Why did Zama go wrong for Hannibal?

[Paul Innes]

Mark says:

Something I think we over look in this discussion - this was the only battle which Hannibal fought against Romans where he did not have to think about the next Roman army. 
There was no reinforcing army on the way, so he had no need to take risks and come up with a cunning plan - he just had to kill the men in front of him - and he sought to do this by replicating the same tactic which the Romans used themselves.

Fair enough point - similarity again with Bagradas.

[Mark G]

and Scipio chose the field, not Hannibal
- which is a big argument against trying something 'tricky' like a flanking manoeuvre.

[Patrick Waterson]

To be more precise, I suppose I'm wondering if Hannibal chose to hold back instead of committing to the flanking manoeuvre because he suspected that the Triarii would be sent wide to counter.  He was right, and this explains why the Triarii are deployed at the ends of the infantry line instead of in its centre.

Paul, right idea but I do not think an interception by the triarii alone would have worried Hannibal - his veterans would have had a six-to-one superiority and would have crushed the triarii in short order.  If he thought about it he probably expected to find the principes appearing on the flanks of the hastati and the triarii on the flanks of the principes Ilipa-style, giving him a tough coherent line to fight on each flank.  I think his real problem was that following the unanticipated appearance of Masinissa he was rattled and starting to imagine all manner of surprises springing up - what else had Scipio got up his sleeve (or toga)?  This would explain why instead of going ahead with the flanking manoeuvre once all the quadrupeds were off the field he just left his first two lines to conduct a 'reconnaissance by suicide' and then committed his veterans only when he was sure Scipio had everything in the shop window.

Mark, we need to clarify a couple of points.

I've found the James article now.

I also passed over Pats one and even Stuart Hay's more recent ones on my way back in time.

None offers any evidence for a flanking march in the course of this battle.

I am puzzled at this comment: of course there was no 'flanking march' in this battle - the suggestion is rather that the dispositions suggest preparation for one but that Scipio's cavalry superiority and Hannibal's subsequent apprehensions aborted it.

the notion that the triarii were put on the flanks of the exhausted remnants of the principes and hastatii to block or prevent a (delayed) flanking marching route column by the veterans is ridiculous.

No one actually suggested that.

these same veterans were deployed initially in a standard third line, no one disputes that.

they were still present in that formation and in that place when the Carthaginian citizens initially refused to fight and retreated 'in cowardly fashion' when the mercenaries and elephants had failed.

They were still present front and centre when the citizens and the principes and what was left of the hastatii had battered themselves to exhaustion.

They did not take advantage of the pause which Scipio introduced after the first and second lines had fought to march down this (exposed) flank, but rather waited and allowed the triarii to fill the space in front of them

This is merely recitation of what we already know.  Is it possible that intentions are being confused with events?

That Scipio needed to rest and reform the principes and then combine them again with the triarii is more than adequately explained by the simple fact that there were more veterans that there were triarii - Polybius even states that when these third lines met they were equally matched in numbers, enthusiasm, experience and equipment.

That is, Scipio needed these men to simply match the numbers and frontage he faced from the veterans.

The point being ...?

putting the triarii on the flanks rather than putting the reformed remnants of hastatii and principes on the flanks is not some revisiting of Ilipa, nor is it a blocking attempt for a flanking march.

The principes and triarii were both committed fresh - at least both were ordered into battle order, and only the hastati are recorded as needing to reform and extract wounded.  Ilipa did see a very similar disposition (hastati-principes-triarii in a single line of battle), and Polybius does have Scipio putting the triarii on the flanks at Zama.  So perhaps we could clarify your intended point? Obviously Scipio needed to match frontages, but is the point that Hannibal's third line was wider than his first two, or what?  And how is this relevant?

Something I think we over look in this discussion - this was the only battle which Hannibal fought against Romans where he did not have to think about the next Roman army. 
There was no reinforcing army on the way, so he had no need to take risks and come up with a cunning plan - he just had to kill the men in front of him - and he sought to do this by replicating the same tactic which the Romans used themselves.

Actually success at Zama would mean he had to think seriously about the next Roman army: the Romans had plenty of military potential left, plus the naval superiority to convey it to Africa, failing which the Carthaginians would feel insecure unless they could recover Hispania and probably Sicilia.  We might also recall that Hannibal had taken an oath of eternal enmity to Rome and would certainly not consider Zama as the last battle he would fight against the Romans.  Even if it had been agreed between the two sides that this would be the last Roman-Carthaginian battle ever, it neither implies nor justifies the adoption of pure attrition - the traditional mark of the poorest of generals - as a battle tactic.

successive lines of fighting men, with the most experienced and well equipped forming the final line which wins the decisive victory.  A deployment based around the maximum killing possible rather than one based around a swift dramatic victory - something which he undoubtedly learned from fighting Romans for a dozen years.

'Swift dramatic victory' at Cannae (taking most of the afternoon) actually produced the 'maximum killing possible' (c.50,000-70,000 depending upon who you read).  Zama subtracted a mere 1,500 or so Romans permanently from Scipio's OB. 

and Scipio chose the field, not Hannibal
- which is a big argument against trying something 'tricky' like a flanking manoeuvre.

Not at all: the ground was perfect for a flanking manoeuvre by either army.  Terrain is not restricted to use by only the side that selects the battlefield.

[Mark G]

Pat,

All three of you in slingshot have argued that the 'plan' was to have a flanking march.

yet none of you offer any evidence.

to argue that there was a disposition to facilitate such a flanking move is quite hard to understand
- the disposition is entirely the opposite of that - it is a disposition to fight a frontal battle head on exactly as described in all of the sources

A disposition for a flanking march would have at least started with the veterans deployed to the flanks and ready to march - not deployed to the centre from where they never moved all day.

remember, Cannae started with them already in such a flanking position - and even then, he did not rely on them marching down the Roman flank, but on having the Romans march into the trap.  That was an army which he had years to train for such a manoeuvre, unlike this one.

And it was a very high risk strategy.  To repeat it against a better general, on a field which he did not choose is very hard to accept, so where is the evidence to support the proposition?

I submit that there was never any plan to march to the flank, because such a move could just as easily have seen Scipio withdraw as fight.

[Patrick Waterson]

Mark,

I will admit the evidence is indirect.  One point to remember is that Hannibal knows from Scipio's record in Spain that his opponent is more wily than Varro at Cannae, and there is no chance of getting Scipio replaced by a Varro-equivalent.  Furthermore, Hannibal may well have known that Scipio had been at Cannae and could be on the lookout for telltale clues.  Therefore there is good reason for Hannibal to try and screen his intentions by not making his deployment obvious.

The Third Line
The first question that arises is why he drew up his third line a considerable distance behind the others.  This would be a hindrance if the idea was to exploit fatigue and casualties among Scipio's army: the final line should be close and ready to intervene before Scipio could redeploy.  As a means of committing the third line in such a way as to decide the battle this considerable-distance-back deployment makes no sense.

It is eminently sensible, however, in the context of a double envelopment: the veterans can split and march round the flanks at a convenient distance - being well behind the citizen troops they can hear their signals and orders without confusion and can manoeuvre without fear of interference from anything that might happen with their own lines.

It was this unusual gap between the third line and the rest of the army that first made me wonder if the role of this line was something other than just long stop at the end of a hot, tiring day.  It would seem that others have independently come to a similar conclusion.

Battle Plans
Next is the curious affair of the cavalry: why, if Hannibal knew himself inferior in cavalry, did he not take steps like helping his cavalry out with elephants and infantry?  He deployed as if he believed himself superior in cavalry.  Tracing back and forwards through our sources, this led me to the conclusion that Scipio had pulled a fast one on him with Masinissa.  Given that it looks as if Hannibal was fooled on this point, the question becomes: what was his battle plan, assuming that he had been superior in cavalry?

If we look for a battle with similar attributes, that battle has to be Bagradas, the only decisive Carthaginian success against a Roman army in Africa.  Some of Hannibal's dispositions - the elephants, the Carthaginian citizen troops - are very reminiscent of Bagradas, but others are not, including the curious retention of his veterans some way back.

Given that Bagradas was a one-line full-encirclement battle, what is missing to make Zama the same?  Hannibal, even if his mounted troops are matched only against Laelius' men or nothing at all, lacks the cavalry strength to surround Scipio's infantry.  And he has a whole line of crack encirclement-capable troops waiting - not in the wings but some way back in the rear.  Given that Hannibal was a master of deception and cunning battle planning, is there a reason he would not have had a cunning plan for this battle?  And if he had a plan, it seemed to be along the lines of the tried and trusted Bagradas (as a certain Mr Grindlay has rightly pointed out) - so by looking at what he had and thinking how he could fill out the Bagradas mould, so to speak, the encircling move by his veterans suggests itself.

Implementation and Timing
So - Hannibal seems to be going for Bagradas version 2.  He does not have enough elephants to recreate Xanthippus' elephant density, and does not seem to think that concentrating his heffalumps against only one third of Scipio's front is going to do much good, so he uses his Celts to help out as either gap-exploiters or as surrogate elephants - either way they seem to be committed in column-like formations to get between the doubled-up maniples of hastati, otherwise the Carthaginian citizen troops cannot end up fighting Celts and Romans at the same time.  Between the elephants and the Celts Hannibal has his shock force to break up the Roman lines.  Behind them come the citizen spearmen, with presumably the same role as at Bagradas: kebab the Romans who push through between elephants and Celts.  This should gradually macerate the main strength of the Roman infantry, and should at the very least force the commitment of the principes to support the hastati, preventing the principes from being used on the flanks (this but actually came close to working).

Now we get a matter of timing.  In what I see as Hannibal's plan, his cavalry chases off Laelius' Romans and Italians, clearing the way for the veterans to do their double envelopment.  The elephants, Celts and citizen troops were intended to pin and crunch the main strength of the Roman infantry, keeping the hastati busy and forcing the principes to come to their aid.  While this was going on, the veterans would be marching round the flanks to deliver a Cannae-style envelopment.  Scipio, with his cavalry driven off the field, would have only his triarii free to counter this move, and even these might be pinned if the Carthaginian cavalry had won handily and left it to Tychaeus' Numidians to see the Roman cavalry off the field, staying around themselves to inhibit Roman countermoves.  All of this would happen in overlapping fashion, so Scipio could not hope to beat off the successive and mutually synergistic attacks by elephants, Celts and citizen troops and free his main infantry strength in time to counter Hannibal's double flank march.

It looks like a plan.

Cannae and Zama
At Cannae Hannibal used his veterans to perform a decisive double envelopment.  There he had a clear cavalry superiority - prompting Polybius' 2:1 comment - and an opponent so useless that a more overt deployment did not trigger his intentions.  At Zama Hannibal had realised that Scipio was evidently a cut above Varro's class, so a pair of flanking columns ready to go would have given the game away and, as Mark has pointed out, perhaps prompted Scipio to decline battle.  The decisive stroke needed to be concealed, and what better way to conceal it than to hide it behind the rest of the army as what looked like a simple reserve line?  A third line looks innocuous whereas a pair of flanking columns can be a bit of a giveaway, especially to a general who had been at Cannae.

This is a longwinded way of saying that Hannibal's initial dispositions would need to have been crafted not to telegraph his intent.  Hence we do not see any obvious dispositions for encirclement, just the potential to execute such a move.  Softly, softly catchee Skippy ...

[Mark G]

That's better Pat,

I could to and fro on those details quite happily - it was the complete assumption of certainty (from not just you) behind this theory of an abandoned envelopment which needed to be challenged.

I'll rest for a bit - but challenge you to think of an explanation from the sources which offers a equally good answer to your questions based on the premise - as written - that his intention was to fight the romans using a roman style battle of layers of fighting men. 

[Patrick Waterson]

Later. 

[Mark G]

actually, there is one thing which might be interesting that may tempt you just now.

Exactly where does the source for the elephants stampeding back onto the Carthaginian lines come from?

I only ask as at the time I read Livy and Polybius on this, I remember not seeing anything on the matter.

And is the same notion stated clearly in any other source on another elephant battle from which it could be assumed to be a universal rule?

[Duncan Head]

Both Polybios and Livy describe the elephants fleeing into their own cavalry and causing confusion, so I'm not quite sure what the issue is, Mark.

[Mark G]

it must have been the translation I was using, I just didn't see it at the time.

[Mark G]

scratch that, I remember what it was that I remembered.

Both of these only report the elephants panicking into their own cavalry.

yet to read wargamers reports on the battle, they pose a threat to their own infantry, and it is a given on a free deployment to put hem out with the cavalry to swing the battle there.

Polybius
15.12
It was just at the moment of this stampede of the elephants, that Laelius forced the Carthaginian cavalry into headlong flight, and along with Massanissa pressed them with a vigorous pursuit

Livy
33.13. raising such a din that the elephants panicked and charged their own lines, especially on the left wing where the Moors and Numidians were stationed. Masinissa quickly added to the general panic and thus robbed that section of the line of its cavalry support. 
33.14. A few of the elephants that had remained under control made a charge against the lines of light-armed skirmishers (velites) and wrought havoc among them, while suffering severe casualties themselves. 
33.15. For by pulling back to the lines of regular infantry to avoid being crushed by the elephants, the skirmishers opened clear lanes between them and then caught them in cross fire by hurling spears against them from both sides. The javelins of the regular infantry kept up a hail of missiles from every quarter, 
33.16. until the elephants were driven out of the Roman lines and turned against their own troops, putting to flight the Carthaginian cavalry on the right wing also. Laelius, with his cavalry on the Roman left, added to their panic as they fled.

which rather speaks to the question of why Hannibal did not station his elephants in support of his cavalry in the first place.

[Duncan Head]

Both of these only report the elephants panicking into their own cavalry.

yet to read wargamers reports on the battle, they pose a threat to their own infantry, and it is a given on a free deployment to put hem out with the cavalry to swing the battle there.

Presumably this varies between rulesets - I vaguely remember (could be wrong)  that in at least some editions of the old WRG rules, elephants wouldn't burst through close-order infantry lines, but would through anything else. But surely this swerving out towards the cavalry is the same phenomenon that gets them running down the lanes between the Roman maniples: the elephants will avoid close-packed blocks of men and go round when they can. There may be occasions - when starting from too close, perhaps - when they can't avoid them. For example Polybios XI.1.8-9 on Metaurus: "The elephants too had been of equal service to both sides in the battle; for as they were shut in between the two armies and tormented by missiles, they threw both the Roman and the Spanish ranks into confusion. "

[Patrick Waterson]

I cannot improve upon Duncan's comments here, so will simply add that this might be the reason Xanthippus close-packed his elephants at Bagradas: with no easy exit anywhere except forwards, the pachyderms would find doing their duty the easiest option.

At Zama, Polybius (more correctly 'Polybios') describes 'some' of the elephants going down the elephant lanes and 'some' swerving in the direction of the cavalry.  This suggests the flankwards elephants headed for the open ground they could perceive while those in the centre took the course of least resistance - forward through the gaps between the hastati.

When the Roman cavalry opened up with missiles, the new priority for the elephants became missile avoidance, resulting in changed direction.  The question seems to be why this did not also happen in the centre.  The elephant lanes in the Roman army would appear to be the answer here: they represented the perceptible course of least resistance.  Experiences at the Metaurus, where (as Duncan mentions) elephants were caught between the fighting lines and equally incommoded both armies, may have helped Scipio towards the conclusion that simply giving them a fright and letting them through was more cost-effective than trying to fight them head-on.  Hence the elephant lanes at Zama and hence no elephants backtracking to trouble the Carthaginian infantry.

[Mark G]

its quite an interesting question though, I think.

especially in the context of the 'obvious' thing for Hannibal to do as a wargamer (well, apart from engineering a flank march) - that of putting the elephants out with the cavalry.

It also has implications for the cavalry battle itself

- did Scipio's cavalry think themselves insufficiently strong to take on the Carthaginian cavalry from the outset - but strong enough to take advantage of the disruption from the elephants?

or was the elephant attack premature (which would assist the idea that the mercenaries failed to follow up closely enough)

Or was the intention simply to use the elephants and mercenaries to completely clear away that heavy velite screen, rather than really get stuck into the hastatii line as we have assumed?

lots of possibilities worth a bit of consideration.

[Patrick Waterson]

Well, Polybius has the elephant attack ordered by signal, which suggests it was not premature.  I really do wonder about Livy's account because he (among other things) seems to mix up the Carthaginian second and third lines.  The rest of this post relies on Polybius as our most coherent and reliable source for the action.  (No references because the Perseus site seems to be down today.)

Cavalry - Masinissa has 2:1 over Tychaeus, whose troops are of superior quality ("the best in Africa").  Laelius and his opponents are not detailed, but Hannibal considered himself 'inferior in the cavalry arm' until joined by Tychaeus, which we can take to indicate Laelius having superiority in quantity, quality or both over just the Carthaginian horse.  The Numidians were 'skirmishing' before the elephant advance was sounded, so they were already getting involved though as yet without a result.  Laelius and his Carthaginian foes, being regular troops, were presumably awaiting orders.

Velites - these fought 'between the armies' but were initially drawn up in the 'lanes' between the doubled-up maniples.  It is hard to envisage the role of the mercenaries and elephants being to clear away the velites (only) because this would imply the ability to do so without the hastati becoming involved - and Polybius describes the fight as being between the mercenaries and the hastati, not mercenaries vs velites.  The problem is not that the mercenaries have overreached themselves in taking on the hastati but that the second line have not advanced closely in support.  The fact that they were expected to do so indicates that the mercenaries were supposed to get stuck into the hastati (and possibly beyond) and the citizen troops were intended to follow up and polish off anything that got through the elephants and mercenaries.  This all has shades of Bagradas.