, and when they have no place at which they can charge with blind violence, like wounded animals they rush headlong upon their own friends. [9] The fact that they fight naked makes their wounds conspicuous and their bodies are fleshy and white, as is natural, since they are never uncovered except in battle; so that both more blood flowed from their abundant flesh and the wounds stood out to view more fearfully and the whiteness of their skins was more stained by the black blood. [10] But they are not much disturbed by open wounds; indeed, sometimes they cut away the skin, when the gash is broad rather than deep, and think that thus they gain greater glory in the fight; the same men, when the sting of an arrow or of a bullet that has buried itself in the flesh torments them, having caused a wound small to look at, [11] and, as they search for a way to extract the missile, it does not come out, turning to madness and shame at being destroyed by so small a thing, throw their bodies upon the ground. So in this instance they lay prostrate here and there; some, rushing against the enemy, were wounded from every side, and when they had come to close quarters they were slain by the swords of the skirmishers.

This pretty much summarises the picture of the Gaul that has come down to us: naked, furious and disdaining wounds (provided they look bloody and impressive) - all qualities that impressed themselves heavily upon classical minds - but not too good in an unexpected situation.

Next we shall look at a couple of instances of Roman and Gallic guile from northern Italy in 223-216 BC.  We shall get to the Cimbri and Teutones (105-101 BC) ere long, and (according to Appian) their lineal descendants the Nervii (57 BC).
"Men occasionally stumble over the truth, but most of them pick themselves up and hurry off as if nothing had happened." - Winston Churchill

Patrick Waterson

First we have a Roman cunning plan, the details of which suggest that the powerful Gallic swordstrokes, whose influence on helmet and armour design has been alluded to, were indeed something to be avoided or ameliorated if at all possible.

Quote from: Erpingham on January 04, 2013, 05:29:55 PM
Quote from: aligern on January 04, 2013, 09:57:57 AM
I would cite Rome's long development of neck and shoulder protection in legionary helmets and armour as evidence that the Romans took this threat seriously.

Roy

Gallic forms of helmet with good protection for the neck and the mailshirt with the reinforced shoulder pieces suggest that blows from above were a threat both cultures were aware of.  It is tempting to relate this to slashing sword armed opponents.

The year is 223 BC, and Rome is at war with the Insubres, a Gallic tribe in northern Italy.  These were settled Gauls, and were deemed to have lost something of their edge (and they apparently went into battle fully dressed rather than sky-clad) but were Gauls nonetheless.

The Romans are thought to have shown uncommon skill in this battle; the Tribunes instructing the troops how they were to conduct themselves both collectively and individually. They had learned from former engagements that Gallic tribes were always most formidable at the first onslaught, before their courage was at all damped by a check; and that the swords with which they were furnished, as I have mentioned before, could only give one downward cut with any effect, but that after this the edges got so turned and the blade so bent, that unless they had time to straighten them with their foot against the ground, they could not deliver a second blow. The Tribunes accordingly gave out the spears of the Triarii, who are the last of the three lines, to the first line, or Hastati: and ordering the men to use their swords only, after their spears were done with, they charged the Celts full in front. When the Celts had rendered their swords useless by the first blows delivered on the spears, the Romans close with them, and rendered them quite helpless, by preventing them from raising their hands to strike with their swords, which is their peculiar and only stroke, because their blade has no point. The Romans, on the contrary, having excellent points to their swords, used them not to cut but to thrust: and by thus repeatedly hitting the breasts and faces of the enemy, they eventually killed the greater number of them. And this was due to the foresight of the Tribunes: for the Consul Flaminius is thought to have made a strategic mistake in his arrangements for this battle. By drawing up his men along the very brink of the river, he rendered impossible a manœuvre characteristic of Roman tactics, because he left the lines no room for their deliberate retrograde movements; for if, in the course of the battle, the men had been forced ever so little from their ground, they would have been obliged by this blunder of their leader to throw themselves into the river. However, the valour of the soldiers secured them a brilliant victory, as I have said, and they returned to Rome with abundance of booty of every kind, and of trophies stripped from the enemy. - Polybius II.33

The trick here is the way the Romans avoid the first - lethal - Gallic swordstrokes.  By extending spears ahead of them they induce the Gauls to chop down through the spear-shafts and then, before the Gauls can raise their swords for another stroke, the Romans push in to close quarters drawing their own dinky but handy blades while trapping the Gauls' swords and sword arms in an unserviceable position (this makes more sense than the assumption that the Gallic blades would bend and be blunted from one chop at a spear-shaft and fits with the insistence on rapid closure by the Romans).  They then just keep pinking their helpless opponents until the latter expire.

Now for the Gauls' revenge.  Not direct revenge, as it is the Boii rather than the Insubres, but effective nonetheless.  The yeart is 216 BC: Rome has just lost an army at Cannae.  The only remaining Roman army in Italy is currently marching through Boii territory to keep this Gallic tribe in subjection.

While busily occupied with these matters, intelligence arrived of a fresh disaster —fortune crowding into this year one calamity after another —that Lucius Posthumius, consul elect, himself with all his army was destroyed in Gaul. [7] He was to march his troops through a vast wood, which the Gauls called Litana. On the right and left of his route, the natives had sawed the trees in such a manner that they continued standing upright, but would fall when impelled by a slight force. [8] Posthumius had with him two Roman legions, and besides had levied so great a number of allies along the Adriatic Sea, that he led into the enemy's country twenty-five thousand men. [9] As soon as this army entered the wood, the Gauls, who were posted around its extreme skirts, pushed down the outermost of the sawn trees, which falling on those next them, and these again on others, which of themselves stood tottering and scarcely maintained their position, crushed arms, men, and horses in an indiscriminate manner, so that scarcely ten men escaped. [10] For most of them being killed by the trunks and broken boughs of trees, the Gauls, who beset the wood on all sides in arms, killed the rest, panic-struck by so unexpected a disaster. A very small number, who attempted to escape by a bridge, were taken prisoners, being intercepted by the enemy who had taken possession of it before them. [11] Here Posthumius fell, fighting with all his might to prevent his being taken. The Boii, having cut off his head, carried it and the spoils they stript off his body, in triumph into the most sacred temple they had. [12] Afterwards they cleansed the head according to their custom, and having covered the skull with chased gold, used it as a cup for libations in their solemn festivals, and a drinking cup for their high priests and other ministers of the temple. [13] The spoils taken by the Gauls were not less than the victory. For though great numbers of the beasts were crushed by the falling trees, yet as nothing was scattered by flight, every thing else was found strewed along the whole line of the prostrate band. - Livy XXIII.24.6-13

The planning and execution of this ambush speaks for  itself.  It also points to Posthumius' complete lack of reconnaissance, a failing the Gauls were swift to take advantage of.
"Men occasionally stumble over the truth, but most of them pick themselves up and hurry off as if nothing had happened." - Winston Churchill

Erpingham

On the subject of bendy Celtic swords, it might be useful to reproduce something on the topic from our old friend wikipedia

Polybius (2.33) reports that the Gauls at the Battle of Telamon (224 BC) had inferior iron swords which bent at the first stroke and had to be straightened with the foot against the ground. Plutarch, in his life of Marcus Furius Camillus, likewise reports on the inferiority of Gaulish iron, making the same claim that their swords bent easily. These reports have puzzled some historians, since by that time the Celts had a centuries long tradition of iron workmanship.[2] In 1906 a scholar suggested that the Greek observers misunderstood ritual acts of sword-bending, which may have served to "decommission" the weapon.[3] Such bent swords have been found among deposits of objects presumably dedicated for sacred purposes. The speculation has been repeated since.[2] Radomir Pleiner, however, argues that "the metallographic evidence shows that Polybius was right up to a point. To judge from the swords examined in this survey, only one third could be described as conforming to the quality which he ascribed generally to Celtic swords. Even so, it is quite possible that even some of the better quality swords would have failed in battle."[3] Nevertheless he argues that the classical sources are exaggerated. Plutarch's claim that Celtic swords would bend completely back is implausible, as only a slight bending would be likely.[3] Pleiner also notes that metallurgical analysis performed on Celtic swords suggests that they were only work hardened and only very few were quench hardened, even though they frequently contain enough carbon to be hardened (in particular the swords made from Noric steel). Quench hardening takes the full advantage of the potential hardness of the steel, but leaves it brittle, prone to breaking. Quite probably this is because tempering wasn't known. Tempering is heating the steel at a lower temperature after quenching to remove the brittleness, while keeping most of the hardness.

The references (for this wikipedia article is in my good books for having some) are
[2] Buchwald Iron and Steel in Ancient Times 2005
[3] Pleiner The Celtic Sword 1993


Patrick Waterson

Everything about Gallic swords suggests to me that they were annealed, probably to ensure they never broke in action.  Annealing iron or steel makes it softer, more ductile and less brittle, all qualities which seem to be reflected in accounts of how Gallic swords performed and which appear to be consistent with the metallurgical analyses cited.

Annealed metal can often be cold-worked successfully, which may account for the swords apparently being 'work-hardened'.

It would seem that Gallic smiths faced a dilemma - make the steel hard and it is prone to shattering; anneal it and it becomes prone to bending.  The latter was evidently considered the lesser evil in most cases, on the basis that a bent sword could again be rendered serviceable with a bit of strength and footwork while a broken one could not.

Accounts of Gallic swords bending in battle seem to dry up ater the 3rd century BC (e.g. one does not find it in Caesar).  This may coincide with Hannibal's and Hasdrubal's passage across the Alps, in which the former is noted as having new equipment made for his men by the Gallic tribes he passed through.  The experienced and capable Carthaginian metallurgists probably had a few pointers for their Gallic counterparts, and this knowledge probably diffused across the Gallic world is subsequent decades.  If it were possible to date Gallic sword samples with accuracy we might be able to explore this hypothesis, as later blades would make better use of their carbon qualities than earlier ones.  It is conceivable that the few blades referred to as being 'quenched' are later blades.  Studies unfortunately seem to lump all samples together and statisticise them with insensitivity to time periods.

I have serious doubts about the Greeks misunderstanding ritual sword-bending because a) it is unlikely Greeks would be present at such a ritual or that they would subsequently uncover the bent swords, and b) the idea that it was possible to straighten the blades with the help of the foot would not have originated from knowledge of such rituals.

Meanwhile, another illustration of how Gauls could exploit poor reconnaissance in wooded country, albeit far less dramatically and effectively than the Boii in 216 BC.  The date is 218 BC and Hannibal is daily expected in Italy.

When word arrived of this affair of the envoys, and Mutina and its garrison were in danger, Lucius Manlius, the praetor, blazing with resentment, set out for Mutina with his army in loose marching order [effusum agmen = a column pouring out, i.e. hurrying along rather than in loose order]. In those days the road led through a forest, as the country was not, for the most part, under cultivation, and Manlius, advancing without reconnaissance, plunged into an ambush, and after sustaining heavy losses, managed with difficulty to get through into the open fields. There he entrenched a camp, and since the Gauls lacked heart to assail it, the soldiers recovered their spirits, though it was no secret that as many as five hundred men had fallen. Then they began their march again, nor, so long as the column advanced through open country, was the enemy to be seen; but when they had once more got into the woods, the Gauls attacked their rear, and throwing the whole column into terror and confusion, slew seven hundred soldiers and carried off six standards. The alarming onsets of the Gauls and the panic of the Romans ended when they got clear of the trackless woods and thickets. Thereafter, marching across open ground, the Romans had no difficulty in protecting their column. - Livy XXI.

Again, a combination of woods and absence of Roman reconnaissance gives the Gauls the initiative and a tactical advantage.
"Men occasionally stumble over the truth, but most of them pick themselves up and hurry off as if nothing had happened." - Winston Churchill

Justin Swanton

It seems, reading the accounts of the battles, that the savage reputation of the Gauls rests on their style of hand-to-hand fighting, which consists of using their swords virtually as cudgels, after which their weapons got bend and they themselves got tired.

Is there anything though that would show they were impetuous in the charge? I can see in the charge descriptions a dash up to close proximity followed by a halt and combat, as opposed to swarming recklessly over the enemy. The first kind of charge might just stop short of entering the gaps in a chainsaw-tooth formation, the second obviously would not.

And now let me resume my seat with the popcorn.

Erpingham

Quote from: Justin Swanton on January 06, 2013, 08:59:34 AM
It seems, reading the accounts of the battles, that the savage reputation of the Gauls rests on their style of hand-to-hand fighting, which consists of using their swords virtually as cudgels, after which their weapons got bend and they themselves got tired.


It is a historical inconvenience that we don't have details of the Gauls v.  other tribal groups to see if these tactics were in fact effective in other contexts.  The fact of their long persistence in the historical record (and the long archaeological timeline for the swords) doesn't suggest that, after meeting the Roman system, they fled back to their forests and said "there has to be a better way".

I also think that separating ferocity from uncontrollability is a good idea.  All these ambushes seem to suggested their commanders could keep them in check before contact.  It is less clear what level of control they had once into combat.

aligern

I think ferocious in combat, but controllable up that point has merit as a general description of their style. I think it would be right to say that the Romans describe their fierce fighting style and eventual exhaustion as the same even when the Gaius are standing still to receive.

Lets take a huge risk here. It sounds rather like rugby games between the English and some of our Celtic neighbours. These games are characterised by a very fierce onset from the 'Celts' who either bully the English into making errors and thus win or fail to do so, lose heart and thus lose.  No , of course I don't subscribe to a thread of Celticness running from 400 BC to today, its just that the behaviours match.  What the Romans have is the advantage of better kit as well as better training and a better system of manouvre and drill  so they maximise the advantage of their 'civilised' approach.  It would be akin to the English rugby team having armour, specialised run on the field kickers and hiring New Zealand coaches.

Mark G... in this comparison New Zealand are the Spartans.

Roy

Mark G

I'm struggling to remember when the Spartans weer last fed dotored food before a game... or had to travel quite so far and fight for such a long season.

Erpingham

One thing I have noted so far in the tale is how monochrome Gallic armies appear to be - they have some cavalry, who seem to have an auxiliary role, but everyone else seems to be tall, white bodied, with a sword and shield.  I believe this will change as we come closer to present in Patrick's timeline and we will get more nuances. Patrick has already hinted that we might be able to trace tactical evolution through time but will we be seeing growing sophistication/specialisation in gallic armies or a more informed set of historians?

 

aligern

Patrick, How about asking Mick Hession if he has any data on Irish warfare that talks about largish battles rather than individual heroic combats?
Roy

aligern

Gallic shields certainly change over time with the winged bosses getting bigger. The sword suspension method also develops. That gives some indication that there is progress in weaponry.

In terms of cavalry we should look at the trimarcisia to which Pausanias refers. I sometimes wonder if the system of having servant support is carried over into Roman auxiliary cavalry, hence the servant carrying javelins who appears behind some Roman cavalry on some tombstones.

I am not sure about the adoption of thrown weapons. Do the Celts go for more javelins etc or pilum equivalents on a systematic basis.  Plutarch refers to the Cimbri, I think,  as carrying two spears which implies a throwing spear single or pair.
There is also the question as to whether the poorer troops in a Celtic army could afford swords. Generally barbarian societies are metal poor and yet the suggestion of Roman authors is that the Romans are facing armies of 20-50,000 sword armed men

Roy

Justin Taylor

#26
A sword is also damn difficult to make (any one else had a good laugh at the idea of pouring them in moulds in LoTR?) and not really suitable for anything else (with a spear you can go hunting).

Mick Hession

Irish accounts date from later though elements of the Red Branch cycle of tales, such as the Tain, are thought to have Iron Age origins. There are no descriptions of pitched battles and instead we see a series of heroic duels by dismounted chariot warriors whose drivers wait nearby. The mass of the army - the lower class infantry - keep well back. These are rarely mentioned as fighting, being of no interest to the upper classes who sponsored the bards composing the praise poems, but presumably once one side's heroes had gained an ascendancy their infantry would feel emboldened to join in, their opponents fleeing in pretty short order. Mons Graupius reads like that sort of battle: the cavorting of the first Caledonian line has the flavour of the feats of arms described in the Tain being executed by the Irish heroes. Of course, the Romans didn't play by the same rules  :)

However these tactics don't seem to have much in common with continental armies (and at least some southern British tribes) so I don't think we can glean much useful information from the Irish sources.

Cheers
Mick

Erpingham

The Tain, coupled with the Mons Graupius description and Caesars chariot description do suggest a warrior elite in warfare in the British Isles, though, unlike the so far undifferentiated mass in the descriptions Patrick has taken us through. 


Mick Hession

I think that's correct - I perceive two distinct styles of Celtic fighting, which I'd dub Insular and Continental. The Insular style is based on a heroic elite of noble chariot warriors with a supporting cast of common folk who don't have much of a role. On the Continent, despite strong cultural similarities in other fields, all classes seem to have had an active role in warfare. Perhaps that is because Insular Celts were fighting each other hence shared the same cultural norms and assumptions; Continental Celts had to evolve methods of warfare that could cope with a range of non-Celtic opponents, or face the fate of the Caledones at Mons Graupius.

Nevertheless, there are some echoes of that Insular thinking in decriptions of Continental Celts: Gallic and Galatian noble horsemen (having forsworn chariots at some point) were often accompanied by lower-class mounted attendants who don't appear to have had primarily a combatant role, though they might join the fighting to rescue their chief if he was under pressure. To us, this seems to be a dreadful waste of two thirds of the army's horsepower but it clearly made sense to the Celts, in the same way that any form of conspicuous consumption makes sense to those practicing it.

Cheers
Mick