The column in battle

[Justin Swanton]

Beloved of wargamers. I notice it is something they very often do: wait until the main lines are about to close, then form columns with their infantry and try to snake around the place looking for ideal places to reform into line.

What role did columns actually play in historical battles? Could they move faster than lines? Could they fight? Who could form into them? Wargaming convention says any unit can form column during a battle, that columns are fast movers and fight just as well as units in line. But I somehow doubt it. Any input?

[Mark G]

could you be a bit more wargame rules specific about this.

I've only seen stuff like that on Napoleonic tables.

[Justin Swanton]

could you be a bit more wargame rules specific about this.

I've only seen stuff like that on Napoleonic tables.

In DBA/M/MM anything can form a column. Columns get a bonus for moving along a road. A group must be in column to end a move in difficult terrain or traverse a tricky or dangerous river. Auxilia in column may cross difficult terrain as a group.

Looking into it, I don't see any special provisions for the column in FoG. I suppose a battlegroup 8 bases deep and 1 base wide just moves an impressive distance when wheeling on its front corner.

My question is, did formations actually adopt column formation once the battle had commenced? If so, how close to enemy? Were there different kinds of columns?

[Justin Taylor]

I think in general principle its easier to march in column than in line. The idea being that it is more difficult to maintain order the longer the line and that the wider you go the more variable the terrain between parts of the line (which of course is not a problem on a nice wide plain.

Does a pike block or a Theban 50 deep phalanx count as a column?

Apparently the Sumerians marched on the battlefield in column, marched to their battle positions (flank to the enemy) and then turned so that the column became a line - and I have no idea how anyone worked that out. But perhaps Hannibals veterans at Cannae performed the same manoeuvre?

Would I let you move around the table in column in TDIC? You betcha, you just reduce a column of march (which doubles your speed) morale dice by one (from 3 to 2), they cannot shoot or evade and are considered unformed if contacted by the enemy.

I suppose a battlegroup 8 bases deep and 1 base wide just moves an impressive distance when wheeling on its front corner.

And thats the thing, in a real column wheel, the column comes up to a point and wheels at that point, the rear ranks do not go haring across the countryside (as seen on the wargames table).

[Mark G]

I'd cue Patrick on that one

- evidence of Hannibal's veterans at Cannae actually marching down the flank of the Romans?

evidence of this being a column?

looks to me like they engaged after the Romans march past them

- remember, the Spanish and Gaul's were instructed to give ground slowly to lure them in - or at least, until the Romans lost all formation anyway, after which, its not too difficult to surround a bewildered enemy.

anyway, back to topic - columns are approach march sorts of things, not something which you would employ tactically.

Think 18th century, not Napoleon, and you might get somewhere.

as for the rules allowing it - well, there are no units in DB - just amorphous elements which can coalesce at will throughout the battle, so its all just games at that level.

A bit like 7th edition march moves when more than a certain distance away from the enemy.

[Patrick Waterson]

I'd cue Patrick on that one

- evidence of Hannibal's veterans at Cannae actually marching down the flank of the Romans?

evidence of this being a column?

looks to me like they engaged after the Romans march past them

To be honest, I am not sure on this one, but will give my current understanding of the subject.

At Cannae, Hannibal deployed his Gallo-Spanish centre in a convex arc.  The Romans advanced to meet it.  The centres contacted first, and to all intents and purposes locked in place while the Roman wings carried on until they, too, contacted opponents.  Result: a Roman line has become a Roman arc, with the ends showing.

Hannibal now has to slip a wing of veterans round behind each Roman wing - the fact that they are now invitingly advanced makes this easier, as instead of going ahead-right-across his veterans can go right and then across the enemy rear.  But how would they be deployed?

JS
My question is, did formations actually adopt column formation once the battle had commenced? If so, how close to enemy? Were there different kinds of columns?

The traditional way of moving bodies of troops any distance in any direction other than straight ahead has been to put them in column.  On the march, this would equate to Justin Taylor's TDIC march column - the more so because the troops would be in march order, with helmets off, weapons slung and maybe shields too.  On the battlefield things would be done slightly differently, because the troops would have helmets on and weapons and shields ready.

A battlefield column would be one of two things: a line turned sideways, so that when it got to where it wanted to be it could simply face right/left and lo, it would be a line of battle ready to move into action, or it could be a march column but with weapons ready.  The first would be employed for battlefield manoeuvres (e.g. flanking) and the second for redispositions (including sending your phalanx up a steep rugged hillside which they could not manage in fighting formation).

At Cannae, Hannibal would in all probability have employed the first option.  His veterans would start lined up with the rest of his army and then, as the Gallo-Spanish crescent advanced and the Roman infantry moved to meet it, each Carthaginian wing could have moved as follows:

1) Face left/right.  This would be done by individual subunits wheeling in that direction as their right (or left) hand neighbour moved out.  Why by subunits?  Because that way the standards would be in the right place, and troops know to follow their standard.

2) Move outwards and wheel.  Moving outwards, i.e. towards the flank, clears space for each subunit to wheel and follow.  Once the column is on the move, the leading subunit (directed by a senior officer) changes direction and heads towards the point designated by the senior officer by a direct or slightly circuitous route, depending upon whether it has to 'round the corner' of the enemy line.  By inducing the Roman infantry to adopt a bow shape with its flanks presented forward, Hannibal made the route his veteran columns had to take more direct and shorter - and also clear of the ongoing cavalry actions.

3) Adopt the position.  Moving towards the intended destination, the column passes behind the Roman infantry line, probably unnoticed on account of the dust and excitement to the Romans' front.  And if they are noticed, the fact that they are all equipped exactly like Romans means they are not immediately identified as enemies.  Besides, the Romans are fixed to the front: there is nothing they can do short of about-turn the triarii.  Even these will not stop Hannibal's men for long.

4) Face the enemy.  Again, the subunits wheel - the distance between subunits while marching allows each subunit (about maniple-sized) to turn to face the enemy without interference from its neighbours.  In a very short while, a battleline forms facing the enemy rear.

5) Charge and have fun.  The senior officer, seeing his men in position, in formation and ready, signals the charge before the enemy can react.  In they go, and even if the triarii have faced about to counter them it will be a fairly one-sided contest, with the triarii being pushed back onto the principes (or equivalents - Hannibal would initially have wrapped the allied alae rather than the legions themselves) and the whole Roman formation under pressure from all sides.  The flanks?  Either some veterans charge in or the unemployed peltasts can make themselves useful there (as they did at the Trebia).

JT
Does a pike block or a Theban 50 deep phalanx count as a column?

No.  These are close and/or deep battle lines, and intended as such.

[Justin Taylor]

- evidence of Hannibal's veterans at Cannae actually marching down the flank of the Romans?

evidence of this being a column?

An idea, I have lots of ideas.

This one is based on the idea of going forward but attacking to the flank. So you march forward in column, turn to the side and hey presto you are facing in the direction you want to attack, just like the Sumerians.

[Mark G]

mmm, so no evidence, just assumptions.

cause the thing is, columns are highly vulnerable in battle, which is why they are used as an approach formation, not a battlefield one (please, no numpties chiming in on napoleon, those are totally different things).

especially in ancient warfare, where the placement of the leading men was vital to the whole structure - which makes turning to flank a much more dubious proposition - especially when there was no cadence marching to help with that.

and the idea of the Carthaginian arc bending makes a much better answer if you then see the Romans moving into the jaws of the trap, rather than simply standing idly by watching the Carthaginian veterans marching down their flanks unimpeded.

that is - the Carthaginians did not have to march past the Romans, the Romans march into the Carthaginians.

once that trap starts to close, completing the surrounding moves is relatively easy - but while the Romans still have formation and order, you just cannot blithely allow them to be flanked without reacting.

Polybios 15.7 is pretty compelling against the whole notion in fact.

remember, all the examples which we have in the ancient world of a clear approach march and change of facing, occur as deployment and approaches -= not as tactical battlefield manoeuvres in the face of the enemy - Sumerians included.

in fact the first proper tactical example I can think of is not until Frederick with his oblique march - quite contrary to the expected column march to the field, deployment and then a commencement of the battle. and the army which came up with that had decades of drill before it until it could be used.

[Justin Swanton]

Patrick's analysis seems to imply that Hannibal had to do everything to ensure that his veterans did not have to fight anyone whilst moving in column. An organised fighting formation is files side by side in line. A column, if attacked, would have its files facing the wrong way. Result, disorientation of the men and resulting disorder and diminished fighting ability. Cannae was a carefully calculated risk by Hannibal - he had to be morally certain the Romans would not be able to react when employing columns in proximity to the enemy.

Transposing this to the wargames table, columns should suffer a severe minus modifier if attacked. In Optioese, a -2 perhaps.

[Duncan Head]

1) Face left/right. 

There's an old thread on ancmed about the Cannae manoeuvre, in which (I think) Steven James argues that the language Polybios uses implies columns that turn into battle formation to attack. I think it began with a discussion in which Steven was rejecting the whole idea of unit-sized "pivot wheels" in wargaming. You might find that useful to search for.

[Mark G]

AncMed's search is atrocious, so I'll pass on that  - but will happily check the posts if you care to search on his behalf and give the post numbers

- but I was very unconvinced by Steven's Zama analysis - which also featured columns marching past Romans at close range, and then turning to flank, so I'd be surprised if he has anything significantly different to add from that.

If his theory on Cannae is the same, and I expect it is, then it conforms with Pat's on Zama and Cannae as well - that the romans start (or planned to start) in a march column, march right past 3 lines of legionaries who fail to react (no Cynoscephalae this time from the triarii), and the Carthaginians simply turn to face, and wallop.

As I have outlined, Polybios for one rejects this out of hand at Zama as impossible given the Roman triplex formation, and it just seems ridiculously complicated relying entirely upon the Romans utterly failing to react to your moves.

There is a much more simple explanation for both battles.

Cannae - the Spanish / Gallic crescent gives way drawing the Romans into the already aligned veterans, who are waiting for them - no need for fancy manoeuvres at all (thus conforming entirely with the Trebbia advance).

Zama - there never was a planned flank march, it was always exactly as reported - the veterans wait,  the Romans fight two battles where they expected only one, and its only the cavalry returning which swings it.

[Justin Taylor]

mmm, so no evidence, just assumptions.

Indeed very little evidence available from so long ago. So yes my ideas (as stated) just as valid as anyone elses idea of course.

As to effect of being attacked whilst in column, already posted that.

Cannae - the Spanish / Gallic crescent gives way drawing the Romans into the already aligned veterans, who are waiting for them - no need for fancy manoeuvres at all (thus conforming entirely with the Trebbia advance).

My reason for not going with this idea is that it is simply waiting. You can improve your chances/effect by moving, so the moving idea wins with me.

I don't understand where the idea of a flank attack by anyone comes into play at Zama. Seems frontal all the way (with the exception of the returning Roman cavalry).

For the battle of Trebbia

The Roman cavalry on the contrary retreated: and the flanks of the line being thus left unprotected, the Carthaginian spearmen and the main body of the Numidians, passing their own advanced guard, charged the Roman flanks: and, by the damage which they did them, prevented them from keeping up the fight with the troops on their front. The heavy-armed soldiers, however, who were in the front rank of both armies, and in the centre of that, maintained an obstinate and equal fight for a considerable time.

I appreciate that spearmen could be considered heavy infantry but a) those are mentioned fighting in the centre and b) earlier references point to the 'spearmen' acting as skirmishers so I think these are javelinmen. So again another frontal battle, no columns involved. Just my 2p of course.

In fact most ancient battles seem straight forward frontal battles; Trasimene and Teutoburg forest being exceptions (and not going well for the armies in column of march).

[Patrick Waterson]

It is intriguing to read people's thoughts on such matters because it reveals so much about their own approach to generalship. 

In fact most ancient battles seem straight forward frontal battles; Trasimene and Teutoburg forest being exceptions (and not going well for the armies in column of march).

Quite true - most were.  It is the exceptions that have us exercised.

I don't understand where the idea of a flank attack by anyone comes into play at Zama. Seems frontal all the way (with the exception of the returning Roman cavalry).

Intentions.  Hannibal's previous record shows him as not the kind of general to batter away frontally when he can improve on things by adding a bit of spice on the flanks.  He was a man with a plan - but his plan depended on being superior in cavalry, a misapprehension that Scipio apparently strove to cultivate in the run-up to Zama.

Take the 202 BC situation: for Carthage, it is very like the 255 BC situation in the First Punic War.  Regulus' army is running riot through Africa and Carthage is down to its last hope.  This hope is Xanthippus, who stocks up on elephants, fields the Carthaginian citizenry and uses his cavalry superiority to encircle the Romans while his elephants and citizenry mow them down from the front.  So what does Hannibal do?  Something remarkably similar: he stocks up on elephants, fields the Carthaginian citizenry and prepares for battle - but with only a handful of cavalry (two handfuls after Tychaeus joins him), so where is the encirclement of the Romans going to come from?

The clue lies in the placement of his veterans in the third line - deployed with an unusual amount of separation from the rest of the army.  Why deploy them so far back?  It merely hinders their commitment if they are intended as the Ottoman-style final throw after the 'lesser' troops have been wastefully expended.  If however they were intended to part in the middle and half march right, half left, around the Roman army while a ferocious frontal attack by mercenaries and elephants,  supported by the citizen-troops, kept the Roman line pinned, the disposition starts to make sense.

So why did it not happen?  It depended on Hannibal having cavalry superiority to ensure nothing interfered with the march of these encircling columns (because as has been pointed out one needs a column to cover distances if doing manoeuvres that involve directional change, and such columns are vulnerable if attacked).  Scipio concealed Masinissa's presence from Hannibal's spies and, at the famous interview, from Hannibal himself.  Thus, on the day, Hannibal suddenly becomes aware that Masinissa's cavalry are, after all, present - he has been 'had' and his plan will not work.  End of flanking manoeuvre before it has even begun.

I appreciate that spearmen could be considered heavy infantry but a) those are mentioned fighting in the centre and b) earlier references point to the 'spearmen' acting as skirmishers so I think these are javelinmen. So again another frontal battle, no columns involved.

These 'spearmen' are 'lonchophoroi', peltast types (most translators do not seem to understand the concept).  Their initial role was to skirmish; once that ended, they, unlike the Roman velites, were not absorbed into the heavy infantry but were redeployed to the flanks and manoeuvred around the Roman flanks to recommence peltasting away.  So how would they have manoeuvred around the Roman flanks?  A column of subunits would seem the most efficient and reliable way.  Anyone is welcome to suggest an alternative.

[Mark G]

Pat and I are quite in disagreement on this.

His argument rests on accepting that Hannibal must have had a better plan that the one described in the sources
- and that this plan was abandoned at short notice once the armies deployed but before they engaged - without ANY disruption or confusion to his army, and with no trace being left which could be recorded.

It is a complicated plan, involving repeated changes of facing and formation.
It relies upon the Romans failing to react in any way when they saw Hannibal's men marching past their flanks - which 15.7 explicitly speaks against.

and we have to dismiss Polybios when he states

"In the next place, when he offered battle he so managed matters that it was impossible for any commander with the same arms at his disposal to make better dispositions for a contest against the Romans than Hannibal did on that occasion"

and again

"He had placed the mercenaries in advance with the Carthaginians behind them in order that the Romans before the final engagement might be fatigued by their exertions and that their swords might lose their edge owing to the great slaughter, and also in order to compel the Carthaginians thus hemmed in on both sides to stand fast and fight, in the words of Homer

That e'en the unwilling might be forced to fight.

The most efficient and steadiest of his troops he had placed behind at a certain distance in order that, anticipating and witnessing from afar what took place, they might with undiminished strength and spirit make use of their qualities at the proper time"


But, if you want to believe that Hannibal had some master plan which he was unable to execute - that he was a god like general who could not be beaten when he was given the space to plan, then its as good as any.

Much simpler, and more believable, is to simply note that after a dozen years of fighting Romans, Hannibal had come to see the benefit of multiple lines to his army, and he maximised this by using the first lines to wear down the Romans, before seeking the major battle with his fresh men.  Just like Polybios says he did.

indeed the apparently random inclusion of the Homer quote could be said to argue that there was a specific rejection of any attempt to envelop the flanks, as it would have resulted in the Romans withdrawing rather than fighting.

the main sources and my interpretation are here

http://soa.org.uk/sm/index.php?topic=907.0

[Justin Taylor]

The clue lies in the placement of his veterans in the third line - deployed with an unusual amount of separation from the rest of the army.  Why deploy them so far back?  It merely hinders their commitment if they are intended as the Ottoman-style final throw after the 'lesser' troops have been wastefully expended.  If however they were intended to part in the middle and half march right, half left, around the Roman army while a ferocious frontal attack by mercenaries and elephants,  supported by the citizen-troops, kept the Roman line pinned, the disposition starts to make sense.

You may have read my earlier view that just makes a damn big hole in the middle of his army. For the above idea to work you have to expect the first two lines to hold So not a view I would share. We are of course told that the citizen troops were sandwiched between the veterans and the mercenaries because they were not keen to fight. Perhaps so badly that without anyone behind them, they simply would have 'bugged out' if they saw the first line breaking.

In fact thinking about it I think I would have gone; mercenaries/elephants, Italian veterans, Citizen troops.