The sharp end at Plataiai - the Spartans in action

[Erpingham]

I don't think we have had this article before :

The Face of Battle at Plataiai by Roel Konijnendijk and Paul M. Bardunias

Readers should be warned it does contain detailed discussion of othismos but, on the plus side, a lot of that has been discussed on this forum by Paul Bardunias himself.

Perhaps the most interesting bit for me was the idea that the Spartans at Plataea were more like the archaic hoplites in their tactics than the classic hyper-disciplined red and bronze steam roller we know and love. 

A good read, with plenty to agree and disagree with.

[Duncan Head]

An interesting analysis, quite van Weesian but not slavishly so. Thanks.

[Anton]

A very informative read, thank you.

[Orc65]

That was a good read, and quite interesting. I probably misunderstood a fair bit of it, but it makes me wonder how to model that sort of formation on the table to see how it performs.

[RichT]

Yes, interesting chapter. I rather felt the two parts - the Konijnendijk part and the Bardunias part - didn't mesh together very much; there isn't really any scope for the crowd crush in Herodotus' account, as K understands it, so it felt a bit odd having it emphasised in the B part. Anyway, lots of familiar stuff and I found myself agreeing with much of it (but guess which bits I didn't...).

[Duncan Head]

Thinking about this some more, I can accept and visualise the non-Spartan units with equal numbers of hoplites and light-armed attendants formed up behind them or even intermingled with them. But I can't visualise how a Spartan formation with seven times as many light-armed as hoplites would work at all. If the Spartans form "at least four shields deep" (or in a non-ranked formation averaging four deep), then you have twenty-eight helot light infantry behind each not-quite-a-file of hoplites. Is this really likely?

[RichT]

Yes, and the Problem of the Light Infantry at Plataea is at least as bad as the Problem of the Cavalry (which the article refers to but rather evades - the Problem of the Cavalry at Marathon, in contrast, has its own extensive literature). I haven't read any of the other chapters in that volume so don't know if any of them tackle it.

Four ranks of hoplites backed by 28 ranks of lights doesn't seem likely, no. But they (the lights) have to go somewhere, if we are to take Herodotus at his word, and putting them in huge (and completely passive and irrelevant) bodies on the flanks doesn't seem very likely either.

I'm inclined to suspect that our whole conception of what ancient armies and battles looked like might be out of whack. The neat blocks of ordered infantry, precisely eight (or n) ranks deep, marching about in perfect order, just doesn't fit (at least at this period, as the article suggests). If the Archaic originals of hoplite formations were large clouds of men in no particular formation or order, standing where they pleased, and with highly variable equipment, from the richest bronze-armoured promachoi showing off at the front to the lowliest stone-armed slave or near slave lurking at the back, then it all makes more sense. Depths (approximate, irregular depths) of 32 wouldn't be unlikely. The men at the back wouldn't be able to achieve very much, but then that's not their function (their function is everything that happens before and after the real close quarters fighting, including the cooking and cleaning). It's a big, deep, disorderly mob fronted by a relatively small number of well armed rich men.

The argument of the article is that this sort of thing was still common as late as the Persian Wars; I'm increasingly inclined to think it remained, if not the norm, at least not unknown, throughout, and not just among hoplites. This is perhaps how most ancient infantry looked.

[Erpingham]

To me, not knowing as much about this as some, I always seem to find more questions.  For example, many tribal infantries would have men with varying levels of equipment so are we sure all the helots were javelin and rock throwers or have we imported that from elsewhere?

The article assumes the helots were integral with the hoplite units.  Yet, the same article says we know nothing about where the helots were, just they were there in large numbers.  Could they have stood on the sidelines (or the rear lines) waiting to take part in a pursuit and leave us with a fighting core of hoplites (albeit perhaps different to what we think of a Classical hoplites)?

And they were fighting primarily bow-armed Persian infantry.  Now an early hoplite was probably pretty arrow proof but a man with some rocks and a cloak over his arm wasn't.  If the helots were in the fighting line, shouldn't the sun-blocking volleys of the Persians have killed them in droves, undermining the Spartan war effort?

As I say, there always seem to be more questions.

[RichT]

Yes, always more questions.

Helot equipment - Herodotus does say they were 'equipped for war' which might imply something more than sticks and stones, but if so we don't know what (or rather, I don't). I suspect it just means light shields and weapons (javelins, some swords).

There are three options for the helots (and other lights): they were integral to the hoplite units but at the back; they were separate from the hoplite units and further back; or they were separate from the hoplite units and on the flanks. (Plus, they weren't there at all). Each option raises more questions. Some were killed at Plataea though, as they were buried there (as some were at Thermopylae, for all that nothing is ever said about them), so they were engaged somehow, whether as targets for Persian archery, or fighting more actively.

The problem is (as with all ancient battles) that our entire knowledge of Plataea consists of a few hundred words in Herodotus, yet this was a battle similar in terms of number of combatants and possibly ground covered to Waterloo (much bigger than Waterloo, if Herodotus' numbers are right). Imagine if our entire knowledge of Waterloo came from a few hundred words in a single author, one who wasn't greatly interested in military history, but liked a good tale, and we had to reconstruct the entirety of Napoleonic military organisation and tactics, as well as the events of the battle, just from that - how close to reality could we expect to be?

[Duncan Head]

There are three options for the helots (and other lights): they were integral to the hoplite units but at the back; they were separate from the hoplite units and further back; or they were separate from the hoplite units and on the flanks. (Plus, they weren't there at all).

Or that some were in one place and the rest in another.

I raise this not (just) to pick nits, but because Herodotos 7.229.1 could indicate that the Spartans at Thermopylai had the "usual" one helot attendant each. So there might have been a distinction between the hoplite's customary attendant, quite possibly a helot from his estate at home, and the other six, whose presence at Plataia may have been a unique measure; and so they could have deployed separately.

When Eurytus learned of the Persians circuit, he demanded his armor and put it on, bidding the helot to lead him to the fighting. The helot led him there and fled, but he rushed into the fray and was killed.

[RichT]

Nit fairly picked, and in fact they could have been all four (not the same ones of course). Most hoplites probably had an attendant (as Herodotus suggests, and as is known elsewhere). If all the Greeks were attended in the phalanx by their attendant, that reduces the unaccounted for LI from 69,5000 to 30,000 (a mere bagatelle).

[DBS]

One thought that occurs to me, and may or may not be relevant to this discussion, is that most of the Greek army at Plataea would have had no meaningful experience of fighting the Persians, save only for the Athenians and Plataeans who had fought at Marathon eleven years earlier - presumably quite a few veterans of that battle were also at Plataea.

Now, whatever one thinks of Herodotus' umpteen myriads (and yes, one presumes that the Greeks knew that Xerxes had taken a load home with him), the Greek perception may well have been that they would still be facing uncomfortable quantity odds, of unknown quality, in 479.  Might even the most culturally arrogant Greek pondered in dark moments that this fight might not be quite what he was used to, compared to the recreational violent confrontations with neighbouring poleis? 

Might this be a reason for abnormal force composition, even if, on the day of the race, they end up not having a terribly good idea of how to use some of the auxiliaries - or, when seeing the Persians actually formed up, decide that the good old hoplite might be enough anyway.  (Not that the latter precludes the idea of more Archaic styles of "phalanx"...)

[Jim Webster]

I'm inclined to suspect that our whole conception of what ancient armies and battles looked like might be out of whack. The neat blocks of ordered infantry, precisely eight (or n) ranks deep, marching about in perfect order, just doesn't fit (at least at this period, as the article suggests). If the Archaic originals of hoplite formations were large clouds of men in no particular formation or order, standing where they pleased, and with highly variable equipment, from the richest bronze-armoured promachoi showing off at the front to the lowliest stone-armed slave or near slave lurking at the back, then it all makes more sense. Depths (approximate, irregular depths) of 32 wouldn't be unlikely. The men at the back wouldn't be able to achieve very much, but then that's not their function (their function is everything that happens before and after the real close quarters fighting, including the cooking and cleaning). It's a big, deep, disorderly mob fronted by a relatively small number of well armed rich men.

The argument of the article is that this sort of thing was still common as late as the Persian Wars; I'm increasingly inclined to think it remained, if not the norm, at least not unknown, throughout, and not just among hoplites. This is perhaps how most ancient infantry looked.

Indeed given that it was not uncommon for younger year groups of hoplites to run out of the phalanx to chase off light infantry I think we have to be more flexible about what a hoplite battle formation actually was.
A lot of hoplites might spend some of their time fighting in comparatively dispersed formations, as marines, or storming camps, supporting raids and similar.

Similarly in "The Rise of Persia and the First Greco-Persian Wars: The Expansion of the Achaemenid Empire and the Battle of Marathon" by Manousos E Kambouris, the author postulates that the 'charge' at Marathon had the youngest year groups who were more used to running in armour arriving first having covered the ground at speed to negate the missile fire, and then the rest of the phalanx jog up at a more sensible pace and fall in behind them.

It has occurred to me that with our discussions on othismos we might have overlooked the fact that it may have been possible but may also have been rare.

[RichT]

A lot of hoplites might spend some of their time fighting in comparatively dispersed formations, as marines, or storming camps, supporting raids and similar.

Yes indeed - the old orthodox idea still repeated eg in Schwarz, Reinstating, that hoplites were completely helpless and useless outside of a formed close order phalanx is or should be completely dead (yet, it keeps rising from the grave). I go on about this a bit in my, you know, book...

[Tim]

By no means an expert on the period under discussion so consider this thought in that light. I have more knowledge of 15th-18th century warfare. Two thoughts occur to me.

Flodden - the Scots, by the accounts I have read, consist of a more organised version of their typical tribal warfare (Laird turns up with a lightly armed retinue) in having dismounted nobles with state funded (very) good armour in the front rank of the phalanx and the rest in a very deep formation behind. The rear ranks won't have been full time professional soldiers, indeed for some of them it might be their very first experience of battle - "here hold that long thing and stand behind your local landowner". Else I can't see how such a large army is raised so quickly.

The French Revolution Demi-Brigades consisting of very large numbers of conscripts brigaded with regular line units.

I do wonder if the helots in such large numbers are operating in a similar way to these examples. Untrained/inexperienced men called up en masse. Armoured/trained men at the front, rear ranks helots, either in the same formation or brigaded together - "don't be scared, you are with those big brave Spartiates. Watch them they know what to do. Stick close and they will look after you".

(Rich - do you have a book out on the topic. You might have mentioned it...)