The column in battle

[Justin Swanton]

are you not assuming that the entire line wheeled as one?

its just as conceivable that each maniple wheeled and they attacked in an echelon.

and let us not forget those elephants, and the shape of the phalanx.

Separate maniples moving separately one behind the other would still have become chaotic. Large formations, even if composed of subunits, need to deploy and move in clearly recognizable shapes (line/column) for the subunits and men to know their place and what they are expected to do. The only exception I know to this is when the general pitches up and takes personal command of one or two subunits.

[Patrick Waterson]

I might yield to you on cynocephalae though.

care to have another look at Polybios 18.25

Perseus has "they were still in column of march," which would be good to see your magic run over to see what sort of implications that has in the original.

he also has "keeping the elephants in front he led the maniples of his right against the enemy" - which is probably a bit more than a couple, but less than one legion's principes and triarii (i.e. 10 maniples of each)

and the elephants seem to be overlooked by all.

Will do.

The Macedonian phalanx at Cynoscephalae arrived at the top of the ridge in two parts: the right, under Philip himself, formed up and slammed into the Romans, forcing them back so that Flaminius wrote off the left as a lost cause and betook himself to the right.  There he found to his delight that the left half of the Macedonian phalanx was still struggling to get into formation and so let rip with his elephants, followed by the hastati.

"Still in column of march" seems to be the translator's rendering of "hepomenoi poreias", literally a 'following mode of walking'.  This would seem to mean they were still at march formation intervals (6' frontage per man) but unable to close up because the ground did not permit it.  They were trying to get into a 'diathesin' (order, arrangement) of 'parataxeos' (lined up/closed up for battle), which I read as filling in the files first to 3' per man then to 18" frontage per man.

Meanwhile, the right half of the phalanx was driving all before it.  Polybius XVIII.26:

"The main body of the Roman right followed and slaughtered the flying Macedonians. But one of the tribunes, with about twenty maniples, having made up his mind on his own account what ought to be done next, contributed by his action very greatly to the general victory. He saw that the division which was personally commanded by Philip was much farther forward than the rest of the enemy, and was pressing hard upon the Roman left by its superior weight; he therefore left the right, which was by this time clearly victorious, and directing his march towards the part of the field where a struggle was still going on, he managed to get behind the Macedonians and charge them on the rear."

Each Roman wing had two legions (or one legion and one ala).  The tribune would be able to command only troops from his own legion, and twenty maniples is coincidentally all the principes and all the hastati from one legion.  This, and not XVIII.25, is the famous manoeuvre that everyone talks about.

are you not assuming that the entire line wheeled as one?

its just as conceivable that each maniple wheeled and they attacked in an echelon.

and let us not forget those elephants, and the shape of the phalanx.

Bearing in mind that (from a Roman perspective) they were on the right of the field and Philip was on the left, they had to travel laterally to move from right to left, and the tribune had to move the triarii further left than the principes (or vice versa) if he wanted to make use of both lines' frontage (if not, why bother with both lines?).  So how does he get the line, or rather both lines, to travel laterally from one part of the field to another, and then commit the two lines together and simultaneously in the Macedonian rear (otherwise the first subunit to hit alerts everyone that something is up)?

On the subject of elephants, it is noteworthy that all the big Roman successes against phalanxes were attributable to elephants: Pyrrhus' elephants stormed through their own ranks at Beneventum, Antiochus III's did the same at Magnesia and the Romans used elephants offensively with success at Cynoscephalae and Pydna (at Pydna, the point at which the elephants were committed was the point at which the Macedonian line first started to come apart).   Naturally, the legions took the credit, and have distorted historical analysis and wargaming ever since.

[Justin Swanton]

Another possible case of use of column in a battle might be Ilipa, where Scipio extended his wings (infantry and cavalry) to envelope the flanks of Hasdrubal's larger Carthaginian army. Since this involved redeploying laterally it would have had been done by column.

So a possible general rule might be to limit the use of columns by infantry to Hannibal and those better-quality Roman commanders directly influenced by him. Everybody else sticks to lines.

Did cavalry use columns more frequently in the course of a battle? Since they were meant to flank the central body of infantry if possible, I suspect they did, as that would involve lateral movement.

[Mark G]

nice one Pat.

the interesting thing there is that these 20 maniples are taking the phalanx in the rear, not the flank - I doubt anyone has much difficulty in seeing that being accomplished without need for the Romans to necessarily form a column to redeploy.  Given they get across the field initially by taking a march column, I'm still inclined to see that as an opportunity attack, not an organised redeployment first. 

the report has Flaminius leading to attack, not redeploying and then attacking.  Given the opportunity nature - I still lean toward that being swift and a bit ad hoc, and the time taken to reform into columns to march and deploy back again would simply allow the phalanx to react.

so its possible to see the only column on the field being the Macedonian one which was caught out badly (18.25) - and the tribune has pulled back the pursuit, which is then able to take advantage of the first phalanx - from the rear. (18.26) without any need for columns on the Roman part.

interestingly, Pats translation there has them directing the march to the rear - possible column. but Penelope has them wheeling

"3 For noticing that the Macedonians under Philip had advanced a long way in front of the rest, and were by their weight forcing back the Roman left, he quitted those on the right, who were now clearly victorious, and wheeling his force in the direction of the scene of combat and thus getting behind the Macedonians, he fell upon them in the rear. "

anything more specific on the options intended to be conveyed at that point?

given it was troops who had charged from the right to the left, and were now pursuing (so clearly well behind the advancing phalanx), who were then ordered to basically go back the way the came - an about face wheel down a bit to aim at the phalanx seems much easier than another redeployment into a column then order to march to position then deploy back again and then attack.

the point of columns being that the greater speed over distance compensates for the time taken to change formation twice, after all.  and these are tactical evolutions, where the distance is necessarily restricted.

[Justin Taylor]

So a possible general rule might be to limit the use of columns by infantry to Hannibal and those better-quality Roman commanders directly influenced by him. Everybody else sticks to lines.

I would not be inclined to do that as it would exclude any action that we did not know about. Leave it to the players as to what they choose to do?

[Patrick Waterson]

I am generally in favour of player choice.    One could add in player notes that moving in column on the battlefield is quick but the consequences of being caught in combat are dire - only the best generals are known to have done this, and only when they had tied down everything on the opposing side that could interfere.

So players can feel free to use the option - but they have been warned!

That said, a player who hits a column in front with a small unit should not do huge amounts of damage (he is basically opposing a combat-ready subunit with a combat-ready subunit, say a mere -1 on the universal disadvatage scale); one who hits it 'on the nose' and on both flanks at the same time should slaughter it.  (This is of course the proper way to take down a battlefield manoeuvre column or a column of march - one flank and the survivors will turn to face after the initial ruckus*; both flanks and it will not be alive long enough to decide which way to turn).

*or fracas, or rumpus, depending upon exactly where one is hit, I suppose. 

Mark, a quick run through Polybius XVIII.26.  Our initiative-showing tribune:

"... therefore left the right [apolipon ... dexiou], which was by this time clearly victorious, and directing his march [epistrepsas = turning] towards the part of the field where a struggle was still going on, he managed to get behind the Macedonians and charge them on the rear."

This says to me that the tribune and his twenty maniples moved laterally from the right to the left and then went in with the cold steel, as opposed to about-turning and going back the way they had come and finding a row of backs conveniently presented.  It does look like a lateral movement across the field, basically a left-face, movement ahead, another left-face and drive in from the rear.  The movement across from right to left really has to be in a succession of subunits, which it is hard to call anything except a column.

A lot of wargaming tradition involves wheeling lines, or at least trying to.  The more I look at classical warfare, the more I am convinced that nobody ever wheeled a line as such: what they did was to turn each individual subunit and proceed with the subunits facing in the right direction, then have the subunits catch up and lo, they have a line which looks as if it has wheeled.  The key to classical manoeuvres seems to be the 'beads on a string' concept: the subunits are the beads, and you can roll the whole string forwards or drag it sideways by one end, and if doing the latter you can snake it around a bit.  The key is that there is always one bead that the others follow or line up on, and this can be one of the beads at the end or one in the middle.

[Mark G]

wheeling subunits was exactly what I had in mind with initiating the attack in echelon.

It works fine for me at a tactical level, and fits in well with the Romans in this battle.

But I don't think that's what anyone would describe a DBM column as - which is much closer to the second Macedonian phalanx, I think.


I'd also ask you to consider the importance of the positioning of the key fighting men - which is something you also have to factor in when 'allowing' a march column to fight.  Basically, all the good guys are positioned ready for them to reform back into battle order - so even on a man to man frontage fight, the column should be disadvantaged further.

[Erpingham]

The more I look at classical warfare, the more I am convinced that nobody ever wheeled a line as such: what they did was to turn each individual subunit and proceed with the subunits facing in the right direction, then have the subunits catch up and lo, they have a line which looks as if it has wheeled.  The key to classical manoeuvres seems to be the 'beads on a string' concept: the subunits are the beads, and you can roll the whole string forwards or drag it sideways by one end, and if doing the latter you can snake it around a bit.  The key is that there is always one bead that the others follow or line up on, and this can be one of the beads at the end or one in the middle.

This clearly would work best with drilled units.  Would you ban undrilled troops from carry out such a "wheel" or allow to make it with some penalty (e.g. slower, ending up disordered)?  Do we assume other troop types like cavalry manouevered the same way?

[Paul Innes]

WRG 6th edition allowed all troops to make the same manoeuvres, whether "regular" or "irregular"; it's just that the latter took twice as long, except for skirmish infantry and light horse.

[Patrick Waterson]

wheeling subunits was exactly what I had in mind with initiating the attack in echelon.

It works fine for me at a tactical level, and fits in well with the Romans in this battle.

But I don't think that's what anyone would describe a DBM column as - which is much closer to the second Macedonian phalanx, I think.


I'd also ask you to consider the importance of the positioning of the key fighting men - which is something you also have to factor in when 'allowing' a march column to fight.  Basically, all the good guys are positioned ready for them to reform back into battle order - so even on a man to man frontage fight, the column should be disadvantaged further.

The 'DBM column' is really an improvisation for getting large numbers of troops through difficult terrain.  In a sense it is a red herring, as classical commanders seem to have taken the view that if terrain is restrictive you do not send troops through it, and if you can send troops through it it is not restrictive.  Sending a phalanx up a rocky slope (difficult terrain) on or close to the battlefield was not done in column but in battle formation in extended order.  The left of the Macedonian phalanx at Cynoscephalae (i.e. the bit the elephants made a mess of) was not a column in any shape or form, but a battle line in deep files at 6'intervals, ready to 'dense up' to 18" per man as soon as it had got through the difficult terrain.

Would you ban undrilled troops from carry out such a "wheel" or allow to make it with some penalty (e.g. slower, ending up disordered)? 

If this is asking, would I permit the rear ranks of the fyrd at Hastings to attempt a Hannibalistic double envelopment of the Norman army, the answer has to be: no.  Would the wings be permitted to face left/right and move some distance to create a gap for newly-arriving reinforcements? Probably not.  I do not think anyone except the huscarls in Harold's army would have the ability to perform such manoeuvres, although the huscarls might have it (especially if Harold had been at them with his Vegetius).  It would be nice if we had a more detailed account of Stamford Bridge to show what manoeuvre capabilities were available.

If however we look at the Black Prince's army at Najera (Navarette), this seems to have had a high degree of discipline and ability to manoeuvre, and the way Percy and the Captal de Buch wrapped up du Guesclin and his vanguard was worthy of a small-scale Hannibal.  So despite its ambiguous regular/irregular status, the English army of the Hundred Years war looks as if it would qualify.

These are guideline instances.  I am rather wary of making blanket general statements on the subject, but the obvious gentlemen to rule on for the classical period would be Gauls and Germans (in tribes, not in the Carthaginian or Roman army).  This requires a look at their command structure, which appears to be on a tribal basis and hence such manoeuvres as they could perform would tend to be based on the tribe or a subset of the tribe with someone important enough to follow.  In Caesar's Gallic War manoeuvres seem to be done by tribe, e.g. in the fight against the Helvetii (Bibracte) the Gallic flank attack is carried out by the Boii and Tulingi.

This focusses us on the degree to which a tribe could itself manoeuvre, and one of the characteristics Caesar describes is fluidity: what the Gauls lack in precision they seem to make up for in rapidity of movement.  Such rapidity comes with its own cost: the Atrebates at the Sambre (Caesar vs the Nervii and friends) zoom out of the woods, cross the river, race up the hill - and are so out of breath that the first volley of pila stops them and they are routed by the Roman charge.

The conclusion to which this points is that Gauls can move themselves with not dissimilar effect in a not dissimilar time period compared to our regulars, but at a cost in combat effectiveness.

Other irregulars might or might not be able/inclined to act similarly: Germans (including Saxons) seem to have had a more deliberate approach to battle with more pre-positioning and less manoeuvre.  Their manoeuvre capabilities are thus harder to evaluate (and I shall avoid a snap judgement here).

Do we assume other troop types like cavalry manoeuvred the same way?

Yes, cavalry seems to have manoeuvred by squadrons: 30-strong turmae in the Roman army, and similar (32-man) strength subunits in Greek armies.  Hellenistic armies fielded the ile of c.200 or 300 men, usually fighting in wedge; Romans the ala of 300 (later 500).  The principle seems to have been the same: if one, for example, wished one's cavalry to travel from one flank to another (as Hasdrubal did at Cannae after defeating the Roman cavalry right), one would order each line, as a chain of subunits, to face flank and travel (following the leader).  Each subunit of c.30 cavalrymen would wheel to face the direction of travel, which puts the standard bearer or officer where the men can follow easily and takes only a few seconds to implement, and the end-most subunit leads off.

Arriving in the vicinity of the foe on the opposite flank, Hasdrubal inclines his direction of travel to pass behind Varro's cavalry at a distance of, say, 200 yards and then, when he sees his line positioned where he wants it, orders the halt and then a turn by subunits to face the foe, so each subunit wheels on the spot and ends up facing the foe, having taken a few seconds to do so.  (At this point, if Varro had not taken fright and run, there would have been a charge to produce Italian cavalry sandwich.)

[Edited typos]

[Justin Taylor]

In WAB2 most troops are no longer allowed to turn 90 degrees - only Drilled troops may do so these days.

In the Die is Cast I go with the old WRG system, warriors (irregulars) turn, wheel and change formation at half the speed of regulars. Light troops make no deduction for any turns and wheel, change formation at the same speed as regulars.

Of course in Warmaster ancients, troops can move in any direction at normal speed.

[Justin Swanton]

It seems from the example given above that trained infantry can form column in the heat of battle but untrained infantry cannot. Going around in vulnerable columns in close proximity to the enemy requires a good deal of nerve, which semi-trained or untrained troops simply do not have.

My suggestion then is that drilled/trained foot of a certain calibre may form column, but other types may not.

As regards attacking a column...in Optio terms charging a column on its sides would be the equivalent of a double flank attack. Let's see.... a flank attack confers a +2 modifier to the attacker and a -1 to the defender. Take an average calibre base in column, with 6 morale intervals. If it is attacked from both sides and the basic charge factors are 2 for attacker and 2 for defender (normal for infantry), that becomes 4 + 4 for the two flanking attackers and 1 for the defender (who can fight back against 1 attacking base only) = 8 vs 1. The difference is 7 and the base in column routs immediately. Yes, it works. Excuse the digression 

[Mark G]

how do you figure that from the above debate Justin?

(ed) as in a what do you agree with, and what not / show working sort of way

[Justin Taylor]

And any lmiitations on what a unit can do whilst in column. Would you reckon that it could shoot, charge, evade?

[Patrick Waterson]

In the Die is Cast I go with the old WRG system, warriors (irregulars) turn, wheel and change formation at half the speed of regulars. Light troops make no deduction for any turns and wheel, change formation at the same speed as regulars.

Paul Innes also mentioned the old WRG system, which seems to work fairly well.  The rationale is perhaps that if big chief saith "Turn left" the assembled multitude will indeed turn left, but then spend the rest of the move sorting themselves out, hence the half-speed condition.

My suggestion then is that drilled/trained foot of a certain calibre may form column, but other types may not.

That is reasonable, because such troops are taught to manoeuvre by subunits, and have the drill and experience to carry out orders of this nature.  Ordering troops who have not been trained to manoeuvre this way to form a 'column' on the battlefield is going to get nobody anywhere.  (Ordering tribal troops to follow their chief and having the chief move toward a geographical objective or specific opposing contingent would probably be the nearest irregular equivalent.  Such a manoeuvre would take longer and be less precise because as far as we know tribal troops had no provision for subunit organisation, so 'loose mob' might be the basic formation here.)

And any limitations on what a unit can do whilst in column. Would you reckon that it could shoot, charge, evade?

There is really one thing that it can do, and that is to react to form a line of battle.  Shoot? - the leading subunit may be able to do so if it really wants, but that is not its job and it then holds up everyone else.  Charge? - the leading subunit might be able to do so, but one then has a command crisis for the rest of the column as they are expecting to switch into line and can no longer do so because the marker subunit is now tied down.  Evade - not really.  The counter to an attack is to get into line and take it from there (which is why one ideally keeps enough distance from an opponent to allow such reaction to take place).

The usual precondition for moving such a column was for any enemy capable of interfering with its move to be tied down or, at a pinch, sufficiently far away that if they began approaching with intent the column could form line (if the foe was coming from the flank) or, in the unlikely event of an opponent appearing ahead, the head of the column would swing off to one side in order to present a flank, and the line would form facing that flank.

If we view the battlefield column as a means of transporting a line from one place to another swiftly and with style, we cannot go far wrong.  The leading subunit could blitz three men and a boy out of its way, but would not wish to enter combat with an enemy formation any more than one would want to head into the attack with just the lead vehicle of a convoy.