The Mediaeval English System

[Patrick Waterson]

Crecy, Poictiers and Agincourt are famous English victories which illustrate the power of the longbow.  The longbow, however, was only part of the mediaeval English system, and while there has been much discussion on the longbow itself, there seems to have been little on the English system as a whole: how did it work?  What made it work?  How effective was it?

This thread is for those interested in the question.  Anyone please feel free to initiate discussion.

Patrick

[Jim Webster]

Some of the 'English System' seems to have been the ability to maintain infantry who were effectively long service regulars, althrough they might not have remained 'under arms' at all times.

Jim

[Erpingham]

OK, I'll pick up the gauntlet.  While there is considerable debate to be had about the specifics (what was the origin of the longbow?  Was it a new weapon at the end of the 13th century?  Does it matter?) to me one of the most interesting things is that the English develop a tactical system, not just a new weapon.  And although we quote the great French-bashing victories, the system was designed to deal with the threat of the Scots.  Up to 1314, the English were fairly sure that mounted men-at-arms supported by archers could deal with the Scots.  This was true up to a point - at Falkirk the Scots fought in static defensive way.  At Bannockburn, the Scots were much better led (and the English worse) and English cavalry were worsted.  Over the next few years, the English continued to be beaten but they continued to try to adapt.  I don't think we know how they did this - did they formally discuss things, or just chew the fat over a pint or two of claret when the weather was too bad to go hunting?  But they first came to the conclusion they needed better close order infantry.  In the early 1320's, the English were calling up armoured infantry almost identically equipped to Scots armoured infantry in their 1318 regulations.  The next stage may have been that the English noted that Scots men-at-arms often fought on foot - maybe this was needed to give backbone to the infantry?  It seemed to work in small numbers at Boroughbridge, but that was a strong defensive position.  In 1327, in the disasterous Weardale campaign, the English tried advancing on the Scots with massed dismounted men-at-arms.  Alas, the Scots wouldn't play.  What the English really needed was to put stuff together into a package and sometime between 1327 and 1332 it gelled.  Out with the armoured infantry - too immobile?  too timid?  In with dismounted men-at-arms, with shooting support to their flanks, standing in a sound defensible position.  The Scots, confident in their ability to beat the English and quite offensive in outlook in this period, could be trusted to attack.  So, at Dupplin and Halidon, the English deployed their new system and Scots hegemony was at an end.  Next stop, adapting to an enemy who relied on cavalry.

[Patrick Waterson]

And the death of John, Duke of Brittany in 1341 brought such an enemy into the field.  The English army made up for a late start by engaging the significantly larger French force at Morlaix in 1342, in a battle that seems to have been a sort of draft version of Poitiers.  The French came in in three divisions, or battles, and were twice repulsed, a trench or pit system helping considerably with repulsing one of the attacks.  One French attack was mounted, another afoot, but neither worked.  Then the French third battle came up - and the English retired into a wood.  The French surrounded the wood, the English broke out and both armies retired.

Reading between the lines, the English system seems to have broken both French attacks and then perhaps run out of arrows, but instead of making a daring flank attack on the last French battle (as at Poitiers), the Earl of Northampton appears to have played safe and pulled back to the wood, a move which nonplussed Charles de Blois' remaining French.

Although Morlaix seems to have been indecisive, in that neither army was actually chased off the field, a small English army had stood against a much larger French one (exactly how much larger is not easy to determine), and English tactical command appears to have been superior.  It would improve further, and one may note the English gaining a marked ascendancy in initiative and the conduct of operations after Morlaix.

Following a truce of a few years, hostilities resumed in 1345 with Sir Thomas Dagworth apparently effortlessly routing a French force at Cadoret near Ploermel.  With Northampton also on the move, the French concentrated against Dagworth and fought him again at St Pol de Leon.  This was a crushing French defeat, and the English archers were mentioned as the major cause of the French debacle.  The English had seemingly gained additional confidence (and perhaps also additional arrow supplies) following Morlaix.

And in the following year Edward III himself took the field against the King of France ...

[tadamson]

If you are going to discuss the 'system' it might be best to look at the elements:

#1  Pick the battlefield  (aka corner sitting)
#2  Use significant field defences to channel and break up the enemy attacks
#3  Dismount the bulk of the army


Simple but staggeringly effective in Scotland, England, France, Spain and Portugal

Tom..

[aligern]

Wouldn't we have to add to the system combine archery with elite infantry (dismounted men at arms.
And in the more grand tactical sense  mount archers and men at arms so that the  column is mobile , can raid to a ddstance and can usually choose the field to be fought over?
R

[Patrick Waterson]

Excellent, gentlemen.  So, putting this together ...

1)  Pick the battlefield
2)  Use significant field defences to channel and break up the enemy attacks
3)  Dismount the bulk of the army
4)  Combine archery with elite infantry

and, in at least some actions:

5) Use a reactive reserve system (in plain English, keep some troops in hand and use them where needed - or let the boy win his spurs, but keep the option).

Operationally, use fully-mounted forces when possible for rapid campaigning (a Scots border lesson here).  This also made possible another feature of the English repertoire: the surprise attack, expertly executed by the Earl of Derby at Auberoche in 1345 (http://uk.ask.com/wiki/Battle_of_Auberoche) and improved upon by Sir Thomas Dagworth at Roche-Derrien in 1347 - this time at night.

The rapid assault continued to be part of the English repertoire, right up to the end of the Hundred Years War, where it came to grief at Castillon against an opponent who for once was prepared.

Are we still missing something?

Patrick

[Jim Webster]

A professionalism that made it possible?
It would be interesting to see whether the English did develop a group of officers, who while drawn from the aristocracy, reached their position because of their ability

Jim

[Patrick Waterson]

They did indeed develop such a group, notably the Earls of Nottingham and Derby in the Crecy period, and also a group of leaders from humbler origins, exemplified by the likes of Robert Knowles ('Knollys') and John Hawkwood.

So yes, professionalism - good point.  This gave English armies an edge which was not really matched until the French created their 'ordonnance' army in the 1440s.

I am sure Anthony will have more to add. 

Patrick

[aligern]

Ah Patrick, you bring another quality to mind. Have superb self belief. Not so in the 1340s , but very much so after the great victories and particularly after Agincourt. Indeed the very reason for the loss at Castillon (If you haven't visited the site then it is well worth it and great wine and food too with the battle-site well marked) As I was saying, at Castillon the self belief of the English is such that  they carry out a sequence of assaults , but are beaten when the French turn English aggression to their advantage by having an artillery camp that   Talbot attempts to assault with tired men and it is in the flood plain of a river with no cover,

So self belief is a key element of the system.

Roy

[Patrick Waterson]

And even as late as 1437 (if I remember correctly) French writers were complaining that when a French force outnumbered an English force 3:1, it was the French who avoided battle.

So we are looking at:

1)  Pick the battlefield
2)  Use significant field defences to channel and break up the enemy attacks
3)  Dismount the bulk of the army
4)  Combine archery with elite infantry
5)  Professionalism
6)  Amazing self-belief (we could call this 'morale' but it may be more like 'ethos')

and, in at least some actions:

7) A reactive reserve system

Plus, as a result of 4-6 above, some quite breathtaking surprise attacks - Castillon being a case of the surprise not actually being that much of a surprise.

I would like to add a small but possibly significant element to the mix: close-combat weapons.  French knights, for much of the Hundred Years' War, seemed to prefer swords.  The English, contrariwise, seem to have preferred axes.  The results when the two nationalities met in close combat on foot were astounding: English knights often massacred significantly greater numbers of their French counterparts (this was very noticeable in 1345-47).  Axes had much greater armour penetrating capability than swords, and penetration of a helmet by an axe would tend to be immediately lethal.

English archers developed the habit of carrying mallets and mauls, particularly in 1415-45.  These were especially useful for reliably knocking an armoured opponent unconscious with only a small chance of permanent damage - an important consideration when armoured opponents normally came with a hefty ransom.

[Jim Webster]

I'm always wary of 'technical' fixes. We're a very technical people and there is a danger that we project weapon technology and its importance back (in much the same way as our maligned predecessors always showed Alexander in the most modern medieval fashion.)

If swords were so much inferior to axes, I suspect that the French would have changed pretty damn quick. Remember these are people whose lives depended on it, they learned to get off their horses, I'm sure they'd think of trying an axe if they saw it was more useful in combat

Jim

[aligern]

I had never heard that the English carried axes and the French did not. I had heard that the French cut down lances to use on foot and that might be quite a good weapon giving some reach in the initial melee.

Contra Jim, the Ancients are very fond of technological explanations for victory or defeat such as the English axes at Hastings exposing the armpit, the Greeks at plateau having better armour, the Byzantines having heavier bows than the Persians. In all those cases we would see morale and societal differences too.
Interestingly, in relation to another debate on this forum, wargaming does provide some ability to test out what might be occurring in real life. If one army has a unit of really top class men and  the other a larger number of average fighters then the way for the elite to win is to kill their direct opponents whilst the larger army has to get around the flanks to make its numbers tell. It strikes me that the English system  pushes the opponent to only confront the elite knights and protects their flanks.  Thus it may be that  the French are not as good frontally  as the English knights and not able to lap around them because of the degradation and funnelling caused by the archery??
Roy

[Patrick Waterson]

That seems to fit, Roy.  When dismounted French knights slam into dismounted English knights it seems to be the French who go down in numbers, although at Navarette (Najera) in 1367 things were much more balanced between Chandos' van and du Guesclin's French contingent - perhaps significantly, the latter were mercenaries ('Free Companions') and conceivably had a more pragmatic and focussed approach to the art of dismounted melee, which would have expressed itself in such matters as armour, armament and how enthusiastically or effectively one shoves.  If any 14th century Frenchmen followed Jim's technological comparability route and surmounted the 'not invented here' psychological barrier, it would be these fellows rather than their tournament-raised brethren back in France.

There would seem to be two reasons why the French habitually went down the funnel: one is that troops generally tend to dislike missiles and shy away from them given the chance (or alternatively duck behind shields and slow down); the other is that archers have no ransoms - the glory and the loot are to be found under the English banners, where the knights stand defending.  Renown and ransoms really did matter in the 14th century (and were the driving forces in many a tournament), and fighting archers brings neither.  Add pits and/or stakes fronting the archers, and French awareness or suspicion of same, and the attractions of going for the English knights and men-at-arms are overwhelming.


Patrick

[Erpingham]

Please forgive me not quoting here but so many things I want to comment on

Lets start with men-at-arms.  The English men-at-arms create a small revolution in providing a whole new option set.  Scots, Flemings, Swiss have good close combat infantry.  The English man-at-arms, however, is a transformer.  He can operate as a mobile strike force on campaign, he can deliver a perfectly convincing heavy cavalry charge, he can be a well armoured, skilled close order infantryman.  He's pretty good at assaulting fortifications or fighting on ships too. Cleverly, the English from the top down (Edward III) agree that the chivalric hero is not just a jouster, he's an all-rounder. Yes, the pinnacle of chivalric endeavour is the one to one mounted kind but a real knight can perform on a battlefield not just for the ladies.  This attitude does spread with the tactic of dismounting - men-at-arms need to be clear that they are not acting in an undignified way by dismounting - they need to bind it into the chivalrous repertoire.   BTW, it is worth considering how much the English used mounted men-at-arms outside set piece battles, certainly early on.

Secondly, what were they armed with?  I'm far from convinced the English had axes and the French had swords at the beginning.  The English start off with lances (read Gray, who gives several examples).  At Dupplin, the English re-equip with Scottish oak "staves" - anything from spears to a plancon-a-piquot might be meant.  The axe was certainly a traditional English weapon for infantry, though, so doubtless some men adopted them.  As the 14th century wore on, more mentions of axes all round - Scots, English, Bretons all seem to like axes.  In the 1380s, Froissart often mentions French men-at-arms with mauls.  The French also like shortened lances but there isn't much mention of others with them.  The White Company in the 1360s favoured long lances held by two men.  Long lances were used by the dismounted Austrians at Sempach and, perhaps most famously, by the Italians at Arbedo (which led the Swiss to rethink their reliance on the relatively short halberd).  So, to summarise, probably lances mainly to start diversifying as the dismounted tactics became less ad hoc and percussive two handers or long stabbing swords as armour became to get more complete.

Confidence - the English certainly develop this but it isn't universal.  The English, with the possible exception of Henry V, are not very confident at Agincourt, for example.  The stand off at Tournahem in 1369 isn't exactly the action of a confident army.  Now, in both cases the English were outnumbered but that does suggest that sometimes a pragmatic approach was taken.