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I've had notion I'd like to bounce off the forum.

I've been  wondering about what happens to an infantryman who faces a superior or fresher opponent. In a single combat situation he would rapidly give ground after the first few blows and then turn and run if he didn't want to be killed. So what saves his neck in a battleline? With men behind him he has nowhere to run and so should be dead in moments. Why do battlelines, when faced with superior opponents, not immediately disintegrate and flee?

Taking the facts that battlelines do recoil in battle if they are getting the short end of the stick and that the basic unit of a battleline is a file, I came up with this idea.

Here is a line of hoplites facing off against some legionaries.



Supposing a central hoplite is knocking the stuffing out of his Roman counterpart. The legionary naturally gives way. His file is under orders to give way with him.



The victorious hoplite then finds he has a problem. As he advances against the recoiling file he finds himself partially surrounded by hostile troops.



If he keeps advancing, he will find himself facing three enemy soldiers on his front and two flanks, and will be quickly killed.



Hence the legionary, by recoiling, renders himself immune to follow up from the hoplite. Of course the leading legionaries of the two adjacent files now find themselves partially exposed and may feel obliged to fall back in turn. A ripple motion of recoils is initiated and the entire line starts falling back. The golden rule is: whether you are advancing or recoiling or standing still, never get into a situation where you face enemy from any direction except your front.

A line that is unable to recoil in this manner becomes vulnerable. Weaker individuals in the line cannot retire into the protective space of the line and are killed by enemy troops. If the line is surrounded or attacked from front and rear it loses this vital recoil ability, whilst enemy soldiers remain free to retire within their lines if they feel themselves overmatched. The surrounded line is soon annihilated. Hence the destruction of the Roman infantry at Cannae even though they still outnumbered the Carthaginians after their cavalry had been chased from the field.

Any comments on this hypothesis?

Quote from: Justin Swanton on February 04, 2016, 05:46:30 PM
The golden rule is: whether you are advancing or recoiling or standing still, never get into a situation where you face enemy from any direction except your front.

True - even then, canny foes might be able to do something vicious: at Argentoratum AD 357), the Primani legion in Julian's army managed to slaughter elite German warriors in a basically frontal configuration.

"Taking care to avoid being wounded and covering themselves like gladiators, they plunged their swords into the barbarians' sides, which their wild rage left exposed." - Ammianus XII.48

This suggests that the Romans were using the British Culloden-style tactic of skewering the opponent to one's right rather than the man ahead.  If anything, this reinforces the basic point that letting an enemy get at your sides individually or collectively is a recipe for a very short life on the battlefield.

And then there is the matter of a frontally superior foe.

QuoteA line that is unable to recoil in this manner becomes vulnerable. Weaker individuals in the line cannot retire into the protective space of the line and are killed by enemy troops.

Turning to Polybius II.33, we find Insubrian Gauls in exactly this situation.  The tribunes in the Roman army issued the spears of the triarii to the front rank of hastati, knowing that holding out the spears would encourage the Gauls to chop downwards to splinter the shafts.  The hastati were ordered immediately to close corps-a-corps when this happened, which would result in each of them being nose-to-chin and chest-to-swordarm with a Gallic warrior whose sword was inconveniently caught with its blade between a Gallic leg or shield and a Roman scutum.

In theory, the Gauls should have been able to back out and get a breathing-space, not to mention space in which to regain control of their weapons.  In practice, it would seem that the men behind the leaders simply got in the way, either pressing from behind or just awaiting their turn, indicating that the Gauls had no such capacity for adjustment.  Not being regulars they would presumably have lacked any form of file organisation.

I would add that a file leader might not necessarily realise when he was outmatched - or might realise too late.  One recalls Crastinus at Pharsalus, one of the best if not the best of Caesar's superannuated centurions, leading an elite century of an elite cohort of an elite legion - and getting killed by a sword-thrust through the mouth.  That said, the ability of Roman legions to fall back from a Macedonian pike phalanx at both Cynoscephalae and Pydna suggests some form of 'file fallback' in operation.

Quote
If the line is surrounded or attacked from front and rear it loses this vital recoil ability, whilst enemy soldiers remain free to retire within their lines if they feel themselves overmatched. The surrounded line is soon annihilated. Hence the destruction of the Roman infantry at Cannae even though they still outnumbered the Carthaginians after their cavalry had been chased from the field.

A surrounded or sandwiched line will quickly become compacted if individuals try to fall back or are forced back on each other, rendering most of them unable to use their weapons effectively or at all.  The Greek mercenaries at the Granicus and the Roman infantry at Adrianople both fell afoul of this feature, ending up as a compressed mass which did little more than provide their opponents with easy weapon practice.  The Romans at Cannae appear to have suffered a similar difficulty, although Paullus is recorded as passing from one part of the action to another until close to the end, so it looks as if the allied wings were the first to suffer acute constraint and compression, the Romans themselves being more gradually herded in by a combination of Hannibal's Gallic stop-line, Hasdrubal's cavalry and the victorious Carthaginian infantry wings.

Leaving aside the lack of hoplites vs legionaries encounters.

The point if the red formation is that the next red guy steps forward, not that the white guy moves suicidally into the red formation.

And when the red guys stop wanting to step up to the hole, red leader calls for a pull back to reform.

Quote from: Mark G on February 05, 2016, 06:11:28 AM
Leaving aside the lack of hoplites vs legionaries encounters.

The point if the red formation is that the next red guy steps forward, not that the white guy moves suicidally into the red formation.

And when the red guys stop wanting to step up to the hole, red leader calls for a pull back to reform.

Which raises the subject of file members rotating through the front position of the file. Do the sources attest to this? How was it executed?

I'd question some assumptions.

QuoteSupposing a central hoplite is knocking the stuffing out of his Roman counterpart. The legionary naturally gives way. His file is under orders to give way with him.

I'd question the last sentence - the file would (I believe) be under orders to stand fast and stop him from giving way. That is what the rearward ranks are for. The more rearward ranks there are, the less likely they are to give way - that is why deep formations were effective, because they provided resistance against backward movement. The general consensus (I understand) for formations in combat is that they run away from the back, not from the front (not least because until the men behind have run away, there's nowhere for those in front to go).

The result might then be that the outmatched legionary would be rapidly killed or injured, but that is why the best, most experienced men were placed in the front rank. If he did go down, the second ranker would step up to take his place, so that the hole would be closed.

QuoteThe victorious hoplite then finds he has a problem. As he advances against the recoiling file he finds himself partially surrounded by hostile troops

If the hoplite did find his opposite number down, dead or recoiling, I surmise he would not advance into the pocket, but would assist his fellows to left or right, while maintaining his position in the ranks. As you say - 

QuoteOf course the leading legionaries of the two adjacent files now find themselves partially exposed and may feel obliged to fall back in turn. A ripple motion of recoils is initiated and the entire line starts falling back. The golden rule is: whether you are advancing or recoiling or standing still, never get into a situation where you face enemy from any direction except your front.

Broadly speaking I'm sure that's correct - although of course as Pol xviii.30 says:

"Now, a Roman soldier in full armour also requires a space of " ... let's not go there ... "But as their method of fighting admits of individual motion for each man — because he defends his body with a shield, which he moves about to any point from which a blow is coming, and because he uses his sword both for cutting and stabbing — it is evident that each man must have a clear space, and an interval of at least " .... something or other ... "on flank and rear, if he is to do his duty with any effect.

So I think (depending on formation, armament, training etc) it wasn't always strictly one-on-one, facing the front.

Probably 1 v 2, 1 v 3 etc were possible, and survivable, because aside from Barbarians exhibiting wild fury, hand to hand fighting was more cagey than we usually picture it, with a lot more hiding behind the shield, watching and waiting and a lot less slashing and bashing.

But I also think (with the possible exception of Romans specifically trained to it) that recoiling was never a good thing - it was involuntary, dangerous and undesirable, and usually a sign of imminent defeat  - which isn't to say formations couldn't recoil without breaking - but that it wouldn't be done deliberately (Romans perhaps excepted).

QuoteWhich raises the subject of file members rotating through the front position of the file. Do the sources attest to this? How was it executed?

No they don't. It wasn't. :)

Aside from rear rankers replacing fallen comrades in front (or pulling the wounded out of the way), I don't think there is any evidence whatever for rotation within the files.

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on February 04, 2016, 08:31:27 PM

Quote from: Justin Swanton on February 04, 2016, 05:46:30 PM
The golden rule is: whether you are advancing or recoiling or standing still, never get into a situation where you face enemy from any direction except your front.

True - even then, canny foes might be able to do something vicious: at Argentoratum AD 357), the Primani legion in Julian's army managed to slaughter elite German warriors in a basically frontal configuration.

"Taking care to avoid being wounded and covering themselves like gladiators, they plunged their swords into the barbarians' sides, which their wild rage left exposed." - Ammianus XII.48

This suggests that the Romans were using the British Culloden-style tactic of skewering the opponent to one's right rather than the man ahead.  If anything, this reinforces the basic point that letting an enemy get at your sides individually or collectively is a recipe for a very short life on the battlefield.

It also suggests that some of the the Roman files deliberately fell back, admitting the imprudent Germans into their ranks where they could be slaughtered by flanking files.

Quote from: RichT on February 05, 2016, 09:21:12 AM

QuoteWhich raises the subject of file members rotating through the front position of the file. Do the sources attest to this? How was it executed?

No they don't. It wasn't. :)

Aside from rear rankers replacing fallen comrades in front (or pulling the wounded out of the way), I don't think there is any evidence whatever for rotation within the files.

Agree with Richard here: strange how a habit can grow on one ... ;D

As an example (Ammianus about Argentoratum again):

"Yet frequently the Roman, driven from his post [pulsus loco] by the weight of armed men, rose up again [resurgebat]; and the savage, with his legs giving way from fatigue, would drop on his bended left knee and even thus attack his foe, a proof of extreme resolution." - Rerum Gestatum XVI.12.48

I think 'pulsus loco' may signify 'knocked down in [his] place' rather than 'driven from his post'; either way, the original occupant of the location restores himself to action in situ rather than being relieved.

QuoteProbably 1 v 2, 1 v 3 etc were possible, and survivable, because aside from Barbarians exhibiting wild fury, hand to hand fighting was more cagey than we usually picture it, with a lot more hiding behind the shield, watching and waiting and a lot less slashing and bashing.

Less sure about this, as our sources tend to picture it as very up close and personal, with any advantage or perceived advantage being followed up with alacrity.  Against raw or timid opponents, yes, the above could apply (and be responsible for some remarkable disparities in casualty rates even before a rout started), but methinks not against veteran or even standard troops, let alone full-blooded barbarians high on the adrenalin curve.

I think I would agree with the general view that it was not about individual files pushing back their opposite numbers.  However, I do think there was a general attempt to break the line, to force your way into the other sides formation, at least in the Middle Ages.  To do this successfully, you were relying on your comrades to step up with you - an individual, even a good fighter, risked being torn down by the pack.  The obvious mirror to this was that you were trying to stop anyone getting into your formation, and again this had to be a team effort.  The other aspect of a disciplined, unit-based approach was that, if the line started to be penetrated in places, you could give ground in an orderly fashion to maintain unit integrity, which I think is what a wargames push back is meant to be.  Once you start tumbling backwards, unable to resist the pressure, the unit is on the point of rout. 

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on February 05, 2016, 11:16:31 AM

Quote from: RichT on February 05, 2016, 09:21:12 AM

QuoteWhich raises the subject of file members rotating through the front position of the file. Do the sources attest to this? How was it executed?

No they don't. It wasn't. :)

Aside from rear rankers replacing fallen comrades in front (or pulling the wounded out of the way), I don't think there is any evidence whatever for rotation within the files.

Agree with Richard here: strange how a habit can grow on one ... ;D

As an example (Ammianus about Argentoratum again):

"Yet frequently the Roman, driven from his post [pulsus loco] by the weight of armed men, rose up again [resurgebat]; and the savage, with his legs giving way from fatigue, would drop on his bended left knee and even thus attack his foe, a proof of extreme resolution." - Rerum Gestatum XVI.12.48

I think 'pulsus loco' may signify 'knocked down in [his] place' rather than 'driven from his post'; either way, the original occupant of the location restores himself to action in situ rather than being relieved.

Which then raises the question of why infantry lines were so deep. If - like a rock group - the front man was the only chap who did any real work, what was the need for lines deeper than three or four men? Infantry battlelines were not meat grinders, working through 50-60% of their opponent until one side finally had enough. Yet 6 deep was the minimum, 8 deep the standard and deeper lines quite common.

My own take is that sections of a line could be obliged to recoil as described above. In this case the line had to be deep enough so the recoiling section remained in contact with its friendly flanking files. These latter could then turn against the advancing portion of the enemy line and decimate it, pushing it back.

Quote from: RichT on February 05, 2016, 09:21:12 AM
I'd question some assumptions.

QuoteSupposing a central hoplite is knocking the stuffing out of his Roman counterpart. The legionary naturally gives way. His file is under orders to give way with him.

I'd question the last sentence - the file would (I believe) be under orders to stand fast and stop him from giving way. That is what the rearward ranks are for. The more rearward ranks there are, the less likely they are to give way - that is why deep formations were effective, because they provided resistance against backward movement. The general consensus (I understand) for formations in combat is that they run away from the back, not from the front (not least because until the men behind have run away, there's nowhere for those in front to go).

The result might then be that the outmatched legionary would be rapidly killed or injured, but that is why the best, most experienced men were placed in the front rank. If he did go down, the second ranker would step up to take his place, so that the hole would be closed.

Which means a compressed line unable to recoil would be no worse off than any other line, hence surrounding a line should not confer any benefit to the surrounders, and I have a problem with that...

Quote from: RichT on February 05, 2016, 09:21:12 AM"Now, a Roman soldier in full armour also requires a space of " ... let's not go there ... "But as their method of fighting admits of individual motion for each man — because he defends his body with a shield, which he moves about to any point from which a blow is coming, and because he uses his sword both for cutting and stabbing — it is evident that each man must have a clear space, and an interval of at least " .... something or other ... "on flank and rear, if he is to do his duty with any effect.

So I think (depending on formation, armament, training etc) it wasn't always strictly one-on-one, facing the front.

Of course the passage could refer to the mobility of a Roman soldier fighting a foe to his front, moving his shield up and down as his opponent's blows come high or low. Notice that he couldn't use his shield effectively if the blows were coming from two directions at once.

Noting the side swipe at the Gauls may I remind us that the Helvetii retrea d a considerable distance against Caesarvwithout it turning into a route. This suggests that as units they could fall back fighting. probably in the pauses for exhaystion and repkacement that occur when both sides have had enough for a bit. I do think there is replacement within files when the rests are taken and new fighters move forward to take the pkace of the wounded .
I agree tgat even having beaten an oppobent. a warrior is not going to set out on his own beyond the front rank. Fighting hand to hand is a team effirt and it will ge unuts that mive forward ir in retrograde .
Roy

QuoteWhich means a compressed line unable to recoil would be no worse off than any other line, hence surrounding a line should not confer any benefit to the surrounders, and I have a problem with that...

But this assumes compression in any direction is equally bad.  We seem often to reach the point of having to remember than these formations were designed to work in one direction - forwards. Compression from the front could reasonably be expected to be allowed for.  Compression from the sides or rear or multiple directions is more difficult to handle.

QuoteWhich then raises the question of why infantry lines were so deep.

Which is a much discussed question. The options are:
A - to provide replacements for casualties
B - to allow 'file relief' (ie rearward ranks of the file can move forward to take a turn at the front)
C - to give extra shoving power in a shoving match
D - to provide greater resilience against retreat, by providing a mass of men behind with forward pressure

A - can be ruled out where we have casualty figures (e.g. hoplite battles) because the victor typically only suffers about 5% casualties which is less than half of one rank
B - there is no evidence for, and it sounds difficult to achieve in a close order formation (especially if as some believe some formations only allowed 18" per man yet were still 8-16 ranks deep)
C - is true if you think close combat was a shoving match, but lots of people don't believe it was
D - is what Polybius and others say and also explains why deep formations were also useful in other periods of history, when we know (or believe we know) only the front rank or three actually fought.

I side with D - other opinions are also available.

QuoteOf course the passage could refer to the mobility of a Roman soldier fighting a foe to his front, moving his shield up and down as his opponent's blows come high or low.

Not really, since this is given as a reason why a Roman needed more space to either side, not above and below (the ground will always be a problem below, and the sky pretty much maximizes the space above).

QuoteWhich means a compressed line unable to recoil would be no worse off than any other line, hence surrounding a line should not confer any benefit to the surrounders, and I have a problem with that...

Well to agree again in passing with Patrick, once a body of men is compressed past a certain point it will be unable to fight effectively. But being surrounded might not necessarily have disadvantaged individual fighters 1 v 1 (and surrounded men were sometimes able to fight their way out) - but it would have caused disorder of ranks and files, be demoralising, and prevent any chance of escape.

Quote from: Erpingham on February 05, 2016, 01:35:30 PM

QuoteWhich means a compressed line unable to recoil would be no worse off than any other line, hence surrounding a line should not confer any benefit to the surrounders, and I have a problem with that...

But this assumes compression in any direction is equally bad.  We seem often to reach the point of having to remember than these formations were designed to work in one direction - forwards. Compression from the front could reasonably be expected to be allowed for.  Compression from the sides or rear or multiple directions is more difficult to handle.

But this is the problem. If the file was supposed to prevent the front fighter from recoiling at all, then he would be in exactly the same position whether facing enemy at the front, rear or flanks of a line. I imagine the troops on the flanks could shuffle easily enough into a position where they didn't have to fight against more than about one opponent each, but that still wouldn't save them (see diagram below). The inability to recoil crucially affects the survival of a battleline.

QuoteIf the file was supposed to prevent the front fighter from recoiling at all, then he would be in exactly the same position whether facing enemy at the front, rear or flanks of a line.

A fair point.  I would suggest, however, that the file (or less formal version thereof) acted more as a "damper" than a brick wall. The extra ranks can cushion a push back from the front, allowing ground to be yielded smoothly and a continuous front be maintained. (This would, I think, go with Rich's option "D" in the reasons for deep formations).  Hit from the rear or flank, there is no organised give and it just compresses, disrupting the controlled absorption of pressure.

Quote from: RichT on February 05, 2016, 02:52:45 PM

QuoteWhich then raises the question of why infantry lines were so deep.

D - to provide greater resilience against retreat, by providing a mass of men behind with forward pressure

D - is what Polybius and others say and also explains why deep formations were also useful in other periods of history, when we know (or believe we know) only the front rank or three actually fought

If A, B and C are ruled out, then only the front rank of a line did any serious fighting, and only the front rank would want to run if things began to get too hot. That being the case, three ranks behind it would be quite enough to keep it in place. No need for 5, or 7, or 15. We still need an explanation for the depth of a typical infantry battleline.

I think that for hoplites (or at least troops armed with shorter weapons than pikes) the man who recoils back might break contact because anybody following is going to be a target for the 'spare' men in the second rank.

My guess is that files didn't advance as such, but that the man who killed his opponent might get a chance to take a crafty stab under the shield at the enemy who was fighting his mate to the right before the gap was filled by the second man coming forward. (Or perhaps there was a gap in time when the second man, rather than stepping onto the body beneath his feet held his shield to screen while men behind pulled the wounded/dead guy back?)

I think one problem is that historians seem to have moved away from the 'rugby scrum' but we're not entirely sure how the two front lines did interact

Jim

This brings us to the question of what the men not in melee contact were doing.

In a hoplite formation, the use of 9' or longer spears held presumably at or near the mid point would confer 4 1/2 feet of reach, or enough to allow the second rank to contribute with their points against the enemy first rank.  Ranks 6-8 of the typical 8 deep hoplite formation seem to have participated by adding their weight and pushing once the initial attempts at spear-work had got nowhere, or at least not very far.

In a Roman formation, they seem to have been doing nothing: Polybius XVIII.30.10 notes that "the Roman front ranks are not supported by the rear ranks, either by way of adding weight [to their charge], or active use of their swords."  Conversely, the Romans were noted for their line relief by backwards movement (Polybius' epi poda; Livy's retro cedentes) which seemingly has to be a movement in reverse by entire files in coordination (in fact by the whole line, but the files need to be working in unison or a mess will result).

In a Gallic formation, they seem to have been cheering, brandishing weapons and/or waiting their turn to get in and hack.  This need not prevent whole Gallic formations from pulling back when in action if they had been briefed and prepared to do so, cf. the Helvetii against Caesar and the Eburones against Sabinius, but ct. the Nervii against Caesar and the Insubres in 223 BC, who evidently had not been so briefed and hence died where they stood.

One thought:

Quote from: RichT on February 05, 2016, 02:52:45 PM

QuoteOf course the passage could refer to the mobility of a Roman soldier fighting a foe to his front, moving his shield up and down as his opponent's blows come high or low.

Not really, since this is given as a reason why a Roman needed more space to either side, not above and below (the ground will always be a problem below, and the sky pretty much maximizes the space above).

Not so much to either side as (that marvellous word) summetatithemenous, which essentially means to shift from place to place as opposed to specifically from side to side - perfectly consistent with blocking the attacks of a single frontal opponent, especially one using his weapon in the fashion described by Dionysius of Halicarnassus XIV.10.1-2:

"Now the barbarians' manner of fighting, being in large measure that of wild beasts and frenzied, was an erratic procedure, quite lacking in military science. Thus, at one moment they would raise their swords aloft and smite after the manner of wild boars, throwing the whole weight of their bodies into the blow like hewers of wood or men digging with mattocks, and again they would deliver crosswise blows aimed at no target, as if they intended to cut to pieces the entire bodies of their adversaries, protective armour and all; then they would turn the edges of their swords away from the foe. 2  On the other hand, the Romans' defence and counter-manoeuvring against the barbarians was steadfast and afforded great safety. For while their foes were still raising their swords aloft, they would duck under their arms, holding up their shields, and then, stooping and crouching low, they would render vain and useless the blows of the others, which were aimed too high, while for their own part, holding their swords straight out, they would strike their opponents in the groins, pierce their sides, and drive their blows through their breasts into their vitals."

While not specifying individuality, Dionysius does give the impression of singularity of opponents.  Hence I think Justin may have the right idea here.

Meanwhile ...

Justin's basic hypothesis appears to be that the file acted, or could act, as a shock absorber.  If the man in front was having a hard time he could pull back a bit to get his breath and/or bearings and his file would conform, giving the semi-successful enemy file leader the chance of staying put or sticking his neck out by following up.

Against a Macedonian phalanx the Roman file appears to have done exactly this, albeit the whole formation tended to find itself under the necessity of retiring at the same time on account of the ubiquity and homogenity of the serried array of pike points faced by each legionary.

Against other formations and opponents it is less clear that individual file leaders had discretion for a tactical step back or that their file comrades would expect them to do so.  Hoplites in particular seem to have valued forward progress and 'one more step' could be enough to crack the foe.

This is starting to lead us towards an as yet undefined model or concept of close combat.  As Jim notes:

Quote from: Jim Webster on February 05, 2016, 07:43:51 PM

I think one problem is that historians seem to have moved away from the 'rugby scrum' but we're not entirely sure how the two front lines did interact

So can we be any clearer on what may have happened once the lines closed for action?

Maybe we are exaggerating how rigid and compressed the formations were in the first place?

Although I am a bit late to the thread, I would suggest there is very little to no incentive for one file leader to push into a gap in an opposing formation. Looks a lot like suicide. I think this is also why generals seemed to leave gaps between phalanxs or legions to a greater degree than we do on the table top, because it would just suicidal to run into the gap.

Quote from: Dangun on February 06, 2016, 03:54:47 AM
Maybe we are exaggerating how rigid and compressed the formations were in the first place?

Although I am a bit late to the thread, I would suggest there is very little to no incentive for one file leader to push into a gap in an opposing formation. Looks a lot like suicide.

Yes, if one is thinking dispassionately - but if one's adrenalin is up and one's immediate opponent has just gone down, one may have a different outlook on what to do next. :)

Quote
I think this is also why generals seemed to leave gaps between phalanxes or legions to a greater degree than we do on the table top, because it would just suicidal to run into the gap.

Curiously enough, my understanding of period battle accounts is that gaps did not exist at all between heavy infantry formations, at least not voluntarily.  Any time a gap appeared, e.g. at First Mantinea in 418 BC (owing to a rare foul-up in Spartan command control which left the Sciritae and Brasidas' returnees separated from the rest of the line) the other side made immediate and devastating use of it and wiped out the exposed contingent - which we also see at Delium in 424 BC when the contingents on either side of the Thespians gave way, creating gaps, and the Thespians were promptly surrounded and killed by the Athenians.

Naturally, this ability to exploit gaps works only if there is adequate frontal pressure on the formations either side of the gap.  A favourite Byzantine ploy was to deploy a meros in a square bracket formation with the open side facing the enemy (from above looking like a reverse ordre mixte) but with a screen of lighter infantry across the open part between the flanking columns.  An obliging enemy would push the lighter troops back to the 'stop line' and then the flanking columns would crunch him.  The front part of the columns would hold against pressure from enemy troops opposing them while the rear portions of the columns faced inward and did the crushing.

Hence a gap could be a snare, but only if prepared; not in the ordinary course of events.

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on February 06, 2016, 10:51:18 AM

Yes, if one is thinking dispassionately - but if one's adrenalin is up and one's immediate opponent has just gone down, one may have a different outlook on what to do next. :)

But adrenalin can be tempered by training and experience.  While our "wild" barbarians may fling themselves forward with abandon, our veteran Romans may temper his enthusiasm and push forward with much greater awareness, only grabbing an opportunity where they are confident of support.  That said, the Romanophiles will doubtless note that by no means all was discipline and order in the Roman fighting style.  Many "superstar" centurions seem to have gained their reputations through tough fighting and heroic leadership, and being noted in battle was sought after, so there would certainly be men ready to push into the enemy if there was a chance of success.

Quote
Curiously enough, my understanding of period battle accounts is that gaps did not exist at all between heavy infantry formations, at least not voluntarily.  Any time a gap appeared,< > the other side made immediate and devastating use of it and wiped out the exposed contingent

How big a gap are we talking about though?  The examples seem to imply a gap wide enough to deploy through en masse, rather than the odd individual to charge into.

My gut feeling is that the loss of a man in the front rank might mean the unit started to 'unravel' as the men on either side of the dead man became more vulnerable, and the gap would have to be filled pretty quickly, or one dead man could soon become three

Jim

Quote from: Erpingham on February 06, 2016, 11:49:48 AM
But adrenalin can be tempered by training and experience.

Very much so.  Not to mention familiarity superimposed upon discipline.

Quote
While our "wild" barbarians may fling themselves forward with abandon, our veteran Romans may temper his enthusiasm and push forward with much greater awareness, only grabbing an opportunity where they are confident of support.  That said, the Romanophiles will doubtless note that by no means all was discipline and order in the Roman fighting style.  Many "superstar" centurions seem to have gained their reputations through tough fighting and heroic leadership, and being noted in battle was sought after, so there would certainly be men ready to push into the enemy if there was a chance of success.

My impression is that the 'superstar' centurions gained their reputation mainly by holding on and holding things together when the going got tough - 120 arrows in the shield, that sort of thing - though leading the men through a gap in the enemy's palisades and being the first to unseam a Gallic chieftain from the nave unto the chaps would also help.

Quote
How big a gap are we talking about though?  The examples seem to imply a gap wide enough to deploy through en masse, rather than the odd individual to charge into.

Indeed: this was considering the implications of gaps between units as posited in Nicholas' post.  With regard to individual-sized gaps, I think Jim accurately notes the implications of these:

Quote from: Jim Webster on February 06, 2016, 01:31:56 PM
My gut feeling is that the loss of a man in the front rank might mean the unit started to 'unravel' as the men on either side of the dead man became more vulnerable, and the gap would have to be filled pretty quickly, or one dead man could soon become three.

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on February 05, 2016, 08:01:38 PM
This brings us to the question of what the men not in melee contact were doing.

In a previous discussion - which I'm too lazy to try and dig out ATM - someone quoted a description of latter (early modern I think) Indian infantry to the effect that the rear ranks shouted "kill! kill!" to the front rank.

I suspect part of the reason for deep formations was psychological - not only did the presence of rear ranks make flight physically difficult, it made it very clear that you'd be seen running away*, and as long as you didn't you'd effectively have your own cheerleading squad (albeit maybe not a very pretty one).

* Modern studies of what keeps soldiers fighting seemingly invariably cite the need to be seen as a man among men; to maintain your image as not a coward. I'm expect the same effect applied in our period.

Quote from: Andreas Johansson on February 07, 2016, 07:25:54 PM
In a previous discussion - which I'm too lazy to try and dig out ATM - someone quoted a description of latter (early modern I think) Indian infantry to the effect that the rear ranks shouted "kill! kill!" to the front rank.

I remember it.  And it seemed as natural to the Indians as it appeared wastefully absurd to the every-man-fighting Europeans.

Quote
I suspect part of the reason for deep formations was psychological - not only did the presence of rear ranks make flight physically difficult, it made it very clear that you'd be seen running away*, and as long as you didn't you'd effectively have your own cheerleading squad (albeit maybe not a very pretty one).

* Modern studies of what keeps soldiers fighting seemingly invariably cite the need to be seen as a man among men; to maintain your image as not a coward. I expect the same effect applied in our period.

I think psychology was indeed a very important consideration in the use of of deep formations: yes, it would be very hard to make one's way to the rear, and there would be a great many people in a position to point out the error of one's ways.  Unless a man was completely without shame he would feel bound by the expectation of several hundred or thousand others to do his best with them, for them and most of all in front of them.  (If he was completely without shame, one of the officers at the rear or in an Achaemenid army one of the Persian whip-men would make his life a misery.)

One might go so far as to suggest that psychology was of at least as much importance as the metal-and-flesh physical contact aspect of two formations meeting.  Throughout history, the deeper the formation (as opposed to mob or crowd) the steadier it seems to have been.  Hence our eight-to-ten man deep classical formations were probably considered ideal for combining efficient use of manpower with steadiness of the formation which was a prerequisite to allow the manpower to be applied in the first place: a necessary overhead, so to speak.

Attempting a bit of a summary of the plot so far :

Isolated file penetration wasn't what was sought - if an individual created a gap by killing an opponent, the attackers would look to exploit the gap by widening with several files working together, looking to create a larger breakthrough.  The defenders would be working together over the similar frontage to stop this from happening.

A degree of depth aided both in reinforcing breakthrough or stiffling it.  How many ranks was a safe number is yet to be discussed (I'd guess about four, based on hoplites being able to fight like this, it was remarked the English at Agincourt were thinly spread at 4 ranks yet they held and there is a Norse battle where an army had to spread thin to prevent overlap and ended up only 5 deep)

Most close order infantry drew up deeper than the minimum.  This gave them a safety cushion in terms of ranks, the ranks' presence provided the formation a certain physical inertia (exactly how uncertain), the deeper formation provided a psychological advantage (possibly in a number of different ways) and it was harder for those at the front to run away (psychologically and physically).

Good summary.  The hoplite and pike tradition also utilised the coordinated push in which rear ranks added their 'weight' - and later Hellenistic pike formations tended to be 16 deep rather than the earlier 8 deep perhaps because they found the extra 'weight' decisive.  Of course when the other chap also goes to 16 deep you are back to square one but in the meantime you can win at Sellasia ...

One wonders how far the provision of inertia in non-othismotic infantry systems may have been partly psychological restraint on the attacker: if you are facing a two-deep line, one good shove will get you through and it is worth a try.  If facing a line 8-10 deep then no matter how good your shove you are just going to get yourself surrounded and into trouble.

There are other factors that might give one pause and dampen impetus when taking on an opponent: here (http://www.roman-reenactor.com/wpimages/wp949aa6da_05_06.jpg) is a Republican Roman lined up behind his scutum: where do you begin?

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on February 12, 2016, 06:08:51 PM
Good summary.  The hoplite and pike tradition also utilised the coordinated push in which rear ranks added their 'weight' - and later Hellenistic pike formations tended to be 16 deep rather than the earlier 8 deep perhaps because they found the extra 'weight' decisive. 

Hoplite armies seem to have favoured depths of 12 or 16 at least as often as 8 in the 4th century, so I am inclined to wonder whether the standardisation on 16 ranks actually had anything to do with the adoption of the pike:

Quote from: Xen. Hell. VI.ii.21, 373 BCThese, who were drawn up eight deep, thinking that the wing of the phalanx was too weak, attempted to perform an anastrophe (to double its ranks).

Another point re depth and psychology: if formations break from the rear, having more ranks means that the guys in the last one are farther from the enemy's weapons, and pressumably feel less need to get out of harm's way.

Quote from: Andreas Johansson on February 13, 2016, 03:40:37 PM
Another point re depth and psychology: if formations break from the rear, having more ranks means that the guys in the last one are farther from the enemy's weapons, and pressumably feel less need to get out of harm's way.

It's a thought.  The deeper in the formation a soldier is, the more insulated he is from the reality of the action.  Yes, there may be arrows falling but much of the battle is just a series of "noises off".  This could be a disadvantage too.  At Laupen, the retreat of the Bernese skirmishers through the main body caused the rear ranks to believe those ahead of them had been routed, so they ran away.  It may be significant that this was an allied army only recently assembled, so recognising who was who may have been confusing.  It is hard to imagine a legion running away as its velites fell back, for example.  It certainly didn't prevent the Swiss from using very deep formations after Laupen.

Quote from: Duncan Head on February 12, 2016, 08:11:09 PM

Hoplite armies seem to have favoured depths of 12 or 16 at least as often as 8 in the 4th century, so I am inclined to wonder whether the standardisation on 16 ranks actually had anything to do with the adoption of the pike:

Quote from: Xen. Hell. VI.ii.21, 373 BCThese, who were drawn up eight deep, thinking that the wing of the phalanx was too weak, attempted to perform an anastrophe (to double its ranks).

True, and we also have the allied (anti-Spartan) army in Hellenica IV.2.13 (394 BC):

"But while they were negotiating about the leadership and trying to come to an agreement with one another as to the number of ranks in depth in which the whole army should be drawn up, in order to prevent the states from making their phalanxes too deep and thus giving the enemy a chance of surrounding them,—meanwhile the Lacedaemonians, having already picked up the Tegeans and Mantineans, were on their outward march, taking the road along the sea-shore."

They presumably agreed on 16 deep, because:

"Now the Boeotians, so long as they occupied the left wing, were not in the least eager to join battle; but when the Athenians took position opposite the Lacedaemonians, and the Boeotians themselves got the right wing and were stationed opposite the Achaeans, they immediately said that the sacrifices were favourable and gave the order to make ready, saying that there would be a battle. And in the first place, disregarding the sixteen-rank formation, they made their phalanx exceedingly deep, and, besides, they also veered to the right in leading the advance, in order to outflank the enemy with their wing; and the Athenians, in order not to be detached from the rest of the line, followed them towards the right, although they knew that there was danger of their being surrounded." - idem IV.2.18

Conversely, Alexander's pikemen seem to have deployed 8 deep, judging by Polybius' (XII.19.6) quoting Callisthenes about the phalanx closing up from 32 deep to 16 deep then to 8 deep, so the later Macedonian adoption of 16 deep formations seems to have been independent of the Greek use of hoplites 12 or 16 deep, or as much as 50 deep in the case of the Thebans.  8 deep pikes presumably trumped 16 deep hoplites at the Granicus, otherwise one would expect Alexander to deepen his pike formations at Issus.  Hence the Macedonians may have seen no need to adopt 16 deep pikes until up against pike-using opponents.

A little table of attested Greek and Macedonian formation depths I'm keeping around, originally from a book by Pritchett:

(http://andjo.free.fr/pritchett.gif)

(I don't have the book, and I don't recall where I first came across the gif.)

Nice table, Andreas: that is very handy.

The 16-deep Macedonian formation at Babylon in 323 is of course the 'mixed phalanx' containing four ranks of Macedonian phalangites and twelve of Persian missilemen.  Arrian also mentions in VII.23.3 that the Macedonian file was called a 'dekad', hinting at the pre-Alexandrian (and possibly also pre-Philip??) depth of Macedonian infantry formations.

If you google the table header, the book containing the table is revealed to be: "The Greek State at War" by William Kendrick Pritchett, p 135.

It looks as though most of the book is readable through Google Books.

Interesting table, and it raises all over again the question of the purpose of depth.

You have Spartans fighting 1 deep, 2 deep, 4 deep, 8 deep, 12 deep and 18/20 deep. Why such variety? Did it depend on the kind of opponent they were facing? It seems that depth was not primarily for psychological support, since such a need would be either unnecessary or necessary in every instance, especially with the same army.

And I think we may have discussed this before... but 12 ranks vs 50 at Leuctra would suggest the choice doesn't have much to do with shoving either, because initially the Spartans made progress and the shoving logic would suggest they should have been shattered immediately.

Yes indeed - while still trying desperately not to have an othismos discussion, extra rear ranks seem to have added momentum, forward impetus, solidity, resistance-to-going-backwards in ways which can be described as 'weight' (eg by Polybius) without us having to understand that they all literally leant on the man in front and pushed (which would itself raise all sorts of problems). I get the feeling people in antiquity were themselves not entirely clear on why extra ranks were good, any more than they are today, but they knew through experience that they were. It's similar for other periods after all, like Napoleonic line v. column. Objectively, a 3 deep line is the maximum that would allow everyone to fight, and yet deeper formations were used, and worked (sometimes), and trial and error and experimentation continued throughout (even at Waterloo, the French I Corps seems to have adopted an experimental, very deep column).

Extra ranks means narrower frontage, so there is a trade off, if a force is not to be outflanked or enveloped. This is presumably why there is little standardisation - number of ranks to adopt depends on number of enemy, number of ranks adopted by enemy, ground to be covered, and expected difficulty of the coming fight (if you think little of your opponents you might be prepared to adopt a shallow depth - if you are expecting a stiff fight, you might prefer to seek safety in depth).

I think Xen. Hell. iv.2.13 quoted by Patrick above is very revealing. "But while they were negotiating about the leadership and trying to come to an agreement with one another as to the number of ranks in depth in which the whole army should be drawn up, in order to prevent the states from making their phalanxes too deep and thus giving the enemy a chance of surrounding them." So each contingent (expecting a hard fight against Spartans) would want to prioritise their own safety in depth, even at the cost of narrowing the front of the whole army.

Quote from: RichT on February 15, 2016, 11:15:48 AM

Extra ranks means narrower frontage, so there is a trade off, if a force is not to be outflanked or enveloped. This is presumably why there is little standardisation - number of ranks to adopt depends on number of enemy, number of ranks adopted by enemy, ground to be covered, and expected difficulty of the coming fight (if you think little of your opponents you might be prepared to adopt a shallow depth - if you are expecting a stiff fight, you might prefer to seek safety in depth).

You beat me to this one, Rich.  I hate to say it (because it won't be me doing the work) but we need to look at why the armies chose the number of ranks they were in at some of these actions to understand what's going on.

From my end of the time scale we might consider Agincourt.  The English Men-at-arms were four deep, thinner than they would like because they had to cover a frontage.  The French were thirty deep, much deeper they would like because their frontage was constrained.  In this battle, of course, uncontrolled forward pressure just collapsed the front ranks and prevented those in the press from using their weapons effectively.

Quote from: Justin Swanton on February 15, 2016, 05:28:06 AM

You have Spartans fighting 1 deep, 2 deep, 4 deep, 8 deep, 12 deep and 18/20 deep. Why such variety?

A few qualifications here. '1 deep' is from the Athenian orator Isocrates in a speech to (or titled) Archidamus, and addressed to the eponymous Spartan king.  Isocrates refers to the battle of Dipaia of 471 BC and that 'it is said' the Spartans were drawn up one shield deep.  Herodotus, in his mention of the battle, makes no such remark, so we are left with Isocrates' oral tradition which may be true or may be retrospective Spartan self-imaging.  Whichever is the case, no Greeks ever used a 1 deep battleline elsewhere.

The '2 deep' seems to be a misunderstanding of Agesilaus drawing up his men in a 'double phalanx'.  He was anyway on the march to Thebes and not deploying for battle.

The 4 deep in Diodorus XIII refers to when the Spartans surrounded Athens with a line '8 stades wide and 4 deep'.  They were not deploying for battle.

At Leuctra the Spartans seem to have deployed 12 deep, which may have been a tactical modification in view of the expected depth of the Theban phalanx.  If so (assuming Cleombrotus actually expected to be facing the Thebans on his wing) this would be an adjustment based on the opponent, assuming it was not a new 6-deep-and-occasionally-double-up deployment designed to stretch a dwindling number of Spartiates.

The 9-10/18-20 deep configuration at Mantinea is from:

"On the following day at daybreak he was offering sacrifices in front of the army; and seeing that troops were gathering from the city of the Mantineans on the mountains which were above the rear of his army, he decided that he must lead his men out of the valley with all possible speed. Now he feared that if he led the way himself, the enemy would fall upon his rear; accordingly, while keeping quiet and presenting his front toward the enemy, he ordered the men at the rear to face about to the right and march along behind the phalanx toward him. And in this manner he was at the same time leading them out of the narrow valley and making the phalanx continually stronger.

When the phalanx had thus been doubled [edediplōto] in depth, he proceeded into the plain with the hoplites in this formation, and then extended the army again into a line nine or ten shields deep." - Xenophon, Hellenica VI.5.18-19

In essence, Agesilaus doubles his depth to narrow his frontage and thus take that part of the army out of hostile reach (not allowed under most wargame rules!), then moves into the plain and resumes his fighting depth of 9-10.  Why not 8?  Why not 12?  It may be that the Spartan system was undergoing some reorganisation or even experimentation around this time (370 BC, just post-Leuctra).

The above apart, Spartans seemed generally happy with 8 deep, which we can probably take as their pre-Leuctra norm.

Quote from: Dangun on February 15, 2016, 05:35:54 AM
And I think we may have discussed this before... but 12 ranks vs 50 at Leuctra would suggest the choice doesn't have much to do with shoving either, because initially the Spartans made progress and the shoving logic would suggest they should have been shattered immediately.

This of course depends upon who generates and coordinates their shove first.  The pattern is consistent with a) othismos being something which happens after the battlelines have already collided/engaged as opposed to being an impact ab initio and b) the more disciplined Spartans being first off the mark but gradually being overcome as the deeper and more numerous Thebans get organised, aligned and pushing in coordination.

I've read authors who suggested that one deep might have been with ranks of Perioeci making up the rear ranks
I merely mention it

Sorry rich, but all of those Napoleonic comparisons are wrong.

It's not the place to detail them, but there was no weight / depth factor in using columns, and d'erlons formations at waterloo ( and Wagram) were not based on that either.

Back to in period comparisons please.

Quote from: Erpingham on February 15, 2016, 11:32:02 AM
From my end of the time scale we might consider Agincourt.  The English Men-at-arms were four deep, thinner than they would like because they had to cover a frontage.  The French were thirty deep, much deeper they would like because their frontage was constrained.  In this battle, of course, uncontrolled forward pressure just collapsed the front ranks and prevented those in the press from using their weapons effectively.

One may also note that the French were not working in files with personnel trained and/or accustomed to act together, which Greeks seemed to regard as essential for generating any sort of controlled pressure.

The Scots at Dupplin Moor seem to have been another example of an uncontrolled (and uncontrollable) assemblage in great depth.  As with the French at Agincourt, I would not dignify it with the name of formation.  The four-deep English at Agincourt had some difficult moments but did seem to act in coordination (I recall, but cannot reference, mention of their stepping back just before the French surge reached them, taking the wind out of the French sails - not sure if this is true, but if it were it would appear to be an example of coordinated file behaviour and perhaps even be possible to regard as a sort of anticipatory 'file recoil'!).

Quote from: Jim Webster on February 15, 2016, 03:22:41 PM
I've read authors who suggested that one deep might have been with ranks of Perioeci making up the rear ranks
I merely mention it

In 471 BC that has a certain attraction.  Sparta had become unpopular in 478-7BC, largely on account of the behavior of Pausanias, who subsequently tried to set up on his own in Byzantium.  We know little about what Sparta was doing in 477-465 BC (prior to the earthquake and the Helot revolt) and the existence an Arcadian war (i.e. a fight with the next-door neighbours) indicates that things may not have been going particularly well.

Whatever the 'one shield deep' signifies, there seems to be no other record of a Greek contingent attempting to fight at that depth (or lack of it).

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on February 15, 2016, 10:34:56 PM
(I recall, but cannot reference, mention of their stepping back just before the French surge reached them, taking the wind out of the French sails - not sure if this is true, but if it were it would appear to be an example of coordinated file behaviour and perhaps even be possible to regard as a sort of anticipatory 'file recoil'!).

This is a modern interpretation (Keegan's).  The original says "They hurled themselves against our men in such a fierce charge as to force them to fall back almost a spear's length"  (Gesta Henrici Quinti).  This looks more like a thinner formation taking the impact of a deeper one and absorbing it before stabilising and fighting it to  a stand still to me.  Still an example of a disciplined approach though, I think.

QuoteSorry rich, but all of those Napoleonic comparisons are wrong.

A sweeping statement!

QuoteIt's not the place to detail them, but there was no weight / depth factor in using columns, and d'erlons formations at waterloo ( and Wagram) were not based on that either.

That is sort of my point - Napoleonic columns were deep, but nobody assumes that they all pushed each other in the back when (if) they came to close contact with an enemy, which is why I don't think we should assume such a thing for Theban or Macedonian columns. Being from a different period, with different weapons, and diifferent doctrine, such a thing might have happened - but we shouldn't assume it did just because the formations were deep.

QuoteBack to in period comparisons please.

No. There isn't very much evidence from in period (which is why debates based on in period evidence have been going on for decades with no sign of agreement or consensus yet). I think it is valuable, and essential, to make comparisons with other periods for which there is better evidence, and perfecty safe to do so provided it is kept in mind that they are different periods and comparisons can be suggestive, not conclusive. So there  :P

As helpful as the table is, it could be rearranged in at least two ways to produce more useful data.

Firstly, it would be helpful to have another list by country - to reveal more clearly national doctrines - Spartan depths via Thebans via Athenians
Secondly, it would be helpful to list by battle to see the opposing depths more clearly

Chronological progression might have revealed a pattern (e.g. changing technology and its impact on depth)...
...but since it didn't, the table could be rearranged into a more helpful format.

Quote from: RichT on February 16, 2016, 08:53:54 AM

That is sort of my point - Napoleonic columns were deep, but nobody assumes that they all pushed each other in the back when (if) they came to close contact with an enemy, which is why I don't think we should assume such a thing for Theban or Macedonian columns. Being from a different period, with different weapons, and different doctrine, such a thing might have happened - but we shouldn't assume it did just because the formations were deep.

I think we tend to assume it because of Greek sources' frequent reference to extra 'weight' (baros) in connection with the deeper formations.

We may grant that depth per se does not ipso facto confer pushing-power, not least because it takes a bit of training/familiarity/discipline to get everyone pushing together.  Hence the very deep Achaemenid formations were relatively helpless before the more disciplined and othismos-oriented Greeks when, er, push came to shove.

Quote from: Dangun on February 16, 2016, 10:23:49 AM
As helpful as the table is, it could be rearranged in at least two ways to produce more useful data.

True, though it looks as if we shall have to do this ourselves.  At least it collects the raw data on one sheet of, um, electronic pixels.

Athens - straight 8, except when the Thirty Tyrants (or post-Peloponnesian War oligarchy) were trying to winkle Thrasybulus and his exiles out of their rocky stronghold in 403 BC.

Sparta - straight 8 with the questionable exception of Dipaia (known to be in 471 BC but otherwise undescribed except as a 'great Spartan victory') until about 371 BC when they begin adding extra ranks (9-12 deep).

Syracuse - 16, on the one occasion they are described (415 BC).  This may be an attempt to counter the superiority of Athenian hoplites.

The Ten Thousand (401-400 BC) - straight 8 in battle; 4 deep on parade (when they scared off the Cilician forces with a mock charge).

Thebans - 25 or 'very deep' until Epaminondas, then 50 deep.

Macedonians - straight 8 under Alexander; the 'mixed' phalanx with Persian missilemen was 16 deep, as were Successor pike formations by the end of the 3rd century BC (Cynoscephalae).

Alexander's 120-deep formation in Illyria was to intimidate the Taulantians into giving up a mountain pass and in addition to distract attention from a couple of cavalry detachments moving up to make flank attacks.  It worked - deep formations do appear to be intimidating and certainly catch the attention.

QuoteI think we tend to assume it because of Greek sources' frequent reference to extra 'weight' (baros) in connection with the deeper formations.

Sure - but then we should be more cautious. Looking no further than the Wikipedia page on 'column formation' for example we find:

"battalions in French armies often attacked in column formation in an attempt to drive through enemy lines by sheer weight of numbers."

"the military historian Sir Charles Oman is credited with developing the theory that the French practically always attacked in heavy columns"

Yet we all agree that French infantry, heavy columns or not, didn't really push anybody.

Wrong.

French battalions were made of 6 companies if men, each 3 men deep.

When formed in a column, there were two companies in line in front, and then a gap the exact depth as the width of one company, whence came two more companies in line.
Behind them, again after a gap the same space as a full company in line, came the last 2 companies.

The gap was to give deployment distance for the next line to wheel out past the first l as fast as possible.

Comparisons to deep formations of 8 or more men are therefore rubbish.

And Oman has be proven to have misunderstood his sources and is wring on thus point.

They are only deep in the flimsiest sense of the word, and bear no relations our period.

Quote from: RichT on February 16, 2016, 02:09:50 PM

QuoteI think we tend to assume it because of Greek sources' frequent reference to extra 'weight' (baros) in connection with the deeper formations.

Sure - but then we should be more cautious. Looking no further than the Wikipedia page on 'column formation' for example we find:

"battalions in French armies often attacked in column formation in an attempt to drive through enemy lines by sheer weight of numbers."

"the military historian Sir Charles Oman is credited with developing the theory that the French practically always attacked in heavy columns"

Yet we all agree that French infantry, heavy columns or not, didn't really push anybody.

Although 'baros' has the overtone or perhaps undertone of 'pressure'.  Even in English a barometer measures air pressure rather than air weight.

And I do not think Polybius was using a metaphor, as one does in 'weight of numbers' or 'heavy column'. 

On the question of later period relevance, a Napoleonic attack column was a rather different thing from a classical period infantry formation: it was, as Mark indicates, differently composed and differently used.  The insistence by many authorities that bayonet fighting or any actual physical contact between infantry was an extremely rare thing in open battle in Napoleonic times should, if accepted, highlight a vital difference: that the Napoleonic column operated principally by frightening off the opposition as opposed to fighting through it.  Classical formations operated principally by engaging in melee and attempting to rout or destroy the opposition, a rather different proposition requiring a rather different modus operandi.

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on February 16, 2016, 12:33:12 PM

Athens - straight 8, except when the Thirty Tyrants (or post-Peloponnesian War oligarchy) were trying to winkle Thrasybulus and his exiles out of their rocky stronghold in 403 BC.

Sparta - straight 8 with the questionable exception of Dipaia (known to be in 471 BC but otherwise undescribed except as a 'great Spartan victory') until about 371 BC when they begin adding extra ranks (9-12 deep).

Syracuse - 16, on the one occasion they are described (415 BC).  This may be an attempt to counter the superiority of Athenian hoplites.

The Ten Thousand (401-400 BC) - straight 8 in battle; 4 deep on parade (when they scared off the Cilician forces with a mock charge).

Thebans - 25 or 'very deep' until Epaminondas, then 50 deep.

Macedonians - straight 8 under Alexander; the 'mixed' phalanx with Persian missilemen was 16 deep, as were Successor pike formations by the end of the 3rd century BC (Cynoscephalae).

Alexander's 120-deep formation in Illyria was to intimidate the Taulantians into giving up a mountain pass and in addition to distract attention from a couple of cavalry detachments moving up to make flank attacks.  It worked - deep formations do appear to be intimidating and certainly catch the attention.

This is interesting.
Admittedly, it is a small number of data points...
But once you arrange the data like that, to clearly show what each nation was doing, does it reduce the question to: 8 ranks was normal, and we just have to explain why the Thebans chose differently?

Wouldn't it be more important to explain why no one copied this winning Theban system, even the Thebans don't seem to have used it again.

A one off might just as easily be surprise and luck

Mark

QuoteWrong.... rubbish.

Depends on the column. Closed columns had circa three paces between companies (in depth). D'Erlon's corps at Waterloo was in Divisional columns of battalions with four paces between battalions. This is not, I maintain, very different from the deep formations of our period.

Edited to add - and I know the use and purpose of Napoleonic columns was different - that was my point. I was attempting to point out that evidence of deep formations was not, in itself, evidence of 'rugby scrum othismos' - which is where this whole digresison kicked off from (but as it is now no doubt trying the patience of our fellow forum goers, can we leave it at that?)

Patrick

QuoteAnd I do not think Polybius was using a metaphor

I know you don't! Others do (with provisos - which we've been over lots of times).

Bottom line is that the othismos situation is uncertain and given the state of the evidence undecidable, and anyone expressing greater certainty on the matter is kidding themselves.

Mark

QuoteWouldn't it be more important to explain why no one copied this winning Theban system, even the Thebans don't seem to have used it again.

A fair question - one reason is the tension between depth and width, and the need to win frontally before being beaten laterally. But also I believe this may be because as I've suggested, people in antiquity weren't really sure how or why deep formations worked either, and didn't have the luxury of being able to experiment with models or theory much more than we do. The only test was to try it in battle, amd failure meant the deaths of thousands of your compatriots, which is a strong disincentive to experimentation.

Quote from: Mark G on February 17, 2016, 06:29:51 AM
Wouldn't it be more important to explain why no one copied this winning Theban system, even the Thebans don't seem to have used it again.

Because, as you suggested, it would seem that contemporaries did not think it was successful and perhaps not even did the Thebans...

So IMHO I think my question is more interesting (although obviously related)... why did the Thebans do what they did?

Quote from: Dangun on February 17, 2016, 09:23:56 AM


So IMHO I think my question is more interesting (although obviously related)... why did the Thebans do what they did?

Well one possibility is they didn't think they could match their opponents man-for-man at a similar depth.  Do we have any evidence that Thebans weren't very good, or tended to inferior equipment? Or that they were less experienced at the battles quoted than their enemies?

Deep formations do allow less well equipped or trained troops to be protected from direct contact with the enemy, while still serving a useful function.

Thebans are noted as using formations at least 25 deep from Delium in 424 BC right through to Second Mantinea in 362 BC.  After Second Mantinea Thebes, bereft of militarily talented leaders, went into eclipse and I do not recall any depth being specified although at Chaeronea in 338 BC we may infer that the Sacred Band deployed 10 deep.

So how many battles did the Thebans lose when thus deep?  They nearly lost Delium, but not quite.  They won at Haliartus, perhaps because they skewered Lysander before he could get his act together.  They were on the losing side at the Nemea and Second Coronea, but it was their outflanked allies who took the brunt of the losses (a feature of the Theban system was that with anything like numerical parity their allies on the other wing always got the short end of the stick).  Having gone to 50 deep they won Leuctra and Second Mantinea, in each case advancing rapidly to get to grips soonest and avoid problems for their allies (these were Epaminondas' battles).  In essence, the success rate was good albeit expensive in allies prior to 371 BC - and when it did fail, the allies tended to be chewed up more than the Thebans.

Why did others not adopt this system?  Spartans never felt the need, Athens never had the manpower even if they saw virtue in the approach and either the Theban deep formation or (more usually) its allies on the other wing were vulnerable to outflanking, and outflanking seems to have been far more decisive than depth, witness Delium in 424 BC where the 25-deep Thebans pushed back the Athenian left while the 8-deep outflanking Athenians massacred the Theban left.

In essence it seems that Thebes used depth to make its perhaps rather pedestrian hoplites more effective and did not really care about what happened to its allies.  As Richard succinctly summarises:

Quote from: RichT on February 17, 2016, 08:57:46 AM
... one reason is the tension between depth and width, and the need to win frontally before being beaten laterally.

Nicely put.  We might add that the Theban approach was aided by the tendency of victorious hoplites on the other wing to chase beaten opponents rather than curl round behind the Thebans.  When they met an opponent who instead redeployed his successful right to defeat the victorious Theban deep column (as at the Nemea and 2nd Chaeronea) the Theban approach came unstuck and lost.

One hopefully final note on matters Napoleonic.

QuoteD'Erlon's corps at Waterloo was in Divisional columns of battalions with four paces between battalions. This is not, I maintain, very different from the deep formations of our period.

It might not be had D'Erlon's columns been a) permanent organisational and tactical formations, b) organised by file and c) trained exclusively in melee tactics, but they were not, so the difference remains.

What is important is not the shape but the structure. :)

And c, not surprised by the very cavalry they had adopted that novel formation to react to.
Quite literally a matter of seconds.

But enough of this out of period digression.

Quote from: Erpingham on February 17, 2016, 10:03:29 AM
Do we have any evidence that Thebans weren't very good, or tended to inferior equipment? Or that they were less experienced at the battles quoted than their enemies?
Deep formations do allow less well equipped or trained troops to be protected from direct contact with the enemy, while still serving a useful function.

We've discussed it before, but I think this is an excellent candidate explanation.
Deep formations would be easier to maneuver if the troops are of poor quality. Keeping wide but shallow formations orderly takes training.

Another candidate explanation might be a preference for speed.
Narrower columns can be maneuvered faster in an orderly fashion than wider formations.

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on February 17, 2016, 11:19:25 AM
Why did others not adopt this system?  Spartans never felt the need

I think its important to be more precise here: "The Spartans, nor anyone else, ever felt the need presumably because it did not produce better results."

Quote from: Patrick Waterson on February 17, 2016, 11:19:25 AM
Athens never had the manpower

This does not follow. The Thebans are described as deploying deeper, not in larger formations, or fielding larger armies.
Athens could have copied the strategy. But they did not.
No literary source opines about the wonders of crack Theban phalanx who had mastered the dark arts of counting beyond the number 16.

The easier to manoeuvre argument does seem to rest on the example of 18/19th century formations, which had cadence marching.

We have much less example for our period, but a lot of examples of deploying initially in such way as to not manoeuvre at all.

Quote from: Dangun on February 18, 2016, 12:36:01 AM
The Thebans are described as deploying deeper, not in larger formations, or fielding larger armies.
Athens could have copied the strategy. But they did not.
No literary source opines about the wonders of crack Theban phalanx who had mastered the dark arts of counting beyond the number 16.

Yes, I need to be a bit more precise (accurate?) here.

The Athenians, in each battle on the list in which they feature (and leaving aside their fratricidal tiff in 403 BC), deploy 8 deep and either match an enemy line which apparently had superior numbers but greater depth (Syracuse, 415 BC) or outflank an enemy line left hanging by the Thebans (Delium, 424 BC) or try - unsuccessfully - to avoid being outflanked (First Mantinea 418 BC, the Nemea 394 BC).  I am not sure they really had the option to attempt a Theban-style deep deployment in any of these battles, at least not without crushing disadvantages.

In theory they might have done better attempting a deep deployment at the Nemea and First Mantinea in order to delay disadvantageous contact and be more resilient when it occurred, but in these cases they started more or less opposite the enemy right then found themselves having to conform to a right-hand drift which left them seriously outflanked and vulnerable - a contingency which even if foreseeable they presumably did not foresee, or at least mistakenly trusted their allies not to create such a situation.

As for the Thebans, they were successful in their own way but their passion for deep formations seems to have been regarded with tolerant condescension rather than any form of awe by other Greeks (we may note in passing that our sources for the period are principally Athenian) until their surprise success over the Spartans at Leuctra.  Their resultant period of supremacy was correctly ascribed to the skill of Epaminondas rather than the majesty of the Theban deep formation, but, that said, there is no record of a Theban deep formation being broken in frontal combat, or at least none of which I am aware.

It looks as if it was principally a matter of horses for courses: the Thebans liked their deep formation and used it at every opportunity; real men who did not sacrifice their allies on the other wing fought eight deep and took their chances. ;)

To add to the previous information about depth of formations for Greek hoplite armies, this is a summary of the information presented in Ancient Greek Military Practices Part I by W. Kendrick Pritchett, University Of California Press, 1971.

A recent thought I have had about depth in hoplite formations, and this can be considered for another formations, is to ask if the increase depth adds to the offensive power of the formation, or does it increase the ability of the deep formation to resist attack.

Date   Army      Place         Depth
471?   Spartans   Dipaia         1
424   Athenians   Delion         8
424   Thebans   Delion         25
418   Spartans   Mantineia      8 generally
415   Athenians   Syracuse      8
415   Syracusans   Syracuse      16
408   Spartans   Athens      4
403   Athenians   Peiraieus      50+ (under Kritias)
403   Athenians   Peiraieus      10 - (underThrasybolos)
402   Spartans   Thrace      8
401   10 Thousand   Tyriaeion      4
400   10 Thousand   Byzantion      8
399   Spartans   Maeander R.      8
394   Athenians   Nemea R.      16
394?   Spartans   Thebes      2
373   Spartans   Kerkyra      8
371   Spartans   Leuktra      12 -
371   Thebans   Leuktra      50+
370   Spartans   Mantineia      18/2→ 9/10
335   Macedonians   Pelion         120
333   Macedonians   Issos         16→32→16→ 8
323   Macedonians   Babylon      16
276   Galatians   ?         24
197   Macedonians   Kynoskephalai   16 32 (or 8 16?)

Returning belatedly to a comment Patrick made a few posts back, in which he remarked that the French at Agincourt had neither rank or files, how important was the rank and file structure in the application of "weight" (usual caveats apply :) )?

If Patrick's aside is considered, disorder meant that greater depth did not give an advantage.  Now we may argue how well ordered medieval armies were in this context - they certainly had ranks but did they have files?* - but one might make this comment of other non-drilled forces.  So perhaps a horde of generic tall naked hairy pale barbarians, with limited structure, might have difficulty pushing Romans in less depth because the Romans actually had the organisation to make controlled use of their "weight"?

Just a thought.

*The only medieval files I feel confident are those of the Swiss, who, perhaps not coincidentally, drew up deeper than your normal medieval infantry and could make it count.

While people are thinking about number of ranks (or size of files) they might also ponder cavalry formations. Cavalry also generally formed up multiple (8?) ranks deep. For similar reasons to infantry? Completely different case? We can at least be sure that cavalry did not practice othismos. Or can we?

For infantry, degree of organisation files smells of red herring to me - it would be important if we were certain that there was a formal drill whereby rear members of a file engaged in a concerted push of those in front of them - but that is precisely the point at issue, and there is no evidence for it. That said, I expect organised ranks and files did offer an advantage over mob (but not necessarily an advantage in organising a push-of-war).

Edit to add a nice quote in this context:
Xen Mem 3.1.8
[7] "It is well to understand tactics too; for there is a wide difference between right and wrong disposition of the troops, just as stones, bricks, timber and tiles flung together anyhow are useless, whereas when the materials that neither rot nor decay, that is, the stones and tiles, are placed at the bottom and the top, and the bricks and timber are put together in the middle, as in building, the result is something of great value, a house, in fact."
[8] "Your analogy is perfect, Socrates," said the youth; "for in war one must put the best men in the van and the rear, and the worst in the centre, that they may be led by the van and driven forward by the rearguard."
( ἵνα ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν ἄγωνται, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν ὠθῶνται -  ina hypo men ton agontai, hypo de twn othontai - led by the one, 'pushed' by the other ). 

Quote from: RichT on February 22, 2016, 08:47:40 AM

For infantry, degree of organisation files smells of red herring to me - it would be important if we were certain that there was a formal drill whereby rear members of a file engaged in a concerted push of those in front of them - but that is precisely the point at issue, and there is no evidence for it. That said, I expect organised ranks and files did offer an advantage over mob (but not necessarily an advantage in organising a push-of-war).

A mob can exert a great deal of pressure, as anyone who has been carried along by a crowd knows.  If all multiple ranks did was recreate this in a glorious rugby scrum, order wouldn't matter.  Yet this doesn't seem to be the case.  Hoplite phalanxes seem to be able to control their use of weight.   I don't think we need to call on the physical pushing school to explain co-ordinated forward pressure in system, just an ability to act together.  "Give me one more step" and all that.

Quote from: RichT on February 22, 2016, 08:47:40 AM
While people are thinking about number of ranks (or size of files) they might also ponder cavalry formations. Cavalry also generally formed up multiple (8?) ranks deep. For similar reasons to infantry? Completely different case?

Ancient writers on cavalry depth suggest that different factors applied than for infantry:

Quote from:  Polybios XII.5.3For to be really useful cavalry should not be drawn up more than eight deep, and between each troop there must be a space equal in length to the front of a troop so that there may be no difficulty in wheeling and facing round.

Quote from: Asklepiodotos VII.4For they drew up the riders with a front of sixteen and a depth of eight, but they doubled the interval between the riders because of the length of the horses. And some made the number of men in length three times that of the depth and then tripled the interval in depth, so that it again appeared to be a square, and these, in my opinion, had the better plan; since the depth of the cavalry unit, provided it is enough to hold the squadron firm and in line, does not have the same importance as in the infantry, rather it may work more havoc than the enemy themselves, for when the riders run afoul of one another they frighten the horses.

Quote from: Maurikios, Strategikon II.6As far as the depth of the line is concerned, the ancient authorities wrote that it had formerly been regarded as sufficient to form the ranks four deep in each tagma, greater depth being viewed as useless and serving no purpose. For there can be no pressure from the rear up through the ranks, as happens in an infantry formation, which may force the men in front to push forward against their will. Horses cannot use their heads to push people in front of them evenly, as can infantry.

Maurikios goes on to say that greater depth may be required when you don't have enough outstanding men to act as file-leaders, so poorer units form more deeply, but:

QuoteThe depth, therefore, must be no more than eight or at the most ten men, no matter how weak the tagmas might be, nor shoudl it be less than five, even for the best units.

Quote from: RichTWe can at least be sure that cavalry did not practice othismos. Or can we?

Not until we agree what othismos was  :)

Very useful post, Duncan: cavalry and infantry are different arms for good reasons.  The general classical period view of cavalry depths and reasons pertaining thereto seems to be that one should not go too shallow (4 ranks minimum) and greater depth is largely a matter of quality and/or convenience, while more than 8-10 deep is wasteful.

Maurice's comment that, unlike infantry, horses cannot push is revealing.

Quote from: Erpingham on February 22, 2016, 10:09:53 AM

Quote from: RichT on February 22, 2016, 08:47:40 AM

For infantry, degree of organisation files smells of red herring to me - it would be important if we were certain that there was a formal drill whereby rear members of a file engaged in a concerted push of those in front of them - but that is precisely the point at issue, and there is no evidence for it. That said, I expect organised ranks and files did offer an advantage over mob (but not necessarily an advantage in organising a push-of-war).

A mob can exert a great deal of pressure, as anyone who has been carried along by a crowd knows.  If all multiple ranks did was recreate this in a glorious rugby scrum, order wouldn't matter.  Yet this doesn't seem to be the case.  Hoplite phalanxes seem to be able to control their use of weight.   I don't think we need to call on the physical pushing school to explain co-ordinated forward pressure in system, just an ability to act together.  "Give me one more step" and all that.

The other side of 'mob pressure' is the situation at Adrianople:

QuoteAnd because the left wing, which had made its way as far as the very wagons, and would have gone farther if it had had any support, being deserted by the rest of the cavalry, was hard pressed by the enemy's numbers, it was crushed, and overwhelmed, as if by the downfall of a mighty rampart. The foot-soldiers thus stood unprotected, and their companies were so crowded together that hardly anyone could pull out his sword or draw back his arm. Because of clouds of dust the heavens could no longer be seen, and echoed with frightful cries. Hence the arrows whirling death from every side always found their mark with fatal effect, since they could not be seen beforehand nor guarded against. [3] But when the barbarians, pouring forth in huge hordes, trampled down horse and man, and in the press of ranks no room for retreat could be gained anywhere, and the increased crowding left no opportunity for escape, our soldiers also, showing extreme contempt of falling in the fight, received their death-blows, yet struck down their assailants; and on both sides the strokes of axes split helmet and breastplate. - Ammmianus XXXI.13.2-3

We may note that, file organisation or no, the Goths (for it was they) were able to exert pressure which crowded the Romans into an unmanageable mass.  This also seems to be what happened to the Greek mercenaries at the Granicus, the Romans at Cannae and certain other contingents which ended up surrounded and unable to make use of whatever qualities regular files may have entitled them to.

This suggests that undisciplined pressure is still pressure, but undisciplined pressure may be trumped by disciplined pressure, and disciplined pressure may be what Greek authors mean by othismos.

Yes very useful, Duncan. The Maurice quote is nice.

Quote
Maurikios goes on to say that greater depth may be required when you don't have enough outstanding men to act as file-leaders, so poorer units form more deeply

That's obvious once it's said, but I hadn't really thought about it before, as a reason for poorer quality units to form deeper.

Given that different factors apply to cavalry than to infantry, it's still not necessarily clear (to me) what those factors are - what the rear ranks of a cavalry formation are for. At any rate, presumably not to fight with weapons.

Duncan:

Quote
Quote from: RichT
We can at least be sure that cavalry did not practice othismos. Or can we?
Not until we agree what othismos was  :)

Indeed - it was sort of a leading question, since Arrian at least uses othismos in the context of  Alexander's cavalry and Poros's elephants. But then we shouldn't discuss othismos...

Patrick:

Quotedisciplined pressure may be what Greek authors mean by othismos.

Maybe - or perhaps not, given the contexts in which the word is used, but we aren't discussing othismos...

Quote from: RichT on February 22, 2016, 01:28:18 PM

Given that different factors apply to cavalry than to infantry, it's still not necessarily clear (to me) what those factors are - what the rear ranks of a cavalry formation are for. At any rate, presumably not to fight with weapons.

This would depend upon your cavalry: most classical cavalry could skirmish, allowing everyone to be involved and show their marksmanship (see Arrian's Hippika Gymnasia).  By Maurice's time, Byzantine cavalry were archers and  carried lances, so rear ranks could at least make an effort to harm the enemy from their rearward position.  Rear ranks of a Parthian/Persian/Roman cataphract formation or of a Companion wedge would tidy up any opponents the front ranks missed.  Hence every rank could be useful in the course of a battle, but some were more useful than others and adding ranks after the 8th or so generally left very little for ranks 9+ to do.  A wedge was the exception as the 'buzz saw' would be biting into an increasing width of opponents so was cost-efficient even with greater depth.

It is interesting. Following Maurice and Duncan's comment, unit depth may be a function of quality as well as the amount of frontage you need to cover.
But poor units were drawn up deep, not because the men were poor but because there was a shortage of  competent file leaders and closers.
So in theory, it must have been comparatively easy to keep the quality of units up on campaign, (Green men just got slotted into the ranks and learned by doing) the big destroyer of units would be combats where you lost large numbers of your front rank.

Quote from: RichT on February 22, 2016, 08:47:40 AM
We can at least be sure that cavalry did not practice othismos. Or can we?

Yes we can.

Quote from: Jim Webster on February 23, 2016, 08:49:30 AM
It is interesting. Following Maurice and Duncan's comment, unit depth may be a function of quality as well as the amount of frontage you need to cover.

In this particular variation of the othismos thread, Anthony suggested this earlier.
Granted its mentioned in that quote, but the relative scarcity of file leaders seems a bit overly specific.
More simply, narrower and deeper formations would be easier to manoeuvre and hence better suited to poor quality troops.

Patrick

QuoteRear ranks of a Parthian/Persian/Roman cataphract formation or of a Companion wedge would tidy up any opponents the front ranks missed.  Hence every rank could be useful in the course of a battle, but some were more useful than others and adding ranks after the 8th or so generally left very little for ranks 9+ to do.  A wedge was the exception as the 'buzz saw' would be biting into an increasing width of opponents so was cost-efficient even with greater depth.

I guess this assumes that the cavalry actually pass into/through the target cavalry/infantry formation (you might almost say - like a knife through butter). But that model is disputed, I believe, and it wouldn't apply in any case for non-wedge-using, non-sarissa-bearing cavalry. Yet Greek and Persian, non-knife-through-buttering cavalry by anyone's account, still formed deep - they are the ones that seem curious to me.

I agree (if that is what is being said) that depth may be more about movement, command control, and morale/psychology, than about fighting (which is what seems to be agreed for infantry too, to some extent).

Quote from: Dangun on February 23, 2016, 01:23:48 PM

Quote from: RichT on February 22, 2016, 08:47:40 AM
We can at least be sure that cavalry did not practice othismos. Or can we?

Yes we can.

Sure - though e.g  Arrian, Anabasis:

1.15.2  Granicus - "Then ensued a violent struggle ( ἱππέων ὠθισμός = othismos of cavalry) on the part of the cavalry, on the one side to emerge from the river, and on the other to prevent the landing."

iii.14.3 Gaugamela "For a short time there ensued a hand-to-hand fight; but when the Macedonian cavalry, commanded by Alexander himself, pressed on vigorously, thrusting (ὠθισμοῖς) themselves against the Persians and striking their faces with their spears,"

v.17.5 Hydaspes - "The beasts (elephants) being now cooped up into a narrow space, their friends were no less injured by them than their foes, being trampled down in their wheeling and pushing about (ὠθισμοῖς)."

All of which are just pushings, shovings, jostlings etc of course, not concerted organised planned massed pushing drills (but then why does anyone think infantry othismos is different? Rhetorical question not expecting an answer).

QuoteAll of which are just pushings, shovings, jostlings etc of course, not concerted organised planned massed pushing drills (but then why does anyone think infantry othismos is different? Rhetorical question not expecting an answer).

Fortunately, we are not discussing othismos but the effects of depth and how those worked in organised and less organised forces.  Otherwise, we might confuse the two.  If we continue to assume that depth works whatever we call it, we'll be OK :)

Quote from: RichT on February 23, 2016, 02:28:18 PM
Yet Greek and Persian, non-knife-through-buttering cavalry by anyone's account, still formed deep - they are the ones that seem curious to me.

And late Achaemenid Persians deeper than most.  The column of armoured cavalry making shock attacks, often in conjunction with scythed chariots, had become their favoured tactical ploy, as Agesilaus found to his occasional discomfiture. 

"But on one occasion, while the soldiers (stratioton) were getting their provisions in disdainful and careless fashion, because they had not previously met with any mishap, Pharnabazus came upon them, scattered as they were over the plain, with two scythe-bearing chariots and about four hundred horsemen. [18] Now when the Greeks saw him advancing upon them, they ran together to the number of about seven hundred; Pharnabazus, however, did not delay, but putting his chariots in front, and posting himself and the horsemen behind them, he gave orders to charge upon the Greeks. [19] And when the chariots dashed into the close-gathered crowd and scattered it, the horsemen speedily struck down about a hundred men, while the rest fled for refuge to Agesilaus; for he chanced to be near at hand with the hoplites." - Xenophon, Hellenica IV.1.17-19

The approved procedure for dealing with same was devised by Episthenes of Amphipolis, who led the peltasts at Gaugamela and simply opened up to let Tissaphernes' heavy cavalry thunder through, using them for target practice meanwhile (Xenophon, Anabasis I.10.7).

Quote
I agree (if that is what is being said) that depth may be more about movement, command control, and morale/psychology, than about fighting (which is what seems to be agreed for infantry too, to some extent).

Indeed, although 'standard' javelin-armed classical cavalry seems to have been quite happy to 'caracole' and pelt infantry opponents with javelins, thus ensuring everyone had a turn at shooting.  One presumes there is an optimum depth for this sort of thing so that the people at the back of the formation can keep their orientation and those who have just thrown get a chance for a quick breather not not a long enough wait to become bored.

Quote

Quote from: Dangun on February 23, 2016, 01:23:48 PM

Quote from: RichT on February 22, 2016, 08:47:40 AM
We can at least be sure that cavalry did not practice othismos. Or can we?

Yes we can.

Sure - though e.g  Arrian, Anabasis:

1.15.2  Granicus - "Then ensued a violent struggle ( ἱππέων ὠθισμός = othismos of cavalry) on the part of the cavalry, on the one side to emerge from the river, and on the other to prevent the landing."

iii.14.3 Gaugamela "For a short time there ensued a hand-to-hand fight; but when the Macedonian cavalry, commanded by Alexander himself, pressed on vigorously, thrusting (ὠθισμοῖς) themselves against the Persians and striking their faces with their spears,"

v.17.5 Hydaspes - "The beasts (elephants) being now cooped up into a narrow space, their friends were no less injured by them than their foes, being trampled down in their wheeling and pushing about (ὠθισμοῖς)."

All of which are just pushings, shovings, jostlings etc of course, not concerted organised planned massed pushing drills (but then why does anyone think infantry othismos is different? Rhetorical question not expecting an answer).

Because classical infantry were more disciplined than, say, elephants. ;)  The cavalry struggles quoted incidentally involved wedges on at least one side, and wedges seem to have been more 'othismotic' or at least inclined to enter out-and-out melee than standard classical types, with the possible exception of armoured late Achaemenids.

Quote from: Erpingham on February 23, 2016, 02:44:09 PM

Fortunately, we are not discussing othismos but the effects of depth and how those worked in organised and less organised forces.  Otherwise, we might confuse the two.  If we continue to assume that depth works whatever we call it, we'll be OK :)

One effect of depth in disciplined armies was, by all accounts, a superior shove, for which we shall avoid any specific terminology. ;)  Throughout the general drift of history, the major benefits of depth seem to have been controllability and morale, not necessarily in that order.

Quote from: RichT on February 23, 2016, 02:28:18 PM
Sure - though e.g  Arrian, Anabasis:

1.15.2  Granicus - "Then ensued a violent struggle ( ἱππέων ὠθισμός = othismos of cavalry) on the part of the cavalry, on the one side to emerge from the river, and on the other to prevent the landing."

iii.14.3 Gaugamela "For a short time there ensued a hand-to-hand fight; but when the Macedonian cavalry, commanded by Alexander himself, pressed on vigorously, thrusting (ὠθισμοῖς) themselves against the Persians and striking their faces with their spears,"

v.17.5 Hydaspes - "The beasts (elephants) being now cooped up into a narrow space, their friends were no less injured by them than their foes, being trampled down in their wheeling and pushing about (ὠθισμοῖς)."

All of which are just pushings, shovings, jostlings etc of course, not concerted organised planned massed pushing drills (but then why does anyone think infantry othismos is different? Rhetorical question not expecting an answer).

Great quotes.

But I think it offers more insight into the lack of precision with which the word othismos was used in regards to infantry, rather than telling us anything about scrimmaging horses.