1211 velite reforms

[Mark G]

I spotted a reference over the weekend which I had not come across before.

The Romans reorganised their velites in 211 to improve their equipment and performance, with the implication that it was caused by the disasters against Hannibal, who managed to comprehensively out skirmish them at the opening stages of trebia, cannae etc., despite being significantly outnumbered.

there was some reference to Livy, which I had not noticed also.

does anyone know any more on this, or have they encountered this argument before?

[Patrick Waterson]

Mark, I take it you mean Livy XXVI.4, referring to the fighting around Capua in 211 BC.

Meanwhile the whole effort of the war had been directed against Capua. But it was rather an intensive blockade than a series of assaults, and the slaves and commoners were unable either to endure hunger or to send messengers to Hannibal through guards so near to each other. [2] A Numidian was discovered who took a letter, declared that he would make his way out, and kept his promise. Going out right through the Roman camp at night he inspired in the Capuans the hope that, while they still had some strength left, they might attempt a sally in all directions. [3] But in the many engagements they were as a rule successful in cavalry battles, while in infantry they were worsted. To be victorious, however, was by no means so cheering as it was depressing to be vanquished at any point by a beleaguered and almost captured enemy. At length a method was devised, so that what was lacking to their strength might be compensated by skilful tactics. [4] Out of all the legions were picked young men who by reason of strength and lightness of build were the swiftest. These were furnished with round shields of smaller size than those used by cavalry, and seven javelins apiece four feet long and having iron heads such as are on the spears of the light-armed troops [velites][/b]. [5] The horsemen would each of them take one of these men on to their own horses, and they trained them both to ride behind and to leap down nimbly when the signal was given. [6] When thanks to daily practice they seemed to do this with sufficient daring, they advanced into the plain which was situated between the camp and the city wall in the face of the Capuan cavalry in line of battle. [7] And when they had come within range, at a given signal the light-armed leaped to the ground. Thereupon an infantry line suddenly dashes out from the cavalry at the enemy's horsemen, and while attacking they hurl one javelin after another. [8] By throwing a great number of these against horses and men in all directions, they wounded very many. But more consternation was created by the strange and the unexpected, and the cavalry charging into the frightened enemy caused them to flee with slaughter all the way to the gates. [9] Thereafter the Roman side was superior in cavalry also; it was made the practice to have light-armed in the legions. [institutum ut velites in legionibus essent] [10] The originator of combining infantry with cavalry they say was Quintus Navius, a centurion, and that for so doing honour was paid him by the general.

This passage has often been quoted, referenced and generally alluded to as evidence for either a change in velite weaponry or the date when velites were first instituted, or both.  The text supports neither contention: the double-mounted light infantry are armed with spears whose heads are 'such as are on the spears of the velites' [quale hastis velitaribus inest], and velites are attested by Polybius (who refers to them as 'grosphomachoi') at the Ticinus in 218 BC and at Bagradas in 255 BC (in the First Punic War).

The Roman light infantry (velites) are not noted as being congenitally out-skirmished in any of our sources; at the Trebia they use up their missiles pursuing the Numidian cavalry and at Cannae they seem to hold off their Carthaginian opposite numbers with ease until the time comes to retire and let the heavy troops advance.  The passage above emphasises that Navius' idea was to give cavalry a portable light infantry contingent who were then specially fitted out for the purpose - it may be noted that Livy does not call them 'velites' but 'iuvenes' - young men, selected for their agility and fitness.  The 'sore thumb' in the passage and the source of much spilt ink is Livy's comment that "it was made the practice to have light-armed [velites] in the legions" [institutum ut velites in legionibus essent].  Since velites are attested well before this date either Livy is being careless or we ended up with the worst of several variants of the original manuscript.  The sentence reads:

inde equitatu quoque superior Romana res fuit; institutum ut velites in legionibus essent. [10] auctorem peditum equiti inmiscendorum centurionem Q. Navium ferunt [or tradunt, or fuerunt, pick your MS], honorique id ei apud imperatorem fuisse.

To me, 'institutum ut velites in legionibus essent' looks like a misplaced phrase.  The passage actually makes more sense as:

inde equitatu quoque superior Romana res fuit; [10] auctorem peditum equiti inmiscendorum centurionem Q. Navium ferunt, honorique id ei apud imperatorem fuisse.

[Henceforth the Romans were also superior in cavalry; the originator of [thus] combining infantry with cavalry was said to be Quintus Navius, and the general honoured him for it.]

[Duncan Head]

There is no general agreement on the significance of this passage, as Patrick suggests. To my mind it is significant that this is the first reference we have to Roman light infantry with shields, or (in the parallel passage in Frontinus, Strat. IV.7.29) with swords and helmets. A re-equipment explains why the velites equipped as described by Polybius can get stuck in with swords, as well as javelins, against the Galatians in 189; when the light infantry at Telamon in 225, in a similar situation, fought against the Gauls with javelins only. That would mean that the velites "as we know them" were indeed first used in 211, whatever the previous light infantry were called. But as I said, there is no general agreement, and any interpretation involves either doing violence to the text, as in Patrick's excision; assuming that at some point Livy has made a mistake; or interpreting what he may actually have meant.

[Patrick Waterson]

Duncan summarises the situation excellently, as ever.

Against the 're-equipment' theory being reflected in the conduct of Telamon and Olympus is the following:

Telamon

Polybius II.30.4: "And at last, not being able to retaliate, because the javelin-throwers were out of reach, and their weapons kept pouring in, some of them, in the extremity of their distress and helplessness, threw themselves with desperate courage and reckless violence upon the enemy, and thus met a voluntary death."

The 'enemy' who were thus contacted and giving the Gauls death were velites, because in II.30.5 Polybius subsequently notes: "Thus the courage of the Gaesatae had broken down before the preliminary attack of the javelinmen [akontistais]. But when the throwers had rejoined their ranks, and the whole Roman line charged ..."

This confirms that the velites did not fall back into the legions until after dealing with the isolated charging Gauls.  Although Polybius does not specify their use of the sword in this respect he seems to take it as read that they were fitted for close combat.

Olympus

Livy XXXVIII.21.11: "Some rushing against the enemy were overwhelmed with darts; and when any of them came near, they were slain by the swords of the light infantry."

Apart from the explicit mention of swords, this is the same pattern of isolated Gauls charging velites and being slain in close combat by velites that we see at Telamon.

If anything, these passages suggest continuity of velite equipment and doctrine between 225 and 189 BC.

[Mark G]

so it would be a valid interpretation to suggest that at Capua in 211, the velites were first issued with swords and shields - after which we find them engaging in melee.

which was,  think, what the reference was suggesting.

thanks both.

[Patrick Waterson]

so it would be a valid interpretation to suggest that at Capua in 211, the velites were first issued with swords and shields - after which we find them engaging in melee.

Ah - not quite:

1) 225 BC,  when from the context the velites are meleeing stray Gauls and hence would already appear to have a close combat outfit, is pre-211.

2) The infantry accompanying the cavalry are not velites - they are drawn from 'young men out of all the legions' for speed, strength and lightness of build - admittedly good light infantry qualities, but the men are designated as 'iuvenes' (young men)  not as 'velites'.  Some of them are thus quite likely to have been hastati.  These men are picked specifically to ride with the cavalry into battle (and dismount to do their thing just before the clash occurs).

Caesar before Pharsalus does something very similar, selecting numbers of agile young men from his 'antesignani' to convert into double riders, which at that time probably designated the younger age groups as much as anything else.

3) There is no discernible difference between the combat behaviour of velites at Telamon in 225 BC (pre-211) and at Olympus in 189 BC (post-211).

For these reasons I would say that it is not valid to suggest

a) that velites were first issued with swords and shields in 211 BC, or

b) that they only engage in melee after 211 BC.

I would go further and say that this passage actually has nothing to do with velites and only tangentially touches their equipment at the point where Livy mentions that the javelins have 'iron heads such as are on the spears of the velites'.

[Mark G]

well that would pretty much agree with my first reaction when I read the passage - what reformation.

so the author has confused a one off event - using young and fast men to act as mounted supports - with a formal reorganisation and reequipping of the velites.

[Duncan Head]

so the author has confused a one off event - using young and fast men to act as mounted supports - with a formal reorganisation and reequipping of the velites.

Well, that would be Patrick's interpretation. It would not be mine.

Since Polybios tells us that the velites were recruited from "the youngest and poorest", calling the men of 211 "iuvenes", "young men",  actually supports the idea that they are velites, it's not evidence against it. If Livy is correct that this is the first time that the velites were organized then it's hardly surprising that these men were drawn "out of all the legions"; they could hardly be drawn from the velites who didn't previously exist in that form. If on the contrary as Patrick suggests nothing has changed here, why is it necessary to recruit and equip young men from out of all the legions, when young men fully equipped as velites with sword, shield, and javelins already, according to his view, exist?

Nor is there, despite what Patrick says, any evidence for the light infantry fighting at close quarters in 225. Polybios says only that some of the Gaisatai rushed forward and were killed: he doesn't say how they were killed, nor how close they got to the enemy, nor mention any weapons other than javelins. To me it merely suggests that instead of standing behind their shields and being shot down, some of them charged and were shot down. The conclusion that the javelinmen had swords about which one of our better ancient authors is silent is far too speculative to bear any weight.

But this discussion has been held more than once - certainly not long ago on ancmed, and probably many times since Delbrueck suggested that this event saw the start of a reform of the velites. I doubt we'll get a general agreement this time either.

[Tim]

OK, if we can't reach any definite conclusions, can we at least use Delbruckian language in rubbishing every other author's theory...

[Patrick Waterson]

Oh, we can reach definite conclusions, Tim: they just happen to be different conclusions ... 

Since Polybios tells us that the velites were recruited from "the youngest and poorest", calling the men of 211 "iuvenes", "young men",  actually supports the idea that they are velites, it's not evidence against it.

Only if one reads Polybius' neōtatous kai penikhrotatous as linking youth with poverty, whereas my reading is that he is telling us that the poorer youth form the velites and the less poor youth (tous d' hexēs = next after them) become the hastati.

If Livy is correct that this is the first time that the velites were organized then it's hardly surprising that these men were drawn "out of all the legions"; they could hardly be drawn from the velites who didn't previously exist in that form. If on the contrary as Patrick suggests nothing has changed here, why is it necessary to recruit and equip young men from out of all the legions, when young men fully equipped as velites with sword, shield, and javelins already, according to his view, exist?

For two reasons:
1) Some of these men have been selected from among the hastati.
2) Their role is to ride into battle behind cavalrymen and then act as shooters; the reduced-size shield seems to be configured with this requirement in mind (if the man behind had a full-size parma it could be inconvenient to the rider).

Nor is there, despite what Patrick says, any evidence for the light infantry fighting at close quarters in 225. Polybios says only that some of the Gaisatai rushed forward and were killed: he doesn't say how they were killed, nor how close they got to the enemy, nor mention any weapons other than javelins. To me it merely suggests that instead of standing behind their shields and being shot down, some of them charged and were shot down. The conclusion that the javelinmen had swords about which one of our better ancient authors is silent is far too speculative to bear any weight.

Not sure we can assume that every Gaul was shot down as opposed to being despatched at close quarters: Polybius'

hoi men eis tous polemious hupo tou thumou kai tēs alogistias eikē propiptontes kai didontes sphas autous hekousiōs apethnēskon

if taken literally suggests the Gauls in question were falling prostrate and offering themselves to be despatched.

As Duncan mentions, there is no explicit mention of velite weaponry by Polybius in this action or indeed in accounts of other battles - perhaps Polybius thinks that his description in book 6 suffices - and we may note that although he mentions Hannibal's change of weaponry and the Roman adoption of Greek cavalry weapons he does not mention any change of weaponry for the velites.

What we also observe is that Polybius uses his velites-only term 'grosphomachoi' for velites back as far as the First Punic War - although he uses 'akonistas' (javelinmen) for the Roman light infantry at the Trebia and similarly at Telamon, but would we conclude from this that the Romans had used velites at Bagradas and then abandoned their use at the end of the First Punic War in favour of javelin-only infantry, only to reconstitute them in 211 BC?

But this discussion has been held more than once - certainly not long ago on ancmed, and probably many times since Delbrueck suggested that this event saw the start of a reform of the velites. I doubt we'll get a general agreement this time either.

Listen very carefully for I shall say this only once: this is not a reform of the velites because the men in question are not velites - they are a contingent specially selected to ride double with cavalry.  This simple fact seems to me to override and negate any question of velite reorganisation being involved: when Caesar did the same thing before Pharsalus in 48 BC nobody (at least nobody I know of) saw it as a reorganisation of legionary light infantry in the latter half of the 1st century BC.

[Justin Swanton]

Since Polybios tells us that the velites were recruited from "the youngest and poorest", calling the men of 211 "iuvenes", "young men",  actually supports the idea that they are velites, it's not evidence against it. If Livy is correct that this is the first time that the velites were organized then it's hardly surprising that these men were drawn "out of all the legions"; they could hardly be drawn from the velites who didn't previously exist in that form. If on the contrary as Patrick suggests nothing has changed here, why is it necessary to recruit and equip young men from out of all the legions, when young men fully equipped as velites with sword, shield, and javelins already, according to his view, exist?

Bearing in mind that velites as a class were not necessarily the fastest runners. I suspect wargamers have a stereotype image of skirmishers as little, lightweight men dashing about like springboks. In reality they had the same average build as the heavy troops. They had less armament to carry and were in loose formation, trained not to engage in close-quarters combat until conditions were right. But they were not necessarily champion sprinters, which was what was required for this particular exercise.

Nor is there, despite what Patrick says, any evidence for the light infantry fighting at close quarters in 225. Polybios says only that some of the Gaisatai rushed forward and were killed: he doesn't say how they were killed, nor how close they got to the enemy, nor mention any weapons other than javelins. To me it merely suggests that instead of standing behind their shields and being shot down, some of them charged and were shot down. The conclusion that the javelinmen had swords about which one of our better ancient authors is silent is far too speculative to bear any weight.

Would javelin-fire, alone, be enough to kill every single charging Gaul? If that was the case, then the Romans could have used Velites as battleline infantry, a bit like English longbowmen (who still had to do some hand-to-had fighting in any case). My impression is that it is highly unlikely the Velites could have mown down the Gauls before they reached them.

[Mark G]

All recruits to the early and mid republic must still have passed the financial requirement before being accepted though, mustn't they.

so the use of the word poorest seems quite relative.  they must all still have had enough money not only to equip themselves, but also to support themselves while they were on campaign (the point of the qualification being that you had enough to keep the farm going while you were away), or had someone to sponsor them for that.

So is it safe to assume that velites must all have been either landed orphans or (mostly) the younger sons of established men?

(and isn't the legion completely different by Pharsalus, making the comparison a bit invalid?)

[Patrick Waterson]

The financial requirements were indeed in place until Marius adjusted - some would say overturned - the system c.107 BC.

Velites would have been the poorest among the property-owners, with the wealthier young lads becoming hastati, at least as I understand the system.  Principes were picked from men 'in the prime of life', say late 20's in a classical context, while triarii were veterans, perhaps 30's to 40's - military service was for a number of years, after which men retired to their farms, sired children (if they had not already attended to that detail) and generally got on with some serious agriculture.

The children of these men would be assessed for military service in accordance with their family's wealth (at least as I understand things) so if daddy had done well on campaign and added a bit of land to the farm then sonny would probably go in as a hastatus, while the neighbour from whom daddy bought the bit of farmland might have his resources correspondingly reduced and his son(s) would go in as velites.

There was probably some cross-promotion when age groups got to the principes age bracket, by which time a somewhat older velite who had not spent his campaign winnings might be able to afford at least the minimum equipment for the principes - or he might remain a somewhat older velite (I do not know and am not sure if anyone else does - Duncan is probably our best bet here) - and triarii were picked on the basis of age and length of service.  I have no idea if triarii had a minimum property qualification or whether the gear was handed down through the family.

There was probably an element of overlap in property status, in that it seems unlikely that every year saw exactly the right number of people with exactly the right degree of poverty (or at least low value property) to become velites, so the bar was probably moved up and down a bit depending on how many men were required for each troop type.

The legion in the 1st century BC was indeed a different organisation to that of the 3rd century BC but the important common element is that Naevius (or his CO) and Caesar were both selecting men to ride double with the cavalry, and the apparent total lack of velites in Caesar's legionary organisation was no obstacle to his creating such a force.  In each case what is being described is the creation of a force of double-mounted light infantry which has nothing to do with the traditional velite.   

Would javelin-fire, alone, be enough to kill every single charging Gaul? If that was the case, then the Romans could have used Velites as battleline infantry, a bit like English longbowmen (who still had to do some hand-to-had fighting in any case). My impression is that it is highly unlikely the Velites could have mown down the Gauls before they reached them.

I also wondered about this: at Olympus, the Romans seem to have had at least one missileman for every Gaul and had crossfire from all angles, and yet some desperate Gauls still got through to hand-to-hand.  At Telamon, there was about one missileman for every three Gauls (though perhaps one for every Gaesatus), and instead of being able to cover all angles with crossfire they were essentially facing their targets head-on, i.e. shooting at basically shielded opponents.  While the number of stray Gauls bursting out of formation might have been lower at Telamon (which I doubt, there being perhaps four times as many Gaesati at Telamon as there were Galatians at Olympus) I doubt that javelinmen with a basically forward-angle shot would be more effective at stopping occasional chargers than a combination of long- and short-range missile types with a crossfire.

[Mark G]

but before anyone (prior to Marius) could enter service (excepting emergencies, such as after Cannae)

they must still have met a fairly hefty income minimum.

so saying 'poorest' is very much an inaccuracy to modern ears.

its like saying that Eric Pickles would be a velite because he is the poorest within the current Cabinet.

to be a serving republican soldier requires a pretty decent sized land holding to begin with, so by no sensible definition is any velite actually poor.

[Patrick Waterson]

We may be in danger of getting bogged down in semantics here: the essential point is that of those on the property ladder and hence eligible for military service, the velite was on the bottom rung or rungs and the hastatus on the rungs above him.  This makes the velite the poorest of the military-service-eligible 'classes' without necessarily putting him below the poverty line.

We could just call him the 'least wealthy'.