How did infantry stop charging cavalry?

[Justin Swanton]

Cavalry punching through heavy infantry seems not to have been especially rare in Antiquity though it is not a continuous phenomenon. At one time the Roman Republic routinely won its battles by smashing through enemy heavy foot with its cavalry and then finishing off the disordered footmen with its own infantry:

The infantry on the right wing fought with distinguished valour, with stout resistance from the Volscians. Servius Sulpicius broke with his cavalry through the centre of the enemy's line; whence though he might have returned in the same way to his own party, before the enemy could have restored their broken ranks, it seemed more advisable to attack the enemy's rear, and by attacking the rear he would in a moment have dispersed the enemy by the twofold attack, had not the cavalry of the Volscians and Æquans intercepted him and kept him engaged by a mode of fighting similar to his own. - Livy: Histories 3, 70

A charging horse packs a fearsome punch against a standing man as we saw in the chariot thread. Just standing in intermediate formation in an 8-deep or 12-deep line is no guarantee against a cavalry charge (unless the infantry have muskets and that's another story entirely). The Late Roman army dealt with cavalry using the fulcum formation, with involved the front ranks overlapping shields and bunching up together. Earlier pike phalanxes didn't have a problem because they had pikes. But how did other heavy infantry units deal with cavalry? Is there any indication in the sources of special formations besides the fulcum that were used to stop charging cavalry? For example, I notice that the mid-Republican cavalry were able to punch through enemy infantry but later Republican cavalry were not, or at least there is no indication of them doing so. Did the enemy devise a countermeasure? How did Greek hoplites stop cavalry if Rome's opponents could not? ( think we can take it for granted the Volscians were not tribal skirmishers)

And to the floor.

[Jim Webster]

In a lot of the battles that Livy describes, the cavalry cannot have been moving at speed because they often seem to have had to pass through their own embattled infantry to take part in the melee

[Patrick Waterson]

The first thing I would look at would be what the respective troops were trained to do.  We may note in passing that the period c.AD 1066-1300 saw the knightly cavalry of Europe able to do serious damage to most infantry formations in the open (Swiss and Scots were among the few exceptional infantry who could repel a charge), and the devcelopment of missilery, professional discipline and ultimately pike formations saw the end of knightly domination of the battlefield.

The first requisite of infantry facing cavalry is discipline.  The opponents charged by Early Roman Republican cavalry appear to have been those lacking discipline, from Volsci to the Gauls at Cremona in 203 BC.  We may note that not all such charges were successful; their professed (at least by Livy) aim was to shake the morale and cohesion of a stubborn enemy and thus give the legionaries the advantage in the ongoing combat.  (How the Romans extracted the cavalry after an unsuccessful charge through their own infantry is probably worth a chapter in itself; my guess would be that the horsemen backed out between the files of infantry, and were trained to do so.)  Failing training, strong motivation (bonding) would enable infantry to stand.

Infantry do require discipline and/or motivation to stand up to cavalry.  Many of us are doubtless familiar with video clips of hundreds of demonstrators scattering as a dozen or so mounted police trot or canter towards them.  Perhaps less well known is that when Sergei Bondarchuk was filming the battle scenes for his production of Waterloo, the Ukranian conscripts standing in for Anglo-allied soldiery initially broke and ran even though they knew the charges were feints for filming!  We can view this as the default reaction for untrained, unmotivated troops.

Training and motivation will keep troops standing and in formation.  Greek hoplites and most tribal warriors would thus be prepared to stand against oncoming cavalry.  Quite apart from the prospect of dying with a shaft through one's back, the prospect of having to explain to one's home community why one fled the field while one's comrades all stood was a formidable deterrent, especially as many societies had particularly unpleasant ways of expiating the sin of cowardice.

Weaponry also helps, in that a forest of pike points is not easy for cavalry to penetrate, with or without serious injury to themselves.  Long shafted weapons, however, are not essential - Antony's Roman legions stood against Parthian lance charges and generally amazed the Parthians with their discipline - but are much more desirable than not having them, which may be why Arrian in his Order of Battle against the Alans armed his first three ranks with the kontos.  (Although some think this is meant to indicate the pilum, after long thought I disagree.  Kontos makes more sense as kontos.)

So - discipline/motivation is required to stand in the first place; long shafted weapons help, but are not essential.

Others will doubtless have their own thoughts to contribute.

In a lot of the battles that Livy describes, the cavalry cannot have been moving at speed because they often seem to have had to pass through their own embattled infantry to take part in the melee

True, and yet they were still effective - except at Cremona, where they found themselves facing elephants.  This in itself indicates that the manoeuvre was executed in fairly leisurely fashion, telegraphing itself in advance, and giving time and opportunity for someone like Hamilcar, who evidently knew what to expect, to enact countermeasures.  Bringing his elephants up through his own fighting troops must have been interesting.

[Duncan Head]

While the Forum's system does warn you if someone else has posted a reply while you were typing, it doesn't seem to be able to deal with two people making a post simultaneously. Or at least, that seems to be the likely explanation for my post disappearing - again....

But if anyone of you is despondent because we are without horsemen while the enemy have plenty at hand, let him reflect that your ten thousand horsemen are nothing more than ten thousand men; for nobody ever lost his life in battle from the bite or kick of a horse, but it is the men who do whatever is done in battles. Moreover, we are on a far surer foundation than your horsemen: they are hanging on their horses' backs, afraid not only of us, but also of falling off; while we, standing upon the ground, shall strike with far greater force if anyone comes upon us and shall be far more likely to hit whomsoever we aim at. In one point alone your horsemen have the advantage—flight is safer for them than it is for us.

Which matches up with Patrick's point on training, or at least determination - on both sides. The big problem is surely that it's harder to motivate the horses.

[Erpingham]

To draw on medieval examples, the key was a tight formation and a lot of nerve.  Close up tight from front and sides and hold your ground.
It also helped to be in an advantageous position, such as on hill or a little back from a ditch, which would prevent the cavalry from attacking with momentum.

As Jim has noted, is our idea of a charge a bit "Hollywood" anyway?  Did cavalry charge headlong into the midst of the enemy, or did they attack at a more controlled speed?  This is not to deny the effects of momentum - a trotting horse is perfectly capable of bowling someone over - more of control.

[Erpingham]

Swiss and Scots were among the few exceptional infantry who could repel a charge

This is a very dubious statement.  If nothing else, what happened to the Flemings?  I think a better reading is that most infantry could stand against cavalry initially but were prone to be worn down, especially if the enemy could deploy missile troops.  Many cavalry/infantry fights were attritional, not just a question of cavalry breezing through infantry lines.

[Justin Swanton]

If infantry that were irresolute got out of the way of charging horses then for sure the cavalry would have no problem piercing the line. But if the infantry didn't flinch and stood their ground would that by itself be enough to stop the horses? IMHO the only way for infantry not equipped with pikes or muskets to stop charging cavalry is to bunch up - the ranks compact together in close formation creating a multi-legged animal that can't be bowled over. Is it a fair assumption that infantry learned to do that and only then were able to stop cavalry?

(How the Romans extracted the cavalry after an unsuccessful charge through their own infantry is probably worth a chapter in itself; my guess would be that the horsemen backed out between the files of infantry, and were trained to do so.)

My understanding of cavalry formations (with the exception of cataphracts) is that they deployed in files wide enough for a horse to turn in place and head back between adjacent files. The manuals describe this in some detail. If cavalry advanced between infantry files those infantry had to have been in open order to allow enough space for the horses to advance between them. This open order corresponds to the cavalry's default order which meant that as they issued from the infantry they were in formation, capable of charging and countermarching back through their own infantry.

All this supposes of course that the opposing infantry themselves had not yet engaged. How many examples are there of Roman cavalry charging through already engaged infantry? I imagine then that if the cavalry couldn't punch through the enemy infantry they would have no choice but to back up, unless their own foot were able to break off and leave them enough space to countermarch.

[Jim Webster]

In a lot of the battles that Livy describes, the cavalry cannot have been moving at speed because they often seem to have had to pass through their own embattled infantry to take part in the melee

True, and yet they were still effective - except at Cremona, where they found themselves facing elephants.  This in itself indicates that the manoeuvre was executed in fairly leisurely fashion, telegraphing itself in advance, and giving time and opportunity for someone like Hamilcar, who evidently knew what to expect, to enact countermeasures.  Bringing his elephants up through his own fighting troops must have been interesting.

But if they were successful in their attack after pushing their way through the ranks of their own infantry, who were still in contact with the enemy infantry, it seems to indicate that the success has nothing to do with momentum of a charge
Indeed it might merely be that the success is owed to the advantage gained by sitting on the bank of a horse raining blows down, but with their own infantry still present to protect the horse

[eques]

The way I see it, cavalry were mainly used to go round the flanks and break up infantry from the sides rather than frontally, and also to finish off formations that already had holes punched in them by a melee against other infantry.

If cavalry did just straight up charge fresh infantry from the front then I guess they were relying on the target unit losing its nerve (which as Patrick says was pretty likely owing to the psychological terror).  "Losing nerve" might literally involve running away or it might just involve losing discipline and cohesion to the extent that the formation became looser and easier for the cavalry to break into.

I think I remember reading in the book Warhorse (my bible for ancient cavalry warfare) that if an infantry formation did maintain cohesion, horses would literally refuse to contact it and swerve off.

Is there any detailed information on what happened during the Norman cavalry charges at Hastings?

[eques]

With regard to the Volscian infantry, I'd guess they were pretty lightly armoured, undrilled and in loose formation?

[Justin Swanton]

With regard to the Volscian infantry, I'd guess they were pretty lightly armoured, undrilled and in loose formation?

Not if they were supplying "stout resistance" against the Roman foot.

[Jim Webster]

With regard to the Volscian infantry, I'd guess they were pretty lightly armoured, undrilled and in loose formation?

Not if they were supplying "stout resistance" against the Roman foot.

But did the cavalry charge them across open ground, or just push through gaps in the Roman foot?

[Erpingham]

I think I remember reading in the book Warhorse (my bible for ancient cavalry warfare) that if an infantry formation did maintain cohesion, horses would literally refuse to contact it and swerve off.

Perhaps.  Though this is often presented as horse instinct, forgetting that there is a rider on the animal's back managing those instincts.  What is the intent of the rider when confronted with this cohesive mass?  Is he willing to press into it or does he stand off?  Perhaps he engages enough to show willing but not risk his expensive asset, his horse?  If he does charge home, does he do it at a gallop, aiming to blast a hole in the enemy for others to follow?  Or does he attack in a more controlled way, using the weight of the horse and make it turn and kick out, forcing a gap to fight in? There are medieval examples of both but more of the latter. 

[Patrick Waterson]

If he does charge home, does he do it at a gallop, aiming to blast a hole in the enemy for others to follow?  Or does he attack in a more controlled way, using the weight of the horse and make it turn and kick out, forcing a gap to fight in? There are medieval examples of both but more of the latter. 

Knightly cavalry did seem (for example) able and willing to charge home against a spear hedge at Falkirk (AD 1296) and a pike hedge at Arbedo (AD 1422); in the latter case they failed with 400 piked horses and in the former case just failed.  In both cases the now somewhat frustrated knights obeyed orders to pull back and let the archers do the work.

Swiss and Scots were among the few exceptional infantry who could repel a charge

This is a very dubious statement.  If nothing else, what happened to the Flemings?  I think a better reading is that most infantry could stand against cavalry initially but were prone to be worn down, especially if the enemy could deploy missile troops.  Many cavalry/infantry fights were attritional, not just a question of cavalry breezing through infantry lines.

Frederick Barbarossa's campaigns in Italy tend to be taken as an illustration of the ease with which knightly cavalry could defeat standard period infantry in the open field.  The Emperor's fifth campaign ran into an unexpected reverse at Legnano where the (trained) infantry of the Lombard League stood against his cavalry, much to just about everyone's surprise.

And yes, the Flemings were among the merry band of stalwarts who gained a reputation for being able to stand off cavalry.  Absence of mention was not the same as mention of absence.

[Nick Harbud]

To take an out-of-period example, Marshal Soult wrote of the British at Albuera,

"There is no beating these troops, in spite of their generals. I always thought they were bad soldiers, now I am sure of it. I had turned their right, pierced their centre and everywhere victory was mine – but they did not know how to run!"