Roman Legions against Macedonian Phalanx and Carthaginian Phalanx.

[Prufrock]

Gentlemen, sorry to be a pain, but I think we have moved quite some distance away from the original topic!

[Imperial Dave]

 

[nikgaukroger]

Doubt anyone is shocked 

[Erpingham]

I apologise for me role in the above digression.  Returning to topic, then, can anyone summarise what we have concluded so far?

Roman legions were obviously tactically different but did this deliver an unstoppable superiority, or is Roman dominance down to non-tactical factors?

[Aetius]

According to  Hugh Elton in his book Understanding Ancient Battle these battles were decided by flanking maneuvers or attacks to the rear of the formations, not by frontal assault. Therefore there was not much difference in their attacks as one system fought another. The Romans however had much more cohesion and were harder to break than most of their opponents because of their training and loyalty to their units. There were few armies that had their staying power and manpower reserves...

[Mark G]

That, and they could replace two full armies - where the greek counterparts couldn't replace one

[Imperial Dave]

And what were the socio-economic reasons behind that?

Social structure...bigger population...more cohesive political system....?

[Jim Webster]

And what were the socio-economic reasons behind that?

Social structure...bigger population...more cohesive political system....?

I'd recommend you have a look at The Material and Social Costs of Roman Warfare in the Third and Second Centuries B.C.E.
Devereaux, Bret

https://cdr.lib.unc.edu/concern/dissertations/3r074v31f

A very brief conclusion reads as follows. But the paper itself is well worth reading

"In turn, however, this conclusion begs an investigation into root causes: what allowed Rome to mobilize such a greater proportion of its resources? The answer lies in the Roman alliance system's ability to scale up an entitlement-based mobilization system.
This ability in turn was socially embedded insofar as it was reliant on a set of cultural preconditions in Italy. The most important of these was a shared social script rooted in systems of patronage whereby individuals and communities could enter into unequal, but reciprocal, relationships without the loss of honor or face. These ties were reinforced by Italy's long history of military confederations and shared military culture. Through this system, Rome was able to harness the civic militarism of subject 'allied' communities, making it possible to demand and receive a greater share of the resources of Italy in both men and matériel. This greater degree of mobilization in turn provided for the vast quantities of men, supplies and equipment on which Rome's military dominance depended. Here, then, is to be found the basis of Rome's success and the foundation of a broader imperium which would change both Rome, Italy, and the Mediterranean world."

[Imperial Dave]

Thanks Jim

[nikgaukroger]

Devereaux is currently writing a book that is based on this.

[Justin Swanton]

According to  Hugh Elton in his book Understanding Ancient Battle these battles were decided by flanking maneuvers or attacks to the rear of the formations, not by frontal assault. Therefore there was not much difference in their attacks as one system fought another. The Romans however had much more cohesion and were harder to break than most of their opponents because of their training and loyalty to their units. There were few armies that had their staying power and manpower reserves...

What the historical record shows is that the legion had no chance against the pike phalanx in a frontal assault. Against a hoplite phalanx probably the best examples we have are the battles against the Etruscans, who had an army composed partially of hoplite-equipped troops. If the Etruscans committed only their hoplite-armed troops they could drive a legion back and defeat it in ideal circumstances. I covered this in my book. Let me just give the relevant passage:

After the destruction of the Fabii clan at the Cremora river in 477 bc, the Etruscan army, composed of Veientian troops plus reinforcements from most of the other cities of Etruria, attacked the two-legion army of the consul Menenius not far away. Gaining possession of a hill adjacent to the Roman army, the Etruscan infantry, outnumbering the Romans two to one, formed up deep and advanced downhill driving the Roman foot back.

When they engaged, there was a great slaughter of the Romans, who were unable to keep their ranks. For they were forced back by the Tyrrhenians, who not only had the terrain as an ally, but were also helped by the vigorous pressure of those who stood behind them, their army being drawn up with deep files. – Dionysius: 9.23.7.

My take is that the Veientians and allied army represented their best, i.e. hoplite-equipped, troops and hence were able to practise othismos as that needed an aspis to work. It also helped that they outnumbered the Romans and that the terrain favoured othismos.

If the circumstances weren't absolutely ideal, however, the Etruscans lost. The same army that beat the Romans at the hill was beaten by them on level ground near Rome:

The Etruscans had the advantage in numbers, the Romans in courage. The contest was equally maintained and cost many lives, including the bravest on both sides, nor did either army show any signs of giving way until the second Roman line came up fresh into the place of the first, who were wearied and exhausted. The Etruscans had no reserves to support their first line, and all fell in front of their standards or around them. – Livy: 9.32.

Given that the Romans abandoned hoplite gear and hence fighting style soon after the foundation of the Republic, it is probably safe to assume that the legion (at least in its early 2-line form) was better than the hoplite phalanx.

[Justin Swanton]

That, and they could replace two full armies - where the greek counterparts couldn't replace one

The big difference was, I think, equipment. A Greek hoplite had to be a man of substance to afford the aspis, cuirass, helmet and greaves in addition to his weapons. Hoplite warfare by its nature required that the hoplite be well armoured, and that was expensive.

Then look at the Roman soldier. His scutum was cheaper to make than an aspis. he had a simple brass plate as body armour and no leg armour and his helmet was a more basic design than the Greek one. That meant that a much wider social segment of men - who, like Greek hoplites, had to pay for their own equipment - could be drawn upon to fill out the legions. It would have to wait for the late Republic before the state could mobilise even the poorest citizens and equip and pay them. Add to this the fact that the Roman recruit didn't need much training - he just had to understand files and ranks and line relief IMHO was a fairly simple manoeuvre (not at all the quincunx which would be horribly complex to implement in a battle situation).

What applied to hoplites applied more so to phalangites. From the get-go they were professional soldiers, equipped and paid for by the state (which nearly bankrupted Philip) as they could not equip themselves. It took a lot of training before they could operate together in a pike phalanx which meant if the phalanx was destroyed it could not be easily replaced.

[Mark G]

Feels like two parallel conversations. 

[Imperial Dave]

I'm still reading the Devereux article

[Monad]

Justin wrote:
Given that the Romans abandoned hoplite gear and hence fighting style soon after the foundation of the Republic, it is probably safe to assume that the legion (at least in its early 2-line form) was better than the hoplite phalanx.

Ah, this is my favourite period. For the year 462 BC, Dionysius (9 69-71) has four cohorts numbering 600 men stationed in front of Rome. This is the reserve legion that was encamped in front of the Colline Gate and ready for any emergency that would arise. The four cohorts would be arrayed one cohort wide by four cohorts deep. Most ancient writers would describe this as being in two lines, artistic license maybe.

Each battle line consisted of men serving a particular number of campaigns, with those troops having undertaking the most campaigns serving in the front cohort, and those with the least number of campaigns under their belt, grouped in the fourth battle line. My research can support that this form of legion was introduced during the reign of Tarquinius Superbus and was still in use at the battle of the Allia in 390 BC. The only major change was Class I converted from the aspis to the scutum in 495 BC.

The next change in the legion was the introduction of the hastati, and the enlarging of the legion, in accordance with the increase in the number of Roman tribes, which is logical. First mention of the hastati is by Livy for the year 350 BC, so quite a late addition.