The Hoplite - What Made Him Special?

[Erpingham]

I shall nip in between the clash of titans to ask whether Homer talks about doratismos in a pre-hoplite context?  Wild speculation here but could the spear phase be a poetic hangover from when two-spear hoplites walked into combat (most people think hoplites charging was an innovation at Marathon) and throwing spears before contact?

[RichT]

I think it's clear that Plut Pyrrhus 7.4 (one of the only two uses of 'doratismos' Perseus finds) is Homeric in inspiration - both the details of the combat, and the way Plutarch describes it, are obviously and deliberately Homeric. But so far as I, and Perseus, know, Homer does not use the word himself.

This is a case where I can't quite believe Perseus is right, since the word 'doratismos' is so embedded in the secondary literature it's hard to believe it is only used twice, and only by Plutarch. But it seems to be the case, in the absence of other examples.

While the single combat and Plutarch's language are Homeric, I don't doubt that spear fighting did take place, if that is all we mean by a spear phase.

[Erpingham]

While the single combat and Plutarch's language are Homeric, I don't doubt that spear fighting did take place, if that is all we mean by a spear phase.

I think we can assume spear fighting was a part of hoplite combat - after all, why trail around a 9ft spear if you don't intend to use it.  But a "phase" where only spears were used and, if anyone drew a sword, a new phase began seems at odds with a quite violent and surprisingly dynamic clash given in lots of the quotes both above and in Richard's paper.  If hoplites rushed at one another and clashed shield on shield, when did the fighting at spear-length occur?  If there were formal phases, how did hoplites move between them?  So many questions to answer about how it all worked?

[Patrick Waterson]

I shall nip in between the clash of titans to ask whether Homer talks about doratismos in a pre-hoplite context? 

The problem with looking for combat-related activity in Homer is twofold:
1) He tends to describe in detail single combats rather than massed engagements.
2) Spears of this era were thrown rather than thrust (the exception being naval spears, of which there is only one instance of use in land combat in the Iliad).  If you had two spears, you threw two spears, then if your opponent was still standing you went in with the sword.

Try stripping out the non-battle uses of otheo/othismos and see when and how they are actually employed in the context of battle.

I wrote an article for Slingshot, published in the latest issue (306) which does exactly this. Please do read it, you might find it interesting.

Ah yes, the one with "After Militades had otheo-ed the Apsinthians by walling off the neck of the Chersonese" and "For when they had otheo-ed the Persians and the war was no longer for their territory but for his."  Clearly within the context of battle.

We have the 'ephodos' or what we would consider the 'charge', the initial coming-together of the lines, followed by 'en khersin' hand-to-hand combat, albeit with the customary Thucydidean lack of any separate reference to 'doratismos', with the outwinged left of each line immediately collapsing ('trope').  Apart from the left-wing Spartans being 'exotheo-ed' back to the baggage, nobody does anything resembling a push, but this is because of the instantaneous collapse of their opponents.

Then we are in agreement, are we not? I've lost the thread of your argument and don't know what you think this passage proves. I assume you don't think the left-wing Spartans were literally shoved back to the baggage? Or that 'customary Thucydidean lack of any separate reference to doratismos' is down to a quirk of Thucydides' writing, rather than because there wasn't any separate doratismos?

The passage demonstrates that Thucydides is using certain terms in the context of specific phases of the battle - closure, contact and the abrupt transition to rout (apart from the Spartans, who were pushed back to their baggage - and why not: at Leuctra they were pushed right back to their camp).  I am sure you can identify which term is which.

So here we have a Greek author who identifies phases in the battle and uses terminology to reflect this.

The basic problem I have with Richard's approach is that it does not distinguish contexts.  As a result, shades of meaning and application of meaning are lost in the rush to promote generalised uncertainty.

[Patrick Waterson]

I think we can assume spear fighting was a part of hoplite combat - after all, why trail around a 9ft spear if you don't intend to use it.  But a "phase" where only spears were used and, if anyone drew a sword, a new phase began seems at odds with a quite violent and surprisingly dynamic clash given in lots of the quotes both above and in Richard's paper.  If hoplites rushed at one another and clashed shield on shield, when did the fighting at spear-length occur?  If there were formal phases, how did hoplites move between them?  So many questions to answer about how it all worked?

True, and hopefully we can make some progress by looking at accounts of various battles.  At present, I would suggest that at mutual army closure the file leaders would each do their best to plant their spearpoint where it would do most good, and as shield met shield so spearpoints would be desperately seeking flesh and, as Dave indicates with his reckoning that about 95% of the hoplite was frontally covered, usually not finding it. 

What happens next is interesting.  One might assume that the files immediately start to apply pressure and go into othismos, but from the various battle accounts it looks as if a period of weapon use preceded the files closing up to an othismotic press to decide the issue - and indeed as often as nto the issue seems to have been decided prior to othismos.  While spears were being broken and discarded (or reversed to use the sauroter on the butt-end), combatants would still need their customary 3' per man depth to move and fight in any meaningful fashion.  Closing up to physical contact for othismos would reduce individual depth to about 18" or so, and once committed to the 'shove' a formation had to prevail or yield - there was no middle ground*.  It would be a push of formation against formation, because room for individual weapon use would have been so limited.  The only weapon likely to be in any way usable in such circumstances would be the shortsword.

*Although there could be an interim condition of mutual balance in which Epaminondas' calling for 'one more step' decides the issue.

It is tempting to suggest that while spears were still mainly intact, hoplites would continue fighting 'en khersin' and not yet move to othismos.  In this context, it is interesting to note Herodotus' account of Plataea, in which the Persians break the Spartan spears prior to being overthrown by the Spartans' othismos - a self-inflicted case of 'out of the frying-pan and into the fire?

[RichT]

Ah yes, the one with "After Militades had otheo-ed the Apsinthians by walling off the neck of the Chersonese" and "For when they had otheo-ed the Persians and the war was no longer for their territory but for his."  Clearly within the context of battle.

What? Have you completely missed the point of the whole exercise?

OK, I should have known better. If anyone else is interested in a mature discussion of hoplite battle then I'd like to take part. Just listening to Patrick expound his Revealed Truth, in which his faith is unshakable, is an utter waste of time.

Just my perception - no offence intended.

[Erpingham]

It is tempting to suggest that while spears were still mainly intact, hoplites would continue fighting 'en khersin' and not yet move to othismos.

Tempting indeed.  From reading your latest exposition patrick, I think you are not as wedded to the formality of phases as at first appeared and are willing to accept the fluidity of the boundaries.  I think the biggest difference is it seems to me that the phases of battle follow from the nature of combat - clash leads to close combat leads to the crisis of othismos - rather than the nature of the battle from some artificial phasing.

[RichT]

Concerning phases, one of the objections has always been that, in the absence of a referee, there would be no way (or reason) to coordinate the shift from one phase to the next. But even Hanson, for example, who devised the list of phases so often repeated on the interweb, has a more subtle view:

"Yet to consider hoplite battle in such stages may be misleading if one assumes that there were always such 'segments' of distinct action rather than a continuous blur of movement, uninterrupted and always somewhat unsure of its next course" (The Western Way of War p. 185).

Some of the phases (the charge, or at least the approach, and the rout) are uncontroversial - they must have happened, but aren't really part of the fighting. It's what happened in between that is less clear. That there would have been, in different battles, or in different times and places within the same battle, variations in the exact nature of the fighting - arising largely from the degree of commitment of both sides - seems entirely reasonable and fits what we know of other eras. The differences between proponents and opponents of phases are probably not really very great at all, except for a few zealots.

Here's an alternative general model of hoplite combat - not that it's really alternative, as it's the mainstream view and was probably universal pre-scrum, and differs only in emphasis and detail, but anyway, here it is:

Hoplite phalanxes, formed eight deep or whatever depth was agreed, advanced towards contact, whether at the run or at a walk, and with varying degrees of loss of cohesion in the advance, according to training, enthusiasm and terrain. If one side greatly intimidated the other at this stage, the weaker side might break and run before contact - but the file closers would be doing their best to keep the rest of the phalanx together and moving forwards, and any tendency to slow to a halt from the front ranks could result in the ranks behind, urged on by the file closers, forcing the men in front forwards. The phalanxes would close to within spear reach - depending on the enthusiasm of both sides they might slow to a halt at this point and begin 'fencing and foyning' (to use a later term) with their spears - or in some cases (Delium, Coroneia part 2) where both sides were fully motivated and determined, they could get closer, even crashing together their shields, and getting stuck straight in to a close up struggle of shield bashing and stabbing. If they fought first at spear range, then spears would get broken and hoplites would take to their swords, plus the ebb and flow of the fighting, in a space restricted by the presence of the rear ranks which would prevent any attempt by the front ranks to step back and increase the range, would tend to make the combat increasingly close, right up to shield bashing. All such combat - spear fighting, shield bashing, sword play - went by the general name of 'en chersi', 'hand to hand', as distinguished from the long range missile fighting of skirmishers, and the closest quarters fighting was very occasionally called 'othismos'. After a variable amount of time of this - again depending on the skill and enthusiasm of the combatants and other circumstances - two things might happen; one side might collapse as, with a general failure of nerve, the phalanx disintegrated from the back - this was known by various terms, most often 'rout' ('trope'). Alternatively, a phalanx might retain cohesion but with the front ranks, feeling themselves outmatched, backing off, and the rear ranks, instead of standing firm, backing off also, so that the whole battle line flexed backwards, the opponents surging forwards in turn. This could be called being 'pushed back' (an 'otheo' verb), though such terms were also used for being repulsed or driven off generally so there is not a simple correlation between word used and type of defeat - further qualification would be needed (such as 'pushed back slowly at first'). Of course different success would be met with in different parts of the field, and would not be uniform across a line. A failure at one point would lead to a breaking of the line, and almost certainly the rapid rout of those hoplites stationed alongside the break. A push back would also usually lead quickly to a rout, though in rare cases a line might have been 'pushed back' some distance while still retaining order and facing the front. A complete rout might or might not have been followed by a pursuit - often, a victorious wing would need to avoid pursuit in order to retain formation and wheel to fight other enemy contingents.

There it is, that's how I see it. Nothing very controversial there I don't think, or wildly different from other views except in detail.

[Imperial Dave]

so to summarise

close to contact
spear fencing with occasional shield to shield stabbing/jostling with swords/daggers etc
loss of will to fight by one side or slow withdrawal
potentially a final push or shove by the 'winning side' to make this fall back permanent (ie full retreat or rout)

could, and I stress could, the othismos therefore be just an element of the hoplite battle that represents the point as which one side is broken to shatter its cohesion?

or is that too simple (i deal in simple, my brain hurts too much otherwise)

[RichT]

Simple is good - I expect it was pretty simple.

Summary fine depending what you mean by "potentially a final push or shove by the 'winning side'".

I don't think 'othismos' is really anything much - it is just a very rare word for close quarters fighting (when used in a battle context - more usually it is used for the jostling of crowds). I don't believe we need to elevate it to any special status and I don't really understand why it has been so elevated.

[Patrick Waterson]

I think the biggest difference is it seems to me that the phases of battle follow from the nature of combat - clash leads to close combat leads to the crisis of othismos - rather than the nature of the battle from some artificial phasing.

Well, it leads to othismos if one or both sides start a coordinated shove, a recourse open to hoplites but not, for example, to Persians, who do not appear to have trained for this sort of thing.  The list of phases seems to have arisen for people of our era to get a grip on what happened on the hoplite battlefield, it seems to convey a workable idea, and I am not sure where 'artificial phasing' comes in.

I don't think 'othismos' is really anything much - it is just a very rare word for close quarters fighting (when used in a battle context - more usually it is used for the jostling of crowds). I don't believe we need to elevate it to any special status and I don't really understand why it has been so elevated.

Largely on account of Greek file organisation, some battlefield 'pushes' of considerable length and the ability of Greeks to crush non-Greeks when it came to othismos, which seems to have involved more than just a rare word for close-quarters fighting.  I gain the impression that some think the term is the be-all and end-all of analysis, whereas I prefer to look at the phenomenon.

The implications are considerable: if coordinated pushing by files was part of the Greek tactical repertoire, it goes a long way to explaining the instances of Spartans being driven back that Richard is so keen to gloss over, it explains the Persian collapse at Plataea when ordinary close-quarters fighting had failed to shift them and it explains why Epaminondas called for 'one more step' to win his battle (I am still waiting for Richard's attempt to explain this. ).

And it helps to explain why from Marathon onwards, Greeks were consistently defeating the best the Persians had to offer.  There were of course other reasons: ethos, training and equipment being prominent, but do these alone explain the crushing Greek successes over the Persians in land battles?

[Erpingham]

Well, it leads to othismos if one or both sides start a coordinated shove, a recourse open to hoplites but not, for example, to Persians, who do not appear to have trained for this sort of thing.

Just when you think you are making progress .....

Most of our references to othismos don't have hoplites on both sides, if at all.  The general meaning of othismos cannot, therefore, just be related to a phase of hoplite combat.  Phases of combat, from evidence presented, seem to be descriptions of what happens rather than a structured melee where someone orders a move from phase to phase (its not like Roman line relief, for example). 

As to "one more step", surely the only certainty is that it is a call for collective offensive action?  To say he really meant "one more push" is working backwards from a pre-made conclusion.

[Patrick Waterson]

Most of our references to othismos don't have hoplites on both sides, if at all.  The general meaning of othismos cannot, therefore, just be related to a phase of hoplite combat.

True, but the key point would seem to be: when it is related to hoplite combat, what does it mean?

  Phases of combat, from evidence presented, seem to be descriptions of what happens rather than a structured melee where someone orders a move from phase to phase (its not like Roman line relief, for example).

Yes, in essence, if 'structured' means 'transition occurring by command'.  I think Greek melees were perforce 'structured' by the strengths and inflexibilities of the hoplite file system but there was more to the tactical repertoire than just that, so that while melee naturally follows charge unless someone bottles out at the last moment, within the actual melee there may have been more active attempts at control, particularly once it became clear that spear-thrusting and/or sword-fighting was not bringing a decision.  Rather than a general transition to ''scrumming' or talking about the weather, someone in authority would tell his chaps to start pushing for their lives.

It would be interesting to see how the idea of battlefield othismos arose.  There must have been some initial reason.

As to "one more step", surely the only certainty is that it is a call for collective offensive action?  To say he really meant "one more push" is working backwards from a pre-made conclusion.

Is it?  What kind of 'collective offensive action' could "one more step" indicate if not one ... more ... actual ... step?  And how could 'one step' have significance unless it crossed a threshold which broke enemy resistance?  And how would it do that except by forcing back their formation?

[RichT]

'One more step'


Polyaenus 2.3.2
In the battle at Leuctra, Epaminondas commanded the Thebans, and Cleombrotus commanded the Lacedaemonians. The battle remained finely balanced for a long time, until Epaminondas called on his troops to give him one step more, and he would ensure the victory. They did as he asked; and they gained the victory.


I don't see the relevance of this anecdote to mass shoving, as I have already said in the previous thread. But if the incident needs explaining, here's one explanation, from Adrian Goldsworthy's The Othismos, Myths and Heresies: The Nature of Hoplite Battle. Adrian follows Phil Sabin's 'dynamic standoff model', in which fighting is punctuated by lulls, with the forces separated by a small distance. It's not important whether anyone buys into this model, this is just an example of one explanation (so don't waste time picking fault with it):


It must have required a great effort on the part of a weary hoplite to advance after a lull and renew the struggle. The longer a battle went on, and the more pauses in the fighting that took place, the harder this would have become. The lulls may well have lasted much longer than the bursts of fighting. Both sides were nervous, teetering on the brink of collapse. The appearance of determination or confidence became as important factors as actual fighting power. It might have often been necessary for a few brave men to lead the way and advance to renew the fight with the enemy, in the hope that the rest of the front rank would join them. The aim would have been to persuade the whole phalanx to move forward together, the front rank advancing side by side and shield by shield to renew the fight. The enemy phalanx needed to advance in a similar way to meet the fresh attack, or at least maintain a cohesive front, if it was not to be beaten. It is easy to see how the mental association of stubborn fighting with 'pushing of shields' or 'locked shields' developed. If a few hoplites advanced alone and the rest of the phalanx did not follow, they would be cut down, like the small groups of Persians who charged alone at Plataea. A concerted, group effort was needed, and was an important part of a general's role to encourage this. It is in this context, the need to persuade the phalanx to make one last effort to move forward and show the confidence that would beat the enemy, that we should see Epaminondas' cry for 'one pace more' at Leuctra (Polyaenus 2. 3. 2). Xenophon makes it clear that there was prolonged fighting, some of it going the Spartans' way, before the Thebans broke through in this battle. The Spartans were able to carry off the mortally wounded Cleombrotus, presumably during a lull in the fighting (Hell.6. 4.13-14). Success in a hoplite battle, especially in a long, hard fight, relied ultimately on the courage and aggression of individual hoplites.


For my part, it strikes me that we have three pretty full accounts of Leuctra in Xenophon, Diodorus and Plutarch, none of which make any reference to this supposedly decisive moment. Plus Polyaenus has a nearly identical anecdote for Iphicrates (he doesn't say at which battle this is supposed to have happened):


Polyaenus 3.9.27
Iphicrates told his men, that he would ensure that they were victorious, if at a given command, they would encourage each other and advance by only a single pace. At the crisis of the battle, when victory hung in the balance, he gave the signal; the army responded with a shout, after which they advanced a pace and defeated the enemy.


You might also compare with this for Alexander:


Polyaenus 4.3.8
In his first action with the Persians, Alexander seeing the Macedonians give way, rode through the ranks, calling out to his men, "One effort more, my Macedonians, one glorious effort." Animated by their prince, they made a vigorous attack: and the enemy abandoned themselves to flight. Thus did that critical moment determine the victory.


So it seems to be a commonplace that a general could demand one last effort from his men to win a victory, not needing any particular explanation.

Taking a pace or three is credited with great powers by Polyaenus - how about:


Polyaenus 7.14.3
Orontes, with ten thousand Greek hoplites, fought at Cyme against Autophradates, who advanced against him with the same number of cavalry. Orontes ordered his men to look around, and observe the extensiveness of the plain. He told them that, if they loosened their ranks, it would be impossible to withstand the charge of the enemy's cavalry. Accordingly, they kept their ranks compact and close, and received the cavalry upon their spears. When the cavalry found that they could make no impression on them, they retreated. Orontes ordered the Greeks, when the cavalry made a second attack upon them, to advance three paces forward to meet them. The cavalry supposed that they meant to charge them, and fled away from the battlefield.


If you are going to build a model of ancient combat on an anecdote in Polyaenus, there are other examples ripe for being used this way, such as:


Polyaenus 4.3.5
When Alexander advanced against Darius, he ordered the Macedonians, as soon as they drew near the Persians, to fall down on their hands and knees: and, as soon as ever the trumpet sounded the charge, to rise up and vigorously attack the enemy. They did so: and the Persians, considering it as an act of reverence, abated of their impetuosity, and their minds became softened towards the prostrate foe. Darius too was led to think, he had gained a victory without the hazard of a battle. When on sound of the trumpet, the Macedonians sprung up, and made such an impression on the enemy, that their centre was broken, and the Persians entirely defeated.


Or how about:


Polyaenus 2.2.9
When Clearchus's hoplites were being harassed by the enemy's cavalry, he formed his army eight deep, in a looser formation than the usual square. He ordered his men to lower their shields, and under cover of the shields to use their swords to dig ditches, as large as they could conveniently make them. As soon as this was finished, he advanced beyond the ditches into the plain which lay in front of them, and ordered his troops, as soon as they were pressed by the enemy, to retreat behind the ditches which they had recently made. The enemy's cavalry, charging eagerly after them, fell one over another into the ditches, and became easy victims to the troops of Clearchus.


Why do these anecdotes not get similar exposure?

[Erpingham]

True, but the key point would seem to be: when it is related to hoplite combat, what does it mean?

Why does it mean something special in this case, except that Hanson believes it so?  Why does it not mean a particularly hard fought melee, as it seems to elsewhere?

Is it?  What kind of 'collective offensive action' could "one more step" indicate if not one ... more ... actual ... step? 

I'm not the one arguing that it means more than one more step.  Scrum-othismos believers are arguing it actually means "push hard at the back".  It means "One more step..." Subtext "Get moving again, attack again.  They've got no more fight left, we have them".  The anecdote is about leadership and the moment, not the mechanics of hoplite battle, which I'm guessing is why Polyaenus uses for several great leaders.