The column in battle

[Patrick Waterson]

The clue lies in the placement of his veterans in the third line - deployed with an unusual amount of separation from the rest of the army.  Why deploy them so far back?  It merely hinders their commitment if they are intended as the Ottoman-style final throw after the 'lesser' troops have been wastefully expended.  If however they were intended to part in the middle and half march right, half left, around the Roman army while a ferocious frontal attack by mercenaries and elephants,  supported by the citizen-troops, kept the Roman line pinned, the disposition starts to make sense.

You may have read my earlier view that just makes a damn big hole in the middle of his army. For the above idea to work you have to expect the first two lines to hold So not a view I would share. We are of course told that the citizen troops were sandwiched between the veterans and the mercenaries because they were not keen to fight. Perhaps so badly that without anyone behind them, they simply would have 'bugged out' if they saw the first line breaking.

In fact thinking about it I think I would have gone; mercenaries/elephants, Italian veterans, Citizen troops.

Funnily enough, that is exactly Livy's description: he thinks Hannibal put his best troops in the second line and an untrustworthy, useless bunch (his opinion of the Italians) in the third line.  It would seem that the stiff fight put up by the Carthaginian second line fooled Livy into believing they were in fact Hannibal's veterans.

Hence both Polybius and Livy confirm that the second line put up a good fight: Hannibal could have executed a flanking manoeuvre without fearing a collapse of his forward lines.

While I have the highest respect for Polybius as a preserver of facts, he does have lapses of judgement (notably when criticising Callisthenes' account of Alexander's approach march to Issus) and his analysis of Zama may be one of them.  However we may note the ambiguity of the following:

"Meanwhile he kept  the most warlike and the steadiest of his fighting troops at some distance in the rear.  He intended that they should watch the battle from a distance, leaving their strength and their spirit unimpaired until he could draw upon their martial qualities at the right moment." - Polybius XV.16

If by this Polybius meant that Hannibal kept his veterans poised to commit when Scipio was vulnerable, sorting out his uncommitted troops and wounded hastati and with the Romans picking their way over the corpses, then this is something Hannibal signally failed to do.  If however Polybius had an inkling of Hannibal's intention to use his veterans to wrap around the Roman army when it was engaged with the lesser quality troops, this makes more sense.

One may also point out that if some troops are not keen to fight, it makes more sense to put one's final line immediately behind them, not some distance away from them.

Much simpler, and more believable, is to simply note that after a dozen years of fighting Romans, Hannibal had come to see the benefit of multiple lines to his army, and he maximised this by using the first lines to wear down the Romans, before seeking the major battle with his fresh men.  Just like Polybios says he did.

Here one might point out that this 'benefit of multiple lines' resulted in the only battle Hannibal is known to have lost. 

[Justin Taylor]

Funnily enough, that is exactly Livy's description: he thinks Hannibal put his best troops in the second line and an untrustworthy, useless bunch (his opinion of the Italians) in the third line.

Yes that is what Livy says about the Italian veterans, I doubt we would agree with him.

[Mark G]

But if you take some Livy, you really should take all of him on this battle - like accounting for the Macedonians, for the unbelievably short timeframe between when livy has Hannibal leaving Italy and zama, for the denigration of the veterans at the exposition of the citizens, for Hannibals force march to the field, for the numbers and for all the other myriad things that livy just gets wrong.

OTOH, you could take Polybios, who is straightforward and clear in every respect so long as you give up the convoluted argument necessary to sustain an abandoned flank march by infantry argument.

Patricks analysis that during the lull, Hannibal could have executed a flanking move is quite correct - and he did not, in fact he made no move whatsoever. 
This despite the potential time pressure which the cavalry situation could produce.  Nor did he seek to introduce them (prematurely) over a bloodied and disrupted battlefield - clearly he had no intention of using them to immediately follow up in support of the citizenry - and quite right too if you are unsure of the citizens ability to fight.

had the veterans been that close to the citizens, then the initial uncertainty the had could have routed through his whole army.  Had he intended to introducing them that quickly, Polybios would have commented on it, on the indecision, on the inability to capitalise on the opportunity.

Instead Polybios comments on the mess which the first field was in, on how disruptive and dangerous to fight over it was.  And how Hannibal let the romans advance through this before engaging them.

Hannibal and Polybios makes perfect sense if you simply see a plan to use the citzs, elephants and mercenaries to wear down the Romans, and then a fresh army of veterans to actually fight an equal battle with the remainder.  just like polybios says.

no dramatic flankings
no dramatic attack as the citizens are broken over the debri strewn field
just a plain and simple two stage battle.

that he lost is entirely due to the timely arrival of the Roman allied cavalry. 

But let us be assured, this was not a swift move, and it was not one which Hannibal could see coming at any point until he was fully engaged with the Romans infantry - for he had ample time to counter it, ample men to form a rear facing line which could easily deal with blown cavalry (especially Numidian light cavalry that was no doubt well out of javelins after it previous exertions).  he did not, for he was in no rush.

Ditto for Cannae - no flank march, no columnar veteran attack, just patience, and waiting for the Romans to come on to where you want to fight them after using expendable troops to blunt their swords and use up their javelins.

[Patrick Waterson]

This seems to be a good list of where Mark G and I disagree. 

This despite the potential time pressure which the cavalry situation could produce.  Nor did he seek to introduce them (prematurely) over a bloodied and disrupted battlefield - clearly he had no intention of using them to immediately follow up in support of the citizenry - and quite right too if you are unsure of the citizens ability to fight.

I would apply a different logic: the veterans are well placed to circle round the 'bloodied and disrupted battlefield' while the fighting is still ongoing.  The evident lack of intent to give the citizen troops support from the third line shows confidence in their ability to fight, not uncertainty on this point.

had the veterans been that close to the citizens, then the initial uncertainty the had could have routed through his whole army.  Had he intended to introducing them that quickly, Polybios would have commented on it, on the indecision, on the inability to capitalise on the opportunity.

The problem here is that if the citizens are not going to fight properly but are going to put their main energies into routing, there is no point fielding them anyway.  If they are capable of fighting but unwilling and thus have to be watched, close supervision is better than distant supervision (which gives them a head start if they wish to abscond).  In the event, they did rather well - and when the remnants finally fled, the line of veterans did not stop them - it simply diverted them.  How would it have stopped the whole contingent if the latter had decided to leave?

Instead Polybios comments on the mess which the first field was in, on how disruptive and dangerous to fight over it was.  And how Hannibal let the romans advance through this before engaging them.

Whereas he could have advanced his veterans round it on both flanks, preferably while the Romans were still engaged.

Hannibal and Polybios makes perfect sense if you simply see a plan to use the citzs, elephants and mercenaries to wear down the Romans, and then a fresh army of veterans to actually fight an equal battle with the remainder.  just like polybios says.

If that is actually what he says.  The translation of this passage seems somewhat loose (I am still trying to work through the implications of the Greek).

that he lost is entirely due to the timely arrival of the Roman allied cavalry. 

Yes, and this is the one factor - inferiority in cavalry - that ruined Hannibal's entire battle.  If he planned to give battle with this deadly disadvantage hanging over everything he did, then he was no general - particularly with Vermina's reinforcements a few days away.  Why stick his head in a noose?

But let us be assured, this was not a swift move, and it was not one which Hannibal could see coming at any point until he was fully engaged with the Romans infantry - for he had ample time to counter it, ample men to form a rear facing line which could easily deal with blown cavalry (especially Numidian light cavalry that was no doubt well out of javelins after it previous exertions).  he did not, for he was in no rush.

But we do not see this formation of a rear line, nor do we see it holding off the Roman cavalry.  Rush or no, Hannibal still lost.

Ditto for Cannae - no flank march, no columnar veteran attack, just patience, and waiting for the Romans to come on to where you want to fight them after using expendable troops to blunt their swords and use up their javelins.

These assertions I would disagree with, and would also point out that at Cannae the Romans had a 2:1 infantry superiority whereas at Zama the situation was reversed.  Besides, Hannibal's veteran Spanish were not 'expendable'.

[Mark G]

your logic totally misses the point that at no point did any move by the veterans ever get made.

if they were so well placed, if there was clear time to move them, then why did they not move as your plan has it?

if he was worried about the cavalry, why did he take no movement to counter them when he had the chance?  he had plenty of time to react to both attack with his infantry and defend with against the cavalry, he did neither. 

[Patrick Waterson]

And he lost.

The way I read the situation is that Hannibal became paralysed by paranoia once he realised Scipio had outwitted him and brought Masinissa to the field.  He only moved his veterans once Scipio put all his infantry 'in the shop window' - indicating (as I understand it) a fear that Scipio may have had something else hidden, quite possibly as a counter against an enveloping march.  Once he saw that Scipio had nothing extra in the infantry inventory, he committed his veterans.  This may or may not be the explanation, but it seems consistent with Hannibal's inactivity up to that point.

The sad thing is that had he sent them round to envelop Scipio's army as soon as the cavalry (and stray elephants) were off the field, the envelopment would have worked.  Whether our historical sources would now be written in Greek and Punic rather than Greek and Latin is another matter ...

[Mark G]

well, its an unusual bass for a theory

- Hannibal was a brilliant general, too brilliant to sit around and not have a cunning plan which we do not know about.

so he forms up with a cunning third rank flank march.

then see all the enemy cavalry, and abandons the plan

then the cavalry are all sent off the field, early, in the battle

and Hannibal freezes and fails to order the envelopment which he has already drawn up the army preparatory for.

OTOH, there is Polybiios' straightforward description of the plan and the outcome.

[Justin Taylor]

Of course you can game it and try out your theories 

I think I did Zama once but I cannot find any records of the game - anything dating back to the days of floppy discs seems to have gotten lost.

[Patrick Waterson]

Strangely enough ...

Aaron Bell and I had this idea and did a PBEM game of Zama.  It followed the historical pattern pretty closely except that Hannibal did send his veterans round Scipio's flanks while the bulk of the infantry on both sides were fighting it out.  As a result, although it was a 'close-run thing', the Roman infantry did collapse just as the Roman cavalry was returning, Scipio it the dust of Africa trying to stem the rout and Hannibal won the day.

Not necessarily absolute and unquestioned validation of the concept, but interesting.

- Hannibal was a brilliant general, too brilliant to sit around and not have a cunning plan which we do not know about.

Sorry, Mark, this is a bit vague: does this mean he was too brilliant to have a plan or too brilliant not to have one, or that if he had had a brilliant plan it would be transparently obvious to us less brilliant mortals?  Or what did you mean to convey?

so he forms up with a cunning third rank flank march.

then see all the enemy cavalry, and abandons the plan

then the cavalry are all sent off the field, early, in the battle

and Hannibal freezes and fails to order the envelopment which he has already drawn up the army preparatory for.

Not surprising, as he, ever the master stratagemist (if such a word exists), would in turn fear another stratagem.  Only when he saw Scipio's infantry fully deployed, i.e. he knew the Romans could have no more surprises in reserve, did he move his veterans.

OTOH, there is Polybiios' straightforward description of the plan and the outcome.

But is it as straightforward as we think?

"Next, having accepted battle, the excellence of his dispositions for a contest with the Romans, considering the identity of the arms on each side, could not have been surpassed. For though the Roman line is hard to break, yet each individual soldier and each company, owing to the uniform tactic employed, can fight in any direction, those companies, which happen to be in nearest contact with the danger, wheeling round to the point required. Again, the nature of their arms gives at once protection and confidence, for their shield is large and their sword will not bend: the Romans therefore are formidable on the field and hard to conquer." - Polybius XV.15

Polybius is considering only the Roman infantry, not Hannibal's deadly inferiority in cavalry - one wonders why, in view of his mention after Cannae that "it is more effective to have half as many infantry as the enemy and an overwhelming superiority in cavalry than to engage him with equal numbers" (III.117)

"Still Hannibal took his measures against each of these difficulties in a manner that could not be surpassed. He provided himself with those numerous elephants, and put them in the van, for the express purpose of throwing the enemy's ranks into confusion and breaking their order. Again he stationed the mercenaries in front and the Carthaginians behind them, in order to wear out the bodies of the enemy with fatigue beforehand, and to blunt the edge of their swords by the numbers that would be killed by them; and moreover to compel the Carthaginians, by being in the middle of the army, to stay where they were and fight." - idem XV.16

All this is for dealing with the Roman infantry, although if the aim were to 'compel the Carthaginians to fight' stationing them in the van with the mercenaries behind them would be a better way to do it.

"But the most warlike and steady part of his army he apostasei parenebale kharin tou prooroumenous ek pollou to sumbainon kai diamenontas akeraious tois te somasi kai tais psykhais sun kairo khresasthai tais spheteras aretais." - ibid

Translating phrase by phrase:
apostasei parenebale = drew them up separated
kharin tou prooroumenous = for the sake of preparing for
ek pollou = from a distance
to sumbainon = the contingency/opportunity
kai diamenontas akeraious tois te somasi = and maintaining whole their bodies
kai tais psykhais = and their minds
sun kairo khresasthai = when the right time [should come] to use
tais spheteras aretais = their special qualities/virtues

'Kairo' generally means 'measure, proportion or fitness' but also has the meaning of 'exact or critical time'.  If, as seems likely, this is what Polybius intended, then Hannibal was indeed holding his veterans out of the battle for use for a specific opportunity at a critical time, or at least intending to.

Polybius' final judgement also hints at a plan thwarted:

"And, if in spite of having done everything that could be done, he who had never been beaten before failed to secure the victory now, we must excuse him. For there are times when chance thwarts the plans of the brave; and there are others again, when a man "Though great and brave has met a greater still."" - ibid

So Polybius' verdict seems to be a cunning plan thwarted by a greater opponent as opposed, to, say, a plan carried out but not bringing success.

[Mark G]

the problem with gaming it, Justin, is the rules.

As we have been discussing this summer, rules overemphasise flank attacks, punish armies for keeping their best troops in the rear, and overemphasise cunning plans and high risk moves.

most of which is fine for hoplite and even Hellenistic warfare, but it just does not work for armies which always attempted to match their frontages and add extra depth rather than width whenever they have the men to do so - such as those in the punic wars.

This was why we put some much effort into covering Sabin's model of combat in the WMWW articles - I see Duncan zoned out of them, quite understandably too, but the point of all that text was not as much to show that the WMWW was nonsense (its pretty clear once you take the heat out of it really), as to use it to get into models of ancient combat, so that we could help break the single line of battle and hoplite style tactics which rules seem wedded too.

this missing flank march argument analysis perfectly chime with current wagamer tactics.

deducing a deadly inferiority in cavalry - yet Hannibal took no action to counter this in any respect once the cavalry had left the field, so it cannot have been that serious on the day for him (unless he froze, which is a tautological answer if ever there was one).

deducing that because the cavalry were gone, the flanks of both armies were entirely exposed- and in good wargamer fashion, concluding that there must have been a flank march to exploit this, using the only troops remaining - which still never happened because the general froze.

And deducing that because the best troops were kept back, they must not have been intended to fight in the front line, but were intended to make some ultra cunning super move, which failed to come about because of the unprovable general freezing argument.

all exactly conforming with the outcomes you would expect of every set of wargaming rules I have ever come across.  dramatic high risk moves with elite troops, flanks winning battles, cunning plans beating hard slogs every time.

to deduce that 'using their special qualities at the right time', in fact meant to engage in some repeated change of formation and performance of an on field flank march in the face of the enemy - rather than as is commonly held, that it simply meant holding them back until the detritus had done their work and worn the enemy down - fine, believe that if you want, but its utterly dependent on far too many 'yes but what if this was true' moments.

but it was a good article, and fun to re read again.  But I doubt either of us has much new to add anymore on it

as for gaming it, well, I think even lost battles might make the infantry flank march tactic virtually impossible - but it would not have the pursuing cavalry go so far away as to be something you need not prepare for the return of, so even those rules would likely see the cavalry sweep back and envelop the flank early.  the right troops would win the game for the romans, but they would do so well before the triarii had been fully engaged - in an unsatisfying manner which would lead the Carthaginians to simply put their elephants on the flanks to win the cavalry battle, and so on.

I'd also suggest if we want to keep going on this we should return to the thread on zama, or the earlier one on where zama went wrong

http://soa.org.uk/sm/index.php?topic=903.30

which was where this really started.

the point for columns in battle being that with the arguable exception of cannae - when the vets might have marched in a column, or might not (I say not), columns are not something which can be tactically employed, and should be restricted to an approach formation.

since they clearly were NOT used as such at Zama, irrespective of whether you think they might have been a plan to do so or not.

So unless you want your rules to normalise exceptions - which IMHO is the absolute worst thing that you can do in a set of rules, columns should not be allowed to be used within a tactically relevant distance of the enemy.

[Patrick Waterson]

So unless you want your rules to normalise exceptions - which IMHO is the absolute worst thing that you can do in a set of rules, columns should not be allowed to be used within a tactically relevant distance of the enemy.

Hence the degree of separation between Hannibal's veterans and the rest of his army - and the enemy.   He had them beyond the tactically relevant distance (a useful clue concerning his intentions).  (Ultimately we have to make up our own minds about Zama: was Hannibal a skilled tactical general or a mere pounder?)

*

We do have two different types of 'column' attested: one is the march column, 6' between men in all directions, often with kit packed and not ready for action, not used in proximity to the enemy.  The other is the column-waiting-to-become-a-line that Polybius describes in VI.40: march ready for action, subunits arranged in a line so that wheeling each subunit creates an instant battleline.  This can be used in the presence of the enemy, though as Mark indicates a 'tactical distance' is advisable.  This 'tactical distance' will vary with the enemy's ability to react: if he is unengaged, and under command, approaching within 200 yards may be inadvisable.  If he is busily engaged to his front, 50 yards may be ample.  The key is how long it would take to halt the column and get the subunits wheeled to face the enemy - if this is achievable before the enemy can close within effective hurled missile range, you have the right amount of separation.

It may be worth noting that phalanxes (Hellenistic) seemed to do things differently.  At Cynoscephalae, Philip's phalanx moved up-slope in two parts, apparently in 'march mode' but on battle frontage, and when on top of the ridge deployed into combat formation (or rather Philip's half did; Nicanor's half found itself among broken ground and was unable to assemble before being hit by the Roman elephants).

This feature of travelling in march formation (albeit with weapons ready) but on battle frontage is also notable in Callisthenes' description of Alexander's approach march to the battlefield at Issus.  The less detailed surviving accounts suggest that he did the same at Granicus and Gaugamela.  We might conclude that 'pike columns' should not be considered for Hellenistic armies (mediaeval armies are a different matter).

*

For Roman armies, the column in testudo seems well enough established as a means of assaulting fortifications that we need some rules for this if we are to represent field fortifications.

On the battlefield, the governing formation is the cohesive line.  That said, some armies formed very deep lines.  Egyptians 100 deep at Thymbra are attested in Xenophon's Cyropaedia.  Greeks 50 deep are occasionally encountered.  Romans formed a triple line equating to a depth of 21-25 men, and occasionally doubled this.  Some might be tempted to try and class these as 'columns' - and under Napoleon-speak, they would be.  In the classical era, however, they are lines and should be treated as such.

*

However, an exceptional general with exceptional troops might well break the rules.  Hannibal's veterans (once reconfigured as Romans) had the skill, the small-unit organisation and the mobility to attempt this kind of hitherto forbidden manoeuvre.  We note that only his peltasts made a flanking move at the Trebia, but at Cannae it was his veterans who delivered this decisive stroke.  It was evidently not something the Romans were expecting, perhaps because it had never been done before and was deemed impossible to execute.

Following Cannae, Hannibal twice more annihilated a Roman army - in 212 BC and again in 210 BC he destroyed a Roman army at Herdonea (some scholars think Livy is duplicating the same engagement two years apart).  In each case, what we can extract from Livy's account suggests that the superior discipline and manoeuvrability of Hannibal's troops were the key elements in the Carthaginian victory.  Thereafter, the Romans seemingly became more wary, and operated in greater force.

In conclusion, while it does seem that manoeuvre in column on the battlefield was a rarity, it was a rarity that Hannibal seems to have used with sufficient frequency to merit his veterans being permitted to do so under any set of rules.

[Justin Taylor]

the problem with gaming it, Justin, is the rules.

As we have been discussing this summer, rules overemphasise flank attacks, punish armies for keeping their best troops in the rear, and overemphasise cunning plans and high risk moves.

I don't know if rules overemphasise flank attacks, attacks in the flanks of most troops seem to have been (and continue throughout history) to be decisive, maximising enemy losses and minimising your own. Perhaps your thoughts are how fast players can get round flanks with things like 3 moves a turn with Warmaster Ancients or DBM?

Personally I prefer to use my best troops for a decisive attack (Alexander style). I agree though, rules which say that after X amount of your army is destroyed then the game is over would preclude keeping a decent reserve - solution, use different rules?

As for cunning plans and wild gambles, yes thats my style of play (its only a game) and sometimes I have to be restrained in multi-player games from my wild attacks. I must admit I do seem to have more success with my attacks restrained by others.

But I do suggest you try the Die is Cast for your games and see if they suit your ideas of 'real' battles any better.

[Justin Swanton]

To sum up the thread thus far:

The only recorded examples of the use of columns during a battle are by Hannibal: Trebia (limited to his Peltasts) and Cannae (his veterans), with a possible third intended use at Zama. That's it.

Conclusion: the use of columns should be banned in Ancients simulations unless the player commands Hannibal.

Hang on, there's another example - Cynoscephalae. The tribune of the victorious legion on the flank of Philip's advancing phalanx gets his Principes and Triarii to move across and flank the Macedonians. The only way that could have been done with any semblance of order would have been to form column and march across to the rear of the phalanx before forming line again. If this was the case then forming column during a battle had become a standard manoeuvre (a tribune could order it on the spur of the moment), not often used, but handy when necessary.

We need rules then that make columns rare but not impossible on the wargames table. Picking up on the hypothesis that Flamininus's army had got the idea of battle columns from Hannibal (the dates are right), we should perhaps limit it to certain OBs, or certain generals, obliging the majority of armies to fight and move in lines.

[Erpingham]

Conclusion: the use of columns should be banned in Ancients simulations unless the player commands Hannibal.

Though you are following Patrick and defining things like 50 deep Thebans as short, deep lines.  many wargames rules probably wouldn't make that distinction.

[Justin Swanton]

Conclusion: the use of columns should be banned in Ancients simulations unless the player commands Hannibal.

Though you are following Patrick and defining things like 50 deep Thebans as short, deep lines.  many wargames rules probably wouldn't make that distinction.

The trouble is that you cannot accurately represent a 50 deep Theban column with bases since the width to depth ratio of bases is so hopelessly inaccurate. But if you could see a real Theban column from the air it would look like what it is: an unusually thick line.

And can a Theban column kink when it wheels? Does it do better in difficult terrain, etc. etc.? Even for wargamers it behaves like a line.