The Mysterious Consul

[Monad]

Livy gives the size of Publius Scipio's fleet as numbering "about" 400 transports, while Appian gives Publius Scipio exactly 400 transports. Following Livy's chronology, in 203 BC, a Roman fleet, under the command of a praetor had 20 warships and 100 transports. Another Roman fleet of 30 warships and 200 transports, under the command of a praetor also carrying supplies for Publius Scipio's army, left Sicily for Africa, was wrecked in a storm. Both Roman supply fleets produce a total of 350 ships (50 warships and 300 transports), which is rather a large supply fleet for Publius Scipio's consular fleet of 400 ships. The fleet of 30 quinqueremes and 200 transports, were beset by a storm within sight of Africa. This resulted in a greater part of the transports being driven close to the city of Carthage. The Carthaginians, decided to despatch 50 warships to tow the beached Roman ships to Carthage.

In 202 BC, a propraetor with 50 quinqueremes and 100 transports arrived in Utica. In 201 BC, the consul Cnaeus Cornelius P Lentulus wanted as his province Africa. The senate decreed that the consul that was allocated the fleet of 50 vessels, would sail to Sicily, and if peace with Carthage failed, the consul and the fleet would sail to Africa, and conduct the campaign by sea, while Publius Scipio, retaining his full powers, was to conduct the campaign by land. Livy comments that whichever consul received Africa as his province, the consul was to select 50 ships out of the two fleets, that is the fleet Cnaeus Octavius was commanding in African waters and the fleet which P Villius was guarding the Sicilian seaboard.

In 202 BC, Tiberius Claudius Nero, was elected consul, and given the province of Africa with equal powers of imperium to that Publius Scipio. Livy allocates Tiberius Claudius Nero a fleet of 50 warships.

Here we find in a space of a few years, six references to 50 warships, which are just recycled data. Now these numbers maybe of no consequences to some, but 50 warships is the number of warships for two consular fleets. In 149 BC, Appian gives the Roman fleet under the command of two consuls as having 50 quinqueremes, 100 hemiolii, many open boats (numbers unknown), and transports (numbers unknown). Appian's 50 quinqueremes are correct for two consular fleets. When broken down into their troop types, all of the fleet numbers for Publius Scipio's Africa campaign all related to two consular fleets.

Following Livy's chronology, in 202 BC, Tiberius Claudius Nero, was elected consul, and given the province of Africa with equal powers of imperium to that Publius Scipio. Livy allocates Tiberius Claudius Nero a fleet of 50 quinqueremes, which coincidentally, is the sum total of quinqueremes allocated to both the praetors in 203 BC, and Publius Lentulus in 202 BC. According to Livy, Tiberius Claudius Nero was extremely slow in getting his fleet ready and putting to sea. No reason is given for Tiberius Claudius Nero tardiness. When Tiberius Claudius Nero finally left Rome, his consular fleet was caught in a violent storm between the ports of Cosa and Loretum, forcing Tiberius Claudius Nero to take refuge in the port of Populonia in Italy. After the storm had past, Tiberius Claudius Nero then sailed to Elba, and from there on to Corsica and then to Sardinia. Unfortunately, whilst rounding the Montes Insani, Tiberius Claudius Nero's consular fleet was again caught in a worse storm than the storm before. Many of Tiberius Claudius Nero's ships were scattered, others wrecked, while others were damaged. Tiberius Claudius Nero's fleet took refuge in Caralis, and while repairing his fleet, winter set in. When his year of office expired in 201 BC, as Tiberius Claudius Nero was not granted an extension of his imperium, Tiberius Claudius Nero returned to Rome with the fleet.

This is not the Tiberius Claudius Nero of 207 BC, who in defiance of the law that a consul must only act in his own province, and with a small force of 6,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry marched to reinforce the consul Livius Salinator's consular army, some 250 miles to the north, who was facing Hasdrubal's army at the Metaurus River in Northern Italy. Before beginning his march, Tiberius Claudius Nero advised the senate to recall the Roman legion in Capua, raise troops in Rome, and had made arrangements that his men would be provided with supplies along his line of march. Here we find the Tiberius Claudius Nero of 207 BC taking the initiative and acting on his own authority, while the Tiberius Claudius Nero of 202 BC is dragging his feet and procrastinating, which is extremely out of character and quite the opposite of 207 BC.

Another mistake is no praetor or propraetor can command anything more than a praetorian fleet of two legions. That is a golden rule I have found, and references to a praetor commanding anything more than two legions is a corruption, and generally is a chronology mistake in which the allocation of the forces has been confused. As Appian states, a praetor has half the dignity of a consul. So, as the Roman fleet numbers are for two consular armies, did Nero actually arrive in Africa? Livy writes that whichever consul in 201 BC, that is Cnaeus Cornelius P. Lentulus or P. Aelius Paetus, was allocated Africa, that consul was to act by sea, while Publius Scipio was to conduct the land campaign.

During the African campaign, Publius Scipio did travel twice to Tunis, and as I have found, with four legions each of 48 centuries. This is accomplished by dividing the 240 centuries in a consular army by five, which produces five legions each of 48 centuries (240 divided by 5 = 48). The fifth legion is Publius Scipio's garrison legion, left at Utica, which is a standard Roman military doctrine...protect the anchorage of the Roman fleet. The evidenced for this can be found in Vermina's casualty list. Following Livy, before being ordered by Publius Scipio to return to Utica, after the battle of Zama, while marching to Tunis, Livy has Cnaeus Octavius, with a portion of his infantry and all his cavalry, attack and defeat Vermina, the son of Syphax, with an army consisting mainly of Numidian cavalry. 15,000 Numidians were killed, 1,500 horses were captured and 1,200 Numidians were taken prisoner. This produces a total of 17,700 Numidian casualties. Four legions each of 48 centuries, gives a total of 192 centuries, and with a century having 80 infantry, this produces a total of 15,360 infantry, which has been rounded and converted to 15,000 Numidians killed. The 1,200 Numidians captured are the 1,200 allied cavalry in Publius Scipio's consular army, and the figure of 1,500 horses captured is all the allied cavalry, which includes the allied cavalry left with the fifth legion at Utica (1,500 divided by 5 legions = 300). This reserve allied cavalry force do on many occasion get omitted from the count, but do appear from time to time. The first reference I have to the Latins doing this was at the battle of Lake Regillus in 496 BC. Dionysius mentions 5,500 Latin prisoners and later 6,000 Latin prisoners. The 5,500 Latin prisoners (rounded from 5,520) are the Latin infantry camp guards, and the 6,000 Latin prisoners includes the 480 Latin cavalry that stay behind with the Latin camp guards. The allied cavalry that remained behind in the camp also acted as a reserve force and were employed at Asculum, and a few of the battles in the Third Samnite War, and also again against Pyrrhus.

So, Publius Scipio travelled to Tunis with 15,360 infantry and cavalry, which means he had no fleet moving in conjunction with the army. If he did so, his overland army would have been smaller. I have found two references that disclose how many infantry and cavalry were allocated to a ship when the army is moving overland. Scipio's attack on New Carthage is one such example. The 3,000-infantry and 500 cavalry as given by Polybius, that was allocated to Marcus Silanus, is actually the number of infantry and cavalry that was allocated to the Roman fleet under the command of Gaius Laelius, that sailed to Cartagena, while Publius Scipio with the rest of the army travelled overland to Cartagena. In 209 BC, Publius Scipio's 15,360 infantry is reduced to 12,000 infantry, of which Vermina's casualty numbers do not support this. Also, the Roman fleet cannot support the army when the army is moving inland to Tunis and not along the coast.

There are references to the Roman fleet travelling to Carthage, and I am coming to the conclusion, this is the second consular fleet in action, which means Nero in 202 BC, or Cnaeus Cornelius P. Lentulus in 201 BC. However, there is a chronology problem with the events surrounding the African campaign, and I believe that in 202 BC, rather than being lazy and getting banged about by storms, Nero has appeared on the scene, and this is giving Publius Scipio some real issues to get the Second Punic War over and done with. Having examined all the number for Hannibal's army and his causalities and from what these numbers have been produced, plus the other data concerning the Africa campaign, I am still convinced that there was no battle of the Great Plains and Zama. But that is other discussion.

[DBS]

Leaving aside your persistent fiction of 48 century legions...  the other explanation would be that fifty quinqueremes was, by the late third, early second centuries the number of large galleys routinely kept in commission or readily commissionable status.  If both consuls need a fleet, you split the galleys between them.  If only one consul needs a fleet, he gets around fifty.

The whole point of a consul having a provincia, a designated command, is that he normally operates there without the other consul.  It is only in times of great crisis that both consuls operate together, eg the early years of the Second Punic War.

There is no evidence for "garrison legions" whatsoever in this period.  If garrisons were needed, they seem to have often been provided by socii, not Romans.  Whether socii detached from an ala, or sent out as an additional force raised for the purpose is not made clear.

[DBS]

15,000 Numidians were killed, 1,500 horses were captured and 1,200 Numidians were taken prisoner. This produces a total of 17,700 Numidian casualties. Four legions each of 48 centuries, gives a total of 192 centuries, and with a century having 80 infantry, this produces a total of 15,360 infantry, which has been rounded and converted to 15,000 Numidians killed. The 1,200 Numidians captured are the 1,200 allied cavalry in Publius Scipio's consular army, and the figure of 1,500 horses captured is all the allied cavalry

So if I understand this rightly, you are taking invented figures for the number of centuries in Scipio's army, coming up with around 15,000 infantry, then claiming that this unsubstantiated 15,000 Romans and allies is proven to be correct because that is the number of Numidian enemies reported killed, but somehow confused with the Romans.  Then wash and repeat for the cavalry - 1200 Numidian enemies are really 1200 Roman allied cavalry.

Seriously...?

[Monad]

Leaving aside your persistent fiction of 48 century legions...

This is how due process works. The defence presents the evidence, and then it is the role of the prosecution to pull apart the evidence presented. I have presented three references to the Roman army that show the data has been based on 48-century legions. I have more examples, including the whole First Punic War. Your process is to ignore the evidence I present and there is a reason for this, you cannot debunk the data, because if you could, you would have. Therefore, your silence says it all. Your only method, which I find weak, is to use terms such as "persistent fiction," and again no substantial evidence to back your claims.

the other explanation would be that fifty quinqueremes was, by the late third, early second centuries the number of large galleys routinely kept in commission or readily commissionable status.  If both consuls need a fleet, you split the galleys between them.  If only one consul needs a fleet, he gets around fifty.

Again, your standard typical response, based on no evidence. You believe your word is the gospel, and nothing but the gospel.

There is no evidence for "garrison legions" whatsoever in this period.  If garrisons were needed, they seem to have often been provided by socii, not Romans.  Whether socii detached from an ala, or sent out as an additional force raised for the purpose is not made clear.

David, I wonder what you have been reading for the last four decades. As found in my research, I call them the "garrison force." As a precaution against the Roman camp being attacked from the garrison of Utica, Polybius (14 4 1) mentions that Publius Scipio left a sufficient body of troops suitable for the purpose of guarding the camp. Are these "sufficient" troops all allied? So, David, what name should we give to the "sufficient body of troops for the purpose of guarding the camp." I call them a garrison force so as not to confuse them with the body of triarii that guarded the field camp. They are two separate identities, and something that you are not aware of.

So if I understand this rightly, you are taking invented figures for the number of centuries in Scipio's army, coming up with around 15,000 infantry, then claiming that this unsubstantiated 15,000 Romans and allies is proven to be correct because that is the number of Numidian enemies reported killed, but somehow confused with the Romans.  Then wash and repeat for the cavalry - 1200 Numidian enemies are really 1200 Roman allied cavalry.

Seriously...?

Oh, very seriously, and they have not been "somehow confused with the Romans." It has been purposely done by our beloved ancient historians, and widely practiced by all. I have mentioned before on more than one occasion that most enemy causalities, be it men or ships have been substituted from the Roman army or fleet that opposed them. Ground breaking research at its best, and something academia missed, because, well, they never have undertaken a study of all the data in the primary sources. They only select what appeals to their theory, the rest being thrown out because they cannot make sense of it.

During the Third Samnite War, at the battle of Aquilonia in 293 BC, the Samnites had 20,340 Samnites killed. Livy (10 42) Now, here is something you do not know or have any idea due to you David, having never studied the data in the primary sources with any intensity, is that a consular army for this period amounted to 22,080 men, consisting of 19,200 infantry and 2,880 cavalry. The 19,200 infantry is organised into four legions each of 4,800 infantry, of which Justin tells me does not exist. The 4,800 infantry (1,200 velites, 1,800 hastati, 1,200 princeps and 600 triarii) does not include the officers and supernumeraries, otherwise each legion would have 5,040 men.

Taking the 22,080 men for a consular army, and after deducting the 20,340 Samnites killed, the difference is 1,740 men. At the battle of Sentinum in 295 BC, we find that the Romans captured 1,740 Perusians. At this stage one could say it's just a numbers game, and I would agree, but when those 1,740 men can be identified, it becomes and different matter, and when they easily slot into the so-called 20,340 Samnites killed, it becomes obvious that it is not a numbers game.

This is something I found unique to the Third Samnite War, the enemy casualty figures have been lifted from the various campaign years, so that events mentioned in one year, appear as casualty figures in another year.

For example, at the battle of Tifernum in 297 BC, to break the stalemate, the consul Quintus Fabius Maximus Rullinius rode over to the first line and ordered the two military tribunes, Maximus and Marcus Valerius to take command of the cavalry and attack the Samnites. As a secondary stratagem, implement in case the cavalry attack failed, Quintus Fabius Maximus Rullinius ordered one of his staff, Scipio, to draw of the hastati of the first legion, and without attracting the attention of the Samnites, to travel to the nearest hills, and to climb them without being seen. When this was achieved, Scipio was to appear stationed in the Samnite rear. The hastati of the first legion would amount to 2,490 infantry, consisting of:

  600 velites
1800 Roman hastati
2400 infantry
30 centurions
30 optiones
30 musicians
2490 infantry

Livy reports that 830 Samnites were taken prisoner. After dividing the 2,490 hastati force by three, the result is 830 men, consisting of:

200 velites
600 Roman hastati
800 infantry
  10 Roman centurions
  10 Roman optiones
  10 Roman musicians
830 infantry

Those 830 men are part of the six tribune cohorts that make a legion, of which I provided a diagram in the thread on the frontage of the Roman army at Cannae.

During the campaign of 295 BC, both consuls defeated a Samnite army, with the Samnites having 16,300 killed and 2,700 prisoners. The Roman losses are also given at 2,700 men, which is the same number as the Samnite prisoner. Notice that, the Roman losses are the same as the Samnites captured. Hello, if this isn't a red flag, then what is? Also, many of the same casualty numbers are recycled during the Third Samnite War.

Getting back to my counterpoint, by taking a consular army of 22,080 men for this period and rounding it to 22,000 men (ok if I do this David?), and then deducting an allied legion of 5,700 men (4,800 infantry and 900 allied cavalry), this leaves a residue of 16,300 men. There are a few examples thought the primary sources of someone deducting one legion, be it Roman or allied from the consular army order of battle and converting the residue to enemy causalities.

The 2,700 Samnites prisoners appears to be recycled from the battle of Tifernum in 297 BC, in which the hastati of the first (Roman legion) attacked the Samnite army in the rear. After deducting the 2,400 infantry (600 velites and 1,800 hastati), that attacked the Samite army in the rear, from a Roman legion (the 1st Roman legion) of 5,100 men (4,800 infantry and 300 cavalry), this leaves a residue of 2,700 men, consisting of:

600 velites
1200 Roman princeps
  600 Roman triarii
2400 Roman infantry
  300 Roman cavalry
2700 men

The 600 velites when divided by the 20 centuries of princeps and 10 centuries of triarii, allocates each century of princeps and triarii, the standard 20 velites.

Of course, David, this would not be sufficient evidence for you, and evidence you will ignore because, well, hell, you are on some crusade against me because I threaten all you believe in about the Roman army, and all those historians you hold so dear to your heart. And we cannot have that. Or maybe it is you see yourself as the Roman authority on this list, the go to man, when people have a question about the Roman army, and you feel threatened. Well, I am here to tell you to relax because I don't want such a status or position. That I can assure you is not my intent. I just like to share what I have found.

Anyway, to those with an open mind and are interested (doubt it), excluding Caesar for the moment, the exact numbers of the enemy forces have been based on the Roman army or fleet that opposed them, and the evidence for this is literally overwhelming. It starts with the battle of Sivia Alsia in 509 BC and continues to where my research cuts off at 410 AD. Even many of the Christian martyrdom stories have based the number of Christians killed from the military organisation of their time. What it provides is a wealth of information and insights into the Roman army and fleet, and I find it a good regulating tool for keeping everything in check.

[DBS]

Of course, David, this would not be sufficient evidence for you, and evidence you will ignore because, well, hell, you are on some crusade against me because I threaten all you believe in about the Roman army, and all those historians you hold so dear to your heart. And we cannot have that.

My dear fellow.  I am not on some crusade against you, but when you ignore any ancient evidence that disagrees with your convoluted fantasies, and declare that the ancient authors are hopelessly muddled and do not know the difference between Romans on one side and Numidians on the other, then I am afraid you simply cannot be taken seriously, and frankly you are not.  Stop wittering on about "data"; when information is twisted and turned inside out in the manner you employ, it is not data at all, but arrant nonsense.

I have not even mentioned thus far your nonsense about Zama and Great Plains never having been fought...

Please, please.  Even you must recognise that what you are proposing is so very, very far out of line with the centuries of scholastic study on ancient Roman military history.  Even if you really believe that you have had an epiphany, show just a modicum of humility, accept that you are asking a very big leap of faith from others, and stop being so arrogant and offensive to anyone who dares question your methods.

[Erpingham]

Moderator hat on . Gentlemen, do not descend to the level of insults please, despite your strength of feeling. Hat off.

Perhaps, Steven, you can explain your reasons for the idea the pattern of swapping Roman casualties for enemy ones?  It seems quite widespread and practiced by multiple authors but also, to outside eyes, seems an odd thing to do.

[Monad]

My dear fellow.  I am not on some crusade against you, but when you ignore any ancient evidence that disagrees with your convoluted fantasies, and declare that the ancient authors are hopelessly muddled and do not know the difference between Romans on one side and Numidians on the other, then I am afraid you simply cannot be taken seriously, and frankly you are not.

I work with the evidence. Now go back to my last posting, take those numbers and tell me where I am wrong? Did a consular army have 22,080 men? Let's discuss it. No, that is not your style. Besides yourself David, tell me who else does not take me seriously? I would like to know what the forum has to say. So, instead of just giving David a "like", reveal yourself, and let's get it all out in the open, have your say but please back it up with something, like evidence.

Stop wittering on about "data"; when information is twisted and turned inside out in the manner you employ, it is not data at all, but arrant nonsense.

Thank you for insulting everyone that has supported my research for the last 20 years that have examined my work and supported my conclusions. Can you explain "arrant nonsense," from the examination of the numbers in my last posting. Is the 830 hastati wrong? Again and again, you just make generalised negative comments without providing examples.

Please, please.  Even you must recognise that what you are proposing is so very, very far out of line with the centuries of scholastic study on ancient Roman military history.

I have stated on this forum my research is a quantum leap, so you were warned. I have also been warned that because my work is a quantum leap, many will go on the attack or just find it too hard to accept. How true. Obviously, you and many others have not studied the methodology of historians for the last 400 years. To all that have, they would have noticed their shortcomings and how selective or limiting historians are in choosing data and ignoring other pieces of data. Are you aware of Graham Sumner's paper "The Legion and the Centuriate Organisation, The Journal of Roman Studies, Volume 60 (1970) pp. 67-78. Can you find the major flaw that destroys his theory completely? You have to look elsewhere because Sumner carefully omits it.

Once at Melbourne University, I had the opportunity to speak with a group of mathematicians. I asked them that if they wanted to determine the size of a Roman legion, would they choose only to work with Polybius' chapter six which outlines his Roman legion, or the whole works of Polybius. All agreed on utilising the whole of Polybius' work, because that way they could determine if his legion details stand up to scrutiny. Obviously, mathematicians have more common sense than historians.

Please, please.  Even you must recognise that what you are proposing is so very, very far out of line with the centuries of scholastic study on ancient Roman military history.  Even if you really believe that you have had an epiphany, show just a modicum of humility, accept that you are asking a very big leap of faith from others, and stop being so arrogant and offensive to anyone who dares question your methods

You do not question my methods David, far from it, you lecture and go on the attack. Your comments are always laced with a little subtle insult. Try changing you tone and see what happens. You refuse to discuss the evidence I present, so why bother responding with another meaningless lecture?

David, if you do not like what I post, then just do the mature thing and ignore it. However, something deep in your subconscious keeps driving you to respond.

Perhaps, Steven, you can explain your reasons for the idea the pattern of swapping Roman casualties for enemy ones?  It seems quite widespread and practiced by multiple authors but also, to outside eyes, seems an odd thing to do

Thank you for the question. First they are not Roman causalities, but Roman army numbers. All I can say is that the ancient authors (excluding Caesar), had no idea of the size of the enemy army or fleet. Why? I have no answer. It would appear they did not have any information. But to think after a battle the Romans actually spend the time to count the enemy dead does not make sense. In many campaign situations, they did not have the time. For the battle of the Allia in 390 BC, the Roman authors are using the Roman tribal system for the Gallic army sizes. The mention of the Roman army having 24,000 men, is the number of men in the 20 tribes, which includes the seniores. The size of the Roman army as given by Diodorus and Plutarch support four Roman legions each of 40 centuries being present at the Allia River, for a total of 160 centuries. Plutarch gives the Roman army at "no fewer than 40,000 men," which equates to 400 centuries at 100 men. The 400 centuries consist of the 240 centuries (24,000 men) for the 20 tribes, as given by Diodorus and the 160 centuries of juniors (4 legions each of 40-centuries), sent to the Allia.

At 100 men per tribal century, the 400 centuries converts to 40,000 men as per Plutarch. For the Celtic army, Diodorus has 30,000 Senones Celts sack the territory of the Clusini, and after another Celtic army of "fellow tribesmen" joined the Senones Celts, this gives a total of 70,000 Celts. (5) The premise presented is the 30,000 Senones Celts has been rounded from 32,000 men (320 centuries), and has been arrived at by deducting Diodorus' 24,000 men from the 16,000 men at the Allia. The residue 8,000 men has then been further deducted from Plutarch's 40,000 Romans, leaving 32,000 men, which were rounded and converted to 30,000 Senones Celts. Livy writes that the levy for 390 BC was small and he is correct, as five legions of 40-centuries should have been levied, with the fifth legion being left at Rome. In the later periods, Goth army numbers have also been based on the Roman tribal system for that period.

Some of the methods used by the ancient historians in calculating the enemy causalities, is to take the size of a consular army and then remove the camp guards. The camp guards then become the number of enemy captured. The remaining men in the consular army after the camp guards are removed, on some occasions, the number of camp guards is again removed. Other examples, are when Roman troops are mentioned doing something, and no numbers are given, this is because those numbers will find themselves are either enemy casualties or roman casualties. Therefore, the princeps of the third Roman legion and the Campanian cavalry that attacked the Gauls in the flank at Sentinum, will somewhere in the Third Samnite War appear as a casualty figure, and they do. Another example is Mons Graupius. For the Roman army, Tacitus has 8,000 auxiliaries, 3,000 cavalry and a force of legionaries. For some reason, he fails to tell us how many legionaries were there. The Caledonian army is given as "above" 30,000 men. Taking the 11,000 Romans (8,000 auxiliaries and 3,000 cavalry) provided by Tacitus and deducting this from the 30,000 Caledonians, leaves a residue of 19,000 men, which appears to be the size of the Roman army, that is 8,000 auxiliary infantry, 8,000 legionaries and 3,000 cavalry. The figure of "over" 30,000 Caledonians is because the 3,000 Roman cavalry has been rounded down.

[DBS]

Some of the methods used by the ancient historians in calculating the enemy causalities, is to take the size of a consular army and then remove the camp guards. The camp guards then become the number of enemy captured.

What evidence do you have for that?  Zero.  None.  Nada.  Your only basis for that assertion is your assertion that no one (except, apparently, Caesar, despite the fact that he was one of the most blatant self publicists) has any idea about numbers of enemies.  To be awarded a triumph, one has to have defeated a minimum number of opponents.  Might that lead to a temptation to inflate enemy casualties where the figures might be a tad marginal for triumph/no triumph?  Of course.  But one would not have a mechanism based on awarding triumphs based on enemy casualties unless one had a sense that they might be estimated with some degree of fidelity.  The nature of Roman politics was such that any such nonsense, if too blatant, would get called out in an instant; any triumphant general was guaranteed to have had some embittered rival who was also present at the battle and would challenge excessive distortion.

Your Mons Graupius example just shows this line of argument at its worst. Caledonians are really Romans, cavalry numbers get rounded down to fit your "maths", or presumably rounded up when necessary to fit your "maths".  Poor old Tacitus, so easily confused between father in law's cavalry and a bunch of hairy northern Britons...  The likely explanation for Tacitus omitting the numbers of legionaries is that, by his account, they were not needed in the battle.  His wonderful father in law was able to defeat a large number of hairy barbarians just using his own house-trained barbarians.  That is something any decent Roman can respect - advance the cause of the Roman state without shedding any significant, precious Roman blood.  Do I think Tacitus is omitting the legionaries for reasons of propaganda?  Yes.  Do I think I need to start counting Caledonians as Romans?  Ridiculous.

The triarii are most certainly not always left in the camp.  It is not clear at all if that was even a common practice.  They are specifically attested as being in the field at hard fought battles such as Zama, and Polybius would have most certainly been scrupulous when describing the mid Republican legion in highlighting camp guard duties if that was their primary role, but instead talks of them as the third line.  If they were in the camp, it would not be much of an acies triplex, would it?  Acies duplex?

Steven, if you post on here, expect your ideas to be challenged and rigorously contested when they fly in the face of centuries of scholastic analysis.  Of course some of that analysis may be flawed.  But perhaps some of your analysis might also be flawed?

[DBS]

Is the 830 hastati wrong?

Yes, because they are Samnite prisoners, not Roman hastati!  Maybe Livy is wrong on the precise number.  But to claim that they are not enemy prisoners but friendly forces...  that is not data, but a complete disregard for the sources. 

If you think that the numbers given are for Romans, not enemies, how can you claim any basis for using the numbers?  If the sources are so out on the identity of the forces involved, what hope is there that the numbers they give have any value?  I am afraid this is where your logic collapses.  Either accept that the ancient authors are broadly right except where there is very clear evidence they are not, or dismiss their evidence entirely, including all their figures.

[Monad]

In his description of Fabius Pictor, Polybius (13 9 1-5) writes "my own opinion is that while not treating his authority as negligible we should not regard it as final, but that readers should in most cases test his statements by reference to the actual facts." Taking Polybius literally, for me, this means if the primary sources allocate two consuls a force of 50 warships, it should be tested whether they actually have been allocated 50 warships or whether the 50 warships is a rounded number, or more importantly a mistake.

Many years ago, when I was examining the fall of Cartagena in 209 BC, a great difficulty arose between the cavalry numbers given by Polybius and Livy. Livy gives Marcus Silanus 3,000 infantry and 300 cavalry, while Polybius allocates Marcus Silanus 3,000 infantry and 500 cavalry, which is a discrepancy of 200 cavalry.

However, at that stage I had learnt to divide the 240 centuries in Publius Scipio's consular army by five, to arrive at five bodies of 48 centuries, with 192 centuries allocated to Publius Scipio, and one body of 48 centuries left to guard Tarraco. The 3,840-infantry left to guard Tarraco does not conform to Livy and Polybius' claim of Marcus Silanus having 3,000 infantry (48 centuries x 80 infantry per century = 3,840 infantry). All attempts in determining how the 3,840 infantry would have been rounded to 3,000 infantry ended unsuccessfully. It is too big a target. However, a reread of Livy found this "most authorities agree that Gaius Laelius was in command of the fleet, but there are some who say that it was Marcus Silanus."

That means the 3,000 infantry were Gaius Laelius' marines, Livy mentions later taking charge of Cartagena when it was captured. With a consular army having 19,200 infantry, when divided by five this produces five bodies each of 3,840 infantry. After deducting Marcus Silanus' 3,840 infantry to guard Tarraco, this left Publius Scipio with 15,360 infantry to attack Cartagena. The 15,360 infantry is commonly rounded to 15,000 infantry. In 211 BC, so as to stop Hannibal from devastating the region, the proconsul at Capua, Quintus Fulvius Flaccus, selected a force amounting to 15,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry to march to Rome. In 145 BC, the consul Quintus Fabius Maximus Aemilianus arrive in Orso in Iberia with 15,000 infantry and "about" 2,000 cavalry.

However, Gaius Laelius' fleet that would move down the coasted in conjunction with Publius Scipio's army and therefore needed to be manned. As an experiment, I again divided Publius Scipio's remaining 15,000 infantry again by five, which results in five bodies each of 3,000 infantry. Now, I had matched Livy and Polybius' 3,000 infantry allocated to Marcus Silanus, which, without the rounding, amounts to 3,072 infantry. This meant that from the 192 centuries in Publius Scipio's army, from each century of 80 infantry, 16 infantry (4 velites and 12 hastati or 12 princeps or 12 triarii), were selected to man the fleet (192 x 16 = 3,072). So, one fifth of each century was removed.

Having already had some years ago deciphered the makeup of a consular fleet for the Second Punic War, the 3,072 infantry perfectly divided by the number of infantry ships that would be allocated to Gaius Laelius, which at full strength amounted to 188 ships. Following Polybius that 120 soldiers were conveyed in a quinquereme, Publius Scipio's 15,360 infantry divided by 120 = 128 quinqueremes. However, when the 3,072 infantry are divided by 128 ships, each ship is conveying 24 infantry. Now, and I don't give a shit who this upsets, is because I am sick of ignorant know all's, and I don't give a shit if it rattles your poor sensibilities, is the ratio of infantry to cavalry allocated to a ship follows the Pythagorean ratio of 4/3. So, if we divide the 24 infantry by 4, the result is 6 and when divided by 3 = 18. Therefore, each cavalry quinquereme carried 18 cavalrymen.

Is there further evidence for this? Yes, and it can be found in the Carthaginian casualty numbers. The only reason I began to examine enemy numbers was because too many were showing themselves to have been taken from the Roman organisation that over years I was fully coming to understand, and there were too many coincidences to ignore (of which I tried to do for some years).

After capturing Cartagena, following Livy, Gaius Laelius, with the marines, was left in charge of the city, while Publius Scipio and the rest of the army returned to their camp. Later, Publius Scipio ordered the hostages from the various Iberian tribes to be summoned. Livy writes that "it is difficult to give numbers, for I find in one place, 300 hostages mentioned and in another 3,724 hostages."

First thing that caught my eye, Gaius Laelius, with the marines, left in charge of the city, and if the lower figure of 300 hostages is deducted from the higher number of hostages of 3,724 hostages, this leaves 3,424 hostages, which is getting close to Livy's 3,300 marines or Polybius' 3,500 marines. After deducting Gaius Laelius' 3,072 infantry from Livy's 3,724 hostages, the residue is 652 hostages. By further dividing the 652 by 2 leaves 326 hostages. Therefore, the figure of 3,724 hostages was composed of 3,072 infantry and 326 hostages and 326 hostages. However, the 326 has come about because of rounding. It should be 324 and when deducted from Livy's 3,724 this leaves a residue of 3,400 hostages, which consists of the 3,072 infantry and 324 hostages, giving a total of 3,396, which has been rounded to 3,400 (a rounding of 4 hostages). The 324 hostages are cavalry, so Livy's figure of 300 cavalry has been rounded from 324 cavalry, as are the 300 hostages. The mistake made by Livy's source was they possibly used a source saying 3,400 and seeing another source with 324, added this to the 3,400 to arrive at 3,724.

The 324 cavalry when divided by 18 cavalrymen per ship, requires 18 ships to convey them. Is there evidence to back this up? You be the judge. After the capture of Cartagena, Polybius has Publius Scipio incorporate 18 captured Carthaginian ships to his original fleet of 35 ships, thereby increasing his fleet to 53 ships. The 18 Carthaginian ship casualties have been derived from the fleet of Gaius Laelius and are the ships that convey the cavalry and are squadron command ships, while the 35 ships are part of Marcus Silanus' fleet at Tarraco, which is small. How Polybius or his original source believed Marcus Silanus fleet of 35 ships was Publius Scipio's original fleet is beyond me.

Appian's 33 Carthaginian captured warships, again is part of Marcus Silanus' fleet. Following Polybius that a ship was allocated 120 soldiers, the 3,840-infantry left at Tarraco would need 32 ships. Question, does Appian's 33 ships consist of the 32 infantry ships and Marcus Junius Silanus' flagships? If you answered yes, you are correct. To get the varying enemy ship numbers, some ship types are omitted from a Roman fleet, like the horse transport, sometimes only the infantry ships are given, or the infantry and cavalry ships are given, and in many accounts, the flagship is either counted or not counted. And all these numbers get rounded, so 32 infantry ships in many examples, becomes 30 ships. The original sources are not trying very hard to cover up what they are doing.

Livy has Publius Scipio increase his fleet by five captured Carthaginian ships, and a further 63 Carthaginian transports, thereby producing a total of 68 additional ships. Livy's total of 63 captured Carthaginian ships, has been constructed on the full number of ships, including the horse transports in Marcus Silanus' garrison fleet at Tarraco and then adding Polybius' reported 18 captured Carthaginian transports (45 + 18 = 63 ships). Livy's figure of five captured Carthaginian ships is also part of Marcus Silanus' garrison fleet and when added to the 63 ships above, produces a total of 68 ships.

Livy further comments that there are other discrepancies on other points: "one author asserts that the Carthaginian garrison amounted to 10,000 men, another puts it at 7,000, whilst a third estimates it as not more than 2,000. In one place you will find that there were 10,000 prisoners, in another the number is said to have exceeded 25,000."

Gaius Laelius' 3,072 infantry when combined with Marcus Silanus' 3,840 infantry produces 6,912 infantry, which has been rounded to 7,000. Basically, I believe the 3,072 infantry was rounded to 3,000 and the 3,840 rounded to 4,000. The figure of 10,000 Carthaginians consists of the figure of 7,000 men explained above plus the 3,000-infantry that was allocated to Marcus Junius Silanus. The figure of 25,000 Carthaginians has incorrectly added Marcus Silanus' 3,000 infantry to Publius Scipio's consular army of 22,000 men (20,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry), instead of deducting them. Throughout the Iberian campaign, Appian on many occasion allocates a Carthaginian army at 25,000 infantry and 2,500 cavalry. Marcus Silanus 3,000 infantry and 500 cavalry make a lot of regular appearances during the Iberian campaign.

According to Polybius, Cartagena was garrisoned by a small force of 1,000 trained Carthaginian soldiers. Polybius also has Mago arm another 2,000 Cartagena citizens, which brings the total to 3,000 men, which aligns with the 3,000 infantry incorrectly allocated to Marcus Junius Silanus. The 1,000 trained Carthaginians mentioned by Polybius consists of the princeps and triarii and amounts to 1,152 men. The additional 2,000 men armed by Mago consists of the velites and hastati that manned Gaius Laelius' fleet and amount to 1,920 men, thereby producing a total of 3,072 infantry. Therefore, the 1,152 men gets rounded down by 152 and the 1,920 gets rounded up by 80, producing a difference of 72.

After deducting Gaius Laelius and Marcus Silanus' force, this left Publius Scipio's with an army of 13,728 men, (12,288 infantry and 1,440 cavalry). Livy also mentions that after Cartagena was captured, a Celtiberian noble named Aluccius is reported to have provided Publius Scipio with a picked force of 1,400 cavalrymen. The 1,400 cavalrymen have been rounded from the 1,440 cavalry that accompanied Publius Scipio to Cartagena. The 12,288-infantry belonging to Publius Scipio were organised into four legions each of 3,072 infantry, and composed of:

  8 cohorts each of 384 infantry
24 maniples each of 128 infantry
48 centuries each of 64 infantry

Generally, the 12,288 infantry in the primary sources gets rounded to 12,000 infantry.

As I have stated on many an occasion, the organisation of the Roman legion can be cut vertically or horizontally in many different ways. It is more flexible than most people have imagined. Also, during the Second Punic War, the Romans did not have a separate organised marine corps. Soldiers placed on ships were simply called marines. Therefore, a whole consular army when on ships were all marines, and when they got off the ships went back to being called infantry and cavalry.

Because the ships conveying the cavalry were also the squadron command ships, each cavalry ships consisted of both Roman and allied cavalrymen. I have come to this conclusion because as the allied cavalry was greater than the Roman cavalry (2 to 1 or 3 to 1), there would be too many allied cavalry ships, and a great number of Roman ships would be under the command of allied cavalry ships. Having an equal division of the cavalry aboard each ship solves this problem.

Because of the data relating to the hostages and captured Carthaginian ships, I final discovered how Polybius or his source had arrived at 500 cavalry. During the First Punic War, every ship, be it cavalry or infantry, carried the same number of infantry or cavalry. This was not so during the Second Punic War. Polybius or his source have incorrectly allocated the same number of infantry, that is 24 to each cavalry ship. However, Polybius figure of 500 cavalry has been rounded from 480 cavalry, and when divided by 24 equals 20 ships, which is correct, as the 18 ships mentioned by Polybius omits Gaius Laelius' flagship and a subordinate's flagship. With 20 cavalry quinqueremes in Gaius Laelius' fleet, there should be 360 cavalry (20 ships x 18 = 360 ships). The 324 cavalry are missing 36 cavalrymen. As I had mentioned earlier, sometimes the flagships are omitted. With Gaius Laelius commanding 188 ships, the two flagships commanded 94 ships (64 infantry ships, 10 cavalry ships and 20 horse transports).

Happy to take questions, but not interested in being harangued by personal opinions delivered without any substance or evidence.

[DBS]

1) Zero attestation for 48 century legions.

2) Zero evidence for division by five.  Consular armies almost invariably consisted of two legion, occasionally four, each with its integral ala.  Praetors sometimes got a single legion, but that would have had its own integral ala.  Even if a general drew off troops for an ad hoc extra body, that could be composed of any number of troops, so simply dividing by five tells us nothing.

3) Pythagoras or not, cavalry assigned to a quinquereme?  Cavalry from the land forces might conceivably cooperate with the fleet when beached, conducting siege operations, or otherwise working close inshore, but no sane commander would deliberately embark cavalry in a galley for anything but the shortest, most uncontested hop across the 'oggin.  If you want to move cavalry by sea, you need dedicated transports with no combat utility.

[Erpingham]

cavalry assigned to a quinquereme?

As I understand it, Steven is separating cavalry from their horses, who have separate transports

"the two flagships commanded 94 ships (64 infantry ships, 10 cavalry ships and 20 horse transports)".

Cavalrymen would be capable of acting as marines if required, I think.

[DBS]

Cavalrymen would be capable of acting as marines if required, I think.

At a pinch, but very sub-optimal.  Smaller shields, lighter weaponry.  When you have thousands of legionaries notionally available but only a few hundred donkey wallopers, not something on which one would obviously rely.  Why assign cavalry to a fleet at all, as opposed to tasking a fleet to transport an army somewhere?