From Cyrus to Darius Codomannus.
Is there any further information about the troop types in an early(ish) period Achaemid Persian Army beyond the old WRG Armies and Enemies book of the period?
Well, there is Xenophon's Cyropaedia and - much more informative - Herodotus' useful listing of types in Book VII of his Histories.
I shouldn't really, but:
http://www.amazon.co.uk/gp/offer-listing/1874101000/ref=dp_olp_used?ie=UTF8&condition=used (http://www.amazon.co.uk/gp/offer-listing/1874101000/ref=dp_olp_used?ie=UTF8&condition=used)
Or - as I've just seen on ancmed - http://www.ebay.co.uk/itm/The-Persian-Achaemenid-Army-Duncan-Head-Richard-Scollins-Montvert-Pub-/140915803403?pt=UK_Toys_Wargames_RL&hash=item20cf3c850b (http://www.ebay.co.uk/itm/The-Persian-Achaemenid-Army-Duncan-Head-Richard-Scollins-Montvert-Pub-/140915803403?pt=UK_Toys_Wargames_RL&hash=item20cf3c850b) with bids currently standing at a lower level than the amazon offerings.
And there's Nick Sekunda's Persian Army Osprey, though that has more on the later period. And the Osprey Campaign titles on Marathon, Thermopylae, and Plataea.
The complete fragments of Ctesias' Persica are at http://etd.fcla.edu/UF/UFE0022521/nichols_a.pdf (http://etd.fcla.edu/UF/UFE0022521/nichols_a.pdf)
Duncan's Montvert is a brilliant book and worth almost whatever you have to pay for it.
I am trying to recall if much has occurred since to change any of the conclusions therein.
Roy
Thanks. I have read the Osprey Persians and Plataea book but they both seem very light on the detail of the non-elite troops.
I guess I'll have to save up for Duncan's book!
David
If you can bid for one of these copies today (17th Feb) you could probably get it for £31-32 - but bids close at about 5pm this afternoon.
Quote from: Duncan Head on February 15, 2013, 09:22:57 PM
I shouldn't really, but:
http://www.amazon.co.uk/gp/offer-listing/1874101000/ref=dp_olp_used?ie=UTF8&condition=used (http://www.amazon.co.uk/gp/offer-listing/1874101000/ref=dp_olp_used?ie=UTF8&condition=used)
Or - as I've just seen on ancmed - http://www.ebay.co.uk/itm/The-Persian-Achaemenid-Army-Duncan-Head-Richard-Scollins-Montvert-Pub-/140915803403?pt=UK_Toys_Wargames_RL&hash=item20cf3c850b (http://www.ebay.co.uk/itm/The-Persian-Achaemenid-Army-Duncan-Head-Richard-Scollins-Montvert-Pub-/140915803403?pt=UK_Toys_Wargames_RL&hash=item20cf3c850b) with bids currently standing at a lower level than the amazon offerings.
Do we know how good the Immortals were?
Apart from Plataea do we have any knowledge of how they and other Persian line infantry of that period performed in battle?
My query really relates to gaining an understanding of what their level of training and morale was. With such a big empire and the complex big-shield and bowman formation, it seems odd that they weren't trained and organised in some manner. Despite this the army lists generally treat most Persians as irregular low quality apart from the Immortals and nobles on horse who are elite.
It seems not that good,
QuoteAt last Xerxes, seeing that the entire area about the passes was strewn with dead bodies and that the barbarians were not holding out against the valour of the Greeks, sent forward the picked Persians known as the "Immortals," who were reputed to be pre-eminent among the entire host for their deeds of courage. But when these also fled after only a brief resistance, then at last, as night fell, they ceased from battle, the barbarians having lost many dead and the Greeks a small number.
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0084%3Abook%3D11%3Achapter%3D7%3Asection%3D4
But of course the Persian style of equipment was just not geared up to beating Greeks in a toe-to-toe engagement. 10,000 is probably too big for a true elite fighting force (although there may have been a smaller true elite within the Immortals). So really a standing infantry force for the Persian empire, ready to go into action as need. Best of equipment (money is not a problem), perhaps they think of themselves a little bit better than ordinary troops (so classify them as steady rather than average), fighting ability, well really the same as most troops, if you wanted be generous and call them veterans.
I have just done an Early Achaemenid Persian army list for TIDC and I think it looks rather tasty. Huge numbers of cheap archers, a few subject race troops and of course lots of cavalry, quite cheap in points because they don't have shields. Tricky to use but if you can get it right, should be very effective.
As Justin says, they were trained - and equipped - for the wrong kind of fight, at least with regard to taking on Greeks in general and Spartans in particular. There was nothing wrong with their morale, as attested by their performance at Plataea in 479 BC:
While he was still in the act of praying, the men of Tegea leapt out before the rest and charged the barbarians, and immediately after Pausanias' prayer the sacrifices of the Lacedaemonians became favorable. Now they too charged the Persians, and the Persians met them, throwing away their bows. [2] First they fought by the fence of shields, and when that was down, there was a fierce and long fight around the temple of Demeter itself, until they came to blows at close quarters. For the barbarians laid hold of the spears and broke them short. [3] Now the Persians were neither less valorous nor weaker, but they had no shields [anoploi]; moreover, since they were unskilled and no match for their adversaries in craft [sophien = skill, cleverness, understanding of an art], they would rush out singly and in tens or in groups great or small, hurling themselves on the Spartans and so perishing.
Where Mardonius was himself, riding a white horse in the battle and surrounded by a thousand picked men who were the flower of the Persians, there they pressed their adversaries hardest. So long as Mardonius was alive the Persians stood their ground and defended themselves, overthrowing many Lacedaemonians. [2] When, however, Mardonius was killed and his guards, who were the strongest part of the army, had also fallen, then the rest too yielded and gave ground before the men of Lacedaemon. For what harmed them the most was the fact that they were running in unshielded [esthes eremos eousa hoplon = 'clothes they were without protection' or 'running up they were without shields'] and fought, as it were, naked against men fully armed. - Herodotus IX.62-63
The Persians (Immortals) are assessed thus: brave almost to a fault, lacking in individual and collective combat skill compared to Spartans and at a grave disadvantage in melee once their shield fence was down.
I hadn't noticed the reference to lacking skill before.
Is that repeated anywhere else, or challenged elsewhere?
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on August 05, 2013, 10:39:20 AM
[2] First they fought by the fence of shields, and when that was down, there was a fierce and long fight around the temple of Demeter itself, until they came to blows at close quarters. For the barbarians laid hold of the spears and broke them short. [3] Now the Persians were neither less valorous nor weaker, but they had no shields[/i] [anoploi]; moreover, since they were unskilled and no match for their adversaries in craft [sophien = skill, cleverness, understanding of an art], they would rush out singly and in tens or in groups great or small, hurling themselves on the Spartans and so perishing.
Patrick, is this passage one of the ones which mention othismos in a fight which isn't hoplite v. hoplite ?
Quote from: Mark G on August 05, 2013, 12:40:30 PM
I hadn't noticed the reference to lacking skill before.
Is that repeated anywhere else, or challenged elsewhere?
Thermopylae.
When the Medes had been roughly handled, they retired, and the Persians whom the king called Immortals, led by Hydarnes, attacked in turn. It was thought that they would easily accomplish the task. [2] When they joined battle with the Hellenes, they fared neither better nor worse than the Median army, since they used shorter spears than the Hellenes and could not use their numbers fighting in a narrow space. [3] The Lacedaemonians fought memorably, showing themselves skilled fighters amidst unskilled on many occasions, as when they would turn their backs and feign flight. The barbarians would see them fleeing and give chase with shouting and noise, but when the Lacedaemonians were overtaken, they would turn to face the barbarians and overthrow innumerable Persians. A few of the Spartans themselves were also slain. When the Persians could gain no inch of the pass, attacking by companies and in every other fashion, they withdrew. - Herodotus VII.211
Quote from: Erpingham on August 05, 2013, 12:57:16 PM
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on August 05, 2013, 10:39:20 AM
[2] First they fought by the fence of shields, and when that was down, there was a fierce and long fight around the temple of Demeter itself, until they came to blows at close quarters. For the barbarians laid hold of the spears and broke them short. [3] Now the Persians were neither less valorous nor weaker, but they had no shields[/i] [anoploi]; moreover, since they were unskilled and no match for their adversaries in craft [sophien = skill, cleverness, understanding of an art], they would rush out singly and in tens or in groups great or small, hurling themselves on the Spartans and so perishing.
Patrick, is this passage one of the ones which mention othismos in a fight which isn't hoplite v. hoplite ?
It does indeed (and well surmised): 'until they came to blows at close quarters' is
es ho apikonto es ōthismon = 'until it came to othismos'.
My question about the Achaemenid Persians is why their cavalry are so useless?
On a wargames table the Persians are deadly because they have lots of foot and lights that can bombar the enemy and then the cavalry can get round their flanks and hit weakened units. How come I can do this and the Great King cannot>?/
Roy
Quote from: aligern on August 06, 2013, 07:50:45 PM
My question about the Achaemenid Persians is why their cavalry are so useless?
On a wargames table the Persians are deadly because they have lots of foot and lights that can bombard the enemy and then the cavalry can get round their flanks and hit weakened units. How come I can do this and the Great King cannot>?/
Roy
Because you are not fighting Leonidas or Pausanias. :) The Greeks seem to have been well aware of the problems they faced against a full Persian army, which is why the battle of Plataea was so long delayed: not only were the Spartans edgy about facing an unknown opponent (Persians), there was also the matter of Persian cavalry, which they did not like - although following the death of its leader, Masistus, it proved less troublesome than hitherto.
There are two instances when Greeks faced Persian cavalry in open battle: one was during the Ionian Revolt (c.497-494 BC) prior to the Persian invasion of Greece, and is not detailed, Herodotus (V.116) simply noting that "Daurises [the Persian general] ... after pursuing the Ionians who had fought at Sardis, defeating them, and driving them to their ships ..." then took their cities. The Carians, who had joined the revolt, were 'overpowered by numbers' when a Persian army came their way. Unlike the Greeks in Greece, the Ionians of Asia and the Carians seem to have fought where the Persians could make full use of their cavalry and numbers.
The other occasion was at Cunaxa, where Tissaphernes and his satrapal cavalry charged through a gap in the centre of the Greek peltasts, who showered them with javelins as they went through. The Persians did not return for another try, but galloped off toward Cyrus' camp. By this time (401 BC) there were few Persian empire troops, cavalry or otherwise, who were prepared to face Greeks in open battle.
Someone is bound to mention Marathon: this battle actually had no cavalry present; they were still on Euboea while Datis and Artaphernes were still collecting the pick of the spoils, having put Hippias in charge of the force sent to Marathon (Herodotus V.102, 107).
So the essential answer is that the Greeks would not put themselves in a situation where the Persians could use their advantages effectively.
Clever Greeks. I am sure that would come up and be demonstrated in an historical scenario.
But of course most wargames games are played to points values where the players get to pick their own armies. There I think the Greek solution is to max out on the skirmishers and try to hurt the Persian cavalry with shooting.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on August 06, 2013, 08:23:44 PMSomeone is bound to mention Marathon: this battle actually had no cavalry present; they were still on Euboea ....
That's one theory - Marathon's full of them :)
"The question arises, Does the south frieze show the battle of Marathon, Athens' greatest moment of glory? Or does the presence of horses preclude that, and are we looking at the battle of Plataia instead, as is sometimes argued? There is nothing in Herodotos about the Persians not using their cavalry, and Pausanias (1.32.4) records an ancient tradition that every night, a ghost battle could be heard at Marathon, which included the sound of horses. The theory that the Athenians attacked the Persians at Marathon after the bulk of their cavalry had been shipped off to Phaleron is a modern construct based on Suda, s.v.
choris hippeis (without cavalry)."
from Olga Palagia's article at http://www.academia.edu/3432846/Interpretations_of_two_Athenian_friezes_the_temple_on_the_Ilissos_and_the_temple_of_Athena_Nike (http://www.academia.edu/3432846/Interpretations_of_two_Athenian_friezes_the_temple_on_the_Ilissos_and_the_temple_of_Athena_Nike)
The absence of Persian cavalry in the Suda is supported by the absence of mention of Persian cavalry at Marathon in Herodotus. In essence, the theories boil down to a) the Persian cavalry had not been brought yet; b) it had been brought but had then been re-embarked (curious as Marathon was selected on account of its suitability for cavalry, so where else would they be going?) and c) it was present but took no effective part in the action (again curious). Of these, I find a) least difficult to explain and requiring no special pleading.
We also have the fact that the Persian force landed at Marathon - and waited. Waited for what? The most reasonable assumption seems to be that they were waiting for the Persian leaders and the cavalry. Herodotus focusses on Hippias and twice mentions him 'leading' [kategeeto] the Marathon force. Kathegeomai can mean to lead or to guide (among other things), but here, with the dative, it means 'lead', at least in the opinion of Enoch Powell, whose Greek was significantly better than mine.
Pausanias' tale and the monument painting are reconcilable with the Suda account: the horses present at Marathon did not belong to the Persian cavalry, but would have been baggage animals and officers' mounts (cf. Xenophon Anabasis III.3.19). Hippias is mentioned by Herodotus (twice) as being in charge - Datis and Artaphernes are not mentioned at all at Marathon. This adds credibility to the Suda account as the cavalry could be expected to be with the Persian leaders, having been disembarked to loot Eretria (VI.101) and no mention being made of their re-embarking (although Herodotus conscientiously records their initial embarkation in VI.95). Datis is not mentioned until VI.118, when he is 'meanwhile' [hama = at the same time] making his way back to Asia and stops to return a golden image of Apollo to Delos. Herodotus' inclusion of 'hama' suggests this activity was in parallel with, but independent of, Hippias taking the Marathon contingent back to Asia after 'resting on their oars' at Phalerum.
All of this points to 1) the Persian cavalry - and leaders - being on Euboea when Marathon was fought, and 2) Hippias being in charge of a cavalry-less force at Marathon.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on August 07, 2013, 11:04:25 AMHerodotus focusses on Hippias and twice mentions him 'leading' [kategeeto] the Marathon force. Kathegeomai can mean to lead or to guide (among other things), but here, with the dative, it means 'lead', at least in the opinion of Enoch Powell, whose Greek was significantly better than mine.
Though not in the opinion of A D Godley, author of the translation used at Perseus, who translates it as "guided".
No ancient writer seems to have picked up on the idea of Hippias being in charge, either - it was a commonplace that Datis was the commander at Marathon (according to Plato, Strabo, Pausanias, Plutarch, Nepos, Ktesias - not all equally reliable, I know).
The cavalry I remain agnostic about.
Quote from: Justin Taylor on August 06, 2013, 09:24:17 PM
Clever Greeks. I am sure that would come up and be demonstrated in an historical scenario.
But of course most wargames games are played to points values where the players get to pick their own armies. There I think the Greek solution is to max out on the skirmishers and try to hurt the Persian cavalry with shooting.
Given that they will probably be unable to pick suitable terrain, yes. A screen of skirmishers backed by a line of hoplites is much less easy for Persian cavalry to deal with, especially if both sides' armies stretch from table edge to table edge with no scope for outflanking.
Historically, the Greek rule of thumb (invoked by Herodotus when attempting to assess Persian numbers at Thermopylae) was one light infantryman to one hoplite. Most of these were light javelinmen; slingers were rare and archers, if anything, even rarer, although Athens made a point of maintaining a modest force of archers. In an action prior to Plataea, the Persian cavalry caught the Megarians on open ground and were giving them much trouble when a picked Athenian contingent including archers came to the rescue, after which the Persian cavalry commander, Masistius, got an arrow in his horse's flank (from the Greek archers or a very poor shot among the Persians) and was thrown, following which the Greeks killed him. The Persian cavalry then, after an unsuccessful attempt to recover the body, retired to camp (Herodotus IX.21-23).
Quote from: Duncan Head on August 07, 2013, 12:38:48 PM
No ancient writer seems to have picked up on the idea of Hippias being in charge, either - it was a commonplace that Datis was the commander at Marathon (according to Plato, Strabo, Pausanias, Plutarch, Nepos, Ktesias - not all equally reliable, I know).
Even Polyaenus has Datis and Artaphernes in charge, and with no less than 300,000 men. Herodotus however is very particular in the way he switches to Hippias as being in charge (Godley's thinking does not explain the surprising omission of Datis or why Hippias should remain in the spotlight after the landing) and refers to Datis making his way back to Asia 'hama', at the same time as, Hippias doing so - a word which Godley curiously omits from his translation. Put it back in and it makes sense in the context of Hippias being in charge at Marathon -
sans cavalry - while Datis, Artaphernes and the cavalry remain at Eretria.
The attempt to sail directly to Athens following the defeat and the alleged showing of a shield to the fleet also point towards Hippias being in charge - the thinking behind the improvised descent upon Athens seems more Greek than Persian, and shield signalling needs the sender and recipient to understand a common protocol, which would have to be Athenian. One could argue that Hippias could have suggested a descent upon Athens to his Persian masters, or that he could interpret the shield signals for them, but I have yet to meet a Persian who would have the quick thinking to react to a defeat at Marathon by sailing to try a surprise directly upon Athens.
However I shall show respect to agnosticism. ;)
QuoteGiven that they will probably be unable to pick suitable terrain, yes. A screen of skirmishers backed by a line of hoplites is much less easy for Persian cavalry to deal with, especially if both sides' armies stretch from table edge to table edge with no scope for outflanking.
I am afraid that is not an option in TDIC as both sides cannot deploy within 20 of the table sides - in an effort to reduce the 'fighting in a boxing ring' that a wargames battlefield is. So to protect their flanks, players must either use terrain or move troops to protect them.
I think the historical Greeks would have avoided TDIC - for that matter they would have avoided Armati, FoG, DBM(M), etc. and even WRG 6th - and stayed with history. They would have shared your thoughts on points value and terrain. ;)
However, given that players have to use rules and the tabletop (full re-enactment not being a realistic option), the Greeks could try a variant of Alexander the Great's system: forget about trying to match the enemy frontage, just draw up in two lines (forward and rear) with a space between them roughly equivalent to a charge move. Use skirmishers to form the sides of the 'rectangle' with hoplites forming front and rear. Keep any archers/slingers as a mobile reserve to go where the Persian cavalry goes if it tries to harass the front or rear. Keep any cavalry as a last-ditch counterattack force, following the army at a distance (to deter attacks on the rear).
How this would theoretically work is that the Persian cavalry tries to charge the flank, consisting of skirmishers; the skirmishers run, the Persians follow and the appropriate frontage of second-line hoplites charges and sandwiches them. If the Greek cavalry can come up and seal the escape route/ride down any escapees, so much the better. (Alex used a different system with his cavalry covering the flanks and light troops supporting the 'corners', but his cavalry was better and more numerous than anything the Greeks could field.)
Whether this would actually work in TDIC is something the designer can best judge.
Ah perhaps they should have set up a staff college to game through their battle options, although given the difficulties in getting city states to co-operate thats probably a non-starter.
On the Persian side, their best option is to bribe the Greeks.
Yes I think the plan to get the the phalanx into combat with the Persian infantry and hold off the Persian cavalry is the best one. Helped no doubt by the inability of the Persian cavalry to beat the Greek hoplites frontally, even if they are not in phalanx. So we are in agreement.
Concur.
At Mycale (fought on the coast of Asia Minor on the afternoon of the same day as Plataea) the Persians seem not to have had cavalry, but to have tucked themselves behind a screen of shields and held on as long as possible. They were defeated - after a struggle at the line of shields - by half the Greek army, the other half going on what we might term a 'flank march' (although they were merely prolonging the front of the army, they had to get through difficult terrain) and arriving when the fun was mostly over.
The core of the Persian force at Mycale was a 60,000-man contingent that Xerxes did not take with him into Greece, but left to guard the Asia Minor coast. These, reinforced or encumbered by the non-Phoenician crews of what was left of the Persian fleet (primarily Asia Minor Greeks), pulled the ships onto shore and built a barricade around them. They then took post next to the barricade, presumably linking it to their camp. Leotychides the Spartan, commanding the Greek fleet, sailed close inshore and had a few words with the Ionians, which caused the non-Greek-speaking Persians to regard their Ionian subjects with suspicion, disarming some and posting others elsewhere. Leotychides then landed his force, put it in order of battle, and advanced. The local geography (as the Persians were probably counting on) ensured that only half the Greek army could make contact; the rest had to struggle across hills and a narrow river, and only reached the fighting during the final stages of the battle.
Conclusion: Persian infantry just could not match Greek hoplites, only their shield-wall (or shield-barrier) conferring a temporary near-parity, and once that was down it was all over bar the stabbing.
Quote from: Justin Taylor on August 08, 2013, 07:46:29 AM
On the Persian side, their best option is to bribe the Greeks.
Could be worth a try over the wargames table: "Concede this battle and I'll buy you a drink!"
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on August 08, 2013, 10:57:39 AM
Could be worth a try over the wargames table: "Concede this battle and I'll buy you a drink!"
I think that might've worked better back when most of my wargaming friends were still university students.
In game terms, this suggests a counter-stratagem: pay a proportion of your army points (representing, loosely, resources) to make your officers less susceptible to bribery (or, to put it more cynically, bribe them first yourself).
There was another side to this aspect of warfare, somewhat closer to home, as seen in Plutarch's Life of Eumenes 13.4-6:
"And now, as they advanced into the interior of the country, Peucestas, who was a friend of Eumenes, met them with the other satraps, and they joined their forces, so that the number of their men and the splendour of their equipment raised the spirits of the Macedonians. [5] But the leaders themselves had been made unmanageable by their exercise of power, and effeminate by their mode of life, after the death of Alexander, and they brought into collision spirits that were tyrannical and fed on barbaric arrogance, so that they were harsh towards one another and hard to reconcile. Moreover, by flattering the Macedonian soldiery extravagantly and lavishing money upon them for banquets and sacrifices, in a short time they made the camp a hostelry of festal prodigality, and the army a mob to be cajoled into the election of its generals, as in a democracy. [6] Eumenes, however, perceiving that, while they despised one another, they feared him and were on the watch for an opportunity to kill him, pretended to be in need of money, and got together many talents by borrowing from those who hated him most, in order that they might put confidence in him and refrain from killing him out of regard for the money they had lent him. The consequence was that the wealth of others was his body-guard, and that, whereas men generally preserve their lives by giving, he alone won safety by receiving."
Life insurance ... :)
Having just caught up with this thread again, I'm surprised that the Persians are getting a really bad press. Whilst fully accepting the hoplite style of fighting and equipment (although most reference books suggest the Persians wore metal armour under their tunics) was more effective, but was the difference that great?
Not being a classical scholar (I failed the 11+), I rely on various reference books where I have to assume the authors have done their homework. Given that their write ups are similar, I guess they must all be working on the same evidence, some of which earlier posts have utilised. At the 3 main battles of this era - Marathon, Plataea and Mycale (Thermopylai was probably a special case) - the write ups indicate that the Greeks did win but the early stages of the battles seemed to be a winning draw and it was only as the number of their casualties mounted that the Persians broke. Do we have any battle reports from the Persian side to compare to?
Also the Persian empire at this time was quite big in terms of area, with a population of about 16million, and had itself had been created by destroying some pretty aggressive predecessor states. Prior to adventures in Greece, the Persian army appears to have been fairly active as far afield as Egypt, Armenia and the border with India either putting down internal rebellions or extending the empire. May be their opponents were even worse, but they must have had something going for them to get that far and that big.
I can accept that a considerable chunk of the Persian army could be considered as "untrained crud", but was this really the case for the all their troops, especially the core units which formed the King of Kings standing army, if he had such a thing?
Yes, he did, and all native Persian troops, not just the 10,000-strong 'Immortals' and 1,000-strong bodyguard of relatives who formed the ruler's elite, were noted for their bravery on the battlefield, as befitted a conquering nation. And no, we do not have battle reports from the Persian side: they do not seem at this point in history to have been a particularly literary nation, so unless a royal archive full of well-preserved hides turns up we may be out of luck in this respect.
The Persians are not getting a bad press, just an accurate one, or as accurate as I can get. Thermopylae was a case where Xerxes, with an estimated 2.5 million combatants against perhaps 7,000 Greeks, thought that even if the Greek tactical system had something going for it (a point he was unwilling to concede, according to Herodotus, who depicts him as being fixated on bravery and numbers as the only things that matter in war) his army would simply roll over them and wipe them out (or take them alive, an objective he abandoned after the first humiliating repulse). Big mistake. The Greek weaponry and tactical system made a massive difference - one that the Persian army, for all of its showers of arrows darkening the sun, was unable to overcome.
However even if we write off Thermopylae as a 'special case' (what was special about it?) there is Plataea. This pitted Spartans (again) against native Persians (again) including the Immortals (again) and the Persians fought with great courage but lost hands down against different - and superior - infantry armament and technique. Once the Persians were seen to be fleeing the subject nations all followed suit.
The problem for the Persians (as opposed to their less enthusiastic allies) was that they themselves were good, but Greeks were better. The solution was to get troops comparable to the Greeks, and Xerxes and Mardonius had gone some way to doing this by enlisting the Thebans and other Greek peoples who found themselves on the wrong side of Greek geography. At Plataea, the Thebans fought long and hard, keeping the Athenians out of the fight between the Spartans and the Persians. However it was to be almost another century before the Persians actively enlisted Greeks to form the cutting edge of their forces.
Quote
... the early stages of the battles seemed to be a winning draw and it was only as the number of their casualties mounted that the Persians broke.
'Winning draw' may be too optimistic a term for 'the rot setting in'. ;) Ar Plataea and Mycale the Persians were tucked into self-created improvised defences (rather more thorough at Mycale) and while these defences held the fighting was more even - but not so 'even' as to cause the Greeks to fail to breach the defences (which were basically a wall of large wicker shields, whose resistance to punishment was not unlimited). Once the Greeks were through the shield-fence, the fighting was totally one-sided.
At Plataea the Persians fought on with what seems to have been total disregard for casualties until Mardonius himself fell, whereupon they cracked. Loss of a commander always seems to have had a devastating effect on Biblical-style armies (of which the Persian was the last), so much so that Alexander the Great would attempt to turn it into a standard procedure for winning battles against them.
Marathon is, if anything, the odd man out: the Persians arrived after defeating the Greeks of Asia Minor (Ionian Revolt 499-493 BC), so felt the Greeks of mainland Greece would be no bother at all. They landed on Euboea, took Ertetria and sent on Hippias (a deposed Athenian tyrant) with a contingent of troops (but apparently no cavalry) to establish a beachead/camp at Marathon, presumably thinking to bring in the rest of their forces later when they had finished subduing (or rather looting) Euboea. The Athenians (and Plataeans) struck first, after much nervous debate, and in perhaps the closest battle of the series managed to crush the Persian wings but were unable to hold the Persian centre, where the native Persians fought against a reduced-depth Athenian line. (They made up for this by catching the Persian centre in a nutcracker between their victorious wings.)
One point that emerges from Marathon is that the Greek system seems to have required a minimum depth in order to be successful against Persians - whether to provide impetus or prevent the ranks from being interpenetrated, or for any other reason - and the reduced depth Athenian centre fell short of this. One may note that Xenophon's 'Ten Thousand' mercenaries in service to Cyrus the Younger deployed four deep when giving a demonstration at Tarsus, but appear to have reverted to the customary eight deep for a real battle.
After the 480-460 war against the Greeks, the Persians studiously avoided ever taking them on again until Cyrus hired the 'Ten Thousand' to support his bid for the throne. After that, Persian monarchs took care to hire Greeks as the cutting edge of their armies (particularly when attempting the reconquest of Egypt) and also - this in itself is revealing - Greek generals. To an extent they had little choice in the latter because cities loaned out mercenary contingents with a commanding general as a job lot, but by the time Darius III was facing Alexander Greek generals were increasingly being placed in overall command of Persian armies.
Aha, that could explain why all the Persian armies I've seen on the tabletop have been Sassanids and not Achaemenids (i.e. they have a justified bad press). I think the summary reads: whilst Persians of this period were OKish in terms of morale and skill their style of fighting was inferior to the hoplite style (irrespective of leadership talent which may also have had an impact). The question now is do I reflect this in my rules?
Without boring with the maths, a 600 man hoplite unit out scores (based on the middle 50% of throws) both an 800 man all spear unit (the Immortals) and an 800 man 1/4 spear 3/4 bow unit (the other Persian line infantry) until they get down to 25% strength when it is equal (the 800 man units having more men left at that point and a thin line of hoplites being no better than other spearmen). These scores are solely based the size of formation and weapon fighting style and take no account of training, weapon skill or morale. That tends suggest I might have got that bit right.
Perhaps the bit I've got wrong is the morale rating. Up till now I've been treating the Immortals as having the same skill / morale level as the top Spartans and the Persian Line infantry as being the same as the best of the other hoplites. That may have been over-rating them. By moving them down a category it would have a very minor reduction in their weapon skill bonus but more importantly would make them rout from melee after fewer "defeats" (i.e. received more melee casualties than inflicted) and also cause them to be more likely to pull back from melee as casualties mount. This may reflect more accurately the initial tough fighting and then the sudden breaks.
I'll ponder on the changes and give it a try.
If the morale rating evaluates a combination of skill and morale (i.e. there is no separate skill rating or 'weapon factor') then yes, this would be the way to do it. While it may seem odd having Immortals with less than top morale, if 'morale' subsumes hardware and technique then the difference needs to be there.
Quote
By moving them down a category it would have a very minor reduction in their weapon skill bonus but more importantly would make them rout from melee after fewer "defeats" (i.e. received more melee casualties than inflicted) and also cause them to be more likely to pull back from melee as casualties mount. This may reflect more accurately the initial tough fighting and then the sudden breaks.
Good thinking. :)
Er, hang on. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_largest_empires, in particular the column on percentage of world population. That doesn't feel like an ineffective military force.
Maybe the Greek/Persian wars were more about a world power built on land battles a) trying to fight and support a campaign in a complex isthmus/archipelago and b) organised in a way where it was difficult to concentrate its full economic force into a campaign army at its periphery. For all the statements below, you could substitute 19C Afghanistan and Britain for Greece and Persia but that doesn't prove the Afghans were militarily better.
Quote from: Mark on September 28, 2013, 12:04:16 PM
Er, hang on. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_largest_empires, in particular the column on percentage of world population. That doesn't feel like an ineffective military force.
One of the persistent lessons of military history is that size matters, but quality and technique matter more: this is evident in campaigns involving not only Greeks and Macedonians vs Persians but also European powers in the Far East and the New World. (One may also note the same lesson in 1904-5, when a really big power took on a quite small power and lost.) An empire can contain an estimated 44.48% of the world's population and still be unable to defeat a small but skilled power even when bringing its maximum mobilisation capability to bear.
Quote
Maybe the Greek/Persian wars were more about a world power built on land battles a) trying to fight and support a campaign in a complex isthmus/archipelago and b) organised in a way where it was difficult to concentrate its full economic force into a campaign army at its periphery. For all the statements below, you could substitute 19C Afghanistan and Britain for Greece and Persia but that doesn't prove the Afghans were militarily better.
I think this derives from modern historians' misapprehensions about the Persian mobilisation in 480 BC: our sources are quite explicit that this was no peripheral activity at the corners of the empire but a complete mobilisation aiming at unbounded conquest (Greece was simply the first step if we are to believe Herodotus VII.50 and 53).
This is an outstanding discussion!
With regard to the presence or absence of cavalry at Marathon, I come down on the side of its absence. The battlefield itself is suitable for the employment of cavalry ("the best ground for cavalry to maneuver in was at Marathon" – Herodotus, Histories, VI:104), and the Greek delay in attacking points to there being some trepidation in facing cavalry in the open (this concern was also of import at Plataea 10 years later as others have pointed out). Herodotus states that the reason for the delay was that some feared "that the Athenian force was too small to stand a chance of success" (Histories¸ VI:110). I postulate that the event that triggered the Athenian attack was a report that the Persian cavalry had departed.
Keep in mind that the Persian mission was to "reduce Athens and Eretria to slavery and to bring the slaves before the king" (Histories, VI:95). From an operational viewpoint, the Persians were no doubt reluctant to attack the Athenian phalanx frontally so two choices emerge, both involving maneuver directly against Athens itself. The Persians enjoyed superior operational mobility with their cavalry and superior strategic mobility with their fleet. Faced with the entire Athenian army blocking the roads from Marathon to Athens, the possibility of using Persian cavalry to threaten the city of Athens by land was limited... unless they took advantage of their strategic mobility.
I suggest that the elite of the Persian army had embarked in the night for a surprise strategic move from Marathon around Cape Sounion and a direct amphibious assault on Athens itself. Herodotus notes that there were elements within Athens in favor of surrendering to the Persians, so the mere appearance of the Persian army at Athens might have led to that. Included in that force would have been the cavalry and the best of their infantry, leaving what they deemed was a sufficient garrison of the Persian base at Marathon.
This theory might also explain the urgency of notifying Athens of the great victory at Marathon by sending Pheidippides on his epic death run with the news. It was critical for the Athenian political leadership and for the people of Athens to know that the army was intact prior to the arrival of the Persian amphibious force at Phalerum thus precluding panic in the defenseless city and possible surrender without a fight.
This theory would answer Patrick's question, "where else would they be going?" It also would clear up the mystery of why the Athenians captured so few ships on the beach at Marathon (only seven of the 600 vessels in the Persian fleet), and the mystery of why the Persian cavalry did not counterattack the Athenians after the battle - with the Persian logistic base gone, there was inadequate supply for such a large mounted force and no way to replenish it prior to winter.
Thus, the only course remaining to the already-embarked Persians was to return to Asia and prepare for a renewed offensive the following spring, which was delayed 10 years by dynastic questions and the revolt in Egypt.
The major problem with this theory is that it is not discussed at all by Herodotus. Indeed, Herodotus' report that the Persian survivors of Marathon got off by sea and attempted to sail to Athens hoping to reach it ahead of the Athenian army (Histories, VI:116) would imply that there was no earlier sailing which he surely he would have mentioned. One way around this dilemma is that the Persians had already embarked their cavalry and were on the verge of sailing when the Athenian attack came. This view would also explain the absence of any mention of the capture of horses by the victorious Athenians. With the speed of the Athenian attack, there might also have not been time for the Persians to disembark their cavalry and prepare for combat.
Another question is raised by Herodotus' report that the Athenian center was broken at Marathon by Persians and Sacae. The Sacae are noted for their cavalry, Herodotus stating that they fought best at Plataea (Histories, IX:74). If the Sacae cavalry were not present at Marathon, were there Sacae infantry brigaded in the center with Persian infantry? Unfortunately, Herodotus does not differentiate between infantry and cavalry in his order of battle for the second invasion in 480BC (Histories, Book VII).
As for the quality of Persian cavalry, Xenophon was impressed enough to advocate for the inclusion of a properly trained and equipped cavalry force into the Athenian military structure, and elite Persian cavalry very nearly killed Alexander at the Granicus (see Peter Green's excellent resolution of the conflicting Greek reports of that battle in his historical biography of Alexander). Note also that the Persian army actually broke the Athenian center at Marathon (Herodotus, Histories, VI:115) which argues for some skill irrespective of being mounted or on foot.
Over the years I have had reasonable luck with Achaemenid armies on the tabletop. I find them very flexible in all manner of terrain but vulnerable to heavy infantry in the open unless supported by mercenary hoplites in their own ranks.
Quote from: Patrick Waterson on August 07, 2013, 11:04:25 AM
The absence of Persian cavalry in the Suda is supported by the absence of mention of Persian cavalry at Marathon in Herodotus. In essence, the theories boil down to a) the Persian cavalry had not been brought yet; b) it had been brought but had then been re-embarked (curious as Marathon was selected on account of its suitability for cavalry, so where else would they be going?)
Let us discuss things a little further. :)
The idea of embarking the cavalry for a direct 'amphibious invasion' of Athens is an interesting one, David, but raises the question of why this approach was not adopted in the first place. One reason is that contested amphibious invasions a) were extremely rare in this period (the only one I can think of is the Spartan attempt to retake Pylos, in 425 BC) and b) did not involve cavalry - the Persians, like the Carthaginians, used specialised horse-transports, and these took quite a while and a fair bit of bother to load and unload because one had to unseal and open, or close and seal, the doors - and painting the door-cracks with heated tar and resin or chipping them free is not something you can really do in mid-battle, so embarking and debarking the cavalry was something you did while the enemy was elsewhere. Herodotus notes that when the Persians landed on Euboea:
"
The Persians sailed holding their course for Temenos and Choereae and Aegilea, all in Eretrian territory. Seizing control of [kataskhontes = making themselves masters of]
these places, they immediately unloaded their horses and made preparation to attack their enemies." - Herodotus VI.101
The key point here is that control of the landing site precedes the unloading of horses and preparations to attack the enemy. This is why it made sense - from the dilatory point of view of Datis and Artaphernes - to send Histaeus on with an advance force to seize the landing-ground at Marathon so the cavalry could safely be disembarked - but although Herodotus notes the landing of the cavalry at Eretria, he never tells us that it was re-embarked from Eretria, or disembarked at Marathon.
Hence if the Persian fleet was intending an 'amphibious invasion' then it would do so without the cavalry in any event.
One reason for the Persian cavalry delaying on Euboea might have been to gather supplies of grain and forage, because although the plain of Marathon was considered ideal for cavalry operations, it was by no means a 'logistic base'. That would have been at Eretria, with ships ready to take the supplies to Marathon.
The next aspect is: who ordered the Persian fleet to try and touch at Athens, in the hope of possible inside assistance while the Athenian army was still at or near Marathon? This kind of flexible thinking is rarely seen among Persian comanders - only Datames (http://www.tertullian.org/fathers/nepos.htm#Datames), who flourished a century later, seems to have qualified. However this kind of opportunism would fit the aging, exiled and now desperate Athenian ex-tyrant Hippias to a 't'.
At the actual battle of Marathon, the Persians and Sacae would be infantry. Persian deployments that we know of tend to put the cavalry on the wings, where can take advantage of any room for manoeuvre, with the only cavalry contingent in the centre of the army being the Royal Guard, possibly by extension the satrapal guard if the satrap is commanding an army - but Herodotus mentions neither Datis nor Artaphernes at Marathon. The reason for the Persian (and Sacaean) success would be the reduced depth of the Athenian centre: four deep is just not sufficient to prevent dedicated opponents in great depth from pushing back a formation and wrecking its cohesion, whereas eight deep seems much better able to hold its own - and the Persians and Sacae were the cream of the invading forces.
Had they been cavalry, it is difficult to see the following Athenian manoeuvre being successful:
"
The foreigners prevailed there and broke through in pursuit inland, but on each wing the Athenians and Plataeans prevailed. [2] In victory they let the routed foreigners flee, and brought the wings together to fight those who had broken through the center. The Athenians prevailed, then followed the fleeing Persians and struck them down." - Herodotus VI.113
The hoplites would have had to be very swift-footed indeed in order to engage and successfully pursue Persian cavalry!
What triggered the Athenian attack, according to the Byzantine Suda (an encyclopaedia equivalent), is that Ionian Greeks among the Persian contingent made contact with the Athenians and told them the Persian cavalry were not present. This is not quite the same as 'departed', but the end result was the same - the Athenians decided to attack, knowing they were safe from Persian mounted troops. As at Plataea in 479 BC, Greek hoplites shone when Persian cavalry was not able to intervene, at Marathon because they were not present, and at Plataea because they seem to have drifted away from persecuting the Spartans once the Persian infantry had come up, probably moving off to hunt down the other Greek contingents.
Persian cavalry was of good quality, but tended to go around in large and inflexible contingents: at Plataea they went around as a single grouping rather than detach some to keep the Spartans pinned down while the rest went elsewhere, and at Gaugamela the Persian cavalry left manoeuvred as a single entity, which allowed Alexander to rout the entire 20,000-man ensemble with three 200-300-man squadrons: two (Menidas' mercenary Greeks and the Paeonians) preoccupied the mass of Persians at one end while the third (Prodromoi) charged them in the other - and broke them through sheer surprise and panic at this unexpected development.
Quote from: Dave Beatty on October 08, 2013, 06:44:10 PM
Over the years I have had reasonable luck with Achaemenid armies on the tabletop. I find them very flexible in all manner of terrain but vulnerable to heavy infantry in the open unless supported by mercenary hoplites in their own ranks.
That sounds about right: they are, like Assyrians, well endowed with various troop types which can function in all manner of terrain, the early armies also have good missile power, and the heavy cavalry are generally good. Their big weakness, as historically, is their inability to stand up to Greeks - which is why, after Cyrus the Younger and the battle at Cunaxa (401 BC) Persian kings started hiring Greeks left, right and centre.
I must say that I agree with all you say Patrick!
The upshot is that the Greeks won at Marathon because the Persian cavalry was not present, and at Platea because it had become ineffective - either as has been said due to inability to operate as effective tactical units, or due to demoralization with the death of Mardonius.
Thank you, Dave.
I think your assessment is on the money - if a substantial contingent of Persian cavalry was present and correctly handled, Greek hoplites had problems beating Persian armies. The one case that probably illuminates this is the Battle of Ephesus (497 BC) during the Ionian revolt (499-493 BC).
"It chanced that they [the Persians] found the Ionians no longer at Sardis, but following on their tracks, they caught them at Ephesus. There the Ionians stood arrayed to meet them, but were utterly routed in the battle." - Hertodotus V.102.2
That, alas, is all the description we get. We can be sure the Persian army included a substantial cavalry contingent, because a little earlier (in V.99) the Paphlagonians who had previously been transported to Asia were taking the opportunity to return home, escaping just ahead of a 'host of Persian horsemen' [Perseon hippos polle]. These Persian cavalry were thus free to join the main army, consisting of "the Persians of the provinces this side of the (river) Halys," i.e. the muster of western Asia Minor, before meeting the Greeks in battle.
The Persians were also successful in a battle to reconquer the Greek cities of Cyprus, which had revolted shortly after the Ionian cities of Asia Minor. Their success in this action was mainly owing to the defection of Stesanor of Curium and his contingent in mid-battle, but it seems to have confirmed the Persians in their belief they could and would beat Greeks whenever they met them.
Hence, when the Persian force landed at Marathon, the history of Persian-Greek major land engagements to date had been Persians 2, Greeks 0 - and both sides knew it. By Plataea the Persians were a bit less confident, but it is very apparent that such successes as they achieved in the 479 campaign were entirely due to their cavalry, for which the Greeks had a healthy respect.