How continuous was combat?

[Erpingham]

We read in reconstructions of battles that army A fought army B for perhaps hours.  For some people, this is envisaged as a continuous piece of action, with troops constantly engaged.  To others, there a phases of strenuous action punctuated either by contact breaks or less fully committed combat, like missile exchange.  This division can cause considerable passions.  But what do we know?  What do period sources (classical through medieval) tell us?  What about modern experience of human endurance? 

[Patrick Waterson]

A few thoughts.

It may also be worth bearing in mind formation depths and tactical deployment, e.g. how easy is it to disengage two formations each sixteen deep, and are relief lines (as per the Roman system) of any use if both sides are to take breaks from the action?  There is also the matter that unless exhaustion or abstention is mutual and simultaneous, one side is going to be very much inclined to press its new-found advantage.

Further considerations involve the differing capabilities and fighting styles of infantry and cavalry.  Cavalry fights by their nature tend to be short, sharp and, if a swift decision is not reached, continue on a try-and-try-again basis.  Infantry tend to close and fight to a decision as opposed to bouncing in and out of contact unless a moving assailant is repeatedly repelled by a non-moving defender or both sides consist of skirmish-type troops.

Belief that fighting must have been intermittent seems to rest largely on the assumption that human endurance will not sustain more than a few minutes of combat at a time.  This leads to the question: what level and manner human endurance is relevant to the period and armies in question?  The near-exhaustion of frequently desk-bound re-enactors after a few minutes' exercise or the day-long running ability of the Zulu warrior?  Perhaps the entire spectrum between the two, as men and armies went to war in differing states of fitness.

Paragons of battle were, for much of their history, the Romans.  Of these, we are told by Josephus:

"NOW here one cannot but admire at the precaution of the Romans, in providing themselves of such household servants, as might not only serve at other times for the common offices of life, but might also be of advantage to them in their wars. And, indeed, if any one does but attend to the other parts of their military discipline, he will be forced to confess that their obtaining so large a dominion hath been the acquisition of their valor, and not the bare gift of fortune; for they do not begin to use their weapons first in time of war, nor do they then put their hands first into motion, while they avoided so to do in times of peace; but, as if their weapons did always cling to them, they have never any truce from warlike exercises; nor do they stay till times of war admonish them to use them; for their military exercises differ not at all from the real use of their arms, but every soldier is every day exercised, and that with great diligence, as if it were in time of war, which is the reason why they bear the fatigue of battles so easily; for neither can any disorder remove them from their usual regularity, nor can fear affright them out of it, nor can labor tire them; which firmness of conduct makes them always to overcome those that have not the same firmness; nor would he be mistaken that should call those their exercises unbloody battles, and their battles bloody exercises.[/i]" - Jewish War III.5.1

In other words, keep your men fit and they will bear the fatigue of battle for however long it takes.

They were not always quite so professionally dedicated, but from early times they did have a system for coping with the fatigue of battle.  In 487 BC, the Consul Gaius Aquillius Tuscus led an army against the Hernici.  Dionysius of Halicarnassus describes the battle.

"Aquilius, one of the consuls, finding the army of the Hernicans waiting for him in the country of the Praenestines, encamped as near to them as he could, at a distance of a little more than two hundred stades from Rome. The second day after he had pitched his camp the Hernicans came out of their camp into the plain in order of battle and gave the signal for combat; whereupon Aquilius also marched out to meet them with his army duly drawn up and disposed in their several divisions. 2 When they drew near to one another, they uttered their war-cries and ran to the encounter; and first to engage were the light-armed men, who, fighting with javelins, arrows, and stones from their slings, gave one another many wounds. Next, horsemen clashed with horsemen, charging in troops, and infantry with infantry, fighting by cohorts. Then there was a glorious struggle as both armies fought stubbornly; and for a long time they stood firm, neither side yielding to the other the ground where they were posted. At length the Romans' line began to be in distress, this being the first occasion in a long time that they had been forced to engaged in war. 3 Aquilius, observing this, ordered that the troops which were still fresh and were being reserved for this very purpose should come up to reinforce the parts of the line that were in distress and that the men who were wounded and exhausted should retire to the rear. The Hernicans, learning that their troops were being shifted, imagined that the Romans were beginning flight; and encouraging one another and closing their ranks, they fell upon those parts of the enemy's army that were in motion, and the fresh troops of the Romans received their onset. Thus once more, as both sides fought stubbornly, there was a strenuous battle all over again; for the ranks of the Hernicans were also continually reinforced with fresh troops sent up by their generals to the parts of the line that were in distress. 4 At length, late in the afternoon, the consul, encouraging the horsemen now at least to acquit themselves as brave men, led the squadron in a charge at the enemy's right wing. This, after resisting them for a short time, fell back, and a great slaughter ensued. While the Hernicans' right wing was now in difficulties and no longer keeping its ranks, their left still held out and was superior to the Romans' right; but in a short time this too gave way." - Bibliotechia Historia VIII.5.1-4

The Romans won the battle.  A point worthy of note is that the Roman and Hernici infantry did not pause for a break when exhaustion set in, but the exhausted troops were replaced by subunits from the second line.

Continuous combat seems to have been the norm for the classical era.  At Leuctra in 371 BC, the Theban phalanx, fifty deep pushed their twelve-deep Spartan opponents all the way back to the latter's camp following a spirited fight over the body of Cleombrotus, the Spartan king, who fell early in the action.  Other hoplite fights give the impression of continuity throughout, as do Alexander's battles against the Persians, although the latter are often over rather sooner than their classical counterparts elsewhere, or at least seem to be.

Fast-forwarding beyond our period but to a more or less technologically comparable culture, prior to Shaka, the Bantu way of war involved primarily skirmishing and discontinuous combat.  Shaka revised the way it was done to emphasise close action and continuous combat, and this gave him a decisive edge over his tribal opponents.  He took care to toughen his warriors so they could endure the fatigue of travel and combat, unlike his opponents, who still fought battles in a come-as-you-are fashion.  His career is a possible microcosm of the developing art of war around the northern Mediterranean, in that tribal skirmishing of the Otzi variety was superseded by close combat of the Trojan War variety and durability gave fitter troops a combat edge, allowing them to turn the increasing fatigue of their foes into casualties and collapse, being able to press them when they sought to break off and discontinue action.

We should perhaps note the existence of differing styles of combat: the skirmishing of more primitive tribesmen, the hit-and-run style of Spanish tribes and the full-blooded charge of Galatians all permit or inhibit a greater or lesser degree of individual and group ability to duck out of combat when exhausted.  Loose groups can pull out for a breather when things get tiring; close formations cannot, or at least not easily.  Formation and combat style need to be considered when quoting examples or drawing conclusions, as not every example is universally applicable.

Lecture done.   Anyone for Agincourt?

[Tim]

I suspect also that (and this is probably implied by what Patrick posted) that it may also relate to psychological endurance, i.e. combat stress.  Modern writers do talk about the need for reserves without ever making clear if this is related to endurance.  Not a helpful answer but the best I have.

[Prufrock]

I think there is room for both interpretations. It seems to me Caesar supports the idea of lulls in combat at times. Ilerda, for example (Civil War, 1.45+), which is described as close combat including the exchanging of lines and relief of exhausted and wounded troops but seems to have been a mixture of melee and missile fire, ended by a charge from Caesar's men who, having spent all their missiles, draw swords, charge the enemy on the high ground, and push them back towards the town. 

In the battle against the Helvetii there appear to be periods without continuous hand-to-hand combat. The Romans throw pila, draw swords and charge, the Helvetii fall back, the Romans follow up but are outflanked, the Helvetii who were falling back now return with a charge (Gallic War, 1.24+).

The fight against the Nervii also implies periods of lower and higher intensity fighting (Gallic War 2.19+)

I'm sure there's more, but I don't have time to look at the moment.

Edit: sorry, those links didn't want to work! Hopefully you can navigate from this one: http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Caesar/home.html

[Justin Swanton]

It might be to the point to examine the nature of infantry melee combat in the pre-gunpowder era. I suspect that combat was neither the all-out wild slash-and-jab sequence of Hollywood choreography nor a quick flurry followed by a mutual break for elevenses.

I see it more as a wary sparring, helped by the  file system of the infantry line. An infantryman leader in his file faces his opposite number in the enemy file. After some spear-jabbing or sword-probing one of the contestants feels himself overborne by the other. He recoils, and his file recoils with him. His opponent now has a problem. If he follows up against the retreating infantryman he will enter the enemy line and face hostile soldiers on three sides, rapidly getting himself killed. He has no choice but to say where he is until the infantryman comes back into the fray and resumes combat. The line itself supplies protection for its members.

If too many infantrymen of a line recoil in this manner then the file leaders who have not recoiled now will find themselves in an exposed position - and so they pull back. Thus the nature of line recoil is explained.

This process can go on for a long time, until one line recoils so much that its members sense they are as a whole overmatched by their adversaries, and in consequence break and run.

[RichT]

It's an interesting question (to which the only honest, intelligent answer is 'nobody knows', but that approach wouldn't make for a very interesting forum).

It's necessary to be clear which combat we are talking about, between which combatants. As Patrick says, cavalry and skirmish-type forces of all kinds (including, arguably, Romans) fought differently from heavy infantry, and their fights could go on a lot longer. The reasons for this include - different type of fighting (chiefly missiles, not hand to hand), and different ways of engaging (repeated charges and retreats, small units engaging individually rather than mass formations engaging all at once). This is low intensity combat, can go on a long time, and was often indecisive. Roman legions may also have fought this way (or at least, had the option to fight this way if required).

Then there is the high intensity combat between (usually) heavy infantry armed exclusively with melee weapons, which (I believe) lasted a lot less long, and while it could involve some ebb and flow, tended to produce a decisive result (the collapse and rout of one or the other side) relatively quickly.  I assume it's this type of combat that we are interested in here.

We could also throw in fights involving cover (buildings, walls, ships etc) which also go on a lot longer (the reason being, seemingly, that the losing side could retire to cover to rally and regroup - not possible in the open). Again I assume it's not this type of fighting we are interested in here.

I'm not aware of any hard evidence for the duration of the heavy infantry type of fighting (from any period, but certainly not pre-gunpowder). References to the fitness of combatants or to fights lasting 'a long time' aren't very helpful - since five minutes of high intensity fighting might seem a long time, and require the highest levels of fitness - that is the question.

Some other thoughts:

- what timings we have ('until sunset', 'less than an hour', 'several hours') are always for entire battles, not single engagements between heavy forces. It's an open question when battles 'started' and 'stopped', and how many individual engagements made up a battle (for Classical Greeks it might well have been just one - all units of a phalanx engaging simultaneously along the line - but this isn't the case for other armies and periods, or even all hoplite battles).

- I don't think we have a clear (accurate) picture of how mass formations fought (nor did they necessarily fight the same way all the time). I suspect (but can't prove) that the classic image of two lines standing toe to toe banging away at each other with swords (or spears) is basically wrong - or at least, is the exception not the rule. Though it could happen - but usually gets commented on when it does. I suspect that formation fights were usually more cagey but I don't have a clear model of the mechanisms involved (not being 100 percent convinced by the 'dynamic stand off' model though I think it has merit).

- aside from fatigue and endurance, we also have to consider combat lethality or effectiveness. How often would one combatant wound, disable or kill his opponent? How many 'hits per minute' was normal? If a combatant scored a lethal or disabling hit once per minute, then eight minutes would suffice to completely annihilate a typical heavy infantry formation - yet one hit per minute doesn't sound like very much (it only takes a second to score a hit). The winning side in hoplites battles typically suffered around 5% casualties - less than one hit for every two men in the front rank - so how long would a fight last in which less than half of the losing side's front rank scored any hits at all? What were they doing the rest of the time? (Nobody say 'pushing'...) Are parrying, shielding and armour that effective?


Digression -

At Leuctra in 371 BC, the Theban phalanx ... pushed their ... Spartan opponents all the way back to the latter's camp

Have you got the reference for this Patrick? I can't see it in the accounts I've read. (I would assume Xen Hell 6.4.14, but that doesn't actually say that).

[Patrick Waterson]

I suspect that combat was neither the all-out wild slash-and-jab sequence of Holly combat choreography nor a quick flurry followed by a mutual break for elevenses.

Justin makes a very important point here: a large part of the non-continuous combat argument is that 'combat' is understood - or misunderstood - as an all-out high-energy exercise akin to fencing or boxing.

The reality is somewhat different.

Polybius II.33, Republican Romans against Insubrian Gauls.

"... When the Celts had rendered their swords useless by the first blows delivered on the spears, the Romans close with them, and rendered them quite helpless, by preventing them from raising their hands to strike with their swords, which is their peculiar and only stroke, because their blade has no point. The Romans, on the contrary, having excellent points to their swords, used them not to cut but to thrust: and by thus repeatedly hitting the breasts and faces of the enemy, they eventually killed the greater number of them. And this was due to the foresight of the Tribunes: for the Consul Flaminius is thought to have made a strategic mistake in his arrangements for this battle. By drawing up his men along the very brink of the river, he rendered impossible a manœuvre characteristic of Roman tactics, because he left the lines no room for their deliberate retrograde movements; for if, in the course of the battle, the men had been forced ever so little from their ground, they would have been obliged by this blunder of their leader to throw themselves into the river."

Worth noting: the Romans had no room for manoeuvre, and so could not even have relieved their first line.  The latter went up close and personal with the Gauls at the outset and stayed that way throughout the entire action.  The only exertion they undertook was more or less continual prodding of the opposition with sword points - hardly more strenuous than an afternoon of woodcutting, to which they would have been accustomed.

Just under a couple of centuries later, here are Caesar's legionaries and their opponents, the Nervii and friends (Gallic War II.19 and following).

"When the first part of the baggage train of our army was seen by those who lay hid in the woods, which had been agreed on among them as the time for commencing action, as soon as they had arranged their line of battle and formed their ranks within the woods, and had encouraged one another, they rushed out suddenly with all their forces and made an attack upon our horse. The latter being easily routed and thrown into confusion, the Nervii ran down to the river with such incredible speed that they seemed to be in the woods, the river, and close upon us almost at the same time. And with the same speed they hastened up the hill to our camp, and to those who were employed in the works."

This enthusiastic dash suggests the Belgae were either relying upon their first impact to defeat their foes or had not thought about what would happen if it did not.  Leaving out Caesar's dashing back and forward to encourage his troops to ready themselves for action, we go straight into the action itself.

"The soldiers of the ninth and tenth legions, as they had been stationed on the left part of the army, casting their weapons, speedily drove the Atrebates (for that division had been opposed to them,) who were breathless with running and fatigue, and worn out with wounds, from the higher ground into the river; and following them as they were endeavoring to pass it, slew with their swords a great part of them while impeded (therein). They themselves did not hesitate to pass the river; and having advanced to a disadvantageous place, when the battle was renewed, they [nevertheless] again put to flight the enemy, who had returned and were opposing them."

That did not last long, the Atrebates having obligingly exhausted themselves before the fighting started.  They paid for that mistake, and paid again when they attempted to renew the action after recovering from their initial repulse.

"In like manner, in another quarter two different legions, the eleventh and the eighth, having routed the Viromandui, with whom they had engaged, were fighting from the higher ground upon the very banks of the river."

Same thing, really: impetuous dash across the river and uphill, same result, except the Viromandui lasted linger when the action was renewed by the advancing Romans.

"But, almost the whole camp on the front and on the left side being then exposed, since the twelfth legion was posted in the right wing, and the seventh at no great distance from it, all the Nervii, in a very close body, with Boduognatus, who held the chief command, as their leader, hastened toward that place; and part of them began to surround the legions on their unprotected flank, part to make for the highest point of the encampment."

This was to lead to the stand-up fight which characterised the memory of the whole battle.

"Caesar proceeded, after encouraging the tenth legion, to the right wing; where he perceived that his men were hard pressed, and that in consequence of the standards of the twelfth legion being collected together in one place, the crowded soldiers were a hindrance to themselves in the fight; that all the centurions of the fourth cohort were slain, and the standard-bearer killed, the standard itself lost, almost all the centurions of the other cohorts either wounded or slain, and among them the chief centurion of the legion P. Sextius Baculus, a very valiant man, who was so exhausted by many and severe wounds, that he was already unable to support himself; he likewise perceived that the rest were slackening their efforts, and that some, deserted by those in the rear, were retiring from the battle and avoiding the weapons; that the enemy [on the other hand] though advancing from the lower ground, were not relaxing in front, and were [at the same time] pressing hard on both flanks; he also perceived that the affair was at a crisis, and that there was not any reserve which could be brought up, having therefore snatched a shield from one of the soldiers in the rear (for he himself had come without a shield), he advanced to the front of the line, and addressing the centurions by name, and encouraging the rest of the soldiers, he ordered them to carry forward the standards, and extend the companies, that they might the more easily use their swords. On his arrival, as hope was brought to the soldiers and their courage restored, while every one for his own part, in the sight of his general, desired to exert his utmost energy, the impetuosity of the enemy was a little checked."

The use of swords implies close fighting.  Caesar encouraged the seventh legion to join up with the twelfth, which they achieved despite the Nervii pressure, and the unified wing held out until relieved by the arriving Roman baggage guard of two legions and the tenth legion from the victorious Roman left.

"By their arrival, so great a change of matters was made, that our men, even those who had fallen down exhausted with wounds, leaned on their shields, and renewed the fight: then the camp-retainers, though unarmed, seeing the enemy completely dismayed, attacked [them though] armed; the horsemen too, that they might by their valor blot the disgrace of their flight, thrust themselves before the legionary soldiers in all parts of the battle. But the enemy, even in the last hope of safety, displayed such great courage, that when the foremost of them had fallen, the next stood upon them prostrate, and fought from their bodies; when these were overthrown, and their corpses heaped up together, those who survived cast their weapons against our men [thence], as from a mound, and returned our darts which had fallen short between [the armies] ..."

The continual close-quarter nature of the combat is illustrated by the passages in bold: we may note in passing that the wounded 'fell exhausted' as opposed to being relieved, and when they got up again were still close enough tot he fighting to take part.  The Nervii stood on the corpses of their fellow-tribesmen, which indicates how little the fighting line had shifted.  No mention is made of rest breaks or disengagement: the last Nervii largely perish in a final exchange of missiles when the corpse piles become too high for close combat weapons to reach those standing on them.

Moving on to Argentoratum in AD 357, the close combat is similarly unremitting and continual.  Ammianus XVI.12.

"Then a cloud of hissing javelins flew hither and thither, the dust arose with steady motion on both sides and hid the view, so that weapon struck blindly on weapon and body against body. [44] But the savages, thrown into disorder by their violence and anger, flamed up like fire, and hacked with repeated strokes of their swords at the close-jointed array of shields, which protected our men like a tortoise-formation. [45] On learning this, the Batavians, with the Reges (a formidable band) came at the double quick to aid their comrades and (if fate would assist) to rescue them, girt about as they were, from the instant of dire need; and as their trumpets pealed savagely, they fought with all their powers."

And it continues.

"[46] But the Alamanni, who enter eagerly into wars, made all the greater effort, as if to destroy utterly everything in their way by a kind of fit of rage. Yet darts and javelins did not cease to fly, with showers of iron-tipped arrows, although at close quarters also blade clashed on blade and breastplates were cleft with the sword; the wounded too, before all their blood was shed, rose up to some more conspicuous deed of daring."

No rest-breaks here.

"[47] For in a way the combatants were evenly matched; the Alamanni were stronger and taller, our soldiers disciplined by long practice; they were savage and uncontrollable, our men quiet and wary, these relying on their courage, while the Germans presumed upon their huge size. [48] Yet frequently the Roman, seeming to have driven from his post [pulsus loco = knocked down in place] by the weight of armed men, rose up again; and the savage, with his legs giving way from fatigue, would drop on his bended left knee and even thus attack his foe, a proof of extreme resolution."

Again, as against the Nervii, even the wounded get up again and fight on - this temporary dropping out groundwards seems to be the only 'disengagement and rest' they ever get.  The Germans are also noted as fighting to exhaustion and not disengaging to take a break while doing so.

Chnodomar's solution is to commit his fresh elite formation as a tie-breaker.

"[49] And so there suddenly leaped forth a fiery band of nobles, among whom even the kings fought, and with the common soldiers following they burst in upon our lines before the rest; and opening up a path for themselves they got as far as the legion of the Primani, which was stationed in the centrea strong feature called praetorian camp; there our soldiers, closely packed and in fully-manned lines. stood their ground fast and firm, like towers, and renewed the battle with greater vigour; and being intent upon avoiding wounds, they protected themselves like murmillos, and with drawn swords pierced the enemy's sides, left bare by their frenzied rage. [50] But the enemy strove to lavish their lives for victory and kept trying to break the fabric of our line. But as they fell in uninterrupted succession, and the Romans now laid them low with greater confidence, fresh savages took the places of the slain; but when they heard the frequent groans of the dying, they were overcome with panic and lost their courage."

Continuous action here.  Note how the Romans stand behind their shields and just whittle the enemy numbers down with periodic sword thrusts. Eventually the combination of ongoing losses and fatigue coupled with lack of success wears away German morale and Chnodomar's army crumbles.

"[51] Worn out at last by so many calamities, and now being eager for flight alone, over various paths they made haste with all speed to get away, just as sailors and passengers hurry to be cast up on land out of the midst of the billows of a raging sea, no matter where the wind has carried them; and anyone there present will admit that it was a means of escape more prayed for than expected. [52] Moreover, the gracious will of an appeased deity was on our side, and our soldiers slashed the backs of the fugitives; when sometimes their swords were bent, and no weapons were at hand for dealing blows, they seized their javelins from the savages themselves and sank them into their vitals; and not one of those who dealt these wounds could with their blood glut his rage or satiate his right hand by continual slaughter, or take pity on a suppliant and leave him."

And that is what happens to opponents who try to break off an ongoing combat.  There are ways to disengage from an enemy line, but they require discipline and swift action, or an irresolute or defensively-minded opponent, as at Ilerda.

[Justin Swanton]

We read in reconstructions of battles that army A fought army B for perhaps hours.  For some people, this is envisaged as a continuous piece of action, with troops constantly engaged.  To others, there a phases of strenuous action punctuated either by contact breaks or less fully committed combat, like missile exchange.  This division can cause considerable passions.  But what do we know?  What do period sources (classical through medieval) tell us?  What about modern experience of human endurance?

The Britons understood the phased method of combat, sadly, the same cannot be said for the Romans:

[Patrick Waterson]

Then there is the high intensity combat between (usually) heavy infantry armed exclusively with melee weapons, which (I believe) lasted a lot less long, and while it could involve some ebb and flow, tended to produce a decisive result (the collapse and rout of one or the other side) relatively quickly.  I assume it's this type of combat that we are interested in here.

Although the length of time to obtain the result seems to have varied, it is this type of combat which appears to attract the intermittent activity school of thought.

- aside from fatigue and endurance, we also have to consider combat lethality or effectiveness. How often would one combatant wound, disable or kill his opponent? How many 'hits per minute' was normal? If a combatant scored a lethal or disabling hit once per minute, then eight minutes would suffice to completely annihilate a typical heavy infantry formation - yet one hit per minute doesn't sound like very much (it only takes a second to score a hit). The winning side in hoplites battles typically suffered around 5% casualties - less than one hit for every two men in the front rank - so how long would a fight last in which less than half of the losing side's front rank scored any hits at all? What were they doing the rest of the time? (Nobody say 'pushing'...) Are parrying, shielding and armour that effective?

This is a good point, albeit when up against armoured infantry contact with shield or armour or a largely unproductive glancing strike partly on a limb will make up the vast majority of hits, with lethal or disabling strikes being the exception.  Even against the presumably unarmoured Insubres in Polybius II.33 it took the Romans a while to put down each individual Gaul through an accumulation of hits to the chest and face.

Digression -

At Leuctra in 371 BC, the Theban phalanx ... pushed their ... Spartan opponents all the way back to the latter's camp.

Have you got the reference for this Patrick? I can't see it in the accounts I've read. (I would assume Xen Hell 6.4.14, but that doesn't actually say that).

What it says is:

"But when Deinon, the polemarch, Sphodrias, one of the king's tent-companions, and Cleonymus, the son of Sphodrias, had been killed, then the royal bodyguard, the so-called aides of the polemarch, and the others fell back under the pressure* of the Theban mass, while those who were on the left wing of the Lacedaemonians, when they saw that the right wing was being pushed back**, gave way. Yet despite the fact that many had fallen and that they were defeated, after they had crossed the trench which chanced to be in front of their camp they grounded their arms at the spot from which they had set forth. The camp, to be sure, was not on ground which was altogether level, but rather on the slope of a hill."

*ōthoumenoi

**ōthoumenon

He said 'pushed back' - he used the 'o'-word - smacked wrist, Xenophon!

His account does not specify when or if, the Thebans stopped pushing, though the fact that the Spartans had a discussion about renewing the action in VI.4.15 indicates the Thebans were not in contact at that point, yet were close enough for the Spartans to be able to renew the action against them.  Best guess: Epaminondas halted his troops near the foot of the hill, not wishing to fight upslope.  And before anyone says Ah, but this means the Spartans were not actually pushed all the way back to their camp, we are not told that they were not.  On the basis of what Xenophon writes, the Thebans could have pushed the Spartans all the way to the trench surrounding their camp; only common sense tells us that Spartans would be unlikely to ground arms if their opponents were that close.  If it makes anyone feel better, I shall state that Xenophon's account suggests the Thebans pushed the Spartans back to a point sufficiently close to their camp that allowed the Spartans to contemplate renewing the action, although 'pushed them all the way back to their camp' seems to me good enough as a general summary, even if inadequate as a specific description, of the action.

[RichT]

Copying and pasting reams of Caesar's battle descriptions and saying 'look, no lulls!' is not a great use of time - obviously lulls aren't explicitly mentioned anywhere (else there would be nothing to discuss). The usual argument (which we heard when discussing the 'o' word) is that readers would have been familiar enough with the concept that lulls wouldn't need to be pointed out - they could just have assumed they happened.

But anyway, Caesar's battles don't read to me as if they went on for hours (except of course for the ones that he says did). Lulls are only necessary if we think fighting took a long time. If fights were short, then lulls would be unnecessary (from a human endurance point of view - but there's still the battlefield clock argument in the dynamic standoff model). My own belief has always been that fighting (high intensity, close quarters fighting) took a very short amount of time - five or ten minutes, maybe fifteen in exceptional cases - though this probably felt like an eternity to those involved.

[RichT]

Leuctra - maybe shouldn't continue this in this thread but just to clear up some things.

He said 'pushed back' - he used the 'o'-word - smacked wrist, Xenophon!

It's OK for Xenophon to use the 'o' word, since he knows what it means...

His account does not specify when or if, the Thebans stopped pushing

Nor indeed when, or if, they started. 

though the fact that the Spartans had a discussion about renewing the action in VI.4.15 indicates the Thebans were not in contact at that point, yet were close enough for the Spartans to be able to renew the action against them

Xen Hell 6.4.15: "The camp, to be sure, was not on ground which was altogether level, but rather on the slope of a hill. After the disaster some of the Lacedaemonians, thinking it unendurable, said that they ought to prevent the enemy from setting up their trophy and to try to recover the bodies of the dead, not by means of a truce, but by fighting."

So this tells us nothing at all about how close the Thebans were to the Spartans at the point of discussion - the proposal was to recover the bodies (and prevent the erection of the trophy) - which would presumably both have been where the fighting mostly took place.

And before anyone says Ah, but this means the Spartans were not actually pushed all the way back to their camp, we are not told that they were not.

We are not told that there were not lulls in the fighting, either. 

If it makes anyone feel better, I shall state that Xenophon's account suggests the Thebans pushed the Spartans back to a point sufficiently close to their camp that allowed the Spartans to contemplate renewing the action, although 'pushed them all the way back to their camp' seems to me good enough as a general summary, even if inadequate as a specific description, of the action.

I don't feel bad in the first place, it was an honest mistake I'm sure.

There's also Diodorus' version of these events (Diod 15.56) "... but finally, as many fell and the commander who would have rallied them had died, the army turned and fled in utter rout. Epameinondas' corps pursued the fugitives, slew many who opposed them, and won for themselves a most glorious victory.... Following the battle they made a truce to allow for taking up the bodies of the dead and the departure of the Lacedaemonians to the Peloponnese."

Xenophon does say "Yet despite the fact that many had fallen and that they were defeated, after they had crossed the trench which chanced to be in front of their camp..."

It sounds to me as if the Spartans were routed in the fighting and fled back to their camp (at least some of them). There, according to Xenophon they discussed renewing the fight (but wiser heads presumably prevailed).

[Prufrock]

Not sure we're getting any further than the observation that when combat was continuous, it was continuous, but when it wasn't, it wasn't!

[Patrick Waterson]

But anyway, Caesar's battles don't read to me as if they went on for hours (except of course for the ones that he says did).

Not sure we're getting any further than the observation that when combat was continuous, it was continuous, but when it wasn't, it wasn't!

Ummm ... 

Lulls are only necessary if we think fighting took a long time. If fights were short, then lulls would be unnecessary (from a human endurance point of view - but there's still the battlefield clock argument in the dynamic standoff model). My own belief has always been that fighting (high intensity, close quarters fighting) took a very short amount of time - five or ten minutes, maybe fifteen in exceptional cases - though this probably felt like an eternity to those involved.

In a clash where one side folds fairly quickly (various outflanked hoplite left wings, Romans at the Allia and of course the Atrebates at the Sambre) this would of course be true.  However there are quite a few accounts where the irresistible force meets the immovable object and, leaving aside cliche-like remarks that "the battle went on a long time with neither side gaining an advantage, with heavy losses on both sides," which seems to be a Diodorus stock phrase, we get basic questions of time and motion arithmetic, e.g. how long does it take for 50,000 or so Carthaginians to dispose of around 70,000 surrounded Romans at Cannae?  Rather more than fifteen minutes, one would presume.

[aligern]

I suggest that we would have to factor in that much of the soldier's combat activity was essentially defensiv, it being most men's objective to survive and perhaps kill an enemy than to take risks and get injured or worse. An interesting indicator  of this is the casualty levels of victorious  armies which are generally low percentages of the forces engaged . That, I suggest, tells us that killing during the phase when troops faced each other was relatively light. The side that was fittest and lasted longest would have a considerable advantage, let us remember the description of the battle of Caesar against the Suebi, where the Germans are so exhausted that all they can do is lock shields and await the Romans killing them.
There are some modern comparators that we might use.
In a game of rugby there is moderately intense action by the forwards for 80 minutes. This includes several grinding mutual pushes (scrums) . There are many periods of explosive action, but these are balanced by periods when the ball is elsewhere and a ten minipute break in the middle.
Boxers go for twelve or fifteen three  minute  rounds (or is it five) There is frequent physical contact and damaging blows and there are regular rests. At the end the bout one or both of the boxers is exhausted, yet they have taken a breather between each round.In an Association football match there is much less tiring contact, but generally, after 90 minutes, even superbly fit teams are making mistakes.  Of course none of our modern athletes is carrying a shield, sword, spear and the weight of his armour . 
So by analogy I would suggest that ancient warriors indulged in rapid bouts of energy sapping action, punctuated by rests that occurred when mutual exhaustion  sliwed the combatants to the point where attacking became too risky and both sides defaulted to defence and catching a breather. If one side was fitter than the other and perhaps better protected, they  would be able to sustain risky, but aggressive actions fir longer than the opponents and would start to kill more men. When the opponent notices this they step back to gain respite.  If they are very tired and the victors have the energy to follow up the retrograde motion would become a route. I envisage the whole unit, perhaps the whole battle line acting as one in this because the consequences of being isolated are likely to be deadly. If those near you fall back, you drop back with them.
The modern sporting examples do align with the concept of short  intense bursts of attack and defence , though that does rely on us seeing the periods of conflict as intensive as each warrior seeks to damage his opponent. We cannot be certain about all armies at all times, but rapid aggression does fit with the style of Romans who ran at their opponents, so eager for combat that they dropped their pila and fell on with their swords.

[Patrick Waterson]

Leuctra - maybe shouldn't continue this in this thread but just to clear up some things.

Yes, one point outstanding is the incompatibility of Xenophon's 'grounding arms' and discussing renewal of the action with Diodorus' 'utter rout'.

There's also Diodorus' version of these events (Diod 15.56) "... but finally, as many fell and the commander who would have rallied them had died, the army turned and fled in utter rout. Epameinondas' corps pursued the fugitives, slew many who opposed them, and won for themselves a most glorious victory.... Following the battle they made a truce to allow for taking up the bodies of the dead and the departure of the Lacedaemonians to the Peloponnese."

Xenophon does say "Yet despite the fact that many had fallen and that they were defeated, after they had crossed the trench which chanced to be in front of their camp..."

It sounds to me as if the Spartans were routed in the fighting and fled back to their camp (at least some of them). There, according to Xenophon they discussed renewing the fight (but wiser heads presumably prevailed).

Diodorus' "the army turned and fled in utter rout" is a translation of egeneto pantelēs tropē tou stratopedou, which appears to mean the camp (presumably camp followers, primarily helots seeing their masters beaten for the first time) dissolved in utter rout, not the army.  While stratopedon can mean by extension an encamped army, is it at all usable for an unencamped one?